

## GARIBALDI AND THE REVOLUTION IN ITALY.

*Mémoires of Garibaldi.* Edited by Alexander Dumas.

*Victor Emanuel.* By Edward Dicey, M.A. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1882.

*Life of Pius IX.* By John R. G. Hassard. New York: The Catholic Publication Society Co. 1878.

**J**OSEPH MARY GARIBALDI, who died at Caprera, June 2d, 1882, was born at Nice, on July 4th, 1806, at the dawn of the present century. Nice at the time belonged to France. The French won it in 1793. A year later Napoleon Bonaparte obtained his captaincy in the artillery of the Republic. It was to Nice that Napoleon conveyed his mother and other members of his family after Paoli's rising in Corsica, during the very year of Garibaldi's birth. Thus Garibaldi was by birth a French citizen, in the same way and by the same accident of fortune that Napoleon himself was born a citizen of France. And in the hands of the French Nice remained up to 1814, when it was given back to Sardinia. By the secret treaty between Cavour, Victor Emanuel and Napoleon III., it again changed hands and went back to France, together with Savoy, in 1860. This treaty evoked Garibaldi's undying enmity. He thenceforth refused to live in his native city, preferring after that date to enjoy his easy life in Caprera.

Mazzini was born in 1805, Cavour in 1810, and Victor Emanuel in 1820; a year after John Ferretti was admitted to priest's orders. Here we have grouped the names of the chief actors in Italy within this century. In what is called the unification of Italy Cavour was the leading spirit, Victor Emanuel the chief instrument. John Ferretti, who became Pius IX., was eager for Italian unity of a federative national kind; that is, he would have an Italy united in commerce and public life, without invading or breaking up the separate states and principalities. Gioberti had been an ardent advocate of the scheme, which might be described as an extension over all Italy of the old Lombard League for commercial and defensive purposes. Pius IX. took the initiative in this regard soon after his accession in 1846. For this he was hailed as a liberal and a nationalist; both of which titles in their best sense he unquestionably merited.

How the scheme of Pius IX. to establish a federated Italy was broken in upon and frustrated by Cavour's idea of establishing a Piedmontese Italy, or an Italy under the sway of one sovereign, makes the story of Italy from Charles Albert's declaration of war

against Austria in 1848 down to and subsequent to the invasion and possession of the Capital of the Roman Pontiffs by the troops of Victor Emanuel in September, 1870. It is a story full of deep interest, of many bloody, many treacherous, and some heroic episodes. The story is not ended yet, and he would be a wise man indeed who could predict the final issue. All Europe may be said to have taken part in it. Austria hastened it by stupidity; and the English and French governments by duplicity. But through all its stirring and changeful movements stand out prominently the figures of these five Italians: Pius IX., Victor Emanuel, Cavour, Mazzini, and last and least the man who died the other day on the rocky island of Caprera.

If ever Shakespeare's sayings about greatness were verified in mortal life, it is so in the career of Garibaldi. He was not born great, he did not achieve greatness, yet he had much of what men call greatness thrust upon him. Pius IX. was a living example of heroic faith and saintly life. Victor Emanuel staggered all his life between the faith that he never lost and indulgence in his passions. He had, however, some sterling qualities, and was of the stuff out of which soldiers are made. Cavour was a statesman of genius, who might have out-machiavelled Machiavelli. Mazzini was a man of culture, enthusiasm, and rare literary powers, diabolic almost in his intensity. But Garibaldi—what was he? His speeches are only worse than his writings; his actions were of the most quixotic character. While the principles to which he gave utterance professed to be noble, his life was an open scandal; and he lived and died a pensioner on the bounty of the very government which he professed to hate. He claimed to be essentially a man of action, a fighting man. He fought much. He undoubtedly had courage. Yet he never won a battle worthy of the name. His mob might and sometimes did beat another mob, whether in Italy or in South America. But when faced by Austrian or French regulars the man was simply nowhere, and may be said to have lost his battle in advance. It was criminal for such a man to lead men against soldiers. It was murder; and of murders of this kind Garibaldi was often guilty, while Mazzini, who probably hardly knew how to handle a gun, took a special delight in sending dupes thus to their death. Garibaldi himself was a dupe of Mazzini, but a deeper dupe of Cavour. It is laughable to-day to see the ridiculous ease with which Cavour used the "Liberator" of Italy to serve his own purposes. Take him all in all, Garibaldi's red shirt is the most conspicuous thing about the man, and is characteristic of him. He was showy and shallow from first to last: "An ass's head on a lion's heart," as some cruel apologist has described him. "All his deeds will bear criticism," says a journal

that admires him beyond measure ; " happy if he had spoken less and written nothing." Here is how he wrote in 1877 to Dr. Brandina, arranging beforehand for the cremation of his body :

" On the road leading from this house northward to the seashore, there is, at a distance of 1300 paces to the left, a depression in the ground, bounded by a wall. Upon that corner you will erect a pile of timber, two meters high, of acacia, linden, myrtle, and other aromatic woods. On the pile you will place an iron couch, and upon that the uncovered bier, with my remains upon it, dressed in the red shirt. A handful of ashes shall be preserved in an urn of any kind ; and this is to be placed in the little sepulchre which contains the ashes of my daughters, Rosa and Anita."

