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## THE CAUSES OF THE JANSENIST HERESY.

*Controversiarum de Divinæ Gratia Liberique Arbitrii Concordia, Initia et Progressus enarravit* Gerardus Schneemann, S. J. Friburgi Brisgoviæ: Sumptibus Herder.

**G**REAT historical facts are not the results of spontaneous causes, nor are they to be attributed to one man, with whose name they may be identified. The ideas, long before they take effect, lie, perhaps unconsciously, in the human mind; they gradually shine forth, change traditional views and belief, direct the desires and aspirations of the age, till one man is sent by God to open the new depths of the soul for the glory of the Most High and the joy of man, or is permitted by Divine Providence to let loose the tides of long-cherished and hidden errors as a new proof of human frailty and malice and a warning to coming generations. Three great powers move through the stream of human events: Divine Providence, which orders all things, never allowing chance, fate, or blind force; free will, unimpaired by the eternal decrees of the Almighty; and the ever active spirit of evil, permitted by God to entice and to seduce the soul by the unreal good. Without tracing the bright and dark periods of human history to the germs of their greatness or decline, historical understanding and knowledge are impossible.

Jansenism is the outgrowth of Protestantism, both in its spirit and in its doctrine. Great heresies, being favored by the spirit of

the time,—for otherwise they could not succeed,—not only withdraw thousands of souls from the bosom of the Church, but also infect the remaining faithful, who too are children of the age, with their poison. Thus Semipelagianism sprang from Pelagianism, thus modern Old Catholics from German rationalism in history and theology, thus Jansenism from the Reformation. We see the same break with theological tradition, the same exclusive turning towards one author,—St. Augustine,—the same hatred of spiritual authority, the same courting of the mighty of this earth. The Church then as now was stern and resolute, the heretics changeable and deceitful. Jansenism is at the same time the precursor of the Encyclopedists and of the Revolution. The names of Calvin, Jansenius, Arnauld, Quesnel, Voltaire, and Robespierre, only express the same idea in its different phases. The long religious dissensions brought forth as a final result the infidelity which was ripening amid the religious strife. “Few men to-day know the history of the Church during the seventeenth century, and yet it alone contains the key to all the religious events accomplished in the course of the following two centuries.”<sup>1</sup>

Every heresy—Protestantism and Jansenism more than any other—subverts the true notion of the divine or human nature. Man either disappears before God, or he overrules God, but always the creature is either emancipated or deified. “Either the objective truth is confounded with the subjective man, and then we have pantheism; or the soul is confounded with the body, and then we have materialism; or the image of God is rejected from the soul, and then God is declared unknown and unknowable.”<sup>2</sup> The two great dogmas of original sin and redemption, in their Catholic sense, form the balance against the intellectual, moral, and social disorder on earth.

The struggles of life, the restless aim towards an unknown end, the yearning of every soul after rest and peace, only prove the words of St. Augustine: “Thou hast made us for Thee, O God, and our heart is disturbed until it rests in Thee.”<sup>3</sup> To the ancients they were an enigma; we seek in vain for a certain hope of immortal life beyond the grave; despair is the gloomy picture of the thinking mind, pleasure the repose of the ignorant. “There was wanting the consciousness of sanctity in God, and the need of sanctification in man.”<sup>4</sup> Christianity opened to man the true pathway to his glorious destiny. The dualism staring from every pagan philosophy was overcome by the Incarnation, and the Incarnation had its reason in original sin, its term in the Redemption. The creature was ele-

<sup>1</sup> Dom Guéranger: *Inst. Lit.*, vol. ii., ch. 17, p. 43.

<sup>2</sup> Ullathorne: *Endowments of Man*, ch. i., p. 8.

<sup>4</sup> Döllinger: *Heidethum und Judenthum*, p. 633.

<sup>3</sup> *Confess.*, p. 1.

vated to oneness with the Creator; the Church became the fruit of that union; the blessed Eucharist the source of grace. The "Reformers" and the Jansenists broke this bond of harmony. Exaggerating the fearful chastisements of the first man, they plunged human nature into an abyss of nothingness; God and humanity were separated by the denial of the Real Presence, for the wants of the soul could not be satisfied, because the Blessed Sacrament was no more the consolation of poor human life; the union of Christian nations was dissolved by the withdrawal from Rome, the centre of unity; the basis of the social order was shaken by loosening the sacred tie of marriage. Wavering and confusion became the marks of science, for reason lost its guide; nations were thrown into a chaos of intellectual and moral decay, the result of which is only known to God alone. In fine, the "Reformation" was a rebellion against the unity of faith and spiritual authority. "Elle était essentiellement révolutionnaire," says Guizot.<sup>1</sup> Jansenism fed this spirit of contempt and disregard during the following century, till its disciples embraced atheism and the worship of reason. "On vit ses adeptes passer de plain pied de la doctrine de Saint-Cyran et de Montgeron à l'athéisme et au culte de la raison."<sup>2</sup>

The essence of the conflict between the Church and the world is the combat of truth and error, of the spirit and the flesh. The weapons used by the world are always the same; "they have been, are, and always will be the civil power;"<sup>3</sup> the final end is its supremacy. Distrust and varying suspicion were kept alive against the Church of God from the beginning; they never could avert *her* from the path of her divine mission, but they often misled parts of her flock and of her pastors. Fraud and violence thwarted her earnest endeavors in selecting true guardians of faith; servility only too often stains the policy of the clergy; they join only too often the unscrupulous abettors of pride and ambition. Still the holders of one office in the Church never became the prey of human intrigue, never discarded a hair's-breadth of the heavenly treasure given to their trust; the Papacy is built on a rock, against which the gates of hell shall not prevail. Thither the enemy turns his zeal. What a joy, if he could overthrow that "stumbling block." "Christian faith and morals fall with the fall of Rome; Christianity without the Pope is only a human belief, unable to breathe into the heart the lofty ideas of eternal truth and wisdom."<sup>4</sup>

Jansenism could never have found its stronghold in French society without the league with Gallicanism, which summed up its tendency in this one idea, "to make the Pope the first of bishops,

<sup>1</sup> Civil. en Europe, leç. 12.

<sup>3</sup> Manning: *Miscell. Essays*, 17.

<sup>2</sup> Guéranger: l. c., p. 45.

<sup>4</sup> Maistre: *Du Pape*, p. 449, ed. 1821.

but to allow him nothing higher than that primacy of honor."<sup>1</sup> In the days of faith and piety the Church often allowed the clergy to choose their bishops, and conceded a wide influence to the secular power, because both were working in one spirit. But soon passion and private interest prevailed; the glory of God had to yield to the glory of man. This unfortunate spirit was manifested in the Pragmatic Sanction; monarch and parliament excluded Rome from the government of the Church. Dishonesty, simony, and violence penetrated the French clergy. The Church, complains Pius II., is like a hydra with many heads, and its unity is thereby totally destroyed—"si judex judicum Romanus Pontifex, judicio Parlamenti subjectus est; si hoc admittimus, monstruosam ecclesiam facimus et hydram multorum capitum introducimus et unitatem prorsus extinguimus."<sup>2</sup> Leo X. annulled the Pragmatic Sanction, yet its sting remained. The outcry against the Papacy arose on all sides: "Rome's tyranny has abolished a system long in force in the Church of France!" A lawless independence, the overthrow of the religious system of the Middle Ages, became the ideal dream of the intelligent throughout the kingdom. Their words were not, perhaps, as violent as those of the "Reformers;" they still professed an outward union with the head of the Church, but the disguised opposition was not less forcible in their hearts. This despotism of self-will afforded ample provision for Jansenistic insolence and haughtiness.

