

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD DEMONSTRATED.

I.

TO deny the existence of God has for about a century been considered by certain men as the highest wisdom, as the very perfection of philosophy. Many thinkers of modern times, pretending to have attained a deeper insight into the nature of the human mind than the ancients, boast of having discovered that the idea of God is a mere illusion, resulting from our subjective framework. Others, searching into matter and its forces, have found that the material world bears in itself the sufficient reason both of its existence and its phenomena, and needs no outward cause to produce it and put order into it. Theism, therefore, was, as they say, only the result of the ignorance of former ages, cherished by priests and tyrants in their own interests; man admitted the existence of God because, not yet advanced in science, he could not account for the astounding works of nature without, and the complicated operations of the mind within himself, but by supposing an Almighty power beyond the sphere of his senses. Were such language confined to the lecture-halls of a few professors we might be amused at its bombast. But philosophical errors, particularly in a point of such importance, always have their issues in practical life in the morals of individuals as well as of society. Moreover, atheism, though clad in the majestic garb of science, yet comes down condescendingly to the level of the common people to undeceive them of their superstitious fear and of belief in God, and to initiate them into the wisdom of the new gospel. Among all classes of society books and periodicals are spread tending to ridicule the belief in God; men of talent live, as it were, on propagating atheism, and seem to have made it their profession to root out the fear of God from the hearts of the rich and the poor; not a few institutions of learning, lower and higher, systematically train our youth to ignore or deny the Supreme Being, on which man, as its creature, is dependent. It is, therefore, necessary to show by all means the inconsistency of atheistical tenets, and to evidence with undeniable proofs this main truth of God's existence, fundamental to the scientific and the moral order.

However, before entering upon such a task, it is suitable first to inquire into the ways in which we acquire the idea of God and the conviction of His existence. The validity of the demonstration, by which we endeavor both to evince this truth and to refute the objections made against it, depends greatly on the preliminary inquiry as to the manner in which we arrive at the idea of God. We shall,

therefore, in this essay answer three questions : first, in what way is the existence of God knowable to man ? secondly, by what proofs does the theist demonstrate it ? thirdly, on what grounds does the atheist deny it ?

I. *In what way is the Existence of God Knowable to Man ?*

God being the purest spirit, the way in which philosophers think Him to be known to us is closely connected with their views on the mode in which immaterial objects are manifested to the human mind. The proofs, therefore, which they use to demonstrate His existence are not only different, as they hold different theories on the origin of ideas, but even scarcely intelligible, if not traced back in some way to psychology. For to see through the reasons why a supramundane being is to be admitted as the cause of the universe we must needs know how it reaches our mind, whether immediately by itself, or mediately through material beings, and, if the latter be the case, how the visible can lead or determine our intellect to the cognizance of the invisible. Now, there are at present various psychological systems more or less opposed to one another. It was not thus in the Middle Ages, when scholastic philosophy had its full sway in the schools, and the tenets regarding the origin of ideas were everywhere the same. Modern thinkers of the last two centuries, partly not knowing, partly despising ancient philosophy, gave rise to a multitude of psychological systems, each one of them becoming in turn the battlefield of fierce controversies. Consequently, if the existence of God was not altogether denied, different methods were attempted of treating of the Supreme Being. For this reason, whoever nowadays is about to demonstrate the existence of God, ought also to lay down the idealogical tenets he follows, and thus to point out the principle from which he means to start, and the road by which he hopes to reach the goal. Nay, more, he must also show the deficiency of the methods opposed to his, not only because his own will be put in a clearer light, and its solidity be more apparent, if the falsity of those opposed to it is disclosed, but also because the attempts to prove the existence of God by arguments not solid and conclusive have given many advantages to atheists. Such unsound demonstrations they easily demolish, and then boast of having overthrown all the proofs advanced for the existence of a personal God, and of being unhurt by all the attacks of the theists. We should, therefore, reject what is really false and unsolid, and avow it to be so ; we should strive to put forth such reasons as are not founded on false or doubtful theories, but rest on certain principles, and are not at variance with experience, else we shall do harm to the cause of truth rather than

advance it. First, then, let us inquire in what way God's existence is not known to man, and then in what way it is.

In treating of false methods I shall confine myself to those only which are still at present followed, or at least supposed to be followed, either in the schools or outside of them. First of all is to be mentioned that of merely subjective impulse. It was invented by Reid. After David Hume had, by denying the objective value of rational cognition, established skepticism in its full extent, Reid would maintain at least the objective reality of the general principles of self, of the outside world, and of God. He granted that reason by itself could not prove their existence; but over it, as its regulator, and as the foundation of all certainty, he put common-sense, a faculty which reached and apprehended those fundamental truths, not by the comparison of ideas, nor by inference, nor by perceiving any reason of them, but by a merely subjective impulse which we cannot resist. Kant combined Hume's and Reid's tenets into one system. By his innate forms of the cognoscitive faculties he denied the veracity of the senses, the understanding, and the theoretical reason, and thus not less than Hume set forth universal skepticism. But feeling himself in opposition to the convictions of mankind, particularly in regard to the existence of God, he resorted to practical reason as a remedy for the shortcomings of his theory. Like Reid's common-sense, Kant's practical reason attains no evidence, reaches no insight into objective truth, but admits certain postulates, because they are forced on it by the subjective necessity of our nature. As to the existence of God, which is one of them, he reasons in the following way: Rational nature lays upon us the law of the moral order with absolute necessity, yet by its own authority and intrinsic constitution, not by receiving it through cognition from a higher power. In this life, however, the moral order can never be perfectly put into execution, since the sensible nature cannot be fully subjected to reason, nor can happiness be enjoyed in proportion to virtue. As reason, nevertheless, tells us that it ought to be so, we are forced to think that there must be a cause which shall realize our happiness and reduce nature to perfect harmony with morality. This cause, no doubt intelligent, we call God. It has often been said that this reasoning of the German Aristotle is of astounding depth, and far more solid than the proofs brought forward by other schoolmen. Atheists even quite willingly admit this, not because they are convinced by the argument, but because they can easily refute it and thus glory in a splendid victory. For both Kant's and Reid's way of establishing the truth of the existence of God is not tenable at all, because repugnant to rational nature and intrinsically contradictory. It is the very nature of all cognoscitive faculties to tend toward

apprehending their object, and not to rest or to adhere to it before they have perceived it in some respect as it is in itself. Every rational or intellectual faculty in particular is by its intrinsic constitution fitted to attain the essence of its objects and penetrate the reason of things, and therefore it cannot acquiesce in a truth except it perceives for the same an intrinsic or extrinsic reason, nor produce in us a certain and firm conviction except it presents us a motive to judge that our assent is true and cannot be false. Common-sense, therefore, of rational nature, which firmly adheres to certain judgments without seeing any reason for them, either by the comparison of ideas or by inference, and practical reason, which is forced to admit certain postulates without any intrinsic or extrinsic evidence of the object, involve contradiction in their very conceptions.