These were doubtless his daughters by Anita, the amazon, whom he fell across while battling for the Republic of Rio Grande. The lady had the misfortune of being already married, nevertheless she deserted her husband to attach herself to the fortunes of Garibaldi. Of this incident in his career his biographer in the *London Times* writes : " At last, after losing a flotilla in a hurricane on the coast of Santa Caterina, where he landed wrecked and forlorn, having seen his bravest and most cherished Italian friends shot down or drowned, he fell in with his Anita—not, apparently, the first fair one for whom he had a passing fancy—with whom he united his destinies for better or worse, in life and till death, in some offhand manner, about which he is reticent and mysterious ;" that is to say, in his *Mémoires*, as edited by his friend and admirer, Alexander Dumas. Anita was an amazon, and when she died in the woods near Ravenna, after Garibaldi's retreat from Rome in 1849, the hero was so heartbroken that he was compelled to seek other and very unsavory matrimonial alliances. His experiences in this respect were anything but heroic, were in fact openly immoral. Indeed all these men, Victor Emanuel, Cavour, Garibaldi were notoriously free livers, Victor Emanuel more especially. Yet these are the heroes of new and regenerated Italy.

Now it is not the purpose here either to belittle or exalt Garibaldi, but to try and get the measure of the man. Certain it is that with all his faults and vices, his blunders and failures, which are almost as numerous as his exploits, the man somehow made for himself a great name in and out of Italy, and at least a passing fame. For a month or so conservative England, that harbored Mazzini, Orsini, and all the conspirators against every government but its own, who were refused asylum elsewhere, went wild over Garibaldi when he consented to visit the country. Certain it is that at his summons men would rise up and face death with him, even in abortive expeditions in defence of their native soil. Garibaldi in this sense was a power. He could create a popular commotion at almost any time, and count upon a certain following. Perhaps the reason of this is to be found in his connection with the secret soci-

eties. He was affiliated to the Carbonari about 1830, as was also Mazzini. The Carbonari were at this time very powerful. Even as early as 1820, they counted 700,000 members in Italy, and 20,000 in Paris alone. It is very doubtful therefore whether there was so much spontaneity as showed on the surface in the various Mazzinian, Garibaldian, and such like uprisings that periodically took place in Italy. Here was a powerful organization, secret, unscrupulous, penetrating all classes of society, sworn to obey the command of an irresponsible, often an unknown leader. To these men Garibaldi's red shirt was an oriflamme, and they rose when he was sent to call. Italy was a land of conspiracy, and had been for a long time. Conspiring monarchs and statesmen took advantage of the undercurrent of popular feeling to secure their own purposes. Mazzini proclaimed that "Charles Albert had betrayed Italy, that Victor Emanuel would also end by betraying her."

And here comes the whole question, what is Italy, what was it at the dawn of this century, what has it become to-day? Italy is one of the most difficult of countries to approach with a clear understanding of the situation for any decade, one might say, since the disruption of the old Roman Empire. From the days of battle against the inroads of northern, eastern, southern, western, tribes and peoples on the Roman Empire, has the soil of Italy been a general battle-ground. The land that we call Italy never entered as a nation into the formation of Christendom. Its great cities tried to combine the municipal privileges of the civilization that had passed away with the new order of things, where the strong hand seized what it could, and held possession as long as it could. The lands of Italy were parcelled out among the conquering Dukes, much as William the Conqueror cut up England, or the later Norman and other kings, parcelled out Ireland. At one time it is the Goths, at another, the Saracens, again the Normans, later on, the French, the Spaniards, the Germans, who fasten upon this or that portion of Italian soil, claim it for themselves, and erect their principalities or kingdoms. Such is the history of Italy all the way down to our own days. Strong and wealthy republics or principalities were formed time and again, only to attack and destroy each other, or to be wiped out by some new invasion. Dante dreamed of a country that did not exist. The Lombard League united for self-preservation against Frederick Barbarossa and German oppression, but it was never more than a League of mutual defence, and never extended over Italy. There was little idea of nationality connected with it. Half Italy never joined it, though the Popes favored it. The land was in truth a land of factions, torn between foes from within and foes from without, robber chieftains and foreign adventurers. The one sacred spot, if any, was

Rome, yet was even Rome often invaded and the Popes were driven into exile. But they always contrived to return.

