

## AMERICAN CATHOLICS AND THE TEMPORAL POWER OF THE POPE.

### I.—AN OBJECTION AGAINST THE TEMPORAL SOVEREIGNTY OF THE POPE.

SOME time ago the *Catholic World* published an important article on the "temporal sovereignty of the Pope," from the pen of one, to whom we can apply a well known phrase: "*cuius laus est in universa Americæ ecclesia.*"<sup>1</sup> A distinguished Catholic priest in his remarks on this article, incidentally called attention to an objection "which rises naturally in the minds of republican Catholics." He formulates this objection in the following words:

"There is no use trying to enlighten the Catholic laity, unless you place in the clearest light the consistency between the right of the Pope to independence and the right of the people to self-government. That the Pope ought to be free to treat with all the nations of the earth, of course, all admit, but how his temporal sovereignty consists with republican principles is the question to be treated in an article addressed to the people of these United States; and Catholic writers should devote their energies to making clear this aspect of the great and important subject. We Catholics live in the midst of fifty-five millions of people estranged from the Church, and holding theoretically, at least, this latter principle; we cleave to it ourselves as well; in order, therefore, that we may give to the Pope 'reasonable service' in this matter, and give also to our fellow citizens 'a reason for the faith that is in us,' and answer their demand—'why we meddle with the affairs of Italy?'—we must have more on the subject."

We entirely agree with this conclusion and express our conviction in the following words: We are sincere Catholics and sincere patriots. A theoretical or practical consequence of Catholic doctrine can never conflict with true patriotism. Contradictions can therefore only be apparent; they are either inexact and grounded on a defective knowledge of Catholic teaching, or not to the point.

The appropriateness of treating the question is therefore manifest.<sup>2</sup> Another consideration will prove its opportuneness and necessity.

The Pope, according to Catholic doctrine, is not only the infal-

<sup>1</sup> Very Reverend A. J. Hewit, *Catholic World*, December, 1890.

<sup>2</sup> We may be allowed to mention that, before the above lines came to our notice, we referred to the difficulty and answered it substantially, in an article in which we openly defended the application of the principles of self-government to France. See AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW, January, 1891, "Cardinal Lavignerie and the French Republic," p. 120, note.

lible teacher, but also the supreme ruler of the Church. A Catholic owes *assensum fidei* to his doctrinal definitions, and *plenam obedientiam* to his orders and precepts. Complete obedience in both cases is the characteristic of a true Catholic.

“Summus autem est magister in Ecclesia Pontifex Romanus. Concordia igitur animorum sicut perfectum in una fide consensum requirit, ita voluntates postulat Ecclesiae Romanoque Pontifici perfecte subiectas atque obtemperantes, ut Deo. *Perfecta* autem esse obedientia debet, quia ab ipsa fide praecipitur, et habet hoc commune cum fide, ut *dividua* esse non possit . . . cuiusmodi perfectioni tantum christiana consuetudo tribuit, ut illa *tanquam nota internoscendi catholicos* et habita semper sit et habeatur.”—Encyclica “*Sapientiae Christianae*,” 1889.

The following facts are undeniable: First, the Pope himself does not cease advocating his claims to the Temporal Power. In the Encyclical “*Inscrutabili*,” 21st April, 1878, he says: “Never shall we abstain from claiming that freedom be again restored to the Holy See by the recovery of the temporal power.” Therefore, we renew all the declarations and protestations of our predecessor, Pius IX., of blessed memory. Again, “It is our sacred duty,” the holy Father says in an allocution to the College of Cardinals, March 2, 1880, “to preserve our right intact in spite of all opposition to the contrary, no matter whence it comes.” This alone is enough to convince a Catholic that the “*concordia animorum*” forbids silence on this question; more especially at this time when our Father in his distress and afflictions appeals to the hearts of his children for sympathy and redress.

Secondly, the Holy Father expressly calls upon the Catholics of the whole world to second his efforts in the defence of his rights and the restoration of his territorial independence, and thus prove themselves devoted and loyal Catholics. “The Catholics of the various States can never hold their peace until they see their Chief, the teacher of their faith, the guide of their consciences, again possessed of true liberty and really independent.” (Letter to the Secretary of State, Cardinal Nina, August 27, 1878.) Therefore the Holy Father doubts not “but that all Catholics all the world over will support, openly and unrestrained, these rights of the Holy See” (Allocution, June 1, 1888.) Frequently he directs this admonition to the Catholics of Italy itself (3d January, 1888.) With an affectionate tenderness he reminds Catholic writers and above all Catholic journalists of this duty: “Therefore, my beloved sons, cease not, both by word of mouth and in your writings, to contend that the temporal sovereignty of the Pope is necessary for the free exercise of his spiritual power.” (Address to Catholic journalists, February 22, 1879.)

## II.—THE TRUE QUESTION.

We treat this question from the Catholic standpoint, as it is derived from that twofold obedience which characterizes a Catholic. Our non-Catholic fellow-citizens must likewise accept the same standpoint as the basis of their criticism. We need not prove to a Catholic that the Pope, by Divine disposition, has the right and the duty to rule the Church in perfect immunity and independence of any earthly power, and that, by the same Divine right, he is exempt from any secular jurisdiction whatsoever. He therefore is—as Leo XIII. expresses it—“by the express will of the Founder of the Church not subject to any secular power.” (Letter to Cardinal Rampolla, 15th June, 1887.)

The *right* to this immunity is essential to the Papacy. The *exercise* of that right however, is not absolutely necessary to the existence of the Church (*ut Ecclesia sit*), but it is necessary for the perfect development of its social life (*ut bene sit*). Providence availed itself of the *Temporal Power* as a *means* to secure to the Popes the free and undisturbed development of their sublime prerogative.

In the early ages, triumphant and victorious, all through the many and bitter persecutions, the Church had the stamp of her Divine origin set upon her. Those years might be called the Church's infancy. The time came, however, when she was to put forth the full vigor of life. The freedom and independence of the Head of the Church was, by Divine Providence, to foster its steady growth, and thus it came to pass that the Popes acquired the temporal dominion over Rome, the seat of their Pontificate. (See letter to Cardinal Rampolla.) No unbiased, unprejudiced historian has ever called into question the *legitimacy* of this temporal dominion and that, too, considering only its historical origin. This, for us, is a settled question in our present discussion. Likewise, we need not prove that the Pope after the spoliation of his States, *i.e.*, since September 20, 1870, no longer enjoys that liberty and independence which the nature and dignity of his office demand. “*Verius in aliena potestate sumus quam nostra*,” “We are more really in the power of another than our own.” We might refer to two facts which will convince even the most ardent friend of Italian unity of the truth of these words of Leo XIII. The outrageous scandals of which Rome was the scene in the early part of October, 1891, when the city echoed the cry “*abasso il Papa*”; the infamous insult which was heaped upon the corpse of the great Pius amid the demon cries, “*al fume*.” These two events in the history of New Italy speak more than volumes.