Kant, moreover, predicates the fallaciousness of theoretical reason on the ground that the forms of its cognitions result not from the object, but from the frame of the mind, and he adds that practical reason also is forced to assume certain postulates, among them the existence of God, not in virtue of an objective reason, but a merely subjective bent of the mind. Reid, too, grants both the insufficiency of reason left to itself to attain objective truth and its proneness to error and fallacy. But how is it possible that for the very subjective impulse, for which theoretical reason is unreliable, practical reason should be true? How can one faculty of rational nature be declared essentially deceitful, and the other, just for the reason that it belongs to our nature, be considered as infallible? In such systems, and consequently also in demonstration based on them, the preceding part destroys the following, and one tenet gainsays the other.

F. H. Jacobi, "the Sage of Pempelfort," tried to counteract Kant's philosophy, and to save from skepticism the reality of supersensible objects, as: God, providence, free-will, immortality, and morality. Following quite a different way he supposes three faculties in man: the senses, the organ for the material; reason, the organ for the immaterial; understanding, which gives our perceptions their form and reduces them to unity. The understanding, he admits, with its dialectical procedure and its conclusions grounded on the principle of causality, cannot reach the divinity as distinct from the world, but must needs end in atheism and nihilism. But reason, he thinks, perceives the immaterial immediately or intuitively, and in an analogous way, as the senses perceive the material. It is, says he, merely passive in perceiving, since it only receives an impression from the object, and does by no means judge or draw conclusions. Its cognitions, therefore, resting on no ground or proof, are termed by him sometimes senti-

ments or feelings, sometimes mere belief. It would not have been necessary to mention Jacobi's philosophy of non-science, as he himself calls it, had he not had a good many followers, and were not modern mysticism, that makes of religion only a matter of feeling, to a great extent based on his tenets. From what we have said against Kant, the falsity of Jacobi's philosophical system is evident, for into Kantism he more or less falls back, however much he tries to refute it. He, too, declares one faculty of our intellectual nature to be intrinsically fallacious; he, too, takes the conviction of reason for blind necessity, denying it any insight into objective truth and into the reason and causes of things, with only this difference, that Kant thinks the postulates of practical reason to result from the necessity of the subject, while Jacobi holds the axioms of reason to be blindly impressed on it by the necessity of the object. The blindness of his belief is well expressed by his saying that reason as well as the senses are in their perceptions merely passive; that is, merely perceiving an impression from the object. If that be so then there is no essential difference between cognition and the impression which a falling stone makes in the water; then cognition ceases to be an immanent act of the subject representing the object as it is in itself.

Plato showed greater genius when he taught God and immaterial objects in general to be known to man by innate ideas. Des Cartes and his school followed him in this regard, at least as far as God is concerned. Of this method I shall not speak in particular, since it is to be reduced to that of immediate intuition, and will, consequently, be refuted together with this. Des Cartes resorted to innate ideas because he thought the idea of the infinite could neither be impressed on our mind by finite and contingent beings, nor be gathered from them, since that which produces an idea or from which an idea may be gathered must contain the perfections of the object mentally represented. But nothing that is finite contains the perfections of what is infinite; consequently he concludes that God Himself stamps the idea of the infinite on our mind by the very act of creation.¹ Were it so God would also be the object immediately determining us to this idea. For, indeed, if what objectively determines the mind to it is finite, all his reasoning above is false, and he must allow that something finite may produce in us the idea of the infinite. Yet, what immediately and as an object determines our mind to a conception is also immediately or intuitively seen. According to Des Cartes's principles, therefore, God must be known to us by immediate intuition.² True,

¹ Des Cartes's school taught that the essence of the soul consisted in actual thought; many ontologists hold the same opinion.

² See F. Kleutgen, *Philosophie der Vorzeit*, II Band, n. 935-937, first edition.

he himself tried to take another way, but inconsistently. His disciples quite legitimately inferred the necessity of immediate intuition of God, and thus started a new system,—Ontologism.

According to the ontologists we see God intuitively as He is in Himself, and consequently also attain His existence, not by demonstration, but directly, though it be by reflexion on the intuitive act known more clearly and distinctly. For, as they say, by our direct intuition we are not cognizant of the divine essence, but either of the divine intellect containing the ideas of all things, or of God's creative act, or of the absolute and necessary being; and also this intuition is not granted to us separately from other acts, but is implied in our conceptions of finite beings, for which reason it is neither clear nor does it fall at first on our consciousness. However, they think to discover Him in our direct cognitions by a more careful reflection, and to obtain a distinct and determinate notion of His perfections by attention to the contingent beings that flow from Him as their source. Their assertions they base on the following reasons: that the material cannot produce in us the idea of the spiritual, as the finite cannot arouse the idea of the infinite; that the finite and the contingent are essentially relative to the infinite and the necessary, and therefore cannot be conceived without the notion of the two latter; that nothing can determine our mind to cognition but what exists, yet that the contingent is neither being nor existing by itself, and consequently cannot act on us by itself; that the universal, eternal, and necessary essences of finite beings are nothing in themselves, and not real, but in God, in His essence, omnipotence, and intellect; and are, consequently, not revealed to us but by Him; lastly, that God, being intimately present to us, determines our mind to His intuition.¹

The great advantage of this system, we are told, is the harmony.

