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KANT'S SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY.

Critique of Pure Reason, translated from the German of Immanuel Kant, by J. M. D. Meiklejohn. London: George Bell & Sons, York Street, Covent Garden. 1878.

Works of Thomas Reid, in three volumes. New York. 1882.

KANT originated a system of philosophy which was entirely new to the schools of higher learning. It presented human thought, and the nature of the mind's faculties, under a strange aspect, one under which they were never before viewed by any philosopher; and the novelty of his conception soon gained for his writings the attention of speculative minds in Germany, France, and England. On completing his work, *Criticism of Pure Reason*, with long painstaking industry, he offered, at its conclusion, the result of his venture as the projector of a new theory, to all who might wish to pursue "a scientific method," in preference to "Wolf's dogmatism" and "Hume's skepticism." He assures the inquisitive reader that his own "critical path," though "hitherto an untravelled route," will lead him who follows it to that perfect contentment in the possession of certain truth not before reached by any scientific method.

But Kant's philosophy does not redeem his bright promise; on the contrary, it is another proof how impossible it is for any human ingenuity to contrive a system of science which can be consistent, and at the same time either disregard or contradict well-

known facts and evident first principles. That his works show him to have possessed an extraordinary intellect cannot be justly denied. While it may not happen, perhaps, that mankind will ever finally agree in awarding him the title given him by his enthusiastic admirers, the "Aristotle of modern times," it is quite certain, however, that the learned world will not allow Kant's theories to pass away unanswered and undiscussed, even if it result, in the end, that his doctrine, like that of Spinoza and that of Hume, prove only a negative help to true science.

The obscurity peculiar to all Kant's writings is generally recognized; and this, with the darkness in which his interpreters have enveloped his theories, has helped to give celebrity to the saying, "German philosophy is obscure and incomprehensible." The obscurity which distinguishes Kant's philosophy comes, in part, from his style, which is diffuse and involved; but it results mainly from the impossibility of verifying his doctrine by reflection on what we observe actually to take place in our own minds; for we can discover in ourselves no such thoughts, no such mental operations or processes, as those which he ascribes to the mind. Indeed, Kant admits no one fact, and no one principle, understood precisely according to the manner in which it had been previously understood by mankind in general. The human mind originates no one idea for itself precisely in the manner described by Kant's theory; and it reaches no one scientific conclusion according to the method which he points out. He has changed the supposition of terms, or the meaning of all the words ordinarily employed to signify the mind's primitive conceptions, and uses those terms to express things which no one ever thought before him, and which no one after him can comprehend, or define, except in Kant's own words.¹ In his transcendental logic he may even be said to have given to logical terms, which are terms of the second intention, a sort of third intention. It is not surprising, then, that his captivated interpreters, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, etc., explain his system into conflicting theories of skepticism, transcendental idealism, pantheism, etc., through elaborate volumes of speculation, in which the ingenuous student can scarcely find a thought that is clear, or a proposition that is intelligible.

Kant is more generally understood by impartial readers as teaching a system of philosophy which is reducible to pure subjectivism or idealism; that is, a system which supposes the denial that there is anything real outside of the mind's ideas.

¹ The translator of his work on "Pure Reason" says in his preface: "It is curious to observe in all English works written specially upon Kant, that not one of his commentators ever ventures, for a moment, to leave the words of Kant, and to explain the subject he may be considering in his own words." Preface, page xii., *note*.

It is not proposed herein to follow Kant's reasoning through all the special subjects or branches of philosophy treated by him ; some salient points of his doctrine will suffice to convey a general notion of his system, comprehensive enough for the present aim ; which is that of considering it as a method of science, or of philosophical reasoning.

Kant, like Descartes, builds up a system of knowledge beginning absolutely *a priori*, and rejecting as "mere dogmatism" all previously admitted principles with the conclusions derived from them, and even all primitive facts, as previously understood and assented to ; because those principles and facts, he maintained, are only assumptions, without due critical proof or explanation. His own presupposition, by way of fundamental "dogma," is, that science or philosophy must be completely originated *a priori*, by the mind for itself, without the concurrence of objects known ; hence, objects can have no existence outside of the mind's ideas, for it must be assumed that in so far as they are things known, they are produced by those ideas. By "*a priori* ideas of pure reason" he seems to mean ideas which have reason alone for their primitive and total cause ; they thus precede experience, and, under that aspect, they are also styled transcendental ideas.