In fine a Catholic cannot rejoin: “Let the Pope look for a free

abode elsewhere," for his faith tells him that to this day it is *only* as *Bishop of Rome* that the Popes succeed St. Peter and possess the plenitude of apostolic power. We may add that it is a theological truth drawn from the teaching of faith that the Primacy *iure divino* belongs, until the end of time, to the Bishop of Rome *alone*, and that it therefore cannot be transferred even by the Pope himself to another See. But suppose this last were possible, still we cannot find therein a solution of the difficulty; for elsewhere the same questions may arise. It therefore remains true that the Pope as Bishop of Rome, and according to the natural order of things—in Rome and from Rome—governs and directs the affairs of the Church of God unmolested, and that in Rome at least he must not be subject to any secular authority, that is, the Pope must also be the temporal ruler of Rome. In this sense Catholics in concert with the Pope declare the necessity of the Temporal Power. Catholics need not be told that this necessity cannot be made the subject of a *dogma*, since it is not a matter of revealed truth. Neither do we discuss the question whether it is a dogmatic fact and whether consequently, the supreme ecclesiastical authority *can* by an infallible definition make it *de fide ecclesiastica*. Nor do we inquire whether Pius IX. or Leo XIII. really did *define* the necessity of the Temporal Power. We are satisfied that all dutiful children of the Church, in obedience to the Holy Father ought faithfully to maintain the necessity of the Temporal Power—" *firmissime retinere*," as the Syllabus expresses it.<sup>1</sup> We are only concerned with the task of reconciling this duty of Catholics with certain principles of modern and particularly of American public right.

We divide the objection into two parts according to the two principles upon which it rests: *The people are sovereign*; and *salus publica suprema lex*: private interest must be subordinated to the public good!

We must first agree on the terms we shall use. The harmony between the right of the Pope to independence and the right of the people to self-government, does not mean that the Pope has a right to be the temporal ruler of Rome independently of the consent of the Roman people, and that at the same time the Roman people has actually a right to choose its own ruler!

Nor will we prove that the temporal power is in harmony with republican principles in this sense, that the Pope's right to monarchical government does not exclude the right of the Roman people to proclaim the republic!

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<sup>1</sup> "Praeter hos errores explicite notatos alii complures implicite reprobantur proposita et asserta doctrina, quam catholici omnes firmissime retinere debent, de civili Romani Pontificis principatu."—See *Syllab.*, 76.

We will not strive to reconcile contradictions. The school of Fichte itself would find it difficult to do so; and surely no American principle demands it.

If two rights are contradictory, then one of them is no right, or, at least, one of them ceases to be a right, because of this contradiction.

Our task is to prove that we give "reasonable service" to our Church and to our country.

"Giving a reason" for our liberty of thought and conscience guaranteed by our Constitution, we shall prove that as philosophers we admit, *in abstracto*, not only "republican principle," but also in a true sense a "sovereignty of the people."

"Giving a reason" for our patriotism, we have only to prove that the Catholic view of the Roman question does not hinder us from being wholly and sincerely attached to our Constitution and from obeying the laws of our country. Freely "giving a reason for the faith that is in us," we shall prove that neither "republican principle" nor the "right of the people to self-government" have anything to do with the "right of the Pope to independence"; in a word, that this right does not fall under any such "principle."

The following words of Brownson are to the point: "Liberty is never to be understood as exemption from all restraints, nor from all restraints but those which are *self-imposed*, which are no restraints at all . . . there is a strong tendency, and, I hold, a dangerous tendency, among us . . . to extol and defer to the alleged wisdom and good sense of the mass. . . . The genuine people, if their voice could really be heard, would be loud and earnest in condemnation of this tendency. . . . In the name of science, of knowledge, of wisdom, of virtue, of the people, . . . I for one solemnly protest against this servility to the mass, a servility to which a man never submits in good faith nor for honest purposes. . . . Let us, then, cease our adulation of the mass, cease our insane efforts to adapt everything to the apprehension of the mass, to gauge the amount of truth we may tell by the amount the multitude can take in; and do our best to gain all truth, to nourish and invigorate ourselves for wisely-directed and long-continued efforts for the elevation of all men."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Works of O. Brownson, vol. xv., p. 299, *segg.* A careful study of the articles, "Origin and Ground of Government," "Demagogueism," "National Greatness," would answer the objection we are considering.

We use the words "self-government" and "sovereignty of the people," although they cannot be strictly taken in their literal meaning. Their true sense will be made clear as we proceed. Let us also note that "republican principle" and the "right of self-government" are very different things; the one does not imply the other.

III.—INDIRECT ANSWER.

We will add one remark which contains an answer to the difficulty, though it does not give a real *solution*. No Catholic has a right to make his obedience to the Pope subservient to his own scientific views, political theories, or local national desires. His obedience should be "perfect," "undivided," "absolute," not a "*simulacrum obedientiæ*" which destroys the "*natura obedientiæ*," as Leo XIII. remarks in the same encyclical. In our religious duties we are not to look up to Nationalism as our guide but to the Church. As a matter of fact we know full well that the faithful performance of our duties as citizens of the United States does not bring us into conflict with any doctrinal or moral teaching of the Catholic religion. As Catholics, and precisely because we are Catholics, we should not allow any one to surpass us in that respect. But the objection supposes the opposite. This will explain our categorical answer.

If every nation of the world asserted its national standpoint as a *conditio sine qua non* of its obedience to the Pope, what would be the result? Have they not all the same right to hold dear their national traditions, customs and regulations as we Americans? The Church, like a loving and just mother, always respects national peculiarities and all just claims founded on them. In this, the Church gives us an example worthy of imitation. But just as she unites all in the unity of faith, she also desires all to be one in obedience to her visible head. *Ecclesia nationum, non vero nationalis!* this is the apostolic motto of the Catholic Church; this is one of the notes characterizing her as the one true Church.

IV.—DIRECT ANSWER.

*A—The Sovereignty of the People.*

Now let us attempt a complete solution. Our opponents say: "We have positive reasons to reserve our judgment on the Roman question. For, as Americans, we recognize the principle of popular sovereignty; it is the ground-work of the Constitution of the United States, the support of our public and political life. But now, did not the Italian, or at least the Roman people desire the fall of the temporal power of the Pope? Is it not a contradiction, then, for us to extol the sovereign will of the people of this country and at the same time to approve of the restoration of the territorial independence of the Pope? Is that not virtually to deny the sovereignty of another people?"

We ask, has popular sovereignty any place *in the Church*? The answer of Catholic doctrine is *No*. To enter deeply into a confirmation of this answer here would be out of place, but a concise

explanation is necessary to illustrate the religious aspect of our question.

The Church is an institution essentially supernatural, to which all men, by the decree of God, must look for salvation. The Incarnate Son of God founded it immediately and in His own person, and gave it that authority which was to bring about that happy and blessed union here below, whose highest ideal and antetype is in heaven, "that they all may be one as Thou, Father, in me and I in Thee." But more than this, the Divine Founder of the Church not only defined the spiritual power His Church was to exercise for that end, but he also designated in particular *who* were to exercise it. Upon St. Peter and his successors He bestowed the plenitude of pastoral power; to the successors of the other Apostles, the bishops, He entrusted the direction of particular churches "in which the Holy Ghost had placed them." Every Pope receives immediately from Christ the entire Apostolic authority with which Peter, the first Pope, was endowed. This authority is, therefore, neither in its origin nor in its exercise, dependent on the approbation of the Church, the bishops, the priests, or the laity. The Episcopacy, no less than the Papacy, is of divine institution; it is an essential institution of the Church. Nevertheless it remains true, that only *One* rules the *whole* Church, that only *One* possesses the fulness of power; that all others are subject to Him; that He can judge all, but cannot be judged by any one; that He is the centre of unity about which all must gather to be partakers of the Kingdom of God.