¹ The ontologists attribute to the scholastics, at least to those of modern times, the opinion once maintained by Des Cartes, that the immediate object we perceive by our direct acts is not the thing outside us, but its image or representation within the cognitive faculty. They likewise say that according to scholastic views the intellectual act is performed by the faculty or the subject alone without any concurrence of the object. For this reason they call their system ontologism, because, according to it, the object itself is seen by us, and term that of the scholastics psychologism, because, according to it, we directly perceive only a phenomenon of the mind. But in one assertion, as well as in the other, the ontologists are entirely wrong. The ideas or species are not that of which we are directly cognizant, but that by which we are cognizant of an outside object: non id, quod, sed id, quo cognoscimus. Their error seems to arise from their not distinguishing in scholastic writings between the idea considered objectively and the idea considered subjectively or formally, between the image itself and the object represented by it. The concurrence of the object with the subject to perform the cognitive act is taught by the scholastics, ancient and modern, in the clearest terms; they require, just on this account, the *species impressa* originating from the object.

it professes to establish between the ontological and the psychological order; the derivation of all things from their supreme principle by the synthetic method, the contemplation of all truth in the divine, increate light. Indeed, very lofty ideas seem at first sight to be embodied in these theories. Yet the question is, whether they rest on sound principles and can be proved by solid reasons. This, however, must be denied, for ontologism is repugnant to human nature and to experience.¹

The nature of man being one, his operation also must be reduced to unity. On this account must not only the lower faculties of the senses be subordinate to the higher, to the intellect and the will, but also the latter depend on the former as their necessary instruments. Consequently the intellect draws its first conceptions from objects perceived and thus presented to it by the senses, and analogically with them forms ideas of the immaterial. Again, the immediate object of our cognition must be proportioned to the nature of our intellect, and therefore, as this is the faculty of a soul united to a body, the intelligible truth of matter must first and directly be known to us. St. Thomas² expounds and proves this fundamental tenet of scholastic philosophy again and again, but particularly in the eighty-fifth question of the first part of the *Summa Theologica*. Having laid down as a principle that the knowable object must be proportioned to the cognitive faculty, he infers, first, that for the senses, since they are bodily organs, the proper objects are the forms individually existing in matter, as they

¹ On ontologism, its tenets, its intrinsic repugnance, its condemnation by the Holy See, Father Kleutgen, S. J., has written a very learned and interesting treatise. It was first (in 1867) published in *Der Katholik*, of Mentz, and later added as a supplement to his renowned work on ancient philosophy. Many of our remarks are taken from thence.

² *Summa Theolog.*, i., p. 9, 85, art. 1. Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, 9, 80, art. 2, et 9, 84, art. 7, objectum cognoscibile proportionatur virtuti cognoscitivæ. Est autem triplex gradus cognoscitivæ virtutis. Quædam enim cognoscitiva virtus est actus organi corporalis, scilicet sensus; et ideo objectum cuiuslibet sensitivæ potentiæ est forma prout in materia existit. Et quia huiusmodi materia est individuationis principium, ideo omnis potentia sensitivæ partis est cognoscitiva particularium tantum. Quædam autem virtus cognoscitiva est, quæ neque est actus organi corporalis, neque est aliquo modo corporali materiæ conjuncta, sicut intellectus angelicus; et huius virtutis cognoscitivæ objectum est forma sine materia subsistens. Etsi enim materialia cognoscant, non tamen nisi in immaterialibus ea intuentur, vel in se ipsis, vel in Deo. Intellectus autem humanus medio modo se habet; non enim est actus alicuius organi, sed tamen est quædam virtus animæ, quæ est forma corporis, et ex supradictis patet (9 F. 6, art. 1), et ideo proprium ejus est cognoscere formam in materia quidem corporali individualiter existens, non tamen prout est in tali materia. Cognoscere vero id, quod est in materia individuali, non prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia individuali, quam representant phantasmata. Et ideo necesse est dicere, quod intellectus noster intelligit materialia abstrahendo a phantasmatibus; et per materialia sic considerata in immaterialium aliquam cognitionem devenimus; sicut e contra Angeli per immaterialia materialia cognoscunt.

individually exist in it; then, that the angels, being pure spirits, and not united to a body, have for their proper object the immaterial, and see in or through it the material; last, that the human intellect, being the faculty of a soul embodied in matter, knows as its proper object the forms individually existing in matter, though not as they individually exist in it, and is cognizant of the immaterial only from the material. "The human intellect," says he, "is the faculty of a soul, which is the form of a body. Therefore it is peculiar to it to be cognizant of the form individually existing in matter, though not in the manner in which it individually exists in the same." After having remarked that such cognition is achieved by abstracting the form from individual matter as represented by the acts or images of our fancy, he concludes: "And, therefore, we must needs say that our intellect is cognizant of material objects by abstracting (their forms) from the images of fancy, and that from the material thus conceived it attains some knowledge of the immaterial, as on the contrary the angels know the material from the immaterial."

This dependence of the intellect on the senses, and on the fancy in particular and proximately, here inferred from the union of our soul with the body, St. Thomas elsewhere confirms from facts and instances of daily experience.¹ First, if our organs of sensation are not developed, or are hurt or hindered in their activity, the intellect also is prevented from action, so as to be unable to acquire new notions, or even to make use of those already acquired. Yet the intellect is no organic faculty. The reason, then, why, the senses being inactive, intellectual activity is impeded too, can lie only in its dependence on the sensitive operations. Again, if we strive to understand something, we form images of it by our fancy in order to see in them as in resemblances what we endeavor to know intellectu-

¹ S. Th., p. i., 9, 84, art. 7. Respondeo dicendum, quod impossibile est intellectum nostrum secundum præsentis vite statum, quo passibili corpori conjungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata. Et hoc duobis indiciis apparet. Primo quidem, quia cum intellectus sit vis quædam non utens corporali organo, nullo modo impediretur in suo actu per læsionem alicuius corporalis organi, si non requireretur ad eius actum actus alicuius potentie utentis organo corporali. Utuntur autem organo corporali sensus et imaginatio et aliæ vires pertinentes ad partem sensitivam. Unde manifestum est, quod ad hoc, quod intellectus actu intelligat, non solum scientiam accipiendo de novo, sed etiam utendo scientia jam acquisita, requiritur actus imaginationis et ceterarum virtutum. Videmus enim quod impedito actu virtutis imaginativæ per læsionem organi ut in phreneticis, et similiter impedito actu memorativæ virtutis, ut in lethargicis, impeditur homo ab intelligendo in actu etiam ea, quorum scientiam prææcepit.