It is not possible for us to conceive how a dependent or created intellect can thus be the absolute and total cause of its own knowledge and the objects known by it ; for we attribute such a mode of knowing objects, by creating those objects, only to the infinite mind of God. The divine intellect is the cause of objects created conformable to archetypal and absolutely transcendental ideas. Hence all created things are related to the divine intellect as that which is measured to its measure ; or as the effect is related to its cause ; but knowledge of objects is produced in the created intellect by the concurrent influence both of the object and of the faculty. Man's intellect, considered in itself and *a priori*, is undetermined to this or that act ; it must be determined to its act by the object of that act duly presented to the intellect. It is not correct argument to lay down the principle, "no object can exist independently of intelligence," and conclude "therefore the human intellect produces the objects of its own ideas." It is true that no object can exist independently of divine intelligence ; but objects exist whether they be known to man's intellect or not. But how must we conceive the *a priori* ideas of pure reason to originate in the mind according to Kant's theory ? Some of his interpreters explain his meaning to be that those ideas are infused into the mind naturally, or that they are innate ; others, with Fichte, contend that these ideas are produced by the spontaneous, natural action of the intellect itself, determining itself to act without help or influence from ob-

jects, or any extrinsic cause; for Kant attributes to the intellect a peculiar spontaneity of action.¹

The most completely self-determining power in man is his will, when acting freely; but even then it cannot act without the concurrence of an object as end intended. Just as it is absolutely impossible for a non-existent body to move itself from a state of mere possibility into actual and real existence by its own virtue or action, so is it impossible for the reason to pass from the state of merely possible act into that of positive action, without any determining influence from an extrinsic cause.² A created agent is not absolutely sufficient for itself, and for its own action; it is only the First Cause that is the absolute principle of its own action.

Fichte goes so far as to assert that the intellect, or its idea, produces itself; but this includes a supposition which destroys itself, since it implies that one and the same being is the cause of itself, and the effect of itself. The divine ideas are absolutely *a priori* eternal, and are thus transcendental; but for that very reason those ideas are unproduced, or they were never preceded by a state of non-existence. The assertion that man's ideas are absolutely *a priori* and transcendental, and that they produce their own objects, and thus transcend all experience, is to use language that is incomprehensible, unless we identify the human and the divine modes of knowing truth, which is not to be done, as is evident.

Kant's *Criticism of Pure Reason* has for its aim to show how the reason as *pure*, or as independent of all experience, produces *a priori* its own ideas, and the principles by which we can know objects when their phenomena are presented to the mind.³ Not, however, that it thereby knows real external objects, for they are unknowable; only phenomena are known, and phenomena have no real existence except in the mind's faculties. The objects which reason knows are furnished by the *a priori* ideas, not by any realities external to the mind. Pure reason forms out of its *a priori* ideas, by means of analysis, universal ideas or judgments; they

¹ As when he says: "Transcendental Logic," i, p. 45: "We call the faculty of spontaneously producing representations, or the spontaneity of cognition, *understanding*."

² "Nihil reducitur de potentia in actum nisi per aliquod ens actu." P. i., qu. 79, a. 3 in C.

"De potentia non potest aliquid reduci in actum nisi per aliquod in actu." I P., qu. 2, a. 3 in C.

"A thing cannot be reduced from the potential or possible state into the actual state except by something else which is itself actual or in action."

"Omne quod exit de potentia in actum potest dici pati; etiam cum perficitur. Et sic intelligere nostrum est pati." P. i., qu. 49, a. 1, ed. 2.

"Everything that passes out of the potential or possible state into the actual state, can be said to suffer, or receive, and this even when it is perfected thereby, and thus for our own intellect to act is to *suffer*."

³ "Idea of Transcendental Logic," I., where he explains the understanding as the "Spontaneity of Cognition."

are deduced analytically from the essences expressed by *a priori* ideas. These judgments thus formed have necessity and universality; and twelve of them have the office of categories.

The schoolmen¹ taught, with Aristotle, that man's intellect knows primarily and directly the universal; it knows the singular material thing secondarily and reflexly. Berkeley and Hume hold that the mind knows only its own impressions and ideas, and that it does not know objects or things external to them at all; Kant agrees in this opinion with Hume and Berkeley.