The constitution of the Church is, therefore, truly monarchical, though tempered to a certain extent with the aristocracy of the divinely instituted Episcopacy, but not mixed with it. The rest of the faithful are the *ecclesia discens*. The authority of the Church does not proceed from them, nor does it depend on them, either immediately or mediately. Still, all the offices of the Church, the highest included, are within the reach of the humblest of its members. In this sense, and only in this sense, can we speak of a democratic element in the constitution of the Church.

Efforts to introduce the principle of popular sovereignty into the Church have not been wanting. The court theologian of Louis, the Bavarian, Marsilius Patavinus, inaugurated the movement in the thirteenth century. He claimed that, according to the will of Christ, all ecclesiastical power is vested in the people. Gerson and Peter D'Ailly enunciated similar principles during the Great Schism of the West. The apostate, de Dominis, sought to spread them in the seventeenth century. From his works, the Gallicans, especially Richter, drew their arguments; Jansenism, Febronianism, Josephism, had recourse to the same theological arsenal for their weapons.

At the time of the Vatican Council, Döllinger renewed this theory, inasmuch as he claimed that the bishops at the Council are only mandatories of the people. The clear decisions of this Council dealt the death-blow to all these attempts. If, in spite of this, Catholics dare to assert, or write, that "the Church desires a non-Italian Pope, *who will grant the people a greater share in the government of the Church,*" we can only say, that such an assertion is the untheological offspring of a narrow-minded nationalism.

Protestantism, to be consistent with its denial of the ecclesiastical principle of authority, was forced to place all ecclesiastical power in the hands of the people. It rejected the divine origin of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and transferred all power to the various "congregations" (*gemeinde*), and degraded the "ministers of the word" to mere representatives of the people. Secular princes, whose aid could not be dispensed with, were made the highest representatives of the community. This was practically to convert the sovereignty of the people with regard to ecclesiastical matters into *Cæsaro-papism*.

## II.—POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AS A POLITICAL PRINCIPLE.

We have now to consider the sovereignty of the people from a political, and especially from an American standpoint. *Is it a general principle? Is it an American principle? And in what sense?*

Popular sovereignty can be understood to mean that the *ultimate reason* and *original source* of all authority is the common consent of all—the will of the people, and not God, of whom all paternity, all authority, is called in heaven and on earth. This principle is totally false; or rather, no principle at all. Precisely in this sense did Hobbes and Rousseau, the founders of this modern theory, put forth their doctrine; each one adding a shade of coloring of his own. Their set purpose, in asserting the sovereignty of the people, was to separate and estrange society from any and every relation to a personal God—to establish the "State without God." Though it does not always openly avow it, Liberalism employs this principle in the sense of the "*contrat social*," and this for a like purpose. Popular sovereignty renders it an immense service; for it is a fruitful source whence are derived the means of furthering its plans, and legalizing State-absolutism. We are not to regard the sovereign power of the people in this atheistic-materialistic sense.

Anarchists and Socialists openly declare that the sovereignty of the people is to be understood in that sense, and that they intend to carry out their plans on that principle as soon as they have a majority in the Houses of Legislation. '

The cynical saying of Bebel, "*Ja gäbe es einen Gott, dann wären*



*wir geleimt*—"If there were a God, we would be caught in a trap"—leaves no room for conjecture on that head.

In Rousseau's system, accordingly, the source of all right is the people, *i.e.*, the majority of those who call themselves the people's representatives, or the "State," the government of which is determined by the "people." In their political enactments, this sovereign people recognize no divine or natural law—no inborn or acquired right. Whatever is legal is, according to this theory, allowable and good. Every change of government, every revolution, is, *ipso facto*, justifiable as soon as it is accomplished by the people, or in the name of the people. *Quod populo placuit legis habet vigorem*—"The will of the people has the force of law" in any and under all circumstances. Shall we, can we, as Christians, and as citizens, defend our position on any political question with this notion of popular sovereignty? No; never. That would mean, in other words: To be a good American citizen, one must tread under foot, at least theoretically, the rights of God and man; or, the American citizen, as such, is a revolutionist against any and every authority above his own! In the name of all that we hold sacred in our religion, in the name of our patriotism, we decline to defend our position on the Roman question, or on any other political or politico-religious question, against the representatives of that "principle," whether they call themselves Socialists or not. We can come to no understanding with materialism, or make any concessions to it. We are a Christian people. We despise a Robespierre who, in the name of the people, wished to do away with the existence of God by an enactment of the State; we have just as little in common with modern political deists, who are striving to place Almighty God on the retired list with a pension.

On political events, then, such as the overthrow of an existing government, we pass judgment according to the divine and natural law; according to the eternal principles of justice which worldly power may thrust aside and despise, but which it can never subvert or destroy. Our question can, therefore, only be the following:

Is it not a principle of natural right, that God, the fountain-head of all authority, has placed political authority in the hands of the people, from whom all government, whether monarchical or democratic, directly derives its authority?

You have full right to hold this doctrine, and we do not oppose it ourselves. Most of the Christian philosophers and theologians were formerly, and still are, of the opinion that the *consensus populi* is the proximate cause of civil society, and that the civil power, considered in particular persons, comes only mediately from God, but immediately from the people. But it cannot be put

down as an unquestionable philosophical principle of the natural law. It is, at most, but an opinion, even though it be a very probable one. There are many acknowledged authorities who do not even recognize the sovereignty of the people to be a principle in that sense, but defend the opinion that the will of the people only designates the bearer of public authority, while God himself confers on him immediately the power to rule. It would be preposterous to deny this fact, and not at all courteous to assert that the defenders of this last opinion have no good reason for it, and that the opposite must be perfectly obvious, must be, *prima facie*, evident to all.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, it is well to remark that those who hold to the more democratic opinion do not allow the people the right to overthrow and rid themselves of a lawfully constituted government which has lost favor in its eyes upon the plea of popular sovereignty. This would be to sanction revolution indiscriminately, as Rousseau has done. They likewise admit that there may be *other legitimate titles* to the exercise of supreme civil authority, as there have been at all times and are to this day.

As Catholics, we are entirely free to embrace either one of these two opinions. The Church has defined nothing in this matter. She has been content, at all times, to confront revolutionary machinations with the Apostolic doctrine (on that account none the less evident to reason), that God, the author of nature, created man a social being, and therefore willed that authority, without which a well-ordered society of free agents cannot be conceived. Therefore, all civil authority is mediately from God. In very truth, then, do the bearers of it reign "by the Grace of God."

Now suppose a people determines to adopt a constitution, then most assuredly, it can without any detriment to the natural law, choose a democratic as well as a monarchical form of government. It can positively declare, through its representatives, that in the government about to be established the supreme authority, divinely ordained, actually proceeds from the people; and that their representatives are only to exercise it as their delegates. In such a State or society the theory of popular sovereignty has the effect of a fundamental law, by which every loyal citizen must abide; which he is to look to for the preservation of his civil and political rights, and which accordingly must guide him in the performance

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<sup>1</sup> See the authors for both opinions in the works of Costa-Rossetti, S. J., who strenuously defends the first opinion: *Philosophia Moralis*, p. 593, *seqq.*; *Philosophisches Jahrbuch 1888-90*; *Die Staatslehre der Christlichen Philosophie*. S. Thomas treats this question, q. 2, 9, 10, a. 10; q. 12, a. 2; 1, 2, q. 105, a. 1; q. 90, a. 3; q. 92, a. 3; ad. 3. One of the most ardent and profound advocates of the rights of the people is Suarez, *Defensio fidei*, l. 3, c. 2; *De legibus*, l. 3, c. 4. See also Brownson's *Origin and Ground of Government*.

of his duties. Thereupon the representatives of the people may declare: "We accept the democratic theory as the principle of the government under which we are going to live." A Parliament with a thousand members could not do more than this. It is beyond its competency to change a question of natural and public right into a general principle which shall be universally binding. And, if in our day the theory of popular sovereignty has been recognized in most States, and has passed into current public right, it is significant of nothing but that modern governments have accepted it as the ground-work of their constitution. This is precisely the case in our glorious Republic. With us the sovereignty of the people is at the bottom of all public right. Indeed, nowhere do we see it exercised so liberally. But the framers of our Constitution, who were by no means hostile to the interests of religion, did not dream of approving the theory of popular sovereignty in the atheistical sense of a Rousseau. Just as little did they wish to decide the abstract question about the origin of civil authority. Considering the peculiar condition in which our people lived, they simply looked upon a Constitution founded on the sovereign will of the people as the best for our country.