Secundo, quia hoc quilibet in se ipso experiri potest, quod quando aliquis conatur aliquid intelligere, format sibi aliqua phantasmata per modum exemplorum, in quibus quasi inspicit quod intelligere studet. Et inde est etiam, quod quando aliquem volumus facere aliquid intelligere, proponimus ei exempla, ex quibus sibi phantasmata formare possit ad intelligendum. See also S. Th., p. i., 9, 84, art. 8.

ally. For the same reason, if we intend to make somebody understand a truth, we propose him examples, from which we may form images in his fancy. A striking illustration, indeed, of how the intellect needs the help of the senses, and contemplates the immaterial through the likeness of the material.

From these premises the impossibility of the immediate intuition of God follows evidently. God is the purest spirit, most remote from all materiality, infinitely perfect and sublime as to his essence and attributes; consequently, he is also least proportioned to our intellect and least knowable to our minds by immediate cognition. St. Thomas, in fact, having proved in general that no rational creature can see God intuitively by the natural power of the intellect, there being no proportion between a finite faculty and an infinite object,¹ still shows in particular man's incapability of attaining the intuition of the Divinity during this life, because the human soul, being united to a material body, naturally cannot know anything but the forms of matter and what may be deduced from these.² Ontologism is directly opposed to all these tenets and principles. It destroys man's unity in nature and in operation, as Plato, from whom it originates, once had done; it does not accord our activity to our nature or proportion the object of our cognition to our being; it makes no longer of the lower faculties the necessary instruments of the higher, and denies the dependence of the intellect on the senses; for, according to its theories, not from the senses does the intellect receive its peculiar object, but from the infinite being itself, and not from the sensible objects does it know the supersensible, but, on the contrary, through the light of the supersensible it understands the sensible, and from the immaterial the material. It is on such suppositions and by such assertions that the ontologist arrives at the necessity of the immediate intuition of God.

That this intuition does not exist in our mind we can prove, not only from the nature of man, as we have just done, but also from our own consciousness. The proof may be reduced to the following terms. If we saw God intuitively, we should be conscious of our seeing Him so. But we have no such consciousness; consequently we do not see God intuitively. But why should we be

¹ S. Th., p. i., 9, 12, art. 4.

² S. Th., p. i., 9, 12, art. 11. Respondeo dicendum, quod ab homine puro Deus videri per essentiam non potest, nisi ab hac vita mortali separetur. Cujus ratio est, quia, sicut supra dictum est, art. 4 hujus quaestionis, modus cognitionis sequitur modum naturae rei cognoscentis. Anima autem nostra, quamdiu in hac vita vivimus, habet esse in materia corporali, unde actualiter non cognoscit aliqua, nisi quae habent formam in materia, vel quae per huiusmodi cognosci possunt. Manifestum est autem quod per naturas rerum naturalium divina essentia cognosci (*videri*) non potest. Ostensum est enim supra art. 1 et 9 huius quaestionis, quod cognitio Dei per quamcunque similitudinem creatam non est visio essentiae ipsius. Unde impossibile est animae hominis secundum hanc vitam viventis essentiam Dei videre.

conscious of the intuition of God if we really enjoyed it? Because we may be conscious of any distinct act or cognition of our mind, at least if we try to call our attention upon it; generally we are conscious of it without or even against our will. Thus, no doubt, we have a very clear consciousness of our cognitive acts regarding sensible objects. We ought, consequently, also to be conscious of our seeing God intuitively, and the more so, if, as the ontologists say, in this light we see all other objects, they having intelligibility not in themselves, but in God. For if this be so, then the Divine Being is that which first and chiefly strikes our intellect, which is first and most clearly known to us; it is the source from which all other objects flow, and from which, if they are not seen flowing, they are not knowable at all. Therefore, if the immediate intuition of God were granted to us, we should be conscious of it more distinctly than of any other cognizance; we should be aware of it as the clearest, the most certain cognition we have, as the light and the source of all our knowledge. Yet we are not conscious of having such a cognition of God. The ontologists themselves grant it when they take refuge in habitual intuition; for by habitual intuition they understand one that is perpetually as an act in our mind, but escapes our consciousness. In reality man is not conscious of knowing God more clearly than sensible objects, and of having a fuller evidence of His existence than of his own self and this material world, else there would be no atheism and no gross errors about the Supreme Being; he does not inquire into the properties of matter by contemplating the Divinity, but, on the contrary, illustrates spiritual and divine truth by similitudes taken from material things; he does not form an immediate judgment that this world takes existence from God by creation, but finds its true origin only by reasoning. These facts, undeniably true and real, show that we are not conscious of the intuition of God, and that consequently we have no such intuition.

Its not existing in our minds is also proved from another fact. Certainly nobody on earth will say that he is perfectly happy. But the intuitive cognition of God necessarily produces full bliss and happiness in the soul. God by his intimate presence immediately determining us to his intuition, fills our intellect with His infinite truth, and our will with His infinite goodness, as much as they are capable of, and in the most perfect way. In this consists the happiness of a rational creature. Since, then, we do not enjoy complete happiness during this life, it follows that we have no immediate intuition of God.¹

¹ These two reasons are alleged also by St. Thomas against those who in or before his times thought, like the ontologists, that God is the first object of our cognition as He is the First Being and the Supreme Cause. He says: *Quidam dixerunt, quod*

Here, however, we meet with serious objections on the part of the ontologists. Our natural intuition of God, say they, is not a clear one, nor do we during this life see the divine essence, but we see only His creative act, or His idea, or the absolutely necessary being, which, though it is God, yet is not known to us to be God directly and immediately. Indeed, they have very good reasons to make exceptions, since here not only a fact of experience but also a dogma of faith comes into the question. It is necessary to say a few words for the solution of this objection. The very idea of immediate intuition excludes obscurity. In general of all cognitions those are the clearest which are immediate or intuitive, because they result from the influence of the object itself on the cognitive faculty, and, therefore, most distinctly represent it as it is in itself. Obscurity may arise in our cognitions from two causes; either from the insufficient presence of the object to the faculty, or from the circumstance that we have to deduce the conception of one thing from another, in which it is not adequately contained or manifested. From the latter cause the intuition of God, as taught by the ontologists, cannot be obscure; for it is immediate. Neither can insufficient presence cause obscurity in it; for God is, as the ontologists fully agree and constantly repeat, intimately present to our soul, and by conserving and supporting our being constantly acts on us. Now if His presence determines our mind to intuition, our intellect is entirely pervaded with its fulness of objective light, with the light of the Divinity itself, and must, consequently, see the latter with the greatest clearness. This being so, it is also evident that whoever sees God immediately, intuitively and clearly knows also His essence, and that whoever by cognition is cognizant of the absolute and necessary being, directly perceives it also to be God. For, on account of His absolute and complete simplicity, there is in God no real distinction and composition whatsoever; His acts and His absolute attributes are His essence itself. If, therefore, God exhibits Himself to our mind immediately, not under the shade of figures and creatures, and consequently as He is in Himself, we cannot see His ideas or His creative act without seeing His essence, nor His absolute being without seeing His Godhead; we must, on the contrary, by the very act of immediate