The world of letters furnished defenders of the fatal system. Mark Anthony de Dominis, archbishop of Spalatro, published in the year 1616 his work on the "Christian Republic," which, though not a product of Gallicanism, fully exhibits its doctrine and was eagerly used by the Jansenists as an armory against the Holy See. Dominis, refusing to pay a pension imposed on him by Paul V. with his consent before his election to the metropolitan see of Spalatro, went to England, where he published his work to take revenge on the Pope. It is a strange compound of Protestantism and Catholicity; above all, it annihilates the primacy and jurisdiction of St. Peter's chair. St. Paul is equal to the Prince of the Apostles; the Protestant theory of an ideal church without any outward manifestation of the essence of the Church, appears in the confusion of church taught and church teaching. Dominis called his work "Christian Republic," because the Pope should only be the minister, and in some sort the delegate of the Christian community.

When the condemnation of the book was to be passed by the Sorbonne, Richer,<sup>3</sup> formerly syndic of the theological faculty, refused to be present because five years before he himself had published

<sup>1</sup> Darras: Gen. Hist., vol. iv., p. 325, Eng. trans.

<sup>2</sup> Spalding: Reform., vol. i., p. 63, note.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Baillet: Vie de Richer.

a similar work "on the ecclesiastical and civil power," wherein he pretended to expose the true sentiments of the Gallican church and the Sorbonne; he afterwards retracted his errors, but his writings remained. His reasonings are only the re-echo of the repeated charges made against Rome. The plea of foreign encroachments on the national church naturally led to the rejection of the universal authority of the Pope.

This hostility against Rome produced absolutism at home. The "Reformers" refused obedience to the Pope; they soon had to recognize the temporal prince as their spiritual head. The French bore divine authority unwillingly; they soon had to accept the dictum, "l'état, c'est moi." The sphere of the civil power now extended over man's will and conscience. The Catholic princes, especially the Bourbons, could not go as far as their Protestant neighbors, but they indemnified themselves by severing the state from the Church, making the former supreme and independent in its own domain.<sup>1</sup> It happened, in the beginning of the seventeenth century, that French jurists publicly burned the writings of Suarez and Bellarmine, because these two Jesuits maintained the grand principles of the Middle Ages, which favored neither despotism nor anarchy.<sup>2</sup> They taught that the sovereign power comes from God, but kings are liable to lose it, and their subjects may, under certain circumstances, be freed from the allegiance due to them.<sup>3</sup> The deputies of the States General of 1614 proposed to make it a national dogma that the king receives his authority immediately from God, and only death alone or free resignation can relieve him of his power. The clergy and nobility, under the leadership of Cardinal Duperron, opposed the presumptuous undertaking. The parliament, however, from the midst of which the motion originally came forth, approved the proceeding of the third estate, and many a difficulty had to be surmounted by the clergy to withhold the king's assent. Strange to say, the meeting of 1614 was the last before the French Revolution, before the regicides. Sad indeed was the state of affairs in France. The bishops opposed the Pope to maintain their supposed episcopal rights, the jurists made themselves the defenders of the Gallican liberties, both against the Pope and the bishops. "Protestant in the sixteenth century," says De Maistre,<sup>4</sup> "with the Fronde and Jansenism in the seventeenth, philosophical at length, and republican in the last years of its existence, the parliaments but too often appeared in antagonism to the true fundamental maxims of the state. The seeds of Calvinism, fostered in

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<sup>1</sup> Ketteler: *Freiheit*, p. 156, 5599.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Rohrbacher: *General History*, vol. 23, p. 247.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Balme's *Civil.*, ch. 51, vol. 3.

<sup>4</sup> *L'église Gallic.*, translation taken from Darras, l. c., p. 331.

that great body, became far more dangerous when its essence changed its name and was called Jansenism. Then conscience was set at ease by a heresy which proclaimed the principle, 'I do not exist.'" The poison reached even those illustrious names in the magistracy of which foreign nations envied France the possession. Then all errors, even errors hostile to each other, being always ready to unite against the truth, the new philosophy in the parliaments leagued with Jansenism against Rome. If we take into consideration the number of magistrates in all parts of France, that of the tribunals which made it a duty and a point of honor to walk in their footsteps, the many clients of the parliaments, and all that blood, friendship, or mere ascendancy drew into the same gulf, we shall easily perceive that there was material enough to form in the heart of the Gallican Church a formidable party against the Holy See.

The religious wars and political disorders did not wield the best influence on the lower clergy. The wish of the Council of Trent, that each diocese should have its own seminary, remained an empty word. There are only three such institutions mentioned till 1600: Rheims, Bordeaux and Carpentras. The young theologians were deprived of the training necessary for ecclesiastical life. They lived in the world without any practical instructions in moral and mystical theology, without conferences and retreats. The admission to holy orders was granted without the necessary trials. The people were without religious instruction; the sacraments were not sufficiently administered; the preparation for them neglected; sermons were rare, without zeal and effect; Christian charity had almost vanished; to be called a priest was a sort of contempt and insult. "Selon la commune opinion du monde, c'était alors une espèce de contumélie et d'injure, que de dire à quelque ecclésiastique de qualité qu'il était un prêtre."<sup>1</sup> The grievous disorder of lukewarmness in the divine service increased the strength of heresy and indifference shooting forth from the spiritual lethargy in which so many lived.

Thus Arnauld's proclamations against frequent Communion had a deeper foundation than mere words. Dark clouds of error and weakness in faith had settled thickly around the throne of our Divine Saviour since the "Reformation."<sup>2</sup> To see the Holy Sacrament despised and trodden under foot, to behold ghastly shapes with priestly character, should fill every noble mind with horror and disgust. But unhappy the man who, wincing under the taunts of the enemy and overawed by that dread sanctity, turns away without hope of mercy. Such men were, or, what is more likely, pretended to be, Arnauld and his followers.

<sup>1</sup> Abelly: *Vie de St. Vincent*, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Müller: *Mass*, p. 14.

It was the design of Divine Providence to raise an Olier and a St. Vincent de Paul to restore the clerical life in France; the cancer, however, was too deep to be impeded at once in its fearful ravages.