This deplorable state of things, of course, affords the strongest argument for the political union of a country that is geographically a unit, and is one in language, not to speak of religion or race. Race in Italy is very mixed. The first man, oddly enough, to make at least an ostensibly united Italy was Napoleon Bonaparte. As usual he took a very short cut to his end. After driving the Austrians out, he fashioned with his sword the native states into a kingdom, which he annexed to France. Napoleon, in due time fell, and his Italian Kingdom fell with him, though not the lesson that his plan conveyed. The great powers met at Vienna, in 1815, and proceeded to rearrange the European map, with which that spoiled child of the revolution, Bonaparte, had played such sad havoc. Revolution was still in the air; secret societies were numerous and powerful; and the wise gentlemen who met at Vienna agreed that the only way to withstand the tide of revolution and disobedience among subjects, was to restore the old order of things, and put back into power, that had been often grossly misused, every trumpery little prince that had been put out of power, in Italy as elsewhere, reserving certain large slices for their large selves. Accordingly the King of Sardinia was set up again on his throne, and Genoa was added to his possessions. Austria got Lombardy and Venetia, very unfortunately as it turned out, for Austria. Italy was again cut up into various quarters; and to stop all clamor of the peoples for constitutional rights, severe restrictive measures were passed. The various governments were perhaps as coercive as is the English government in Ireland to-day. The people were practically allowed no rights worthy of the name. Later on, in 1851, Mr. Gladstone was eloquently indignant about the treatment of political prisoners in Naples during the revolutionary *régime* of Ferdinand II., whose methods Mr. Gladstone now seems, with the accumulated wisdom of over a quarter of a century, to adopt in Ireland. The consequence of such harsh treatment in Italy then, as in Ireland to-day, was to drive the people outside of the law into secret societies. Hence the Carbonari flourished so mightily, and Mazzini came to develop them into "Young Italy."

Mazzini was a republican on paper, an autocrat in a republican bureau. Italy was to be made a republic under one system of law. "Liberty, equality, and humanity," was the cry he set up for Young Italy, and with it "God and the people." Italy was to undergo a "moral regeneration" under Mazzini's direction. "Young Italy" was suppressed only to develop into "New Europe," which was to proclaim the old theory of the first French Revolution, of universal liberty, equality, fraternity, or death. Indeed death figured very

largely in Mazzini's calculations, for his chief agents of "moral regeneration" were the dagger and the bowl, and one of Mazzini's right-hand men among "the party of action," was the ardent and effusive Garibaldi.

The people in Italy were disaffected, as they had ample cause to be, but the Austrian armies put down all disaffection, at least for the time being. The Austrian rule was harsh and encouraged harshness among the native princes who ruled under Austria's protection. Risings took place here, there, everywhere, and were quenched in blood.

Meanwhile Garibaldi had entered on his adventurous career. The son of a coasting captain, his father intended him for the Church, and his mother's piety is evinced in the names she chose for him, Joseph and Mary. There was little of the ecclesiastic about young Garibaldi. With that vein of tenderness that betokened a sweeter and higher nature than was developed by his adventurous life, he says of his mother, that "to her inspiration he owed his patriotic feelings," and that "in his greatest danger, both by land and sea, his imagination always conjured up the picture of the pious woman prostrated at the feet of the Most High, interceding for the safety of her beloved." Much in the same way, though to a deeper degree, Victor Emanuel always cherished secretly his religious feelings. "I am not a good man," he said once, "but she who is above could never allow me to make any other than a good death." And when death came to him and he was told that it was knocking at the door, "Is it come to that?" was his response; "then send for the priest," and "she who is above" helped him at least to the grace of the last sacraments.

Garibaldi's sentiments of piety troubled him less than Victor Emanuel's. He had small vocation for the priesthood. After picking up, thanks to the priests, what might be called a fair education, he followed his father's vocation to the sea, coasting from place to place, and subject to all the aspirations of "Young Italy." Early in 1831 those aspirations developed into new risings in Parma, Modena, and also in the Papal States. It was about this time that Garibaldi fell in with Mazzini, and they remained fast friends for a very long period, a rupture only occurring between them late in life, when each denounced the other in the public press. The revolts, like most of those in which these champions of democracy engaged, having proved wretched failures, Garibaldi took to sea and to exile, landing finally in Rio Janeiro. He was absent from Europe from 1836 to 1848. His exploits in South America were more of a buccaneering character than otherwise, full of the adventures incidental to such a state of life and the condition of the countries and peoples through which he passed. At one time he

is a general, at another a captain, again a schoolmaster, now a prisoner, now a broker, occasionally a professor of mathematics or a cattle drover. With all this period of his career the present article has little concern. The man was a soldier of fortune, living a life of adventure, and gathering a certain romantic glamour around his name and that of his "Italian Legion" of 800 men, most of whom he lost.