primū, quod a mente humana cognoscitur, etiam in hac vita est Deus, qui est prima veritas, et per hanc omnia alia cognoscuntur. Sed hoc aperte est falsum: quia cognoscere Deum per essentiam, est hominis beatitudo, unde sequeretur omnem hominem beatum esse. Et præterea cum in divina essentia omnia, quæ dicuntur de ipsa, sint unum, nullus erraret circa ea, quæ de Deo dicuntur, quod experimento patet esse falsum: et iterum ea, quæ sunt prima in cognitione intellectus, oportet esse certissima, unde intellectus certus est, se ea intelligere, quod patet in proposito non esse. Opusc. 70. Super Beth. de Trin., 9, 1, art. 3.

intuition know His wisdom, His power, and His absolute necessity to be His Divinity.

Moreover, according to the ontologists, we know God intuitively as far as He is the light and intelligibility of all knowable objects, the source of all finite essences, the cause of all existences, the absolute and necessary being. Yet we cannot know Him thus without seeing clearly and penetrating His essence. For the essence of God consists in His absolute necessity, or in His infinite perfection; but by His absolute necessity He is the last cause of contingent existences, and by His infinite perfection the source of all finite essences, of all being, and thus, also, of all intelligibility. Consequently, if we see in God, what the ontologists tell us we do, we must see His essence; and clearly and penetratingly too, because we know it as eminently containing all things in the infinite abundance of its perfection and constituting them in their essence and their existence.

But what shall we say about the reasons which the ontologists advance for their system? The two principal ones we shall consider soon, the others in the course of our discussion as occasion shall offer. First we heard them say that what is contingent has being and existence not by itself but by God, since the being of an object is its intelligibility. No doubt contingent beings have their existence not from themselves, but from the creative act of God. Yet if they are once created they have being and existence distinct from God, though still sustained and supported by His almighty power, for were they not distinct from God they would be divine, which is sheer pantheism. Having their own entity and existence distinct from that of any other being, and also of God, they have also their own intelligibility and their own power to act on our senses and to awaken through them our intellect. It is, for this reason, utterly false that contingent beings are not intelligible in themselves, but only in God. True, they always have an essential relation to God as their last cause and source; but our intellect being finite and imperfect, is not at once cognizant of all that is knowable of an object, but knows one of its properties after the other. Thus we know many a thing first as to its being considered in itself, and then as to its dependence on a cause which produces it. Yet, again, of this efficient cause we do not instantly know the specific nature, but find it after further reflection and inquisition. In the same way man may have a notion of beings which are contingent without being aware that they are contingent; and, again, after some reasoning he may discover that they are such, and consequently dependent on a cause, without yet knowing that they imply dependence on an infinite cause. If the ontologists insist on the non-intelligibility of the contingent, they must also deny

its own being and its distinction from God. This is one of the reasons why their system has been justly accused of containing the germs of pantheism.

The other reason, alleged as a chief support of ontologism, is the following : Whenever we think of an existing contingent being, we perceive in it an essence universal, eternal, necessary, and immutable. Now this essence is on the one hand no fiction of the mind, but real and, therefore, existing, and yet on the other hand cannot exist in the contingent beings themselves, they being as to their existence individual, temporal, not necessary, and mutable. Where, then, can such essences exist and from where may they be understood ? In God alone, it is answered ; because He alone is necessary, eternal, and immutable. Two very important tenets of ontologism seem thus to be well founded : the first is, that we cannot know any contingent being intellectually or as to its essence but in God ; the second is, that the universals (the essences common to many individuals and predicable of many) are, as far as they are real, God Himself. What is to be said in reply to this objection ? The metaphysical essences are, no doubt, no fiction of the mind, but have their objective reality. Yet it must be denied that whatever is real exists in itself. That also is real which is contained in or founded on an existing being ; for most certainly what is such, though it does not yet exist in itself, is no product of our mind or our abstractions. Now the finite essences are really contained in the contingent that exists ; for they are made actual and embodied, as it were, in it, just as the model is expressed in the statue carved after it. For this reason we can conceive the finite essences in and from contingent beings that exist, though, in order to have them universal and necessary, we must abstract them from the individual properties and accidental notes with which they are joined, and from the temporal existence which they have in the concrete. However, the existent beings, which we directly perceive, are not the last ground of these essences for the reason mentioned above, that the latter are eternal and necessary, whereas the former are contingent and temporal. What, then, may be this ground ? No doubt a necessary, eternal, immutable, self-existing being. It is not, however, necessary that they themselves exist as such a being ; it is only required that an absolute being exists, which is necessarily their foundation. The divine essence being participable and imitable outside itself is in reality, and on account of its being the only absolute, infinite, and self-existent being can also alone be the reason of them all. Nevertheless, in saying so we evidently differ from the ontologists. We firmly maintain that God's infinite essence is the last foundation of all finite essences ; yet we do not say, as the ontologists do, but, on the contrary, most explicitly, deny that

He is Himself the universal, necessary, and eternal essences of finite things, and that there is between Him and them no real distinction. This we must disavow; first, because else the universal would exist as such, which is absurd, and secondly, because, if God Himself were the finite essences as far as they are real, His simple and indivisible essence would also be in the finite beings as their essence, and we should say both God is humanity and materiality and humanity and materiality are God. But are these not pantheistic errors? Here we have another reason why ontologism is considered as leading to pantheism.

If nevertheless the authority of St. Thomas is appealed to, because he sometimes with St. Augustine calls God the light in which we know all things, it is not difficult to infer from his own words a meaning quite contrary to the teachings of the ontologists. He himself explains his mind at least in four different places of the first part of the *Summa Theologica*, where he discusses the question how God is the light of all our knowledge.¹ We know all things, he repeatedly inculcates, in the light of the first truth, not because God is the first object of which we are cognizant, but because our intellectual light, that is our intellectual power, is a participation of His intellect and created by Him to the imitation of the divine intellect.