“Een serpent in den eegen boezem”—a serpent in one’s own bosom, was the title the Catholics received from the states of Zeeland in 1672. Holland was the bulwark of Protestantism on the continent of Europe, a formidable power sought and feared by every nation. The prestige Spain had held on the sea was ceded to the Dutch. Their cities became the asylums of all the Protestant refugees and malcontents of Europe; the Puritan and the Huguenot, the Socinian and the Bohemian found a hiding shelter on Dutch soil. Graswinckel and Salmasius defended there the rights of the kings; Ulrich Huber proclaimed democracy as the natural and only form of true government; Spinoza enjoyed in Leyden his gloomy and fantastic dreams of the eternal substance of all things. Amsterdam, Utrecht, and Leyden opened their presses for all pamphlets proscribed in other countries. Europe was full of the anonymous and pseudonymous writings of the firm of Cologne and Pierre Martineau. And strange, says Treitschke, an unsuspected author, the sectarian spirit of the people finally penetrated the old Church: the Jansenists of Utrecht rebelled against the infallible Pope—“und seltsam der sectirerische Geist des Volkes drang endlich sogar in die alte Kirche hinüber; die Jansenisten von Utrecht lehnten sich auf gegen den unfehlbaren Papst.”<sup>1</sup> The bold disputers were sometimes stirred up by a thunderbolt from the Hague, but as long as the stomach and counting-house were safe, said Buzenval, there was no need of making great bustle about the matter. When Descartes’ philosophy was threatening the peace of the university of Leyden, the wise counsellors commanded the arguments to be taken from law or medicine, and not from theology. It is but natural that the Jansenists looked upon Holland as their promised land, where the broad ideas “left room enough for their treachery and deceit.” Their poisonous literature, prohibited in France, found ready publishers in the Dutch republic, and there linger till to-day the remnants of that sect.

The salvation of the faithful is the object so sublime for which God pours out His abundant graces. If the want is extraordinary, extraordinary means are employed to lead the faithful to truth and virtue. Thus the great fathers of the Church were sent against the numerous heresies of their times; thus the Benedictines to civilize the renewed west; thus the Jesuits to fight against the “Reformers.” St. Ignatius, contemplating our Saviour’s Incarnation, was convinced that it had no other object but his own perfection and the sanctification of man, and chose these two sublime intentions as the fitting

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<sup>1</sup> Die Repub. der Niederlande, hist. polit. Aufsätze, vol. li. p. 593.

and only object of his institute.<sup>1</sup> To grow in virtue and to lead others to God, their eternal end, was the only desire of the saint and his followers. Seeing the Church filled with contemplative orders, he was inspired to found a society, as he said, "like a kind of flying camp, that should be ready at the least alarm."<sup>2</sup> To preserve the pure faith, to defend it against heresy, and to carry the Gospel into countries deprived of it, became its great task; perfect subordination to the superiors and unconditional obedience to the Pope its distinguishing marks. The spirit of the Society was entirely opposed to that of the "Reformers." Wherever their principles met one had to yield—the Jesuits to force, the Protestants to persuasion. No order ever endured more persecution than the sons of Loyola. They were accused of perverting the youth, of revolt, despotism, and regicide. Father Guignard expired on the scaffold, an innocent victim of blind fury. The whole Order was banished from France because the assassin, John Châtel, had studied for a short time in a Jesuit college. This was the masterpiece of the policy of the Huguenots; they called the day of the "arrêt" lucky—"il fut compté au nombre des jours heureux"<sup>3</sup>—and erected a monument to immortalize their glorious deed. Henry IV., however, took a decided stand in favor of the Society, which checked the violence of the Calvinists. Yet outward steps, how favorable soever, do not change so suddenly the minds of men; French society remained to a large extent as hostile to the Order as ever.

The *ratio studiorum*, causing a destructive contest between the Jesuits and Dominicans, roused the resentment still more. The sons of St. Dominic regarded St. Thomas as the absolute standard of theological science. St. Ignatius, on the contrary, allowed the members of the Society the use of authors treating *ex professo* on questions purely philosophical, scriptural, or canonical; and if in the course of time a theological work more appropriate to the wants of the age should be composed, the Order could accept it with the approbation of the General. "Legetur doctrina scholastica divi Thomæ, . . . sed si videtur temporis decursu alius auctor studentibus utilior futurus, ut si aliqua summa vel liber theologiæ scholasticæ conficeretur, qui his nostris temporibus accommodatior videretur, gravi cum consilio et rebus diligenter expensis per viros, qui in universa societate aptissimi existimentur, cumque Præpositi Generalis approbatione prælegi poterit."<sup>4</sup> The learned Lainez was even commissioned to write such a work. St. Ignatius disliked two opinions of St. Thomas—those about the Immaculate Conception and the solemn vows. His views were afterwards, as we know,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Bartoli: Life of St. Ignatius, vol. ii., p. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Rodriguez: Chr. Perf., vol. iii., p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Duplessis: Mém., tome ii., p. 500.

<sup>4</sup> Const. IV., cap. 14.



confirmed by the Church. The bull "Ascendente Domino" did not require solemn vows as an essential condition of an Order, and the dogma of the Immaculate Conception must to-day be believed by every Catholic. St. Ignatius did not exclude the idea of a clearer understanding of theological problems in the course of time. Herefrom we shall trace the cause of the Thomistico-Molinistic controversy, which afterwards served the Jansenists as another pretext for exerting their ardor against the "subtle novelties" of the Jesuits, thereby propagating their own pernicious doctrine. Thus the hatred which the doctors, magistrates, and Dominicans caused to break forth against the Society was left to the rising Jansenists. Damped, but never extinguished, hardly appeased in one period when excited anew in another, it was made a kind of theological virtue for the higher classes of the French kingdom.<sup>1</sup>

It is well known how much the union of the Humanists with the "Reformers" contributed to the spread of Protestantism.<sup>2</sup> Both hurled the shaft of their ridicule at the scholastics, not so much for the barbarous Latin some of them used, as because the orthodox theologians often condemned the most elegant style for its spurious contexts. The whole scholastic theology was thrown overboard. St. Augustine had to hold forth as a shield of Protestant brawling. "I am the whole Augustine," said Calvin; the same boasted Luther. This partial and defective system soon entered into Catholic schools. Two young professors in Louvain, Michael de Baius (Baïus) and John van Löwen (Hessels), left the scholastic method, devoting themselves entirely to Scripture and St. Augustine; Protestant errors on grace and liberty were the result. Jesse Ravestein, Ruard Tapper, the chancellor of the university, and other distinguished doctors perceived the danger. Tapper, being himself well versed in St. Augustine's works, often disputed with Baïus, who was unable to answer the objections. "Read and study the scholastics, especially St. Thomas, and you shall easily understand me," usually replied the chancellor. Baïus was a man of learning and exemplary life. His authority was very great, both among professors and students. Philip the Second sent him as one of his theologians to the Council of Trent. After his return Baïus published his greater works, renewing his errors, known already before the council. They were condemned by Pius V. in the bull "Ex Omnibus Afflictionibus." Baïus's friends asserted that the propositions in their proper sense were erroneous, but could be sustained in the sense intended by the author. Baïus himself sent a long apology to the Pope, but the Pontiff, after a sufficient

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Daxes: *Des Jesuites ligueurs*, p. 36.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Janssen: *Geschichte des deutschen Volkes*, vol. ii., p. 66.

deliberation, confirmed his former judgment, intimating to Baius that he had incurred an irregularity by his proceeding. The professor then withdrew his heresy, but after the death of Pius V. he started his defence again, till he finally, in consequence of a repeated condemnation by Gregory XIII., abjured his errors at the feet of Francis Tolet, afterwards the first cardinal of the Society of Jesus.<sup>1</sup>