From what has been said we draw a two-fold conclusion: In the first place, that we as citizens of the United States, have an indisputable right to hold popular sovereignty in the highest esteem; to proclaim aloud that it is the best system of government for the American people, because it accords best with our character and the traditions of our country. But, it would be most ridiculous, and this is the other conclusion, were we to maintain that we had thereby established a principle which should be binding for all times and be accepted by all nations. With precisely the same right, may another system be adopted elsewhere, which may equally well meet the desires, and may be practically as well adapted to the necessities of that country as our system is for us. Did we attempt to impose our political views on other peoples, whose character and wants may be totally unlike ours, we would be untrue to our American sense of liberty. No, a true American is proof against the madness of Chauvinism. God forbid that such a foreigner should ever be naturalized here.

*Deductions.*—What we have hitherto said, we think, warrants the following conclusions:

There is no sovereignty of the people, no self-government in the Catholic Church.

No Christian can defend the right of the people to self-government in the sense of Rousseau's theory.

Every Catholic may defend as true, the opinion that civil authority comes immediately from the people and mediately from God.

Every Catholic of the United States can, like any other citizen, acknowledge the right of self-government guaranteed by the Constitution, and his religious principles need not suffer in the least. He may also consider this system as the best one for this country. He may also advocate that it be introduced into all countries for which it is suitable. Finally, he, like every other citizen, has the obligation to render obedience to the government established according to the principles of the Constitution.

Now, it may be asked, does all this remain true, if we judge the Roman Question as the Pope does? if we not only desire the restoration of the Temporal Power, but also defend it?

Yes, even in this case, all this remains true! Nor do we contradict in any way our political views, or act contrary to our civil duties. If we Catholics acted otherwise *we would be illogical* and disloyal to our religious convictions.

Let us consider in the first place the *national standpoint*. As citizens of the United States we must unreservedly acknowledge the Constitution, in the above sense, and fulfill our duties accordingly. The obligation of a good citizen extends no further; it cannot extend further unless the liberty guaranteed by this very Constitution be only such in name. Or is it perhaps American to say: Every nation of the earth *must* be governed according to the same principles? This would be a ridiculous assumption. Is it necessary to pronounce the death sentence on all monarchies in order to be a true republican? This would be a contradiction of the very principle of self-government, which allows a people to transfer the supreme authority to any form of government, monarchical or democratic. Indeed, one can be a good citizen of any State, without maintaining its form of government to be absolutely or even relatively the best. If this were not so what would become of liberty of thought? of liberty of science and research? It would be downright tyranny if a government, if a people strove thus to fetter free thought.

Must a citizen of the United States approve of *every* revolution by which governments are overthrown? Such theories would declare revolutions the order of the day! Even the American people, notwithstanding its sovereignty, has no right violently to overthrow the Constitution; it has not even a right to forcibly oust the President or a majority in Congress before their term of office has expired. Thus, though every form of government be an immediately human institution, still from the very nature of the case it is a *permanent manner and means* of exercising authority, and the people must pay deference to it as such.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> "We utterly deny the right of revolution, or the right to resist, for any purpose whatever, legitimate government in the legal discharge of its functions. We repeat

Now what must our judgment be on the spoliation of the Papal States by Victor Emmanuel, considering it as a mere political event.

Let us first merely glance at the overthrow of the Pope's Temporal Power. The Italian or Roman people as such did not perpetrate that robbery. It was Freemasonry and the Piedmontese thirst for spoils which committed the outrage. The Roman plebiscitum of October 2, 1870, was a mere comedy and can in no way be said to have been the manifestations of the "sovereign will of the people," even if we allowed that the subjects of the Pope were sovereign. At present, however, we only wish to lay stress on the ground of principle. We therefore say: the Pope is as legitimately and rightfully the sovereign of the Papal States as any monarch or Executive Ruler, the whole world over. The legitimate form of government in his kingdom was always a purely monarchical one. Therefore the Temporal Power could not be set aside upon the plea of popular sovereignty—not by the Romans and much less by other Italians, except by the violation of justice and fidelity.

Some will say: We do not approve of the spoliation of the Papal States; but now we are face to face with the *fait accompli*, and behold it sanctioned by the Italian people. The explanation and application of the proposition "*Salus publica suprema lex*," will thoroughly answer this difficulty. (See B.)

Let us now give expression to our *Catholic conviction* on this question, by considering its *religious side*.

The Liberty—dearest of all which our Constitution permits us to enjoy, is liberty of conscience, religious freedom; the freedom to openly profess our faith and practice it by fulfilling the duties which it enjoins upon us.

As Catholics we believe that the successor of St. Peter is divinely appointed by God, to rule the entire Church, free and independent of any earthly power; and that all Catholics owe him unqualified obedience.

Furthermore we believe that the Bishop of Rome and only the Bishop of Rome, is the successor of St. Peter.

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then, that the right of rebellion and revolution on the part of the people, is no right at all. The people can never have the right to act, save through the forms prescribed by the supreme authority." (Brownson, xv., p. 398). "The people of the United States and of the several states can amend the Constitution, but only constitutionally, through the government. The notion which has latterly gained some vogue, that there persists always a sovereign people back of the government or constitution or organic people, competent to alter, change, modify, or overturn the existing government at will, is purely revolutionary, fatal to all state government, to all political authority, to the peace and order of society, and to all security for liberty, either public or private."—(*id.*, vol. xviii., p. 451).

Our faith then teaches us that the Bishop of Rome by Divine right must rule the Church freely and independently and that we owe him childlike submission.

It is therefore the will of God that the freedom of the Pope be *secure in Rome*, in order that he be truly independent in leading the whole flock of Christ.

This conclusion no Catholic can deny without a severe shock to the Dogma of the Primacy of the Bishop of Rome. The following conclusion is just as firm: Against the will of God there is no sovereignty upon earth, no sovereignty of the Cæsars, no sovereignty of one people or of all people taken together.

Hence, no Catholic can ever approve of any act or condition of things, by which the Pope is bereft of his full freedom and liberty.

"*Illa autem, quae sursum est Jerusalem, libera est quae est mater nostra!*" "Free she must be, that Jerusalem which is our Mother!" "*Itaque fratres, non sumus ancillae filii, sed liberae, qua libertate Christus nos liberavit!*" "We are not the children of a slave, but of a mother who is free-born." "We claim for her that freedom which Christ our Lord purchased for her" (Gal. ii.). These grand words come to the mind of a Catholic when he raises his eyes and looks aloft to the Roman Church, the mother and teacher of all the churches of the globe. The lamentations of Jeremiah are inadequate to give expression to his sorrow, when this Jerusalem, "the ruler of nations," "the Queen of the Provinces is robbed of her freedom."