After all, then, the method of the ontologists in evidencing the existence of God cannot be considered as solid and safe. Though it may have put on a scientific appearance, and it may be highly praised by its admirers as the only true philosophical system and the only sure way of refuting atheism, its very foundation is a mere fiction. There is no immediate intuition of God granted to us during this life; the unity and the finiteness of human nature reject it, our own consciousness testifies against it, the reasons alleged for it are not only not tenable, but, on the contrary, imply pantheism.²

¹ 9, 12, art. 2 et 11 ad 3; 9, 84, art. 5; 9, 88, art. 3 ad 1.

² It is claimed that, though ontologism has been condemned by the Holy See, yet not every form of it has been condemned. We must, therefore, consider in what way this condemnation was brought about. In 1861 the Congregation of the Roman Inquisition censured seven propositions as being such as could not be taught safely. I shall mention the first and the third. I. Propositio. Immediata Dei cognitio, habitualis saltem, intellectui humano essentialis est, ita ut sine ea nihil cognoscere possit, siquidem est ipsum lumen intellectuale. The immediate cognition of God, at least that which is habitual, is essential to the human intellect, so that without such cognition it cannot know anything at all, this cognition being the very intellectual light. III. Propositio. Universalis a parte rei considerata a Deo realiter non distinguuntur. The universals considered in their reality are not really distinct from God. The ontologists, then pretty numerous in France, generally thought that this condemnation was aimed at German pantheism. However, L. B. S. Brancheran, S. S., before publishing a new edition of his work, *Prælectiones philosophicæ in majori Seminaris Claromontensis primo habitæ*, deemed it prudent to ask the competent authority about the bearing of the said condemnation. Accordingly he condensed his system of ontologism into

From the principles and tenets laid down thus far it will now not be difficult to determine in what way God is knowable to man. As the object directly proportioned to human nature is the essence of sensible things, and as our intellect in general gathers the knowledge of the immaterial from the material, we cannot know God but from

fifteen propositions, and through the Arch.bishop of Tours and the Bishop of Nantes put the question to the Holy See whether they were or not implied in the seven propositions condemned in 1861. Cardinal Patrizi, then Secretary of the Congregation of the Inquisition, in 1862, replied to the Bishop of Nantes that the fifteen propositions in question scarcely differed from the seven already condemned and ought to be taught no longer, a decision to which L. Brancheran submitted with exemplary humility and obedience, and to the greatest satisfaction of the Holy See. In 1866 the Congregation of the Inquisition and the Index published a decree, approved by the Sovereign Pontiff, by which the works of G. C. Ubaghs, professor at the University of Louvain, a renowned ontologist, were condemned, because they contained teachings quite similar to some of those seven propositions. Mgr. Hugouin, before being promoted to the episcopal See of Bageuz, was urged by the Pope through the Nuncio at Paris to recant the opinions he had espoused in his work, *Etudes philosophiques*, and to promise to take care that they should not be taught in the schools any longer. The bishop-elect complied with the wishes of the Pope, and in 1866 published a declaration, in which he says that the opinions of his disapproved by the Holy See were his views on ontologism, because favorable to the seven propositions condemned in 1861. (See the documents in the *Revue de Sciences Ecclesiastiques*, 1866, Août; in *Der Katholik* of Mentz, October, 1866; in F. Kleutgen's *Treatise on Ontologism*, pages 15-20.)

From all this it is evident that in the seven propositions censured by the Holy See ontologism is concerned; and that the views of the French ontologists as to the immediate cognition of God and as to the universal essences were implied in them. Any other form, then, of ontologism, to which the first and the third of those seven propositions are also fundamental, we should infer, is likewise disapproved by the Holy See. Gioberti in particular, whose doctrines, if we are to believe Dr. Brownson, are not hit by the said decree of the Inquisition, requires the immediate intuition of God not less than the French authors mentioned above, though he does not advance for his assertion quite the same reasons. He thinks man cannot know anything but by immediately seeing God as he creates the contingent existences, and teaches that this first principle, "ens creat existentias," is known to us from the very beginning of our intellectual life, and is the light and the source of all knowledge in the ideal as well as in the real order. Then he denies that the finite and the contingent have an entity and intelligibility of their own, and says accordingly that they are only secondary and relative substances, supported by the first cause, and simple abstractions or modifications of the same; that they are individualizations and determinations of the absolute; that creation is not the production of a being out of nothing, but the production of modes in the absolute by the independent power of the latter; that the absolute is first vaguely conceived by us, but by reflection limited, determined and endowed with finite unity. There is indeed no form of ontologism so akin to pantheism as that of Gioberti's. Should this censure appear too severe to anybody, I appeal to his own letter, *Demopito alla govine Italia*, in which he openly proclaims pantheism as the only solid philosophy. What the Holy See thought of Gioberti's system may be learned from the decree by which all his writings were put in the *Index librorum prohibitorum*. Dr. Brownson, to some extent, adopts and defends Gioberti's ontologism in several articles of the last series of his *Review*, particularly in his *Refutation of Atheism, Ontologism, and Psychology*, and of F. Hill's *Philosophy*; all that he says tends towards proving the two propositions: "Immediata Dei cognitio, habitualis saltem, intellectui humano essentialis est, ita ut sine ea nihil cognoscere possit, siquidem, est ipsum lumen intellectuale," and "Universalia a parte rei considerata a Deo realiter non distinguuntur."

beings perceived by the senses. This inference St. Thomas draws very explicitly in the 88th question (art. 3) of the *Summa Theologica*. The human intellect, says he, owing to the condition of this life, cannot immediately know the created immaterial substances, and much less the essence of the increated substance. For this reason God is not the object of which we are first cognizant, but is known to us from creatures, and as the object directly proportioned to our intellect is the material, he is known to us particularly from the beings of this material and sensible world. The truth of this conclusion he confirms by the words of St. Paul (Rom. i. 20): "The invisible things of Him (God) from the creation of the world are clearly seen."¹