The hinge of the Baian heresy is that two powers inevitably govern the freedom of man: theological charity, by which he loves God above all, and concupiscence, by which he turns towards creatures as his last end. There is a threefold state of human nature—innocent, fallen, and restored. The state of innocence displays nature in its perfect integrity, immortal and predestined to the intuitive vision of God; nay, it was but just and becoming that God should create angels and men to eternal happiness. Adam by his fall lost all gifts of the first grace; nature, now subject to concupiscence, had no other power but of committing sin. In the state of reparation every good work by its very nature merits eternal life; the justification of the sinner does not consist in the infusion of grace, but in the obedience to the commandments; the motions of sensitive pleasure, though not consented to, are transgressions in the just, yet God does not impute them; there are no venial sins; the penalty of sin is forgiven, not the fault. The act of absolution only affects the first; God alone, who suggests penance, can take away the guilt. The liberty sufficient for moral works is the freedom from constraint. In fine, Baius, like Luther and Calvin, denies all free will, and misrepresents the true notion of the merits of Christ and the merciful providence of God. Jansenius embraced the same errors, trying to soften them by the name of his work, "Augustinus."

The Baian troubles being hardly settled, another conflict arose intimately connected with them.<sup>2</sup> The Jesuits at Louvain were open rivals of the university. Their professors, Bellarmine, Lessius, and Hamelius, could not help warning the students against the errors openly proclaimed in the university. Their polemics, though not personal, roused the wrath of Baius and his friends. The humiliation of abjuring his errors into the hands of a Jesuit increased the rancor. Besides this the Jesuits, having received the power of granting degrees, refused any fees for them, whilst the university imposed them. The contest between the two bodies broke out in the year 1587. In the week after Easter the professors of the university secretly collected several copies of Lessius's lectures on Scripture and theology. Three weeks after they showed him

<sup>1</sup> S. Liguori: *Hist. of Heresies*, p. 364.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Duchesne: *Hist. du Baianisme*, p. 195.

thirty-four propositions, asking whether he would acknowledge them as his own doctrine. Lessius declared them to be mutilated, offered thirty-four other propositions, and demanded a public dispute. This was refused, and Lessius was condemned. The Jesuits abstained from further quarrels till Rome would have decided the question. Their enemies in the meantime seized every opportunity to undermine the authority and reputation of the Order. Still many students remained faithful to the Society, which caused frequent rows between the academical youth. Baius, Jansen, and Cuccius were the chief promoters of the intrigue. They were especially "provoked" by the *scientia media*, then already proclaimed by Lessius. They charged the Jesuits with Pelagianism, but Rome disapproved their action.<sup>1</sup>

Let us remember that Jansen was the protector of Jansenius and DuVerger during their stay at Louvain. Both venerated Baius as a saint, adorned his picture with the aureola, and regarded his works as the infallible source of theological science. Under such circumstances, it is plain that the two founders of Jansenism were imbued with the spirit of the traditional errors, plots, and contrivances.<sup>2</sup> Here we enter into the famous Thomistico-Molinistic controversy.

Before we continue the subject, let us first state the question and ascertain the teaching of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, who frequently were misunderstood and misrepresented in the heat of the contest.

The work of man's regeneration was defined by the Council of Trent as being performed by the mutual co-operation of the human nature with divine grace. The fallen man retains moral and religious faculties, by which he becomes responsible for his actions. The Divine Spirit suffers human freedom, because an unconditional interference with that freedom would bring about the annihilation of the moral order of the world which Divine Wisdom had founded on liberty.<sup>3</sup> The gap between the two is infinite. The best use of our intellectual and moral force will not raise us to God nor merit grace unless God gives it freely; then both pervading each other accomplish the one "theandric" act of justification. The words of the Council are: "If any one maintains that the free will of man, inspired and excited by God, does not co-operate, by its consent, with God exciting and calling, whereby it disposes and prepares itself for receiving grace of justification; or if any one maintains that the will cannot refuse its consent when it pleases, but, like something lifeless, does not act at all, remaining merely passive, let him be anathema."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Schneemann's Thomistisch-Molinistische Controverse, i., 125.

<sup>2</sup> Tournelly: De Gr., i., 321.

<sup>3</sup> Möhler: Symbolism, i., 122.

<sup>4</sup> Sess. vi., can. 4.

According with this doctrine, Catholic theologians distinguish different phases in the working of divine grace. The sinner, unable to merit, or even to desire, grace, is awakened by God (*gratia excitans*); giving his consent to the divine call, he gradually advances with assisting grace (*gratia adjuvans*), which, giving strength to his good intention, enables him to acquire a true and perfect power (*gratia sufficiens*); that he, finally, by efficacious grace (*gratia efficax*), may infallibly produce the justifying act. Herein all agree, though differing about the nature of the various graces. The question arises: Wherein consists the union of efficacious grace with the consent of man? How is it possible for this grace infallibly to produce the justifying act, whilst the human will is able to resist? Does the efficiency come from the *exterior* cause, namely, the foreknowledge of God that each created will, by the use of its liberty, will consent, when God should give the necessary grace—*scientia media*—or from the *interior* cause, namely, the irresistible power of efficacious grace itself? Is there any connecting link between the free will and that which precedes it?

The great controversy itself is a sufficient proof that neither St. Augustine nor St. Thomas has solved the problem. Great and saintly theologians, earnestly devoting their whole lives to the study of the two holy doctors, they nevertheless arrived at thoroughly contrary conclusions. This is certainly not derogatory to the greatness of the two saints; the essential point of the question was not stated with the same precision in their ages as in more modern times. St. Augustine's writings on grace, being chiefly directed against the Pelagians, who denied the necessity and gratuity of grace, principally dwell on these two qualities, and hence, by the nature of the combat, differ from the question stated above.

The words of the Apostle, "As by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death, and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned . . . so, also, by the obedience of one many shall be made just,"<sup>1</sup> sufficed for St. Augustine. This is the foundation of the Christian faith, one and One; one man by whom the ruin came, and another Man by whom the construction.<sup>2</sup> All men suffered by Adam's fall, but the essence of human nature remained. Who of us should say that by the sin of the first man free will perished from the human race? Freedom, indeed, perished, but that freedom, which was in paradise, of having full justice and immortality.<sup>3</sup> The essence and sufficiency of human liberty are two different things; the will often wishes what it cannot perform, and not always wishes what it can perform; liberty consists in the power of determining our mind to one thing or another; but from

<sup>1</sup> Rom., v., 12-19.

<sup>2</sup> Sermo 30, de verb. ap. n. 5.