Italy all this time was agitating for reform. Gregory XVI. died on the 1st of June, 1846. His reign had been troubled by efforts of the secret societies in the domain of the Church, and he had condemned the extreme liberalism of Delamennais. On June 16th, 1846, Cardinal Giovanni Mastai Ferretti was elected Pope. He began his reign by introducing a liberal series of reforms, including representative government, which should be jointly clerical and lay. In brief he took measures to bring about the scheme of a federated Italy, to which allusion has already been made.

At once Pius IX. became the hero of the hour and the world rang with his name. The "party of action" in Italy saw in the Pope their agent. They had already made overtures to Charles Albert, the King of Sardinia. "In great countries," said Mazzini to Young Italy, "it is by the people that we must seek regeneration; in yours it is by the princes. Get them on your side. Attack their vanity. Let them march at the head, if they will, so long as they march your way. Few will go to the end. The essential thing is not to let them know the goal of the revolution. . . . You must *manage* the clergy, because the people believe in it; already it holds half the doctrine of socialism, for, like us, it has the sentiment of fraternity, which it calls charity. But its hierarchy and habits make it the imp of authority—that is, of despotism."

Charles Albert had a very keen appreciation of the goal of the revolution. Naturally he seems to have been a man inclined towards liberal ideas, but he was unfortunately placed for their exercise. "Throughout his life," says Mr. Dicey, "Charles Albert had a profound distrust—which he imparted to his son—in the power of the Italian revolutionists to effect anything of and by themselves. Upon his accession Mazzini addressed to the young King one of his grandiloquent and declamatory epistles, calling upon him to emulate the fame of Washington and Kosciusko, and promising him the aid of twenty millions of Italians if he would only inaugurate a crusade against Austria under the patronage of the *Giovane Italia*. The offer was ignored, and forthwith Mazzini and his adherents vowed deadly and lifelong enmity against the one prince who had at heart the cause of Italy."

The revolutionists turned to the Pope. Instead of aiding Pius

IX. in his efforts to establish peace and good will within the Italian borders, Austria resented his attempt, and some of the Italian states themselves joined with Austria in its resentment. France, then under Louis Philippe, took up the Pope's cause, and England re-echoed his praises. A great Protestant meeting was held in New York city in November, 1847, and the "hearty and respectful salutations" of the American people were conveyed to the Pope "for the noble part he had taken in behalf of his subjects." Horace Greeley prepared the address. Mazzini was alive to the signs of the times and their changes. Having renounced all hopes of winning over Charles Albert, he wrote to the Pope in November, 1847: "Holy Father: I watch your progress with immense hopes. Be confident, trust in us, and we will found for you a government unique in Europe. We know how to convert into an active force the instinct with which Italy is quivering from end to end. . . . I write to you because I believe you worthy to initiate this grand enterprise."

Garibaldi was at this time in Montevideo, and seeing things stirring again at home longed to be back "while there was something left to do." So he offered his sword and the remnants of his legion to Pius IX., much in the same spirit doubtless that Mazzini offered his services. Garibaldi, in October, 1847, addressed a letter to Mgr. Bedini, the papal nuncio at Brazil, saying that "if to-day, men who have some practice in the use of arms should prove acceptable to his Holiness, it is scarcely needful to say that we shall gladly consecrate ourselves to the service of him who is doing so much for the country and the Church. We shall indeed deem ourselves fortunate if we can contribute aught to the work of redemption initiated by Pio Nono." He graciously added that he made this offer, "although well aware that St. Peter's throne rests on a solid basis, proof against all human attacks, and needing no mortal defenders." How much of this sentiment was real and how much simulation may be left to the conjecture of the reader. Garibaldi, not receiving an answer speedily enough to please him, embarked for Europe with Anita and his children, and from sixty to eighty of his legion, landing at Nice in the spring of 1848.

The interval of his voyage had been eventful in Europe. There was revolution in the air, not in Italy only, but over all the continent. "Associate, associate! Everything is in that one word," was Mazzini's constant instruction, and it was carefully carried out. He bade the people assemble in mass meetings, under the guise of festivals, celebrations, any excuse at all to bring them together and enable them to feel their strength. "As for the Pope," he said, "we must make him our political *banf gras*." The Jesuits were to be expelled, and the retrogrades slain. So matters progressed



during 1847. The Austrians invaded the Papal territory. The Pope protested against such invasion, and all Italy was aflame. The Austrians retired and Italy was inflamed still more. The Pope's attitude was one of complete trust in his own people; he can hardly have realized the extent of the secret agencies that were at work in his own domains and over all Europe. Everything marched the way of the revolution. Then came the year of wonders, 1848.

Modena, Milan, Leghorn, Messina, Palermo, and other cities, were the scenes of revolt. Naples rose, and its King, Ferdinand II., hastened to grant his people a constitution. Charles Albert immediately followed suit in Piedmont. Then came Tuscany, and finally the Pope to put the finishing touch to the reforms he had already inaugurated. But most influential of all was the revolt in Paris, the expulsion of Louis Philippe, and the establishment of a French Republic. This reacted on Europe. The German States, Hungary and Austria itself were in convulsion, and Charles Albert hastened to place himself at the head of the popular movement in Italy, by declaring war against Austria, March 23d, 1848.