*The Roman Church then must be free; free in the person of her Bishop, the head of the Church.* But now if the Pope has received from God the *right* to exercise his sublime office most fully and without molestation, he thereby also has a right to the *means* necessary for the perfecting of that liberty; he has a right to determine and demand them. These means may differ as times and circumstances change. We are only concerned with one of them now—the Temporal Power of the Popes.

Assuming then, as true, the doctrine of the Primacy, (*a*) *common sense* must tell every one, that the Pope is truly free *in Rome* when he is in no way subject there to another, in no way dependent upon another; that moreover, this independence has its safest guarantee, and is most effectually secure against every extraneous influence, when the Pope himself is likewise the temporal ruler of Rome.

If we consult (*b*) *history* we are told that the Popes after the division of the Roman Empire, and since the fifth century, possessed some political power in Rome, which subsequently developed into a truly regal power, and that the Popes during eleven centuries held and exercised that power.

Now the (c) *Christian concept* of the Church and of Divine Providence tells us that God "who loves nothing dearer than the freedom of his Church" (St. Bernard), thus shaped events that the freedom of the Head of the Church should be made secure by his Temporal Power, "singulari scilicet prorsus divinae Providentiae consilio factum est, ut Romano Imperio in plura regna variasque ditiones diviso, Romanus Pontifex . . . . civilem principatum haberet."<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore the (d) *events* of the last twenty years sadly but unmistakably prove, that the Pope is no longer free to exercise his office in Rome in a manner becoming its importance and dignity; since Victor Emmanuel forcibly entered by the Porta Pia and took possession of Rome as King of Italy; since the Pope in spite of all guarantees is completely dependent upon government measures and the whims of ministers, Chambers of Parliament, and the rabble; in fine, since he is at the mercy and good pleasure of others.

Lastly, we know from the clear and positive (e) *utterances of the Popes* themselves, "that the Temporal Power of the Pope is *necessary* at present in order that he may, freely and independently, of any power or secular prince, rule and guide the entire Church."

The last reason alone would be more than sufficient.

The Pope is the competent judge in this question. Every Catholic must accept humbly his declaration. But we add, and Pius IX. emphasized it in the allocution quoted above, that the *Episcopacy* of the whole world more than once has repeated these same declarations of the Head of the Church.

It is not incumbent upon a Catholic, therefore, to defend the Temporal Power *because* the Pope was the legitimate prince of Rome, who was unjustifiably and violently despoiled of his temporal possessions. No, the real and true reason why Catholics defend the Temporal Power is a deeper one: They defend the liberty of the Pope inasmuch as he is Pope, *i.e.*, inasmuch as he is lawfully constituted the Head of the Church by Jesus Christ. It is a question, therefore, of defending that liberty and independence to which the divine Founder of the Church has given His Representative an inalienable right. In defending his rights he is defending our rights as Catholics. The means to preserve intact this freedom is the temporal dominion. Therefore our conclusion runs thus: Just as no power on earth has the slightest right to destroy the freedom of the sovereign Pontiff, which God wills, so also no emperor, no king, no people, has any right whatever to deprive the Pope of the temporal power which he needs

<sup>1</sup> Allocution of Pius IX., "Quibus quantisque," April 20, 1849. Letter of Leo XIII. to Card. Rampolla.

<sup>2</sup> Allocution of Pius IX., "Maxima quidem," June 9, 1862; Leo XIII., l. c.

and must have to govern the Church with the freedom willed by Christ. The sovereign freedom of the successor of St. Peter is to-day necessarily conditioned by his temporal sovereignty; therefore the latter, through the former, is rendered sacred and inviolable; and *to attack it, is to assail Christ Himself, in the person of His representative.*

Therefore Victor Emmanuel had no more right to deprive the Pope of his Papal States than had Napoleon I.; therefore the occupation of Rome will ever be a sacrilege no matter by what people it was effected. We say a *sacrilege*, for such in very truth it is: "peccatum contra *immunitatem loci sacri*," and as *prescription* has no force against "*res sacræ*" and "*jura ecclesiastica*," so also the spoliation of Rome cannot be legalized by any title whatever. Hence the Constitution "Apostolicae Sedis" places the ban of Excommunication (*speciali modo Romano Pontifici reservata*) upon, "*Invadentes, destruentes, detinentes vel per se vel per alios civitates, terras, loca, aut jura ad Ecclesiam Romanam pertinentes, vel usurpantes, perturbantes, retinentes supremam jurisdictionem in eis nec non ad singula praedicta, auxilium, consilium, favorem praebentes.*" "On all who either themselves or through others invade, destroy, retain the cities, lands, places or rights belonging to the Roman Church, or who usurp, disturb, retain supreme jurisdiction therein; also on all who give help, counsel, favor to any of the aforesaid things." (I. 12). Is this excommunication of itself not sufficiently expressive for every Catholic, who knows that it is the *severest* ecclesiastical punishment, and always presupposes grave sin? Can there be any right or any principle to justify that sin? Knowing this must not every Catholic openly condemn the *invasio* and *detentio*? Unless he does so he is in direct opposition with the Pope and with himself. Solicitude for the maintenance of a so-called political or national principle would then *lead to the denial of an undeniable Catholic principle!*<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> A remark of St. Thomas on a similar subject may appropriately illustrate these deductions. The Angelical Doctor, as is well known, along with the majority of mediæval theologians defends the opinion that civil authority proceeds immediately from the people. Treating on the laws and customs of the Old Testament he makes the objection: "With the Jews the election of rulers was not sufficiently provided for, since no direction had been given to the people in this regard." He answers the objection as follows: "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod populus ille sub speciali cura Dei regebatur: unde dicitur (*Deut. vii., 6.*): Te elegit dominus Deus tuus ut sis ei populus peculiaris Et ideo institutionem summi principis . . . electionem regis non commisit Dominus populo, sed sibi reservavit, ut patet (*Deut. xvii., 15*): Eum constitues regem quem Dominus Deus tuus elegerit."\* I. 2. q. 105, a. 1. Hence according to Aquinas

\* "That people was governed under the special care of God; whence it is said (*Deut. vii. 6*) 'The Lord thy God has chosen thee to be His peculiar people,' therefore the Lord did not commit the election of the supreme ruler, the choice of the king to the people, but reserved it to Himself, as is clear from *Deut. xvii. 15*, 'Thou shalt set him king whom the Lord thy God shall choose.'"



It is our duty to speak plainly and forcibly. On the Roman question the religious side is and remains for us the main point. Our non-Catholic fellow-citizens will not recognize this argument as the only true one, because they reject the religious principles on which it is grounded. They deny moreover *all* spiritual sovereignty of the Pope; hence, *a fortiori*, his "right to independence." But they cannot gainsay our right to remain true and loyal to our religious principles. Do we Catholics enjoy only a partial or an imperfect liberty of conscience? They cannot but respect consistency; while shameful compromise and cowardly faint-heartedness will surely not gain their esteem. Let us cling, therefore, above all, to the great American principle that we are free citizens and esteem Religious Liberty above all else. Let us proclaim it clearly and positively: Yes, as Americans we hold firmly to our Constitution, to "the right of self-government" and "republican principles. We believe also that in general, civil authority comes only mediately from God and immediately from the people; but we also hold that there may be other legitimate titles to this authority. We have neither the right nor the intention to impose our views on others. Just as it is not contradictory to *our* "republican principles" that monarchies exist *elsewhere*, so also we cannot reject *a priori* a Constitution that does not recognize the sovereignty of the people. In any case, not even the most sovereign people in the world can have a right to violate the ordinances of God. But we Catholics behold in the Papacy an immediate institution of God, and in the Temporal Power the necessary condition of the divinely-ordained freedom of the Pope! Therefore, according to Catholic principles, there is no right in the world, the right of self-government not excepted, which can destroy that freedom. Hence we may also apply to the Roman question:

"*Quod Deus conjunxit homo non separet!*"

"What God hath joined let not man put asunder!"