<sup>3</sup> Cont. duas Ep. Pel., lib. i., cap. 2, n. 5.

the determination does not follow the ability of executing the intention.<sup>1</sup> This regards the act of justification. Our end is to see God face to face; human nature cannot, by its own force, reach the supernatural order. Hence arises the necessity of grace to enlighten the understanding, to inspire the will, to heal it, to prepare it, for even to desire grace is beyond human power; "provided," Pelagius concedes, "that God not only aids the natural strength in man; but when he (Pelagius) recognizes that the will itself and the action are assisted by God, and assisted in such a way that without His help we neither could wish nor do any good, there would be no reason for dissent between us."<sup>2</sup> The operation of grace is both physical and moral. The Pelagians and semi-Pelagians only admitted the extrinsic inducement on the part of God, abhorring the subjective elevation of man. Grace is the internal, hidden, wonderful, and ineffable power of God, whereby He not only operates true revelations, but also good wishes,<sup>3</sup> for God has a greater power over the human will than man himself.<sup>4</sup>

All theologians agree that, according to St. Augustine, efficacious grace properly is exciting grace itself. The Jansenists herefrom concluded that our will is forced by necessity either to do the good or to fall into sin, according to the greater or lesser degree of earthly or heavenly delectation. The Molinists prove from St. Augustine that man is perfectly free to give or to withdraw his consent. The other schools float, as it were, between these two extremes. There are, no doubt, many obscure passages in the saint's works which, taken by themselves, may lead to some misunderstanding. He says himself: "That question, where we dispute about free will and the grace of God, is so hard to understand that when free will is defended the grace of God seems to be denied, and when the grace of God is asserted free will is apparently taken away,<sup>5</sup> and yet both are true, but few are able to comprehend it."<sup>6</sup> The only way to understand St. Augustine is to discern the spirit breathing through all his writings, comparing the contested texts with others of the same kind.

Let us find out his definitions of delectation and efficacious grace, and we shall have the key to the most difficult passages in his works. "Quod amplius delectat id nos operemur necesse est—we necessarily perform what us more delights"—is the famous text on which Jansenius based his victorious delectation. This and similar texts do not prove the irresistible determination of the delight. St. Augustine always supposes the *deliberate* love of complacency actually predominating in our will. "C'est l'amour

<sup>1</sup> De Sp. et Litt., n. 53.

<sup>2</sup> De Gr. Chr., c. 24.

<sup>5</sup> Lib. de Gr. Chr., c. 47.

<sup>3</sup> De Gr. Chr., c. 47, n. 52.

<sup>4</sup> De Corr. et Gr., c. 14.

<sup>6</sup> Lib. 2, contr. Litt. Pel., c. 84.

dominant de la volonté, laquelle commande suivant la disposition," says Fénelon.<sup>1</sup> Thus, when God draws us,<sup>2</sup> when He sometimes gives a victorious delectation to the saints, that they may know, it is not from themselves but from Him who is the light and truth,<sup>3</sup> the pleasure only precedes the consent. For what is concupiscence and pleasure, if not the willful assent to what we wish for; and what is fear and sadness if not the willful dissent from what we do not desire?<sup>4</sup> God delights by teaching, not by imposing the necessity.<sup>5</sup> St. Francis de Sales beautifully explains this thought. "We present nuts to a child," says St. Augustine, "and it feels itself attracted, not by an exterior force or a foreign violence which acts on the body, but by the attraction of the heart, or pleasure which never exists without some degree of love. Such is the conduct of God in our regard; He attracts by the delights which accompany His inspirations, not by the force of obligation or compulsion. He insinuates spiritual pleasures into our hearts, and these act as baits, inducing us to let ourselves be taken, and disposing us to receive and to relish His doctrine. Our will is not constrained by the omnipotent strength of the hand of God which touches it; grace urges, but does not compel, and notwithstanding its great power, we can yield or resist its influence as we please."<sup>6</sup>

God acts in the heart of man, performs the motion of his will, yet "I did not what, with an incomparable affection, pleased me more,"<sup>7</sup> says the holy bishop, and there is no contradiction in his words. "Facit ut faciamus, præbendo vires efficacissimas voluntati"<sup>8</sup>—He acts that we may act, by offering a most efficacious power to the will"—is a general and most decisive key for the strongest texts in St. Augustine's works.<sup>9</sup>

The doctrine of *predestination* rests on the doctrine of grace. We have to distinguish between predestination to grace and to glory. The great mystery of the dogma consists in the predestination to grace. Though it is certain<sup>10</sup> and undeniable that God has reasons on which to act, yet it is far above our comprehension; human speculation cannot dive into it. "If any one should bind me to scrutinize that depth why one is so charmed that he is persuaded, another not, I have only two things to answer: O the depth of the riches! And is there iniquity in God?"<sup>11</sup> All agree that the predestination to grace is wholly gratuitous, because free will cannot perform any meritorious works without and before

<sup>1</sup> Instr. sur la grace, tome i., lettre 5.

<sup>2</sup> De Pec. Mer., c. 19, n. 32.

<sup>3</sup> In Joh., c. vi., v. 27.

<sup>4</sup> Conf. i., 3, c. 8.

<sup>5</sup> Fénelon says: "Voilà une clef générale et décisive des textes les plus forts de St. Augustin que ce Père présente de sa propre main." L. c., lettre 8.

<sup>10</sup> St. Francis of Sales, l. c.

<sup>2</sup> In Joh., c. vi., v. 26.

<sup>4</sup> De Civ. Dei, lib. xiv., c. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Love of God, book ii., c. 12.

<sup>8</sup> De Lib. Arb., l. 3, c. 16.

<sup>11</sup> De Sp. et Litt., c. 34.

grace. This is the truth, for the defence of which St. Augustine so earnestly and successfully fought. Further, all agree that the predestination to glory necessarily supposes the merits flowing from grace, and, as such, on account of the gratuity of grace, is also a free gift. The dispute begins whether God, in the act of predestination, considers the meritorious works or not? Which, by its nature, precedes in the mind of God, the foresight of the good works or the simple predestinating act? Whether and how far is the foreknowledge an essential element in the eternal decree? "At non isto sensu disputatur inter theologos, an prædestinatio ad gloriam sit gratuita, sed alio, nempe utrum fiat ante vel post prævisa merita gratiæ."<sup>1</sup>

The thought of the Divine Providence so completely swayed in St. Augustine's mind that, on the slightest occasions, he perceived the incomprehensible wisdom and goodness of God. He looked upon the fall of the Roman Empire, but he was not crushed in the grasp of the conqueror. "As all human powers seemed dissolving visibly before him, his eyes fixed themselves more and more intently upon another vision, transitory, indeed, in one sense, in that it was passing in time, but springing from the council of God, ordained before time, and flowing on till the full tide of its waves is gathered into eternity"<sup>2</sup>—he wrote his *City of God*. There he traces the two commonwealths emerging into life from Adam, and passing away into an eternity they choose. God disposes of the minds of men; of the issues of their conduct; what they are responsible for, what will cause their reward is their good will. The moral worth of their actions is in their hands; their result is ordered by God as He finds best for His providential designs. God's foresight does not cause the thing foreseen. "He who foreknew the causes of all things certainly could not ignore our will which He foreknew to be the cause of our actions."<sup>3</sup> "We do not sin because God foresees it, but because we sin God knows it."<sup>4</sup> Predestination and foreknowledge cannot be separated, though foreknowledge can exist without predestination, as, for instance, in every sin;<sup>5</sup> hence the definition: Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of God's benefices, by which those are most certainly saved whosoever are saved.<sup>6</sup> We will now understand why St. Augustine calls God the Author of good and evil. "God delivers men to shameful passions, God sends the operation of error, that they may believe the lie; it is thus He operates in the hearts of men in any direction He pleases for the good or the

<sup>1</sup> Tournelly: De Deo, vol. i., qu. 11, art. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Allies: Formation of Christendom, vol. i., p. 209.