The test had now come, and the final issue was raised. There could hardly be a united Italy with Austria as the predominant power. Austrian power had, to say the least, not been exercised to the best advantage either for itself or for Italy. As Austria was not likely to abandon Italy of her own good will, there was no visible alternative between letting her stay in or forcibly turning her out. Encouraged by the condition of affairs in Europe, and by half promises of assistance from the newly established Republic of France, as well as pushed on by his own ambition, and the traditional acquisitive instinct of the House of Savoy, Charles Albert, who had made preparations with a view to such an event, finally declared war on Austria, expecting all Italy to flock to his standard, while the enemy was being rent in the rear.

And how did the Pope act, the man who so generously and actively took up the idea of a federated Italy? He acted as the Pope could only have been expected to act. The days of warring Popes were over, even if there ever had been what could properly be called a warring Pope. In all the history of the Church, the Pope never could, and never cared to, raise an army that could hope to cope single-handed with any European state worthy of the name. He never could successfully defend his frontiers or his capital from anything approaching a formidable attack. In his very weakness lay his strength, save against conspirators and freebooters. He was the father of Christendom, the head of the Christian Church, and by the common consent of Christendom, the heritage of the Papacy, which it had acquired in past ages by

cession and free gift, was guaranteed and protected. Napoleon Bonaparte overrode this common assent, invaded the Papal territory, and possessed himself of it, as of all Italy. But at his fall the common consent of the powers, predominant among which at that time was England, restored the estates of the Church to their lawful owner. And now he was called upon to take part in what was proclaimed as an Italian crusade to free Italian soil from the invader.

The Pope refused to join in the war against Austria. How could he, the representative of peace on earth, have done otherwise? The Pope is Italian only by accident. As head of the Catholic Church he has relations with all peoples, even Protestant peoples, quite as binding as those he has with Italy. There is no such thing as an Italian monopoly of the Papacy. The cry of the Italian revolutionists against the Pope was the old cry of the oppressed Jews against Christ. They wanted no Prince of Peace. They wanted a leader, a warrior, one who should restore her ancient glory to Israel, not minding that to the Saviour all the world was Israel. Whatever might be his personal nationality, the Pope sent his troops to guard the Papal frontier, much as he might have sent an army of police. But he made it expressly understood that they were not to cross the frontier, and, so blessing them, he let them go.

General Durando, the commander of the expedition, was hand in glove with the revolutionists. He understood the Pope's commands perfectly well, and proved a traitor to them. The Pope had, to say the least, the good sense to see that even all Italy could not hope to cope with Austria single-handed. At Bologna, Durando placed his command at the service of Charles Albert, under secret instructions from Aldobrandini, the Papal minister of war. Thus it was conspiracy all around.

The Pope promptly repudiated Durando's action, and from that day forth he became a special object of hatred to the revolutionists. At once revolutionary Rome rose and raged against him. At the same time he addressed a letter to the Emperor of Austria, avowing that while he shrank from declaring war, he appealed to the Emperor's filial and religious sentiments to withdraw from a contest "which can never subdue to your empire the hearts of the Lombards and Venetians." He begged the German nation to lay aside resentment, and "exchange for friendly relations of neighborly intercourse a domination which could never be useful or honorable while sustained only by the sword."

In this is revealed the idea of unity proposed by Pius IX.; a unity among the friendly Italian states, with the consent and gradual withdrawal of Austria from Italian soil. It may seem a dream, and yet the Austrian government was so struck by its feasibility

as to ask the British government "to mediate between itself and Italy on the basis of the independence of Lombardy and the duchies," on condition of the payment of an annual tribute or a separate administration for Venetia. (See Hassard's *Life of Pius IX.*, pp. 92-93.) Lord Palmerston, who favored Mazzini in all his schemes, was the chief obstacle to the bringing about of such an understanding.

Meanwhile, where was Garibaldi? Garibaldi, with his remnant of a Legion, scorning the Pope, made his way up northward from Nice and offered his sword to Charles Albert. Charles Albert took the offer very coolly. Garibaldi then turned in disgust to Milan, where, as in Venice, the Mazzini party was all-powerful. The success attending the Sardinian arms was short-lived, and Charles Albert was crushed by the Austrians under the veteran Radetzky at Custoza, in July, 1848. The campaign as regarded Sardinia was virtually ended here, but as Milan had joined its fortunes with Sardinia, the King retreated to that city in the hope of saving it. He was greeted by the revolutionists as a traitor, and had to fly from the city by stealth. Mazzini proclaimed that a republic alone could save Italy. On August 5th, Milan capitulated, and Garibaldi, who was hastening to its defence at the head of a considerable force, organized by the republican Committee of Public Safety, was compelled to retreat towards Como. He took his revenge by denouncing Charles Albert as a traitor, and declaring war on all in Italy who recognized peace before the expulsion of the Austrians. The declaration was happily timed, as the Austrians had just overwhelmed the only available and regular force that Italy could bring to bear against them. "The royal war is at an end, and the war of the people is now to begin," proclaimed Mazzini, who offered to serve as a volunteer under Garibaldi. The war of the people did not last long. As usually happened in Italy, it speedily degenerated into a rabble rout. The 30,000 men under Garibaldi's command dwindled away with astonishing rapidity to two or three hundred, who, with their leader, vanished over the border. This campaign affords a very good example of Garibaldi's generalship when faced by real troops.