Aristotle's categories are founded on real objects, which they classify into ten families or supreme genera; Kant's twelve categories are *a priori* abstractions which, as he asserts, determine their objects. Aristotle's categories are made by their objects; Kant's categories make their objects.

Kant's categories, which he describes as *a priori* forms or ideas by which the mind knows objects of intuition, are of four classes; first class, of quantity, unity, plurality, totality; second class, of quality, reality, negation, limitation; third, of relation, substantiality, causality, community (reciprocity between agent and patient); fourth, of modality, possibility, existence, necessity.—*Transcendental Logic*, sect. iii., Categories, p. 64.²

Aristotle's categories, which are classes of real things, are: substance, quantity, relation, quality, action, passion (action received), place, time, posture, habiliment or thing possessed. Aristotle's post-predicaments are not supplementary categories, as Kant asserts; they are merely modifications, consequent to real things as constituted into the categories; but they are not themselves distinct genera of real things; they are opposition, priority, simultaneity, motion and mode of possession. These are not distinct kinds of realities, but only modifications of real things.

Kant teaches that the category, *substance*, for example, is an *a priori* or a transcendental deduction of reason from its own *a priori* conceptions; that is, such object is antecedent to experience, and is not furnished by experience, as are the objects of Aristotle's ten categories. Hence, when the mind knows an object, say, this tree, which it judges to be a substance, the "substance" which it attributes to the tree exists only as a category or object of a universal idea in the reason; we cannot even know that a "substance" is possible outside of the mind's idea; for "beyond the sphere of phenomena all is mere void."³

¹ P. i., qu. 86, a 1: "Singulare in rebus materialibus intellectus noster directe et primo cognoscere non potest . . . Intellectus noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi universalium . . . quod a materia individuali abstrahitur est universale."

² "It is only by these categories the mind can render the manifold of intuition conceivable, in other words, think an object of intuition." Ibid.

³ "Analytic of Principles," ch. iii.: "Division of all objects into phenomena and noumena."

His theory is that all scientific knowledge consists of two elements or constituents; one is an *a priori* idea of pure reason, or, what is here the same thing, a category, which is an *a priori* judgment; the other element is a synthesis, or a synthetical judgment, furnished by experience; and experience is the same thing as intuition, whether the intuition be consciousness¹ or sensation. A judgment composed of these two elements, the *a priori* and the synthetical constituents, is what Kant styles a "synthetical judgment *a priori*;" and he maintains that such judgments are the only ones which augment our knowledge. For analysis, by which we deduce a predicate from an essence, adds nothing to our knowledge, he tells us, since the predicate was included in what was already known; as "a part is less than the whole," such analysis teaches us nothing of that "whole" not previously known. But synthesis, as "bodies are heavy," teaches us something not previously known by merely knowing the essence, for it is not of the essence of bodies to be "heavy." Hence, synthesis augments knowledge; analysis of an essence does not.

It seems certain and evident, however, that to deduce a predicate from an essence in which it was not previously known to be contained, is to augment knowledge; just as, despite Locke's assertion that "the syllogism is not a means of discovering truth," to deduce a conclusion from premises not previously known as containing it is to "discover truth." Knowledge is truly and properly augmented by each of these operations.

But how, in Kant's theory, is an empirical or synthetical judgment formed? How does the mind acquire experience of things represented through sensation? The answer is, sensation gives or represents in the imagination a "manifold," that is, sensation represents, say, a tree, or a lawn, not as one distinct total, but as a confused collection of particulars or points. Then consciousness and the understanding have an intuition of that confused "manifold" or collection of particulars, and are thereby enabled to reduce this representation to "synthetical unity" in a judgment affirming the object.² This is experience, or it is thus the empirical element of knowledge is acquired.

But neither the representations of objects in a "manifold" nor the synthesis of the "manifold" furnished by sensation would be possible he tells us, unless we concede to the imagination two

¹ "In *Transcendental Logic*," I., p. 45, he distinguishes intuition as pure, or without sensation, and intuition as empirical, as having sensation from the presence of an object.