<sup>3</sup> De Civ. Dei, lib. v., c. 9.

<sup>4</sup> De Civ. Dei, lib. v., c. 10.

<sup>5</sup> De Præd. 55, c. 10.

<sup>6</sup> Lib. de Dono Persev., c. 14.

evil,<sup>1</sup> not because God is the author of sin, or withdraws sufficient grace, but because He permits sin." It is difficult to suppose that, after St. Augustine, the eternal decree concerning our salvation is made without any regard to human worthiness. God wishes all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of truth, but not so that He should deprive them of their free will, for the good or bad use of which they shall be rightly judged.<sup>2</sup>

Many passages, indeed, seem to favor the opinion that grace efficaciously attracts our will, human consent seeming to be imperceptible; the rise of the one apparently overwhelms the other. The only reason for such and the like objections is that the saint had not yet determined the inmost relation between both. Besides, the difficulty is increased by the promiscuous use of predestination to grace and glory. The different schools quote the *same* texts in favor of their systems.<sup>3</sup>

It suffices for us to have shown that the downright predestination couched in the doctrine of Jansenius and the dangerous principles of the extreme Thomists have no foundation in St. Augustine's works. He nowhere upholds the constraining force of the spirit of good or evil in the vast scene of contending mankind; man has to wrestle with his heart; he is responsible for his freedom; the consent is neither extorted nor compelled. Disorders spring up from the perverse will, but are directed to a final order; eternal goodness is vindicated by eternal justice "until the loveliness of this whole temporal dispensation, of which the subordinate parts are those which suit each their own times, runs out like some grand composition of an unspeakably perfect artist, and from it those who, even in the time of faith, rightly worship God pass into the eternal contemplation of Him, face to face."<sup>4</sup>

There is a twofold order in every movement of God's providence; the primal cause, which is God's will itself, ordaining all things to their final end, the secondary causes implanted in His creatures. The irrational creatures are governed by the laws of necessity; the rational by the moral law of God, who never impedes the use of their free will. The operations are necessary, and fall upon God alone; when performed by the former, they are contingent; when enacted by the latter, the will necessarily tends towards beatitude, the universal good is its object.<sup>5</sup> The natural striving after happiness becomes the motor of all our actions, because it is natural that the immovable principle, namely, beatitude, on which the actions of the will are based, should become their cause.<sup>6</sup> Yet

<sup>1</sup> De Gr. et Lib. Arb., c. 21, n. 43.

<sup>2</sup> De Sp. et Litt., c. 33.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Hurter: Theological Dogma, vol. ii., p. 86; Scholion, numb. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Cp. 1385, translated by Allies, l. c., p. 206.

<sup>5</sup> I, 2 qu. 1, a. 3.

<sup>6</sup> I, qu. 82, a. 1.



various may be the nature of the good we desire, good in its essence or only its appearance ; it may or may not have any connection with true happiness, and thus the will, though necessarily determined to the end, is not necessarily determined to the means.<sup>1</sup> To transfer the necessity of the irrational creation to human nature would pervert the whole character of the divine government ; man would only act as he is acted upon by an unchangeable law. The dominion the will has over his acts, whereby it is in his power to wish or not to wish, excludes the determination to *one* thing.<sup>2</sup> It is, therefore, not repugnant to the goodness of God to allow evil, because, if sin should be debarred, divine providence would not govern man according to his nature,<sup>3</sup> and God does not destroy, but preserves, the nature of things ; His motion is appropriate to the being to be moved.<sup>4</sup> The divine goodness is one and single, and is the root of all the goodness that is to be found in created things. But, as individual creatures can but faintly represent the goodness of God, and each only in particular ways, it was needful that He should represent it in many different things, which, by their unity of relation with one another, should reflect in a certain sense the unity and simplicity of the Divine perfection, that each in that endless gradation of creatures might partake of it according to its own nature and capacity.<sup>5</sup> Thus the contingency on our part does not arise from the nature of the secondary cause itself, but from the efficiency of the divine will, by which we are created under such circumstances. God wishes that one thing should happen necessarily, another accidentally and voluntarily. His infallible foreknowledge and the contingency of human acts perfectly agree ; they are moved by God like instruments, their free choice being respected.<sup>6</sup> Even if God should infringe our deliberate determination, there is no reason why our will should not be influenced by Him who gives to it the power of determining itself.<sup>7</sup>

The indifference of the will is not an absolute one, the tendency towards the universal good being innate, but the election of the object, which seems best, is fully in its power. Ullathorne, reproducing St. Thomas, says : As the material and unreasonable creatures, devoid of free will, are governed by the laws of necessity, it is the noble plan of God that man, however divinely assisted, can accept that help, and work out his lot with the use of his freedom. For God has endowed him with a cause that must operate with the supreme cause in determining his course. He can choose the good that is offered to him, whilst the providence of God gives

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<sup>1</sup> I, 2 qu. 10, a. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. theol., c. 142.

<sup>3</sup> Comp. theol., c. 102.

<sup>7</sup> De Malo, qu. 3, a. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Contra Gent., i., 68.

<sup>4</sup> De Malo, qu. 3, a. 2.

<sup>6</sup> De Vero, qu. 21, a. 1.

him the means to achieve it.<sup>1</sup> The operation of God may be in a certain way determined or modified by the free creature. "Causa primaria plus dicitur influere in quantum ejus effectus est intimior et permanentior in causato, quam effectus causæ secundæ; tamen magis similatur causæ secundæ, quia per eam determinatur quodam modo actus causæ secundæ ad hunc effectum."<sup>2</sup> The whole creation exhibits a gradual progress of perfection, the lowest creature reflects the image of God, but the nearer the creature approaches the Creator, the greater becomes its power of determination and the less does God incline it.<sup>3</sup> The self-determination of man requires the non-determination of God.

St. Thomas accepts St. Augustine's definition of predestination.<sup>4</sup> It would be absurd to suppose that our merits *induce* God to raise us into the number of His elect. Whatever in human nature has any relation to the supernatural, belongs to the effects of predestination. Yet, if all our actions were only the result of God's motion, then one man were not better than another, and there could be no difference of reward on earth, nor of glory in heaven.<sup>5</sup> It is erroneous to say that human actions and events are not subject to the divine foreknowledge and predetermination; and not less erroneous is it that necessity is enjoined by them. God ordains things as they act; what is decreed from eternity happens in time according to the disposition of the proper cause.<sup>6</sup> The providence of God overrules that life, giving to everybody what he deserves; man's free will works out God's intention.

St. Thomas, like the great bishop of Hippo, defends human freedom, whenever in contact with divine grace, but where and why both join each other remains undecided.

