

THE LAST TEN YEARS OF THE TEMPORAL POWER. FROM MENTANA TO THE PORTA PIA.

1. Joseph Powell. *Two Years in the Pontifical Zouaves*. London, 1871.
2. *Der Italienische Raubzug wider Rom im September, 1870. Von einem Augenzeugen*. Münster, 1871.
3. Le Comte de Beauafort. *Histoire de l'Invasion des États Pontificaux et du Siège de Rome par l'Armée Italienne en Septembre, 1870*. Paris, 1874.
4. Henri d'Iderville. *Les Piémontais à Rome*. Paris, 1874.
5. G. Busetto. *Notizie del Generale Nino Bixio*. Fano, 1876.
6. Prince Joseph Charles Paul Napoléon. *Les Alliances de l'Empire en 1869 et 1870*. Paris, 1878.
7. E. Tavallini. *La Vita e i Tempi di Giovanni Lanza*. Torino, 1887.
8. R. Cadorna. *La Liberazione di Roma dell'anno 1870, ed il Plebiscito*. Torino, 1889.
9. *Politica Segreta Italiana (1861-1870)*. Torino, 1891.

THE invasion of the Papal territory and the campaign of October, 1867, which were ended by the defeat of Garibaldi and his volunteers at Mentana, were followed by a short period of tranquillity, during which the enemies of the Holy See, though checked for the time and held at a distance by the presence of the French troops, still continued to intrigue and conspire to bring about the downfall of the Temporal Power. Among the most active of these was Giuseppe Mazzini. The indefatigable conspirator who, since 1833, had organized so many piratical expeditions against the States of the various sovereigns of Italy, had taken no part in that which had just been repulsed; but, shortly before the beginning of the incursion, he had come to Lugano on the Swiss frontier to be ready, in case Garibaldi succeeded in entering Rome, to follow him thither and proclaim a Republic. Disappointed in his hopes, and more irritated than ever against Victor Emmanuel, who had withdrawn his troops on the arrival of the French, he issued a violent address to the Italians, calling on them to rise and overthrow the monarchy which had betrayed them, and then to march to Rome and plant their standard on the Capitol. But his manifesto produced no effect; the advanced party was thoroughly disheartened by its many defeats in the recent campaign, and Garibaldi, the only leader who had still influence enough to induce the people to take up arms again, had been arrested and imprisoned by the Italian Government after his flight from Mentana.

As help had, therefore, to be sought elsewhere for the realization of that unity of Italy for which he had so long worked and plotted, Mazzini, who had already discussed the matter with a Prussian officer at Florence, wrote to Count Bismarck on November 17,

1867, to suggest the formation of an alliance between the Prussian Government and the Italian Republican party. By means of his secret agents, who were often better informed with regard to coming events than the members of the diplomatic body, he had learned that Napoleon III. had even then resolved to declare war against Prussia; that about March 19, 1867, he had asked Italy to form an alliance for that purpose, and that Victor Emmanuel had consented and would furnish a contingent of 60,000 men. Mazzini therefore asked the Prussian Government to give the party of action a million of francs and 2,000 needle-guns, and he promised, in return, to destroy every possibility of that alliance by bringing on a war between France and Italy, or even, if necessary, by overturning the Italian Government and replacing it by one which would be friendly to Germany. Count Bismarck, who did not care to enter into correspondence with the head of the revolutionary party in Europe, gave no direct reply to these overtures; but, by means of Count Usedom, the Prussian Minister at Florence, he returned a vague and cautiously worded answer, asking for proofs of the existence of the alliance, which he already suspected.¹ Mazzini, however, could produce no proofs, though from the reports of his agents he knew that the idea of a war with Prussia had been spread throughout all the barracks in France, and that Victor Emmanuel had promised to make Italy take part in it. The matter was, therefore, soon allowed to drop, and Mazzini continued to work independently for the furtherance of his projects, making use of the Masonic lodges already established in Italy to diffuse as widely as possible his anti-Papal and anti-monarchical doctrines, and extending even among the ranks of the army and of the police the ramifications of a secret society entitled *l'Alleanza Universale Repubblicana*.²