² "It is necessary for the mind to make its ideas sensuous, that is, to join the object to them in intuition, and to make its intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under ideas. Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without ideas blind."—"*Transcendental Logic*" I., p. 46.

a priori transcendental forms or principles, namely, time and space. These forms are only in the imagination; for time and space have no existence outside of the imagination.¹ They are the formal principles in sensation, and impression is the material principle or the occasion. They are necessary for representing objects, since there must be succession in time, and relation of parts in space, for objects to be imaged at all. But these conditions or principles, time and space, are furnished by the imagination, they are not in or of objects external to the mind.

The next operation of the mind is the one by which knowledge is made perfect; and it consists in combining together the *a priori* judgment and the synthesis or synthetical unity acquired by means of experience. The *a priori* judgments of pure reason which the mind thus applies to the synthetical conceptions furnished by experience are the twelve categories.

It may be seen, from what has been thus far said, that Kant proposes to explain theoretically, and to prove absolutely anew, even the primitive truths which the human mind has hitherto accepted on their own self-evidence as neither requiring nor admitting proof, because themselves first principles. He aims to go beyond those first truths, and to show how all knowledge is ultimately the product of *pure reason*, and how reason gives, even to the empirical object represented, what it takes back from that object; and thus that all science, in the last analysis, has a purely subjective origin. He does hypothetically admit the possibility of an external objective order; that is, if it be necessary "to explain the possibility of experience;" but he denies that the noumena, or objective reality of that order, is knowable. He gives what he styles a "refutation of idealism;" but his argument is found by all that read it to be obscure and unintelligible; it is entirely *a priori*, and from the subjective side of the question, for it is a radical principle of his theory that objects must conform to the ideas of them in reason (preface to second edition, xxi., where he insists on this point). The total reason of all truth in the mind must be found; according to Kant's system, in the mind's own idea, not in anything extrinsic to those ideas; "inasmuch as the object, as in the case of right and

¹ "We have intended then to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena, that the things which we intuit are not the same as our representation of them in intuition; nor are their relations in themselves so constituted as they appear to us; and that if we take away the subject or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general, then not only the nature and relation of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves, disappear, and that these, as phenomena, can not exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the nature of objects considered as things in themselves and without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility is quite unknown to us. We know nothing more than our mode of receiving them," etc.—"*Transcendental Aesthetic*," sec. 9.

wrong, is not to be discovered out of the conception."¹ Or, as he expresses the relation of ideas to their objects (*Principles of Pure Understanding*, sect. ii., p. 117): "The possibility of experience is that which gives objective reality² to all our *a priori* cognitions." The object, therefore, derives its reality from the cognition of it in such case; the cognition does not depend on the object. But this is not to refute idealism, it is to defend idealism.

After the understanding has combined the "manifold of sensation" into a synthesis or whole, reason then applies to that synthesis the corresponding category, for example, the category "cause;" and this is done by "subsuming" the particular synthesis under the category, which gives to reason a "synthetical judgment *a priori*." Mathematics, all science, all genuine metaphysics contain these synthetical *a priori* judgments or propositions; and, as before said, it is only such judgments that augment knowledge. Hence, such synthetical *a priori* judgment consists of two elements or constituents; namely, the category, which is an *a priori* judgment of pure reason;³ and the empirical judgment, which is a synthesis from experience or intuition.

We may be helped towards conceiving what Kant perhaps here means by his "synthetical judgment *a priori*," if we translate it into more familiar terms, and style it a "mixed judgment," or a "direct universal," understanding a direct universal to signify the same thing in this case as a simple universal applied to a particular included under it.

A judgment which is synthetical in its primitive origin, however, could not be formed by reason, since reason would not know its subject and predicate as separate, before making their synthesis. Either the intellect first knows the subject and predicate as separate, and then combines them into this synthetical judgment, or it does not first know them as separate; if it does first know subject and predicate separately, then the synthetical judgment

¹ "Antinomy of Pure Reason," sec. iv.: "In the general principles of moral there can be nothing uncertain, for the propositions are either utterly without meaning or must originate solely in our rational conceptions."—*Ibid.*, p. 299.

² He often insists on this notion, as in "Transcendental Dialectic," bk. i., sect. ii., p. 225: "Pure conceptions *a priori* represent objects antecedently to all experience."