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there could be no question about the election of a ruler—about the exercise of the sovereignty of the people in the proper sense of the term—because there can be no right of the people *against the ordinances of God*. Now we say a *pari* or *ab analago*: God provides in a special manner for His "*populus peculiaris*," the *Holy Catholic Church*, and in her more especially for the Roman Church, whose Bishop by His express command was to be the successor of St. Peter—the Head of the Church. By the *providentia specialis Dei* it came about that also the temporal sovereignty over Rome was given to the successors of St. Peter, in order that they might exercise freely and independently their sublime office. Hence with regard to the Roman people it is true that since they are the objects of God's special providence, *He has not committed to them the election of a ruler, but has reserved to Himself, i.e., to his Church, the right to determine, by the election of the Pope, the person who is to be the King of Rome.*

We will conclude this part of our argument with the words of Brownson, who was ever proud of being an American citizen, and whom all Americans claim as their own: "It is enough to say that the Pope never was a subject of any temporal prince, and *never can be*. He represents Him who is King of kings and Lord of lords. He is above all earthly monarchs, by the law of Christ; . . . the status of prince belongs to him by right of his office as Vicar of Christ, for by that office he is declared independent, and clothed with plenary authority to govern all men and nations in all things relating to salvation."<sup>1</sup> "The Roman or ecclesiastical state was a donation to the Holy See or to the Church of Rome. Gifts to the Church are gifts to God, and when made are the property, under Him, of the spirituality, which by no laws, heathen, Jewish, or Christian, can be deprived of their possession or use without sacrilege. They are sacred to religious uses, and can no longer, without the consent of the spirituality, be diverted to temporal uses, without *adding sacrilege to robbery*. Whoso attacks the spirituality attacks God. The temporal power of the Pope is therefore not within the category of any earthly human government, but is the property of the spirituality. Victor Emmanuel, in despoiling the Pope, has usurped Church property, property given to God, and sacred to religious uses. The deed, which our eminent jurists and Protestant divines sympathize with and applaud, strikes a blow at the spirituality, at the sacredness of all Church property, of Protestant churches as well as of Catholic churches,—at the sacredness of all eleemosynary gifts and asserts the right of power when strong enough to divert them from the purposes of the donors . . . Or are they (the Protestant divines) so intent on crushing the Papacy that they are quite willing to cut their own throats?"<sup>2</sup>

*B.—Salus Publica Suprema Lex.*

We cheerfully admit this principle. It does not militate against the re-establishment of the Temporal Power, but is rather a confirmation of its usefulness and necessity. It shows both in a brighter and clearer light. Let us therefore briefly consider its essence and the deductions made from it in the light of Christian jurisprudence and according to the teaching of Christian moralists.

The common good is to be placed above that of the individual;

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<sup>1</sup> See vol. 12, *Pope and Emperor*, p. 456.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. 18, *Sardinia and the Holy Father*, p. 451. This article carries the greater weight with it, because it was written in 1871, a year after the spoliation of the Holy See, and in order to refute the arguments of Dr. Thompson and other Protestants who pretended to defend the "sovereignty of the Roman people," saying that the sovereignty of the Roman State "is in the category of all earthly sovereignties."

hence duties towards society precede, generally speaking, those towards self. The temporal welfare of the people is the immediate end of civil society. Governmental *régime* exists not for its own sake, but for the people. A change of government or a change in the form of government, brought about by any event whatsoever, *may* be legitimate, even though effected by unlawful means. It suffices that the former state of affairs may have become hurtful or impossible, and that, accordingly, the welfare of the entire society requires the subsequent situation to be upheld by all. Even he who does not admit the lawfulness of our Revolutionary War with Great Britain, or the Belgian revolution in 1830, must declare that the forms of government thus brought about are perfectly legitimate. But if the above conditions are not verified, the members of such a society may tolerate the change of government, but cannot directly lend their aid to confirm or maintain it.

If the claims of *different societies* be compared, precedence, *ceteris paribus*, must be given to the highest and most important. Since every society is made up of a number of rational beings to secure a more or less determined end, it is evident, that the dignity of a society depends upon the loftiness of its end and on the greater number of intelligent beings who are striving for that end. This truth must ever be borne in mind when considering civil and religious society, the State and the Church.

The State has for its immediate end the temporal welfare of its subjects; the Church, the eternal welfare, the salvation of mankind. Inasmuch as eternal salvation is of far greater importance, nay more necessary, than temporal happiness, by so much the Church, the mediator of eternal happiness, by divine appointment, must take precedence in dignity over every civil society. There exists therefore a true subordination of the State to the Church, and the Church cannot be made subservient to the State, and no perishable temporal considerations can prevent her from using the necessary means to attain her sublime end.

The ecclesiastical as well as the civil power are both supreme in their respective domains; but, though each has its own sphere, both should act conjointly for the welfare of humanity; they should mutually assist one another. But the Church, because of her exalted end, is superior to the State, "as the soul is superior to the body, as the sky is above the earth" (St. Chrysostom). "Or should the spirit give place to the flesh, the celestial to the terrestrial?" (St. Gregory Naz.).

Moreover, the Church surpasses also in excellence the civil organization of any people or nation, because her organization embraces a wider field. Her welfare, is the welfare of all her children who are scattered over the entire globe; nay more, that of all men, for whom she was instituted.

This is why, in case of a conflict between Church and State—*e.g.*, when both claim jurisdiction for their respective ends—precedence must be given to the Church. This is no “individual theory.” It is catholic teaching, which can be proven by sound reason and which Leo XIII., in union with the Fathers and theologians, has clearly and distinctly explained.<sup>1</sup>

Suppose, that the temporal advantages of a nation come in conflict with the welfare of the Church, to which that nation belongs, or hinders the Church in the attainment of her end, then evidently that nation must make its temporal interests subservient to the higher interest of the Church—which is identical with the nation’s own higher interests—and with the higher interests of the faithful at large.<sup>2</sup>

These are the conclusions which faith and reason draw from the principle “*Salus publica suprema lex.*”

#### I.—THE WELFARE OF THE WHOLE CHURCH DEMANDS THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TEMPORAL POWER.

The objection brought against this principle when applied to the Roman question may be stated thus, in clear terms :

“Private interests must give way when there is a question of public welfare or of the common good.

“Now, the welfare of the Romans and Italians, that is, the public welfare of Italy, demands the maintenance of the present political situation of their country; consequently the Pope’s temporal power must be permanently abolished. It is therefore the Pope’s duty to renounce his claims to temporal sovereignty, or at least, Catholics need not strive to reestablish it.”

The first proposition is true, but it proves just the contrary of what our opponents deduce from it.