We add this paragraph to complete the preceding one. The "Summa," written for beginners,—*ad conditionem incipientium*<sup>7</sup>—has been explained in its minutest details. Many and great are the names of the commentators, both among the Dominicans and other theologians. Till Francis Vittoria, however, and Dominic Bañez, the founders of the so-called Thomistic school, we do not find any deviation from St. Thomas's teaching on grace and liberty. Our Holy Father, Leo XIII., recommending in his grand Encyclical on St. Thomas the scholastic doctrine, ordered at the same time the edition of his works containing the commentaries of Cajetan and Ferrariensis. Both belong to the elder Thomistic school; and to avoid long and tiresome quotations, we only shall produce the opinions of these two authors.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> L. c., ch. iv.

<sup>2</sup> De Vero, qu. 22, a. 4.

<sup>3</sup> II dist., 25, qu. 1, a. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Prologus.

<sup>5</sup> De Vero, qu. 5, a. 9.

<sup>6</sup> Lect. Pi. Rom. 8.

<sup>7</sup> Decl. contra Græcos, c. 10.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Schneemann, l. c., Anhang.

Of Cajetan it was said that, if the works of St. Thomas could ever have been lost, they would have been found again in Cajetan's memory. He expressly says that the motion of the first cause undergoes a *modification* in the secondary cause. God does not operate by a previous motion; it suffices that He intrinsically co-operates in the choice and illumination of the intellect; man is free to use or to refuse God's influence.<sup>1</sup> God indeed gives power to the will, suggesting in every act the desire of the good, but the will determines itself to the particular good proposed by God.<sup>2</sup> Referring to our controversy, the cardinal says: "I have not found anything in St. Thomas concerning this doubt, for I do not recollect that he ever touched it, but he always was anxious to save the contingency of free-will."<sup>3</sup>

Ferrariensis, in his celebrated commentaries on the "Summa contra Gentiles," gives the same judgment. Distinguishing between *agi simpliciter*—to be simply moved—and *agi secundum quid*—to be moved indefinitely, he says, that whenever the inclination determines the hitherto indifferent power to a definite act, it simply moves; when the action is moved in such a way that it still remains free to act or not to act, it is moved without a determinate end. The operation of the Holy Ghost is of the second kind, because we have it in our power to follow or to withdraw.<sup>4</sup>

The same were the views of the theologians at the time of the Council of Trent. Schneemann says: "The universal doctrine was that God operates in us the consent through grace, provided we freely co-operate, and only in this manner the grace of God becomes efficacious."<sup>5</sup>

The *ratio studiorum* laying, as we have seen, great stress on theological tradition, gave a new impulse to theological studies. The Jesuits, accepting the fathers and scholastics, tried to shape the whole Catholic doctrine in one harmonious system. Their first great theologians and St. Ignatius himself were educated in the spirit of the older Thomistic school. They and their disciples regarded the *scientia media* as a necessary implement of St. Thomas's theology. We have seen that Lessius maintained it before Molina. Stapleton wrote to the Bishop of Middlebrough that he had heard all the propositions of Lessius twenty-five years before in the lectures of Father Toletus in Rome. The first Jesuit, however, who exhibited the whole doctrine of the order in its full extent was Louis Molina. Born in Cuença, he entered the Society at the age of eighteen, in the year 1555; having finished his studies

<sup>1</sup> In. i., qu. 14, a. 13.

<sup>2</sup> In. i., qu. 22, a. 4 ads.

<sup>3</sup> L. c., i., p. 102. Father Kleutgen, in his great "Theologie der Verzeit," maintains the same doctrine.

<sup>4</sup> In. i., qu. 9, a. 3.

<sup>5</sup> In lib. 4, c. 22, lib. 3, c. 161.

at Coïmbra, he was made professor of theology at Evora. He died in Madrid at the age of sixty-five, renowned for his modesty, piety, and learning. His principal works are a Commentary on the first part of the "Summa," a treatise on right and justice, and the famous "Concordance of Grace and Free-will," published in 1588.

In order to solve the great question, Molina starts with the definition and minute description of human liberty, for the obscurer the subject the safer the way of choosing what is near at hand. Free will is certainly more known and better understood than the hidden working of grace. Molina's definition is that of the scholastics: We are free, because we may do one thing or another; freedom formally lies in the will, but it supposes the judgment of reason, hence it is called "liberum arbitrium." The grace given to the angels and the first man was not efficacious by itself, but changeable (*versatilis*). It became efficacious in those angels who stood the trial; in man it remained inefficient, because he resisted it. Still the essence of human nature was not injured by Adam's fall. Man can perform good actions of the natural order, but neither can his intellect conceive nor his will desire anything proportionate to the supernatural. The supernatural is to be taken in the strictest sense; it is above both angels and men. The least meritorious act is impossible without an actual help of grace. The supernatural actions, though they are such not only by reason of their origin, but by virtue of their essence, retain, nevertheless, a close relation to the soul, because they come forth from its inmost depth and are performed by the faculties of human nature, many natural circumstances coinciding with their accomplishment. Supernatural in their essence and completion, they notwithstanding totally belong to man and totally to God, not, indeed, as if the will had any influence on the supernatural, for anything meritorious attributed to the will requires the touch of grace, but because the human consent is the condition without which grace cannot start to act. The foreseen consent is not by any means the reason or motive why God should pour out His blessings; His aid is entirely gratuitous; He may reserve His grace even if He foresees the consent of man. The *scientia media*, therefore, is the link between efficacious grace and human will. It is necessary to understand fully the meaning of this word.

Molina and his followers distinguish a three-fold science in God: simple intelligence—*scientia simplicis intelligentiæ*; visions—*scientia visionis*, by which He sees the things existing and to come; the science lying between both, *scientia media*, whereby he sees what would happen if certain conditions were fulfilled. The question is not, whether *scientia media* can be reduced to one of the other two; that would be only a play of words, because the condition which

the *scientia media* includes is merely possible, and thus known by the knowledge of simple intelligence; or the condition will be sometimes realized, and then the knowledge arises from vision. The centre of the controversy rests on the point, whether God in the formulation of His decrees is directed by the *scientia media*, that is, whether He predefines any actions of man without taking notice of human liberty.<sup>1</sup> With that knowledge, says Molina, God predestines the one to glory, the other to reprobation. He actually and sincerely desires the salvation of all men, provided they themselves correspond with the graces received. By reason of that will He sent His only begotten Son on earth to be the Saviour of mankind. He does not predestine by a decree efficacious of itself and antecedent to the prevision of the free consent of man; there is no predestination to glory before the prevision of the merits of man; no reprobation without the foreknowledge of the sins that will be committed. Yet there is no coördination of God and man. Whenever something supernatural is attributed to the human will, God is the principal, man only the subordinate cause. The efficiency of grace does not depend in its nature on the will, which cannot contribute anything to the supernatural power; the consent only is the condition that grace may unfold its wonderful works. God, however, can place the will under such circumstances and give such graces that the assent immediately follows, and on this ground Molina also accepts the predestination before the foreseen merits.