³ Kant aims to prove in his "Transcendental Logic," sect. 18, that in cognition the only legitimate use of the category is its application to objects of experience (p. 90). By "subsuming" a synthetical judgment under the category, he means simply the connecting of a particular with the universal, by way of minor premise, in order to make an inference. For example, "The sum of the angles in the rectilinear triangle is equal to two right angles; A is a rectilinear triangle," etc. Here the triangle A is *subsumed* under the general truth, in Kant's use of the term. "If reason is the faculty of deducing the particular from the general, and if the general be certain *in se*, and given, it is only necessary that the judgment should subsume the particular under the general, the particular being thus necessarily determined."—"Transcendental Dialectic," appendix.

a priori does not really differ from any other synthetical judgment. If the intellect does not know subject and predicate separately, or before knowing them as conjoined in a judgment, in that case the intellect does not form the judgment at all, and consequently such judgment would not be a rational operation. Judgments not formed by the intellect, as affirming or denying predicate of subject, must needs be infused, or be naturally implanted by way of instinct, as are instinctive judgments in brute animals. It is certain that brutes can practically discriminate between some objects as good and harmful to them; and it is equally certain that they are unable to know the subject and predicate of a proposition, or synthesize them into a judgment. Kant seems to regard the judgment in question as primitively, or *a priori*, a synthesis. Yet all the judgments of human reason are comparative; the human intellect can form no judgment unless by first apprehending subject and predicate separately, and then comparing and conjoining them. What answer, then, must be given to Kant's question, which, he tells us, "proposes the great problem of pure reason," namely, "How are synthetical judgments, *a priori* possible?" He himself gives no intelligible or satisfactory answer to the question.

Kant contends that Hume was correct in denying the possibility of knowing cause, as inferred from an observed fact as effect, for the reason that there is no "medium," no "interposed idea," which can certainly found such inference. But when Hume concludes, with universality, that all our knowledge of real cause and effect is "merely the customary experience of constant conjunction," Kant finds Hume thereby to show that he failed to conceive the whole problem, namely, "how is a synthetical judgment *a priori* possible in such case?"¹

Kant answers that we know such cause and its effects in "a synthetical judgment *a priori*," or by a mixed judgment. But, as this is not explicitly to answer Hume's denial of any assignable medium, or "interposed idea," through which the inference of cause from its observed effect is made, Kant proceeds to ascertain that medium:² "Now what is this *tertium quid* that is to be the medium of all synthetical judgments? It is a complex in which all our representations are contained; internal sense, to wit, and its form, time." This, then, is the *tertium quid*, third thing, or medium, in which,

¹ Introduction, sec. vi.

² "Hume could not explain how it was possible that conceptions which are not connected with each other in the understanding must, nevertheless, be thought as necessarily connected in the object; and it never occurred to him that the understanding itself might, perhaps, by means of these conceptions, be the author of the experience in which its objects were presented to it."—*Transcendental Deduction of the Categories*, p. 78.

³ *Analytic of Principles*, sec. ii., p. 117.

according to Kant, the *a priori* principle and the synthetical principle meet, and by which they are united into a synthetical judgment, *a priori*; with this medium the mind is able to connect cause, which lies outside of its effect, with that effect, so as to make the tie or synthesis of the two.

But this answer is mere fanciful theorizing; and, moreover, it is based on what is not true as a fact; because, even if we perceive in our minds such "complex," we do not employ any purely subjective medium in deducing a cause from its effect. Instead of answering Hume's statement, which, though false, is not obscure, Kant merely involves both the point in question and his own peculiar synthetic judgment in more complete darkness.

His most intelligible statement, perhaps, as to what is this medium of the synthetical judgment, *a priori*, is contained in his "Conclusion of Transcendental Æsthetics," p. 44. But that, too, is purely speculative theorizing, not founded on fact; and it does not explain what we see to be the operation of our own minds when we infer cause from its observed effect. He returns to this fundamental principle of his theory, by which he entirely shuts out from the mind the real objective order, in *Transcendental Principles*, conclusion, p. 174, where, like one striving to reconcile the inconsistencies of a false story, he only burdens his previous assertions with new incongruities.¹

As heretofore seen, the medium, or this *tertium quid*, by which we truly deduce causes from their effects, first observed as facts, is the real relation between them which we discover; and this real relation is something objective, not a mere conception of the mind itself.