Napoleon III. had hitherto been master of the situation in Italy; as long as his troops occupied the Papal territory, or were ready to return there whenever the independence of the Holy See was threatened, neither the secret intrigues of Mazzini nor the open aggression of Garibaldi, even though countenanced by the government of Victor Emmanuel, could destroy the Temporal Power of the Pope. But the complex and vacillating character of Napoleon III. made it impossible to reckon with confidence on his protection. In his youth he had been a member of the secret society known as the *Carbonari*, and had taken part in the insurrection of 1832 against Gregory XVI. Without his powerful aid when Emperor the Kingdom of Italy could never have been founded; but, though hostile to the temporal power, he considered himself bound to protect Pius IX., and not to allow him to be deprived of the last remnant of his

¹ *Politica Segreta Italiana*, p. 350. ² *id.* pp. 382-397.

sovereign authority. He hoped, apparently, that some compromise might be effected which, while satisfying the aspirations of Italian statesmen towards the unity of Italy, might still leave to the Pope a territory which, though small, would suffice to guarantee his independence; or that matters might remain as they were while Pius IX. lived, and that his successor might perhaps prove more yielding.¹ The influence of his Ministers, the Marquis de la Valette and M. Bénédicti, and of his cousin, Prince Napoleon, all three enemies of the temporal power, contributed also to impress on his policy a tendency favorable to the unity of Italy; while, on the other hand, the influence of the Empress and of the French clergy, and the dread of alienating the Catholics of France, prevented him from taking too actively the part of those who sought to despoil and enslave the Church, and the alternate preponderance in his council of these opposed tendencies may perhaps account for the variations in his policy with regard to the Holy See.

It was more especially towards the end of the Emperor's reign that the predominance of the Catholic element among his advisers made itself felt during the negotiations which took place concerning a Franco-Italian alliance, the first suggestion of which, according to Prince Napoleon,² was made by Victor Emmanuel in the course of 1868, with the object of finding a solution of the Roman question, though Mazzini stated in his letter to Bismarck that he knew that the Emperor had sought the alliance as far back as March, 1867. The matter was first vaguely discussed in a correspondence between the two sovereigns, and then in a more formal and official manner by their Ministers. At this stage of the proceedings the Austrian Government intervened and a treaty for an offensive and defensive alliance between France, Italy and Austria was drawn up, in which Italy exacted as an essential condition in return for her assistance the authorization for her troops to enter Rome after its evacuation by the French; and Austria, which was then ruled by a Liberal and anti-clerical parliamentary majority under the administration of Count von Beust, a Protestant from Saxony, approved and supported the demands of Italy.³ But Napoleon III., who, as has been stated, did not wish to abandon Pius IX., and who continued to entertain the hope that the election of another Pope more willing to come to terms with Italy, would extricate him from his embarrassing situation, refused to consent. The negotiations were suspended in June, 1869, until some more favorable opportunity, and General Menabrea, who had come to treat with the Emperor at Vichy, returned to Florence, saying as he took leave:

¹ Prince Napoleon, *Les Alliances de l'Empire*, p. 8. ² *id.* p. 11. ³ *id.* p. 15.

“May your Majesty never have reason to regret the 300,000 bayonets which I brought you.”¹

The negotiations were resumed in the second week of July, 1870, on the eve of the Franco-Prussian war, by the Emperor, who sent to Florence and Vienna the draft of a treaty consisting of only three articles, by which, in return for the coöperation of an Italian army, he consented to withdraw the French troops from Rome and to trust to the honor and good faith of the Italian Government.² But to these three articles Italy, with the assent of Austria, added a fourth, by which France should agree to oblige Pius IX. to be reconciled with Italy and to yield up the Papal territory with the exception of Rome and its immediate environs. The Emperor, to his credit be it said, refused to accept this proposal, and on July 30 the Duc de Grammont replied: “If what is asked for is the entry of the Italians into Rome after the departure of our troops, it is impossible.”³