But how can the invisible be gathered from the visible and the infinite from the finite? To answer this difficulty, I invite the reader to a careful consideration of the following remarks: Perceiving objects presented to us by the senses, we first form a notion of their essence and thus conceive them as beings; for in reality they are beings and can, after having acted on our senses, be apprehended as such. Indeed, if our intellect were not capable of such cognition, what object could be proportioned to it? By further reflection we understand those beings to be produced, because we see them come into existence; contingent, because they are temporal; finite, not because they appear below the infinite, but because among them one is inferior to the other in perfection, and even the highest of them can still be conceived as perfectible and deficient in many regards. Then, from the contingent, that is the being, which can exist and not exist, we form the idea of the necessary by denying the possibility of non-existence; from the produced, the idea of the unproduced by denying production; from the finite, the idea of the infinite by denying all limits of perfection. Moreover, considering that the contingent and produced beings, which exist, require a cause which is not produced and contingent, we conceive the last cause to be the necessary and unproduced being and, therefore, of a quite different and much higher nature than the effects; and knowing that the perfection of the effect must pre-exist in the cause, we infer the last and universal cause to possess all the real and possible perfections of the universe, though not divided and

¹ S. Th., p. i., 9, 88, art. 3: Respondeo dicendum, quod cum intellectus humanus secundum statum presentis vite non possit intelligere substantias immateriales creatas, ut dictum est art. præc., multo minus potest intelligere essentiam substantiæ increatæ. Unde simpliciter dicendum est, quod Deus non est primum, quod a nobis cognoscitur, sed nagis per creaturas in Dei cognitionem pervenimus, secundum illud Apostoli ad Rom. i. 20: Invisibilia Dei per ea, quæ facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur. Primum autem, quod intelligitur a nobis secundum statum presentis vite, est quidditas rei materialis, quæ est nostri intellectus objectum ut multoties supra dictum est 9, 84, art. 7 et 85, art. 1 et 87, art. 2 ad 2.

distinct from one another, but reduced to perfect unity and simplicity, and existing in it in a higher and eminent manner according to its superior nature. This is the threefold way of causality, remotion, and eminence, by which St. Thomas says we rise from the creature to the Creator. By the way of inference from the principle of causality we know Him to exist; by the remotion or negation of all the limits, dependence, or imperfections of the creature we conceive Him as independent, infinite, unproduced, self-existent; by exalting Him on this account over all His works, we understand that whatever perfection may be conceived from the world, as being, life, wisdom, goodness, power, beauty, is in Him in an eminent degree.¹ However, this cognition of God, as St. Thomas repeatedly remarks, is analogical and imperfect. Analogical it is, because we attribute to Him the perfections we gather from the sensible works of His power, though cleared from all limitation, and thus conceive Him from the entity, which the effect has in common with its last cause, or, in other words, from the similitude which the creature has with its Maker. Imperfect is the knowledge of Him, because, though we distinguish Him by it from any other being, still it does not fully manifest Him to us as He is in Himself. For as all the effects He produced in the universe cannot equal the infinite cause, He does not and cannot reveal all His excellence by His works. Even such perfections as are perceived by us from them, cannot be transferred to Him as his peculiar attributes but by denying the limits they have in the creatures, and thus we know Him rather by conceiving what He is not than by conceiving what He is.²

From the visible world, therefore, we can really gain the knowledge of its invisible Creator, though not one by which we see Him clearly and in the fulness of His perfections, but one by which we understand His essence only inadequately and with much obscurity, and contemplate Him, not directly as He is in Himself absolutely simple and infinite, but indirectly as far as His image is faintly reflected from the multitude of His works both unequal to Him and representing His perfections one distinct from the other. We ought, therefore, to say, not that the finite cannot produce in us an idea of the infinite, but that it cannot give us an intuitive insight into the infinite and reveal it to us as it is in itself absolutely simple and yet infinitely perfect. This St. Thomas and all the scholastics after him taught and most forcibly insisted upon.³

It is now necessary to call the attention of the reader to the

¹ S. Th., p. i, 9, 12, art. 12; 9, 13, art. 1, art. 8 ad 2, art. 10 ad 5.

² S. Th., p. i, 9, 12, art. 12. See also Cardinal Franzelin, S. J., *De Deo Uno*, sect. ii., page 154.

³ S. Theol., p. i, 9, 12, art. 11. *Summa c. Gentes*, bib. iii, cap. 49.

particular manner in which we perceive the perfections of sensible objects. Whenever they strike our senses we form by the intellect an idea of their essences, and of the essences of their properties and their attributes. It is thus that we acquire the conceptions, for instance, of being, of action, of power, of order, of wisdom, of virtue, of necessity, of freedom. Now all such essences are abstract for a twofold reason. First, we have abstracted them either from any subject at all, or at least from any individual and determinate subject, and thus they become universal and predicable of many; of the contingent and the absolute, the finite and the infinite, provided they do not involve a limitation in their very conception. Secondly, we have abstracted them also from physical existence so as neither to include it in them nor to exclude it from them, on which account they belong to the metaphysical order and can be predicated of the possible as well as the existent. The essence of beauty, for instance, is neither something that as such individually exists, nor something that is merely possible; and, therefore, by conceiving it we do not know at all whether there is something beautiful actually existing in nature or not. It is of importance to observe that we conceive God and his attributes by such abstract notions drawn from sensible beings; for this will be decisive in the question how His existence is to be demonstrated.

The cognoscibility of God from the visible objects of this world granted, two ways have been proposed to evidence His existence. St. Anselm,¹ and after him several philosophers, among them Des Cartes and Leibnitz, tried to show it by a simple analysis of the idea of God, and for this reason affirmed it to be self-evident, or known by the mere comparison of the two notions: God and existence. We think God, say they, to be the most perfect or infinite and absolutely necessary being. But infinity and absolute necessity include existence in their very essence or conceptions. It seems, therefore, that the existence of God can be proved from the idea we have of him; or, as others say, *a priori* or *a simultaneo*. St. Thomas and his school have always rejected this proof as insufficient. He allows that God's essence involves His existence, or, rather, is in reality identical with it, but denies that we can attain it so as directly and without demonstration to see real existence contained in it. And why? Because we do not see God immediately, and by ideas drawn from His entity, but we think of Him by conceptions gathered from the creatures, made universal by abstraction, and then applied to Him, after having been purified, as it were, by the exclusion of all limits and all imperfections. However such abstract conceptions, as I said above, do not in-

¹ *Froslog.*, c. 2.

volve physical or actual existence, but are abstracted from it; and, consequently, we conceive the essence of God without perceiving Him as actually existing. But it is objected that infinity and absolute necessity, which constitute His essence, also, according to our conception, include existence. No doubt they do, but that existence again belongs to the metaphysical, not to the physical order; or, in other words, it is ideal, not actual. For existence may be conceived in a twofold way: in the abstract, so that we only know its nature or its quiddity; in the concrete, so that we perceive something as actually existent in the universe.¹