It is true that we do not know real cause and its effect as intrinsically and essentially connected with each other, for this would be to know such cause and effect *a priori* as they are primordially known only to infinite intelligence, which is presupposed both to the cause and its effect. Our knowledge of them is *a posteriori*, or from the objects, for we know them by way of related facts or realities; and the principle of causation, which is first acquired by us analytically as a necessary and universal judgment, furnishes

¹ Kant makes a remark (*Transcendental Doctrine of Method*, ch. 3, p. 510), which, perhaps, has reference to this medium between the *a priori* principle, or category, and empirical element related to it: "Even thinkers by profession have been unable clearly to explain the distinction between the two elements of our cognition, the one completely *a priori*, and the other *a posteriori*; and hence the proper definition of a peculiar kind of cognition, and with it the just idea of a science, has never been established." This seems to be a surrender to Hume, whose skepticism is based on the assumption that there is no medium or bond of relationship between any cause and its effect which can ever be known with certainty; a doctrine which it is the avowed claim of Kant to have refuted with his "synthetical judgment *a priori*."

the absolute major premise, whether it be expressed or only implied, when we infer a cause from its observed effect.

It could be conceded to Kant, however, that the mind's inference of cause from its observed effect furnishes a synthetical judgment, *a priori*, in the sense that such judgment includes both a particular and a necessary universal element as absolute major principle; but the medium of inference, as said, is, in all cases, the real relation of the effect and its cause. The medium founding such inference perplexed Kant much; and he states the difficulty also in his introduction (iv.), where he defines the analytical and synthetical judgments. His error is in assuming that such medium must be purely ideal and subjective, or that it must be sought for in the mind alone, and not in the objects. The true reason why a cause is formally and really such is in the cause or object itself as presupposed to our knowledge, or our ideas of it; and therefore our knowledge of a cause must proceed fundamentally from the object, not from any merely subjective affection, or pure figment of the mind.

It has been suggested that Kant borrowed the ideal of his "synthetical judgment *a priori*" from Dr. Reid. The peculiar judgments attributed to the mind by Dr. Reid, supposed to be the original copied by Kant, are described in vol. ii., essay vi., chap. i., of Dr. Reid's works. He says there may be judgment which "is a solitary act of the mind, and the expression of it by affirmation or denial is not at all essential to it. . . . Our judgments of this kind are purely the gift of nature, nor do they admit of any improvement by culture. Nature has subjected us to them, whether we will or not Philosophers have never been able to give any definition of judgment which does not apply to the determinations of our senses, our memory, and consciousness, nor any definition of simple apprehension which can comprehend these determinations." He restricts these judgments, however, to "persons come to the years of understanding." He admits, also, that "judgment is an act of the mind, specifically different from simple apprehension, or the bare conception of a thing." He should have admitted, moreover, that there can be no judgment without affirmation or denial; or, what comes to the same, there can be no judgment without comparison of subject and predicate, and assent or dissent as to their agreement.

Dr. Reid seems not to have distinguished duly between the mind's obvious first judgment of what is evident by way of primitive fact and the act by which the intellect simply apprehends, or has "a bare conception." While analysis, synthesis, and judgment may be required to form our first clear conceptions, both of incomplete things, as "being, one, essence," etc., and of sensible objects,

yet it does not thence follow, as Reid assumes, that such sensible objects cannot afterwards be apprehended by the intellect without a judgment. The intellect can readily either apprehend or judge when objects previously known are presented by "the senses, memory, or consciousness;" it can apprehend even a complex object, as a judgment; and it can thus apprehend a judgment without making that judgment its own act, or without affirming or denying the agreement of its subject and predicate. But obvious first judgments of things, evident by way of primitive facts, are not "solitary acts of the mind." They are comparative judgments, which affirm or deny connection of subject and predicate. Reid's "judgments, which are purely the gift of nature," which are "solitary acts of the mind," would not give logical truth to the intellect, since they would not be comparative judgments, and would not explicitly include either composition or division; indeed, they would not express formal truth in the mind any more than the instinctive appreciation or *quasi* judgment of sensible things expresses formal truth in the brute's faculties.¹

Kant must have weighed all these objections to Reid's "judgment of nature," which is "a solitary act of the mind;" for Kant's "synthetical judgment *a priori*" includes, as he often tells us, the synthesis of subject and predicate, made somehow, *a priori*, by "pure reason." His embarrassment is to ascertain and assign the medium, or the nexus of predicate and subject, which must be seen by the intellect when it forms this incomprehensible judgment. If the medium is something learned empirically, then the judgment is purely synthetical; if the medium be known only *a priori* then the judgment is purely analytical. He seeks for a mixed or dual principle, that will account both for the synthetical and the *a priori* character of such judgments.