Facts show the second proposition to be false; *but even granted it be true*, it would prove nothing against us. Hence, in any case, the conclusion is false. We prove this as follows :

As temporal welfare must be subordinate to the spiritual, so likewise must the incidental claims of a single nation be subordinate to the demands of the Church and the Catholic world at large. Now the Roman question means the security of a spiritual good,

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<sup>1</sup> Particularly in the Encyclicals “*Immortale Dei*,” “*Quod Apostolici Muneris*,” “*Humanum Genus*,” “*Diuturnum*.” There is no need of citing authors in confirmation of the above-mentioned principles; they may be found in any treatise on Christian Jurisprudence. Cf. especially Card Hergenröther, *Staat und Kirche*, viii., “*Die Lehre von der Superiorität der Kirche und ihrer Gewalt über das Zeitliche.*”

<sup>2</sup> On the subject, “*How the Church, notwithstanding her higher aim, or rather by means of it, promotes the temporal well-being of nations*,” Cf. Encyclical of Leo XIII., “*Humanum Genus.*”

the security of ecclesiastical liberty, through the territorial independence of the Head of the Church; a claim most intimately associated with the well-being of the Church and the interests of two hundred millions of Catholics.

Hence *Salus rei publicæ Christianæ suprema lex!*

*Rome, therefore, belongs to the Church, to her visible Head, and therefore to the whole Catholic world!* The Papal States are the incontestable heritage of the common father of Christendom, the "patrimonium Petri." Romans and Italians have no right to rob Rome of its essential character, that of the centre of the Church, the Capitol of the Catholic world! Even though their claims be unanimous; even though they gained thereby a national advantage by despoiling the Pope, and subjecting the Vicar of Christ to a temporal king!

*Italy, therefore, has the obligation towards the Pope, towards the Church, towards the Catholics of the whole world, to restore to the Pope that liberty and independence indispensable to the government of the Church, viz., his Temporal Power.*

This is the unbending logic of philosophy, the logic of the ecclesiastical standpoint, the logic of Catholic consciousness.

The following proposition stands out clearly in the light of present events: In order to enjoy *sovereign liberty*, as the Head of the Church, the Pope must be a *temporal sovereign*. Only lately three enemies of the Papacy furnished eloquent commentaries upon the outrageous occurrences of last October—commentaries that must come home forcibly to the blindest adherents of Nationalism and Modernism. They were the speech of Minister *Rudini* at Milan; the circular of the Jew *Lemmi*, the Grand-Master of Italian Freemasonry, to the Italian: "Brethren," and the agitation of the demagogue, *Menotti Garibaldi*, against the so-called Guarantee-Law.

True it is, that the Church will survive, as some timid persons are fond of saying, though days of worse captivity and still greater affliction be in store for the venerable sufferer in the chair of St. Peter. She lived through ages of persecution when almost all her Popes reddened the chair of St. Peter with their life's blood. And she will live through the same ordeal again, by virtue of the Divine life dwelling within her. But are these the sentiments of a child realizing the sublime dignity of its mother? Is this the language of one who glories in his faith and is proud of being a Catholic? Every true Catholic understands the "*non possumus*" of the successor of St. Peter in an entirely different sense; and from deep conviction, proclaims with him, that "the Temporal Power of the Pope is at the present time not only *useful* but *necessary* for the liberty of the Church." Necessary, because the

Church has not only a right to live, but also the right to live free and unmolested! Necessary, because she has not merely the right to conceal herself in the catacombs, under the surveillance of a Questor, by the grace of the State, but she has the right to show her everlastingly youthful, beautiful and venerable countenance to all people! Because she has not merely the right to pass by the palaces of the mighty in the ragged garb of a poor servant maid, a beggar imploring a place of shelter, but she has the right to pass majestically through human society, a royal personage with power to command and a gracious blessing for all, a queen adorned with that royal crown which the eternal King placed on her brow when he purchased her, on the Cross, at the price of His Precious Blood!

## II.—THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TEMPORAL POWER, A BENEFIT TO ITALY ITSELF.

It only remains for us to show in a brief way that in the Roman question it cannot be said that Rome and Italy must sacrifice their temporal advantage for the common good of Christianity. The opposite is true. We will only mention the following facts:

*a.* It is not true that the overthrow of the Pope's Temporal Power was the work of the Roman or Italian people, and that the present situation fulfils the desire of the *people*. We do not mean that the Italians may not be justly reproached for lack of energy in proclaiming their Catholic sentiments. Nevertheless, Leo XIII. gave expression to the truth, on different occasions, when he said, that the great majority of the Italian people faithfully adhered to the Roman See. It was the confirmation of this fact, by the grand demonstration of October 1, 1891, in St. Peter's, when with 20,000 pilgrims, not less than 40,000 Romans and Italians knelt at the feet of the Sovereign Pontiff, that induced the Grand Master Lemmi to issue an impassioned circular.<sup>1</sup>

*b.* Far from having promoted the welfare of Rome and Italy, the proclamation of Italian Unity has caused it to suffer greatly and has well nigh ruined it. Rome and all Italy are suffering from the "*mal di Roma*," the Roman plague, that is, financial embarrassment and poverty, the outcome of the mania for political ascendancy. The straits in which New Italy finds herself, plainly

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<sup>1</sup> The well-known liberal deputy, Fazzari, presented the following programme to his constituents: "The reconciliation between the Roman See and our Government is *the highest need, the most urgent necessity and the sincerest wish* of our Fatherland." He was elected to Parliament by an immense majority. Distinguished *conservatives* wrote to him: "*All Italians feel the truth of your resolution*, but few have the courage to declare it openly to the official world." Cf. "*la Conciliazione tra il Papato e l'Italia*." Florence, 1887.

verifies the saying of Thiers: "*Qui mange du Pape en meurt*," "To eat of the Pope is death." The Italians, whose sensitiveness in money matters is proverbial, understand the practical application of the well-known adage: "*la farina del diavolo va tutta in crusea*;" "The devil's meal all turns into bran." Even those, who out of inborn cowardice join in the cry "Evviva l' Italia unita," will tell a stranger in a significant and plaintive way: "*Si stava meglio quando si stava peggio*." "We fared much better when we were worse off.

A living proof of what kind of blessing the new kingdom showers on Italy's population, is the great mass of poverty-stricken Italian emigrants who daily land on our shores.<sup>1</sup>

c. National honor and glory! That Providence selected Italy for the seat of the Papacy, is her fairest fame, her greatest glory! It was the Pope who added the most celebrated pages to Italy's history. The glorious traditions of the land, its splendid achievements in the domain of science and the arts, all are to this day most intimately connected with the names of the Popes.<sup>2</sup>

d. Even from an international standpoint, Italy's great misfortune is and will be the Roman question. Without Crispi's notorious declarations, his angry speeches and his frivolous article in the "North American Review," it is as clear as day-light to the unbiased mind that Italy keeps an immense standing army, which consumes millions and millions, for no other purpose than to guard her spoils against the protestations of the Catholic world. For that very reason the Roman question will always be a question of the day, despite the efforts and tricks of diplomacy, until the sacred right of St. Peter's successor is restored to him. Never will the two hundred million children of the Pope cease to accuse Italy of the crime committed against their common father, and demand back his freedom. They will be louder in their claims, the longer the Head of the Church is kept in prison. The world's legions of soldiery are not able to smother the voice of the Pontiffs and deaden the ring of its echo, in the hearts of the faithful and prevent its re-echo from their lips. And now can there be any question about the lawlessness of a state of affairs, which leaves to so many subjects of the usurper the only alternative, either to transgress a religious duty, to refuse obedience to the Church and the Vicar of Christ, or, to look upon the Italian kingdom in its present form as the enemy of the Holy See and of the Church? We say "Italy in *its present form*"; for the union of all under the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. "La question Romaine au point de vue financier." Office of the Osservatore Catholico, Milan.