The effects of Charles Albert's disastrous campaign in Italy were manifold. For the time being all hope of liberation through Sardinia was abandoned, and Charles Albert, like the Pope, was regarded as a traitor to the national cause, the cause of a nation that did not yet exist; the hands of the revolutionary party were strengthened. They alone were the patriots, they alone did not betray the people, though it must be confessed they made a pretty bad mess of matters. The scenes that immediately followed in Rome are well known. Count Rossi, the Pope's chief minister,

was assassinated, and by November the Pope was in exile at Gaeta, while in all Italy Charles Albert could hardly count upon a friend.

Seeing their opportunity Garibaldi and Mazzini made for Rome. The cry of a "United Italy, with Rome for Capital," was an old one with the party of revolution. In Rome a Constituent Assembly had hastened to depose the Pope as a temporal sovereign, to establish a "pure democracy," to which they gave "the glorious appellation of the Republic of Rome." A triumvirate was created, with Mazzini as leader, and Garibaldi and Avezzana for military leaders. Under this inspiring government Rome became a pandemonium.

It is unnecessary to go over the details of the memorable siege of the city by the army of the French Republic under General Oudinot, and the triumphant re-entry of Pius IX. The defence was very stubborn, and Garibaldi's claim to military skill probably never showed to better advantage than during this siege. But, as usual, he could never face trained valor, and at the fall of the city Garibaldi and those immediately associated with him in command took to flight. It is singular to note the comparative ease with which the revolutionary leaders in Italy always escaped from desperate plights, or rather it would be singular were it not known how the whole country was eaten up by the secret societies, numbers of whom were members of the very governments whom the revolutionists attacked. As to the restoration of the Pope, there could be no more doubt about the general joy of the Roman population, at that event, than over the desperate hate of the revolutionary party.

Meanwhile in the north Custoza had been followed by the final defeat of Novara (March, 1849), which resulted in the abdication of Charles Albert in favor of his son, Victor Emanuel. Charles Albert died a heart-broken exile at Oporto, on July 28th, of the same year, and Sardinia lay a cripple at the mercy of Austria.

The history of Italy from this date out is so modern and so well known that it calls for no extensive detail. It is only now that Cavour, the man whose able but wholly unscrupulous statesmanship, advanced Sardinia from its crippled condition into the foremost place, and finally into at least the nominal possession of Italy, comes prominently to the front.

On the very night of the defeat at Novara Charles Albert, with a view of making terms easier for Sardinia, resigned in favor of his son, Victor Emanuel. The fact, though not the idea, of a united Italy had been rudely dispelled. Austria was again predominant in the north, while the sense of the European powers was wholly averse to the revolutionary party in Italy. Italy struggled along among its factions much in the old style. Perhaps the revolu-

tionists had still the ear of the masses. As Mr. Dicey, who is by no means a defender of the Pope or of Catholicity, says, "the grandeur attributed to the long defence of Rome and Venice under the Republic, was contrasted with the summary collapse of Sardinia under a monarchy," though he confesses that the siege of Rome "made but slow progress, mainly it is true, on account of the extreme reluctance of the French commanders to resort to force," and adds that "the magnitude of this resistance was exaggerated by national vanity till it assumed, in popular imagination, the proportions of an heroic achievement."

It would be a mistake to set down Victor Emanuel, as is the custom with some writers, as nothing else than a man of brutal appetite and a slave to his passions. He was by no means a good man, as he himself confessed. At the same time he was not a man devoid of conscience, of religious sense, training and feeling, nor lost to the traditions belonging to his great and illustrious house. He was always reluctant to oppose the Church; he always entertained extreme personal respect and reverence for Pius IX. as head of the Catholic Church, and Pius IX. was not ignorant of this; and when Victor Emanuel did, as often happened, wrong to the Church and the papacy, he tried to console his conscience with the excuse that he was driven into such action by the press of circumstances. He was a constitutional king, and had to stand by the constitution. So he argued. Had he been a genius he might have devised means of his own to work out Sardinia's supremacy and the union of Italy in such a manner as not to have left behind him the vexed burden of an imprisoned Pope and a despoiled papacy on the historic soil and in the historic city of the Popes. But he had Cavour at his back, and even Cavour died too early. Cavour's idea was to reach Rome by moral means, never by force. Not that he was averse to force in order to gain his ends. His valet, who knew him as valets only know men, always presaged war when his master was in an exceptionally good humor. It was like the old legend of the statue of Memnon, that, cold and impassive in the time of peace, when war was in the air, and the sun's rays first caught it, gave utterance to sweet music. Possibly had Cavour not been called away on the eve of his triumph, he might have attempted some means of providing for his free Church in a free State. But if he had the secret, he carried it with him to his grave.