Since, then, we do not directly know God as He is in Himself, neither by intuition nor by drawing from His creatures a concrete and proper, that is, not an analogical idea of Him, we cannot prove His essence *a priori*, or from His very essence. There remains, therefore, nothing else than to demonstrate it from the effects He produces in this visible world. Such is always the procedure of our cognizance. What we do not know of a being from its essence or in general from its causes, intrinsic or extrinsic, we must learn from its operations. St. Thomas very distinctly points out this way as the most appropriate to demonstrate the existence of God, after he had rejected St. Anselm's proof, and in general any evidence of the same by the analysis of His essence. There are, says he,² two ways of demonstration: one from the cause of a thing; and the other from its effects. From the latter we demonstrate the existence of their cause; for as the effect is dependent on and produced by the cause, it cannot exist, the cause not pre-existing. We have to make use of the demonstration *a priori*, whenever the effects are better known to us than the cause. This is really so in regard to God. For His essence, the intrinsic cause, is not attained by us by a conception involving actual existence, and on extrinsic causes He is not dependent at all. On the contrary, the effects He has produced in this material world are proportioned to our cognitive faculties and can be perceived by us directly and immediately. Consequently we can prove His existence only from the effects wrought by Him. This reasoning shows both the sole way of demonstrating this truth and the validity of such demonstration.

¹ Summa Theol., p. i., 9, 2, art. 1.; S. e. Gentes, lib. i., lip. xi.; Quæst. disp. de Veritate, 9, 10, art. 12; Kleutgen, Philosophie der Vorzeit, I Band, n. 93, F. 943.

² Summa Theol., p. i., 9, 2, art. 2. Respondeo dicendum, quod duplex est demonstratio. Una quæ est *propter quid*, et hæc est per priora simpliciter; alia est per effectum et dicitur demonstratio *quia* et hæc per ea, quæ sunt priora quoad nos. Cum enim effectus aliquis nobis est manifestior sua causa, per effectum procedimus ad cognitionem causæ. Ex quolibet autem effectu potest demonstrari propriam eius causam esse, si tamen eius effectus sint magis noti quoad nos; quia cum effectus dependent a causa, posito effectu, necesse est causam præexistere. Unde Deum esse secundum quod non est per se notum quoad nos, demonstrabile est per effectus nobis notos.

The method of gathering the knowledge of God from this visible world and of inferring His existence from His works, is not only approved of by Sacred Scripture, but also recommended as quite convincing. "That," says St. Paul (Romans i., 19-21), "which is known of God is manifested in them (the Gentiles); for God has manifested it unto them. For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made: His eternal power also and divinity, so that they are inexcusable." In the Book of Wisdom (xiii. 1-6) we read, "But all men are vain, in whom there is not the knowledge of God, and who by these good things that are seen could not understand Him, that is, neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who is the workman; but have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and moon to be the gods that rule the world. With whose beauty if they being delighted, took them to be gods: let them know how much the Lord of them is more beautiful than they; for the first Author of beauty made all those things. Or, if they admired their power and their effects, let them understand by them that He that made them is mightier than they. For by the greatness of the beauty and of the creature the Creator of them may be seen so as to be known thereby." The apostle, in general, points out the way of knowing God, His divinity (essence), power, and eternity, which he calls invisible, either because they are not perceived by our senses, or because they cannot be seen intuitively by the natural power of our intellect. Even to the Gentiles, says he, who had no supernatural revelation, they have become knowable from the creatures of this world, and have in this way been manifested to them so clearly that their idolatry or ignorance of the true God is inexcusable. More particularly we are told in the Book of Wisdom how man ought to have been cognizant both of God's existence and His infinite perfections. From the good things which they have seen, the heathen should have understood Him that is (*τὸν ὄντα*), the absolute being; from the works they attended to they should have acknowledged Him who effected them; from the beauty of the elements, the sun, the moon, and the stars, with which they were so much delighted as to take them for Gods, they should have inferred how much more beautiful than they the Lord, the author of all beauty, must be; from the power of the earthly and heavenly bodies, which they admired, they should have known that the Maker of them is still mightier; for, it is added at last, as a general axiom, from the greatness of the beauty and of the creature, the Creator of them may be seen, so as to be known thereby. This last clause is in the Greek text expressed by the simple adverb *ἀναλόγως*, which the Vulgate translates with *cognos-*

cibiliter, but is rendered still more exactly by *consequenter*, or *concludendo*, or *analogice*, so that the sense of the whole phrase is: From the greatness of the beauty and the creatures, the Creator of them may be known by inference or analogically.¹

Having seen that the existence of God can be known to us neither by a blind subjective impulse, as Reid and Kant thought, nor by a blind impression on the part of the object on our reason, as Jacobi imagined, nor by immediate intuition, as the ontologists teach, nor by the analysis of the conception we have of Him, as it seems to those who admit the ontological proof *ab idca*, but that, on the contrary, it is evidenced only by demonstration *a posteriori*, or *ab effectu*, we shall in another article discuss the second question, to wit: By what proof is it demonstrated by the theists?

(To be continued.)

LORD BEACONSFIELD AND HIS LATEST NOVEL.

Endymion. By the author of "Lothair."

The Young Duke; Vivian Grey; Coningsby, etc. By the same author.

HALF a century ago Mr. Disraeli began his political career by being a novelist who dabbled in statesmanship. He ends by being a statesman who dabbles in novels. All his stories, from *Vivian Grey* to *Endymion*, were written with a view to statesmanship. At least they were so intended; and very grandiloquent were some of the author's early announcements regarding the merit of his works. These it would be ungenerous to recall, though probably no man to-day would laugh more heartily at such youthful ebullitions than the aged and wary statesman who has lived to achieve more than even the wildest of his heroes ever dreamed of achieving. In all his novels he had a purpose, and novels with purpose generally fail. The purpose is apt to be too much for the story. Those who wish to hear a sermon will go to church; or a policy defined and defended will go to the senate. In a novel they look for love, adventure, humor, the delineation of character. To trace up the tangled web of a Berlin treaty, to show how to overthrow a government, is to the novel-reader as nothing com-

¹ Cardinal Franzelin, S. J., *De Deo Uno*, sect. i., p. 41.