It is not easy to conceive how all mathematical judgments are synthetical, as asserted by Kant, especially if we accept his own definition of the synthetical judgment, in which he describes it as one attributing to a subject or essence a predicate which lies entirely outside of that subject or essence; as, for example, "bodies gravitate." It is true that he subsequently amends this definition so as to include the case in which a mathematical predicate implicitly or logically contained in the subject is attributed to that subject, though not explicitly known by merely knowing the es-

¹ There is inchoative but imperfect formal truth in the intellect's simple apprehensions; but yet, as St. Thomas says, p. 1, qu. 16, a, 2, truth is in such acts as in things, it is formal truth properly so called only in judgments of composition or division: "Veritas quidem potest esse in sensu, vel in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est, ut in quadam re vera, non autem ut cognitum in cognoscente."

sence itself, which predicate, however, is found by analysis.¹ But no explanation can do away with the obvious fact that all purely mathematical conclusions are properly and truly analytical judgments, and are learned by means of analysis.

It seems true that the mind never employs analysis, which, under all respects, excludes synthesis, as Aristotle implies, *Posterior Analytics*, bk. ii., ch. 9, where he says: "It is manifestly necessary that primary things become known to us by induction," which includes experience. But yet, the final inference in the example given by Kant, that $7 + 5 = 12$, or that "a straight line is the shortest distance between two given points," is analytical, though it is a judgment of composition; and his reasoning merely shows at the most that some synthesis must precede this judgment and help towards it. Yet the two operations, synthesis and analysis, are here distinct from each other, and therefore they do not so combine as to constitute one composite operation, which is a "synthetical judgment," *a priori*.

The absolutely necessary, he asserts, is out of and beyond the world, or the "cosmological;" it is not an object of experience or intuition, nor can it be concluded from the world. But this is not logically correct, for the necessary can be validly deduced, *a posteriori*, from the contingent. "Supreme Being is a mere ideal of speculative reason," he says; yet, though "a mere ideal," he concedes that it is a faultless one for its theoretical uses. "Necessity and contingency are not properties of things themselves, they are merely subjective, or are of ideas."² In this language, again, it may be seen how universally Kant denies all reality which is external to the idea. If objects external to the ideas of reason have neither contingency nor necessity, then they have no reality; they become, as Fichte would say, merely "things posited by reason," for all conceivable real things must, as a fact, be either necessary or contingent; and, consequently, if there be no real things that are contingent, nor any that are necessary, then there are no real things at all, since there is no medium between the necessary and the contingent.

Kant concludes his work, *Criticism of Pure Reason*, with a treatise on the *Transcendental Doctrine of Method*, in which he explains his "architectonic of all cognition," or how all science may be systematized into a high philosophy, based on principles of an upper pure reason, which, it would appear, transcend all his other transcendentals. He says: "It is possible to frame an architectonic of all human cognition, the formation of which, at the present time,

¹ *Transcendental Æsthetic*, § 9. Also, *Transcendental Doctrine of Method*, chap. I., sec. I.

² *Transcendental Dialectic*, bk. ii., chap. iii., sec. 5, p. 378.

considering the immense material collected, or to be found in the ruins of old systems, would not, indeed, be very difficult. Our purpose at present is merely to sketch the plan of the architectonic of all cognition given by *pure reason*. By *reason* I understand here the whole high faculty of cognition, the *rational* being, placed in contradistinction to the *empirical*."

He then proceeds to construct this "architectonic of all human cognition" by giving each branch of science its proper place in the edifice. Logic, Natural Philosophy, or Physics and Mathematics, he maintains, are not philosophy; they are merely instruments used by the philosopher. He distinguishes philosophy as historical, or philosophy as learned from a teacher; but not understood scientifically and in its principles; and as rational, or philosophy which is understood in its principles, its conclusions being seen as apodictic, or demonstratively true. But if philosophy be considered as something objective, or in itself, it is an archetype which has never been reached yet. Reason can philosophize, he tells us, and thereby tend to that archetype as to "a possible science," but cannot certainly reach it.