The fundamental principle of Molinism is: The nature of grace sufficient and grace efficacious is only one and the same thing. The grace takes effect through the consent of the human will; without it grace remains only sufficient, the same as the sacraments by themselves are channels of grace, but do not operate if the necessary conditions on the part of man are neglected. Molina distinguishes between efficacious grace in the first act (in *actu primo*), where the human consent is wanting; and in the second act (in *actu secundo*), where the consent is given. The difference between the first and inefficacious grace is this, that the first one is given to those whose assent God foresees, whilst the other is given to those who will refuse it. Thus, the *gratia efficax in actu primo* is a far greater benefit than the *gratia inefficax*, because the one will bring forth its fruit, whilst the other will remain barren. Of two men, therefore, who receive the same amount of grace under the same circumstances, the one may coöperate, the other resist; Bossuet, though not a Molinist, clearly showed the wide difference between Molinism and Semipelagianism. That heresy, he says,<sup>2</sup> objected that the necessity of grace ruined the freedom of man, extinguishing all zeal for virtue; the

<sup>1</sup> Tournelly: De Deo, qu. 7, c. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Second Avertissement aux Protestants.

Molinists admit the necessity and gratuity of grace, but deny the antecedent decree of predestination. Molina himself, answering the objections against *scientia media*, says that their opinion at first may seem probable; still, when we consider that God, having foreseen the disposition of our will, makes *this* the measure and rule of His choice, and thus confers the help and means for our salvation, fixed from all eternity, there is no cause for any prejudice against His omnipotence or foreknowledge.<sup>1</sup>

Great theologians like Maldonat, Stapleton, Lessius, Vasquez, Sfondrati, Franzelin, accept the Molinistic system, and St. Francis de Sales calls it old and of authority;<sup>2</sup> not less honorable is the enmity of the Jansenists against Molina's doctrine. When the Concordance was published, the Jesuits as a body never accepted the book, but they defended the *scientia media*, opposing the efficiency of grace by itself.

The *scientia media* met most vigorous adversaries in the Dominicans, who charged Molina with Pelagianism. Other reasons added to the animosity between the two orders. The Jesuits, though a new order, had gained an immense influence in Spain and other countries. Their constitution was entirely different from that of the older orders; the very name Jesuit intimated hypocrisy, if not blasphemy. Melchior Canus saw in them the coming Antichrist and preached in Salamanca against the associates of the devil. The bull "Ascendente Domino," and finally the Concordance brought on the fierce combat.

At the head of the Dominicans stood Dominic Bañez, professor *primarius* in the University of Salamanca, a man of great learning, virtue and energy, ready to carry his point to the extreme. The shield of the Louvain professors was St. Augustine, that of the Dominicans St. Thomas. The exclusive partiality for one author, and that propensity to attribute to St. Thomas what *they* thought to be his opinion, increased here as well as in Louvain the heat of the dispute. The original founder of the Thomistic school was Francis Vittoria, an intimate friend of St. Ignatius, Faber, and Toletus, whose teacher he was. His commentaries on the "Summa" are not printed. Schneemann used a copy of his lectures, preserved in the Vatican library. From these it appears that Vittoria forms a kind of transition from the older to the modern Thomists. Schneemann says, if we consider his doctrine, we see that he is completely opposed to Bañez, who rejected what with Vittoria all ancient and modern theologians accept. Yet there are at the same time certain propositions which, taken by themselves, directly lead to the system of Bañez.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Disp. I., qu. 23, a. 4, ct. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Letter to Lessius, 26 August, 1618.

<sup>3</sup> L. c., II., p. 223.

The fundamental principle of the Thomists is: God is the first cause of all things; He sustains the creature in its being and operation; it is repugnant to His dignity to await the determination of the creature, and make it the rule of His decrees. God Himself is the efficacious cause of everything good, and thus efficaciously wishes the end and the means leading to it, for no secondary cause can operate unless it is efficaciously moved by God. He not only wishes the act, but decrees it to be free, and thus His motion does not draw the will as something lifeless, but enlivens it and disperses the clouds from the intellect for the better choice of the object. Since God, together with the freedom of the act, determines its existence, His foreknowledge arises from its causality. The disposition of the creature cannot have any influence on Him, nor be the condition of His efficient gifts, *because that very disposition is the work of God.* Bañez's whole system will be best understood in his doctrine on Divine permission of sin. Denying the *scientia media*, he was compelled to say that the permission *precedes* the foresight of the refusal on the part of man. Thus going to the extreme, he maintained that God *probably* does not wish the salvation of all men.<sup>1</sup> He elected some for eternal life, some He disdained and despised, yet this contempt is nothing else than the will to allow them to fail in their last end. Bañez's followers, Billuart, Lemos, Alvarez, Bellarmin, and the others did not accept the harshness of this doctrine, which can hardly be excused from heresy. The Thomists rejected the severe conclusions of their master, but having the honest persuasion that Molina was renewing the Pelagian heresy, they followed the great Dominican in the struggle against the Jesuits.

The Inquisition found no fault in Molina's work. Bañez's complaints, brought before Rome, ended in prohibiting the mutual charges of heresy and imposing silence on both parties. The Dominicans, however, continued their attacks with a violence which even the ardor of dispute could not excuse. The Pope finally decided to bring the whole question before a tribunal, called the *Congregatio de Auxiliis*. The public sessions and disputes were without avail. Pope Paul V. dismissed both parties, advising them to wait till the Holy See should decide the problem at some future time. The general impression, however, the *congregatio* left was a condemnation *in petto* of Molina's system, which, in fact, was almost accomplished on two occasions. The first session took place January 2d, 1598; the last, August 28th, 1607. The question remained unsettled. The Jansenists pretended that their victorious delectation does not vary from the grace efficacious of

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<sup>1</sup> Qu. 23, a. 23.

itself, taught by the Dominicans, but the difference between the two is great. The victorious *indeliberate* delectation of the Jansenists destroyed the freedom of the will; the efficacious grace of the Thomists means an enlightenment of the intellect and a strengthening of the will. The great controversy, and the Thomists above all, had to serve as a cover for the propagation of the subtlest heresy ever known in the Church.

Whether or not there was between St. Cyran, Jansenius and the others a secret association, a common plan of attack against the Church, drawn up by the sectaries at Bourg-Fontaine, is one of those problems which history has not solved satisfactorily.<sup>1</sup> Though from the evidence known thus far we are inclined to answer in the affirmative, the question is practically of not much importance, and beyond the scope of our essay. It is certain that all the causes enumerated met, like many strings tied in one knot, at Port Royal, the headquarters of Jansenism. The simple and solitary life of its inhabitants, the precision and elegance of their works, before unknown in the French language, generally increased the strength of that heresy. Nothing seduces more than a beautiful style combined with an apparently earnest doctrine and the fame of a virtuous and austere life led by its author. But foul ambition, conspicuous by its rigorism and contemptuous perseverance in errors repeatedly condemned by the Church, overshadow the glory of Port Royal. Its members proved themselves deplorably ignorant of the past and present of the religion they yet professed. They pretended to master and to exhaust the patrology and history of the Church. Whenever submission was required, they only admitted attenuated theories suiting their own frail system. The woe and misery brought on the Church by that heresy were great, but Jansenism to-day is, like the rest of the heresies, only a matter of history.

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<sup>1</sup> Darras, vol. iv., p. 279.