<sup>2</sup> Leo XIII. to the Italian Bishops, February 15, 1882.

sway of the King of Piedmont is not at all a necessary condition for the oneness of the nation! Were the Popes ever opposed to a federative union of Italy? Did not the united cities of the land in earlier times find precisely in the Papacy their most active representative, protector and defender? And now, to conclude: Would not united Italy be powerful enough without Rome? Would it not, above all, be a more blissful Union?

*e.* Would it not be a benefit, in the word's truest sense, to the world, to all civilized nations, if the Popes should again be universally acknowledged and appealed to as the arbitrators in international differences?

But in order that all nations and in every instance, may resort to such an arbiter and peace-maker, with full confidence, he needs must be entirely independent, a prince himself, in his own free right. Who is there who does not pray for such an arbitrator? All, including the enemies of the Church, must admit that there can be no person better qualified for that sacred trust than the Pope. Therefore the *salus publica*, the public common good of humanity in this regard too, demands his perfect freedom and liberty.

### III.—WASHINGTON, D. C., AND ROME.

The relation of the District of Columbia to the United States strikingly resembles the relation of Rome to the Catholic Church. Space will only allow us simply to indicate the line of thought. The Constitution explicitly states that "Congress shall exercise *exclusive legislative power in all cases whatever* over a district" set apart for the government of the nation.<sup>1</sup> Now, the inhabitants of the District of Columbia are more numerous than those of certain States; nevertheless they have no representatives in Congress, no right to vote on national issues in the district; not even the right to elect municipal officers. The *proximate* reason of such a wise measure is the *independence* of the legislative and ruling power of the United States; the *ultimate* reason: the welfare of all the States, of the *whole country!* We ask: Did the decree of 1801 ask the consent of the Washingtonians? By no means. Are the people of Washington "sovereign?" Can they *change* this article of the Constitution, even if its population of 200,000 unanimously demanded it? Not at all. What would be the answer of Congress, of all Americans, to such claims? Simply this: it is *an honor and a privilege* for Washington to be the capital of the United States; but its citizens must sacrifice some political rights exercised by other citizens, because: *salus publica suprema lex! the welfare of the whole country demands it!*

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<sup>1</sup> Constitution of the United States, xvii. clause, 8th sect. 1st art.



We say *a pari* and *a fortiori*: According to the *divine* Constitution of the Church, Rome is the centre and capital of the Catholic world, the seat of government of the Church. Hence the Roman Pontiff must have "*exclusive* legislative power" over Rome! Therefore Italy is honored with the highest privilege of Divine Providence, but it has at the same time the sacred duty towards all Catholic nations, towards Catholics of the whole world, to sacrifice certain political or national rights, if there should be such, in order to insure the complete independence of the Pope and thereby the well-being of the whole Catholic Church.<sup>1</sup>

#### CONCLUSION.

The re-establishment of the Temporal Power therefore can in no way and in no sense be injurious to Rome or to Italy. Is a re-establishment *possible*? History has answered this question over and over again in the most unequivocal manner. Our own century has been the witness, both in 1815 and 1849 of how wonderfully God directs His Church in troublesome times, and prepares new triumphs for her in her persecuted Head. We therefore do not ask: *when* will God hear the supplications of the Catholic world for its captive father? *how*, under the present circumstances, Providence will again give to the Bishop of Rome the temporal sway over the eternal city? will it be brought about amicably and peacefully? or must the crime against the Vicar of Christ be expiated in blood? God alone knows.<sup>2</sup> "Never was the papal independency more seriously threatened than now, since the conversion of the

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<sup>1</sup> Rev. H. A. Brann, D.D., in his learned pamphlet, *The Schism of the West* draws the following just conclusion about the *election* of the Pope: "We learn from this schism how dangerous it is to the peace of the Church to permit any secular power to have influence in the Conclave. The election of the Pope should be absolutely free so as to forestall excuses for schism. Hence the place of the Conclave should be subject to no prince. The Popes should be temporal sovereigns; their territory, be it great or small, absolutely inviolable; and in that territory the Conclave ought to be held. The Schism of the West furnishes arguments for the restoration of the temporal power of the Pope. There are some, I know, who dream of a possible spiritual independence of the Papacy, without temporal power. But we ask when or where the Popes were absolutely free, *de jure* and *de facto*, except when they were temporal sovereigns. They should be perfectly free *de jure* as well as *de facto*, and this is only possible with the temporal power restored. All the facts of history are against the platonic dream of a spiritual independence of the papacy when it is subject to king, kaiser or mob. The restoration of the temporal power is therefore a necessary guarantee to the freedom of the Conclave. The attempt of Crispi, the late prime-minister of the king of Sardinia, to get a pledge from the *Dreibund* to coerce the future Conclave to elect a Pope who would sanction Sardinian usurpation, shows what is to be expected of any civil government which can claim the Pope as a subject."—*The Schism of the West and the Freedom of Papal Elections*, New York, Benziger Brothers, 1882, p. 30, 31.

<sup>2</sup> Divine Providence does not recognize the so-called "principle of non-intervention," and God has not yet emancipated the world.

Roman empire. Never was the *duty of defending it more urgent, and never was it more necessary that all loyal Catholics should be on the alert to discover and defeat the machinations of the politicians,*" said Brownson, writing in 1861. ("Pope and Emperor," vol. 12, p. 457, seq.) It would certainly be desirable that a settlement be effected by *Italy herself* or at least *with Italy's co-operation*. Such a solution, humanly speaking, would in every respect be more advantageous and more lasting.

In the meantime, it is the duty of Catholics in every land, now that Rudini in his speech has shown himself a master in political hypocrisy, to openly, positively and persistently urge the rightful demands of the Catholic world. Just claims do not secure a hearing in any other way nowadays. In this way alone does a numerical minority gain public recognition. Those who stand aside and only call upon heaven to witness their protest, will never prevent the usurping power from calling for the order of the day. The more active and vigorous *international action* is, in this case, the heavier will be its weight with the governments, the more powerful its efficacy, the more speedy its success. Again, the more outspoken Catholics are in a country where they enjoy greater liberty, the greater will be their influence upon public opinion. This shows how true the statement is, that a Catholic Congress cannot be thought of to-day, in which the condition of the Holy Father is not made the common subject of discussion and of most eloquent protestation. Therefore the Holy Father heartily welcomed the idea of an international Catholic Congress on the Roman question. It will be most eminently a Congress of Peace. Let us meanwhile follow the noble example which the Holy Father gives us. "We place our trust in God," said Leo XIII. in an address, "and are determined to contend with all our might for the freedom of the Church and its Head. . . . We are moreover not alone in this conflict." No, Holy Father, you are not alone in this conflict! Your devoted bishops and priests, all your faithful children pray and protest with you! Our trust, like yours, is in the Lord, who above all else, loves the freedom of His Church! The day will come, the longed-for day of deliverance! The successor of the Prince of the Apostles will again ascend the venerable throne which centuries erected for the Papacy, to shed new lustre upon the Church, to spread over all the world the beneficent influence of the apostolic word, to be free again to bestow his blessing without let or hindrance, upon the Eternal City and the entire world, *Urbi et Orbi!*

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