The Emperor was already at Metz on his way to the army when, on August 3, Count Vimercati, the Italian envoy, brought him the draft of a new treaty, prepared by Count von Beust and Visconti-Venosta, by which Italy and Austria agreed to observe an armed neutrality, guaranteeing each other's territory and forming a triple alliance with France, as was proposed in 1869, in case the war were to acquire a greater development. France was again requested to conciliate the national rights of Italy with those of the Holy See, which meant practically that Pius IX. was to be abandoned and deprived of his States. But the Emperor still hesitated and sought various pretexts for not putting his name to the document; he objected to the form in which the treaty was drawn up; he asked to have its conditions modified, and though Prince Napoleon strongly urged him to sign it, he at last refused to do so, stating in a letter of that date to a friend that, in spite of all efforts of his cousin, he would not yield with regard to Rome.⁴ Count Vimercati left that evening with the unsigned treaty, and in a few days the Prussian victories of Wörth and Wissembourg put an end to all hope of aid from Italy or Austria.

The Emperor had, however, decided to recall the troops which occupied the Papal territory, and the Holy Father had been informed of his intention on July 27, the reason assigned for the withdrawal by the Duc de Grammont being that it was necessary, not from a strategical, but from a political point of view, for the purpose of conciliating Italy and assuring her neutrality. For, as the Duke remarked, the importance of the small detachment which

¹ G. Rothan, *Souvenirs diplomatiques*, *Revue des deux Mondes*, 15th November, 1884, p. 316. ² *id.*, p. 507. ³ *id.* p. 510. ⁴ Prince Napoleon, *Les Alliances de l'Empire*, p. 36.

then occupied the Papal territory was that it might be looked upon as the advanced guard of a French army which would hasten to support it in case it were attacked, a reinforcement which the war just beginning would render impossible, and it was advisable not to afford the Italian Government a pretext for setting aside the stipulations of the convention of September 15, 1864, by which it was bound to respect the Papal frontiers. In a subsequent dispatch addressed to the French envoy in Florence, he expressed the confidence which he felt that Italy would execute these stipulations with vigilance and firmness, and in reply Visconti-Venosta, the Foreign Minister, assured him that the King's government would conform strictly to the obligations imposed by the convention of 1864.¹

In spite of this declaration, the Italian Government was already preparing to invade the Papal States. On July 31 General Govone, the Minister of War, asked Parliament for a grant of sixteen millions of francs for the purpose of calling out and arming two levies of recruits, and on August 10, when the first French defeats had shown that there was not much danger of another intervention, the general asked for two more levies and a further grant of forty millions of francs. The French flag was lowered on the forts of Cività Vecchia as the last French soldiers quitted the Papal territory on August 12, and on the 14th General Cadorna took the command of the troops which were being gradually assembled at different points along the Papal frontier.² After the loss of the battle of Gravelotte on August 18, Napoleon III. made a last effort to obtain succor from Italy, for he knew that Victor Emmanuel was favorable to the idea in spite of the opposition of his Ministers, and on August 20 Prince Napoleon arrived in Florence as his envoy to request the armed intervention of Italy and Austria, with leave for Italy to act as she pleased with regard to Rome. The Prince, indeed, declares in his pamphlet that he would not have accepted the mission if he had not been allowed to give this authorization.³ But it was then too late, and the abandonment of the Papal territory, around which the invading army was taking up its positions, was a useless concession. Victor Emmanuel, it is true, was willing to do all in his power to aid France, but his Ministers and his generals remained inflexible;⁴ though, to gain time and to avoid offending an old ally by giving a positive refusal, an envoy was sent to Vienna to consult the Austrian Government. Before he could return the capitulation of Sédan and the fall of the Empire put an end to all further negotiations, and the Italian Government saw that the way to Rome lay open before it; for, though Jules Favre, the Foreign Minister of the