Also, philosophy as cosmical is the teleology of reason, or it gives the ultimate end of reason. That final end of reason, or its ultimate perfect state, is, as yet, something ideal. When reached or realized by reason, then the philosopher can legislate for human reason, or give the entire law of rational knowledge. Finally, philosophy is either propedeutic, that is, critical and explanatory of pure reason; or, it is metaphysical, including metaphysics of nature and ethics. The metaphysics of nature comprehends all pure rational principles and all theoretical cognition; understanding, as regards such theoretical cognition, that the theory itself is founded on pure *a priori* ideas or principles. Ethics contains all the principles which determine *a priori* and necessitate all action. Ethics is philosophy which is purely *a priori*; hence, it is not based upon anthropological considerations, nor, indeed, upon any empirical matter. Ethics supposes, as a fundamental truth, the will's necessary tendency to good as its object; but the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God, are not demonstrable, though they may be admitted as presuppositions for theoretical convenience. The whole system of metaphysics includes four principal parts, namely: ontology, rational physiology, rational cosmology, and rational theology.

The argument of Kant's entire work is briefly this: "Granted that pure reason originates for itself *a priori* all its universal ideas, and that time and space exist only as *a priori* forms or principles, which determine representations in the imagination; then all my system follows as a necessary conclusion."

But neither does he deduce a congruous system from his supposed first principles, nor are his first principles themselves true; and thus it happens that, by repudiating all first principles and all primitive facts, as previously understood by the human mind, Kant has built up, *a priori*, a theory which does not defend one proposition, peculiar to itself, that is simply true when viewed under all respects. Nor is this assertion too sweeping, since the human mind has no such ideas, and no such principles, as those on which he bases his entire system, and from which he derives all his conclusions. It is not too much to say, furthermore, that no distinguished philosopher before Kant's day had ever gone so far as he went into that arbitrary and gratuitous "dogmatism" which he full often censures in his predecessors. On his own "dogmatic" assumptions he founds a theory of man, of the world, and of God, which does away with the objective reality of them all, and reduces all real truths to a maze of *a priori* abstractions, to a mere barren and meaningless idealism, which is more completely unfounded than that of Berkeley, or than was the skepticism of Pyrrho. Kant affirms neither the existence of God nor the immortality of the soul. His theory incloses man's soul in himself, where it is to become learned without seeing any real truth; where it has no object to know except the unrealities of a blind idealism. The student, educated entirely according to this ideal, must soon come to see his own life as aimless, and even existence itself as without purpose. If he looks upon the dreary and perplexed theories of his own subjective philosophy, he finds only ideas with which nothing, no object, is thought. What wonder if his spirit then sink down within him, baffled and hopeless!

Some few salient principles of Kant's ideal philosophy, which are above briefly considered in this article, are: 1. Pure reason has various *a priori* transcendental ideas not derived from objects external to them; 2. The imagination has two *a priori* forms or ideas, space and time, which do not exist outside of that faculty; 3. Phenomenon is from impression, but it is only subjective; and the forms of the imagination, space and time, are the active determining principles that give existence to all representations in the imagination, the impressions being the matter or the occasion; 4. The mind acquires scientific truth only by means of synthetical judgments *a priori*, the synthesis alone being augmentative of knowledge; all mathematical judgments are synthetical *a priori*; 5. The medium through which a synthetical judgment *a priori* is inferred, as, when cause is inferred from an observed fact or effect, is purely subjective, is obscure and is undefined in Kant's system; 6. The mind knows nothing of external things beyond phenomena, and *a priori* ideas or judgments are the only means by which phe-

nomena can be manifested to the mind; 7. Objects must conform to our cognitions, for intelligence and ideas are presupposed to all their objects; 8. The noumena, or the objects from which phenomena proceed, are unknowable.

Since the human mind knows naturally, and by way of primitive facts, both that the external objects around us are realities, and that time and space are things independent of man's imagination, this article will not be lengthened with arguments adduced to refute Kant's "mere dogmatism" in gratuitously denying these evident truths.

A complete exposition of Kant's *Criticism of Pure Reason* could not be made within the small compass of a few pages. It is intended herein merely to convey some notion of that author's philosophical method, which may prove useful to the student who wishes to read for himself the influential writings of this distinguished founder of a new school in speculative philosophy.