Cavour was called to the chief power in 1852. He had been in England, and studied closely the English system of government. He had travelled about Europe a good deal, and observed much. He had a rare combination of extraordinary keenness of intellect and far-sightedness, with strong every-day sense. To all ap-

pearances, even his personal appearance, he was a very matter-of-fact sort of man. But his purpose was as firm, though apparently as flexible as the finest tempered steel. It would bend this way and that at will, yet always come back to itself. His purpose from the outset of his political career was to make Italy a nation through the agency of the House of Savoy, and this he accomplished, using always whatever and whoever came to hand to suit his purposes, from Napoleon III. to Victor Emanuel, Mazzini, or Garibaldi, and, as some would whisper, Cardinal Antonelli, the Pope's clever Secretary of State.

With the advent of Cavour, Mazzini, Garibaldi, and their secret society associates, simply appear as puppets pulled by this master-hand. Thenceforth the campaign in Italy is his; and whatever was accomplished, whether in Sicily, Naples, Rome, was done according to his will or inspiration. This has now become matter of fact, so that it would be sheer waste of time to go over Garibaldi's ridiculously easy conquest of the kingdom of Naples, and his equally easy surrender of his assumed dictatorship at the confidential command of Cavour. As to how the conquest of Naples was accomplished, in common with all Cavour's conquests, it is enough to say, in the words of Mr. Dicey, "There is no disguising the fact, that the part played by Sardinia in the Garibaldian invasion of the Two Sicilies was not altogether open or straightforward;" and he adds, that "by a not unjust Nemesis neither the King nor his minister have ever attained the credit due to them for the skill with which they brought about the annexation of the Southern Kingdom. The glory of the enterprise was monopolized by Garibaldi, and it was believed at the time, and will probably be believed hereafter, that, but for Garibaldi and his red-shirted comrades, the unity of Italy would never have been an accomplished fact" (p. 235). Mr. Dicey adds, as is well known, that it was the interest of Sardinia to repudiate all responsibility for the act, and to represent Garibaldi as a principal, not as an agent. "Garibaldi himself," he says, "honestly shared this delusion; but the more the true history of the Neapolitan revolution becomes known, the more it will be recognized that it was Cavour who pulled the wires and worked the puppets."

Mr. Dicey was an eye-witness of the exploits of "the thousand of Marsala" in overturning a king and a kingdom. It is not always necessary to be an eye-witness in order to be a fair judge of events. But this Protestant writer ridicules the whole idea of the marvellous success of the Garibaldian invasion, save in so far as behind Garibaldi there stood the kingdom of Italy. The Bourbon monarchy, as he says, collapsed from sheer inanition and fear. The Neapolitans did not join Garibaldi any more than later on did the

Romans. Mr. Dicey is an honest admirer of Garibaldi. He witnessed his rule as dictator in Naples, and here is the picture he draws of it: "Naples had had long and rich experience of all kinds of mal-administration, but in the whole course of her troubled annals the capital of the Two Sicilies was never worse administered than under the rule of Garibaldi. In no city of Europe were there greater elements of social disturbance. The partisans of the Red Republic saw their opportunity." It is needless to quote further.

This is Garibaldi's most famous exploit, and the measure of the man may be taken here. In the zenith of his success he was never more than a tool playing into the hands of abler men, to what end he hardly knew. Deprived of his dictatorship, and enraged at both Victor Emanuel and Cavour, he retired to sulk in Caprera, rating them roundly as liars and cowards, charges that they could easily withstand from the *fou furieux*, once he had accomplished their work. He indignantly refused a pension from the King, but afterwards thought better of his refusal and accepted it, though refusing to relinquish the privilege of assailing, at stated intervals, the monarchy whose pensioner he voluntarily became. It is generally understood that such ebullitions occurred only when Garibaldi's pockets were empty, or when he had some favor to demand of the government, and his forcible appeal was never without effect. The march on Rome is simply a repetition of the march on Naples, save that Garibaldi was badly beaten by the French and the Papal volunteers. In all these movements Louis Napoleon was a close ally of Cavour and Victor Emanuel. In 1861 Cavour died, but his policy with regard to Rome lived after him. Victor Emanuel was recognized as King of Italy by Napoleon III., and after him by the other powers. In all Italy there was only left a little strip of territory and the City of the Pontiffs to the Pope. Even that would have been abandoned had not Napoleon III. feared the anger of the French people, already angry at the absorption, by invasion, duplicity, and fraud, of the peaceful States of the Church, that threatened the peace of none and relied on the good-will of all.

It is impossible here to touch on all the events that tended to make Italy what it is: such as the Crimean campaign and the campaign of Solferino, ending in the peace of Villafranca. In the campaign of Solferino, Garibaldi bore a conspicuous though not a very effective part. Through all the war of 1859 the French bore the lion's share. Later on Cavour discerned the rising power of Prussia, and made a secret alliance with it, which proved of service to Prussia during the war with Austria, and to Italy in the final session of Venetia, though it came through the hands of the

French Emperor. The result of this alliance with Prussia was the desertion by Italy of its old ally, the power that most of all helped to make Italy, France, in its sorest hour of need, during the war with Germany. The war with Germany necessarily included the withdrawal of the French forces from Rome, and the final invasion and possession of the city, in violation of his solemn pledge, by Victor Emanuel, on September 20th, 1870. In all these events Garibaldi bore a part of no special consequence. The kingdom had conquered the republic, at least for the time being. Rome had become the capital of a kingdom, and the Savoyard was king. Mazzini and Garibaldi had become little more than names. The one remained in exile and wrote and scolded to the last. The other, while continuing to advocate a republic, became a pensioner of the King, and so lost character among those who once worshipped him. Cavour and Pius IX. were the real conquerors. Cavour succeeded in making a kingdom of Italy, whether united or not is for the future to say. He conquered the Mazzinians and Garibaldians by using them for his purpose. The only man that neither he nor his successors could conquer was the Pope. They broke a breach through the Porta Pia, and entered in and took the City of the Pontiffs. They might have done that years before had they so desired. As said before, the Pope could never by arms defend himself against them. They could not make him, as they made Garibaldi, a pensioner on their bounty. They could not prevent him being head of the Church, or his sacred person from being the centre, his word from being the guide, of Christendom. They broke the pact of centuries and destroyed the last tradition of moral force, standing calmly in the face of might; and to achieve this great victory they employed the foes of all order, and made use of every kind of deceit. This is the brilliant statesmanship of Cavour, which has resulted in making an Italy united over a revolutionary Vesuvius and an outraged and alienated Catholic population. Italy is to-day held together, the revolution repressed, by an army of 200,000 men, while the land groans under more grievous taxation than the separate States ever knew. Of moral force there is none attached to the monarchy. The only thing after all staple in Italy to-day is the Papacy. The figures that played so conspicuous a part in the stirring events faintly sketched here have one by one disappeared. Cavour was the first to go in the hour of his temporary triumph. Mazzini followed, irreconcilable to the last, and leaving a school of Mazzinis behind him. Victor Emanuel's death preceded that of Pius IX. by a few days. There is a new King and a new Pope, and if asked which will surely last, all the world would give but one answer. And now Garibaldi has gone, unreconciled to the



Church that he had learned to hate, or to the kingdom that he had helped to make. Italy remains to be made. The revolutionists will surely unmake even the present framework unless they are offset by a government of justice and right. But the right arm of such a government is the great conservative force of the Catholic Church, which these makers of Italy chose to cut off. The brilliant policy of Cavour, which after all was the policy of the revolution, resulted in the dispossession of the centre of Catholicity and conservatism. The government would now fain call that power to its aid against the living revolution; but they found it easier to dispossess than they find it to repossess, and all Europe bears witness to their mistake.

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#### PROTESTANT CHURCHES AND CHURCH-GOERS.<sup>1</sup>

**P**ROTESTANTISM has always been stronger in denial than in profession; it could always say decidedly that it rejected and did not believe certain doctrines of the Catholic Church, and denies its authority in general; but when it came to say what it professed and believed, all unanimity was lost, each individual claimed, if he did not exercise, the right to frame a system for himself. Under state pressure uniformity was enforced in many countries in utter defiance of the boasted right of private judgment, and men were compelled to acquiesce in confessions of faith and formularies drawn up by men who did not, and could not, claim to be directly commissioned or empowered by God. Attendance at the church service instituted was made compulsory, punishment being meted out to all who neglected or refused to be present.

This was so utterly inconsistent and absurd that human reason rebelled, and in England, Holland, Denmark, Germany, and Scandinavia, as well as in this country, men believe as much or as little of Protestant doctrines as they choose, and attend service in the churches as it suits them. Their opposition to Catholicity, and their rejection of the teaching authority of the Church, its worship and its ordinances, still stands firm in most minds; few men can tell precisely what they believe on any point, or what constitutes

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<sup>1</sup> A Compendium of the Ninth Census (June 1, 1870) compiled pursuant to a concurrent act of Congress, and under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, by Francis A. Walker, Superintendent of Census. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1872, pp. 940.