¹ De Beaufort, *Histoire de l'Invasion des États Pontificaux*, p. 416. ² Tavallini *id.*, vol. II. p. 14. ³ Prince Napoleon, *id.*, p. 29. ⁴ Tavallini, *Vita di Lanza*, vol. I., p. 510.

newly inaugurated French Republic, twice refused to accede to the request of Cavaliere Nigra, the Italian Ambassador, and to consent to the occupation of Rome by the Italian troops, saying that he did not wish to cause any pain to the Sovereign Pontiff or to his own countrymen, at a third interview he yielded so far as to decline to interfere in the Roman question, and said that he would be pleased to see the government of Victor Emmanuel go to Rome.¹

Giovanni Lanza, the Prime Minister of Italy, had already taken the necessary precautions to hinder a premature invasion of the Papal territory under the leadership of Garibaldi, which would have probably resulted in the proclamation of that Republic for which Mazzini had been organizing so actively over all Italy his "*Allianza Repubblicana*," which reckoned among its adherents many sergeants and corporals of the royal army. Some republican manifestations had already taken place in Northern Italy, the most serious having been that of March 23 at Pavia, where the barracks were attacked, with the result that there were several killed and wounded, and a corporal who was found among the rebels was condemned to death and shot. Lanza therefore gave orders to have Garibaldi carefully watched in his island of Caprera, and to arrest Mazzini, who was known to be hiding in Genoa. The tools of the House of Savoy, which had helped to lay the foundations of the Kingdom of Italy, were now no longer needed; their assistance had even become dangerous, and the difficult operation of the completion of the edifice could not be entrusted to the dreamer of impossible Utopias or to the leader of undisciplined revolutionary bands. But Mazzini, in spite of the peremptory commands of Lanza to his subordinates, succeeded in leaving Genoa in disguise and with a false passport. The police failed to recognize him when the steamer on which he traveled touched at Naples, and he was only arrested on August 13 at Palermo, whence he was brought on a man-of-war to the fortress of Gaeta.²

Being thus freed from the dread of a republican movement, the Italian Ministry sought to obtain the approval of the rest of Europe for their sacrilegious aggression on the remaining possessions of the Holy See, and on August 29 Visconti-Venosta addressed a circular for that purpose to the representatives of the Italian Government at the different courts. In this document he accused the Holy See of adopting the attitude of a hostile government established in the centre of the peninsula and enlisting foreign soldiers, not to maintain order, but to carry out a crusade for the restoration of the ancient order of things in Italy. A lengthy memorandum joined to this circular gave an account of the negotiations which had taken

¹ Rothan, id., p. 529. ² Tavallini, Vita di G. Lanza, vol. II., p. 9.

place since 1860 between France and Italy with regard to the Roman question, in which the obstinacy of the Papal Government was held responsible for the failure of the well-meant efforts of Napoleon III. and Victor Emmanuel to bring about a reconciliation between it and the Kingdom of Italy.¹ Another circular followed on September 7. The imperial government had fallen, and therefore Visconti-Venosta was still more outspoken in his calumnious denunciations. He declared that the unfertile and thinly inhabited tract of Italy which had been left to the Holy Father in 1860 was a serious danger for the rest of the country, as the territory of the theocratic government of the Sovereign Pontiff served as a basis of operations for all the elements of disorder, and the King was, therefore, under the necessity of taking steps to maintain peace and tranquility in the peninsula and to defend the Holy See. His Majesty did not even intend to wait till the actual outbreak of a struggle between the Romans and the foreign troops which might expose the Holy Father and the goods and the lives of his subjects to the dangers of a conflict much to be regretted, but when he judged fit he would occupy the positions requisite for the preservation of order.²

It is needless to observe that not the slightest disturbance had occurred or was likely to occur in Rome. The Œcumenical Council which had met on December 8, 1869, in St. Peter's, when the prelates assembled from all parts of the world to the number of over 700 presented the most magnificent and memorable spectacle ever witnessed in the Basilica, had proclaimed the dogma of the Papal infallibility on July 18, the day before France declared war against Prussia. Its sittings had then been suspended till the 11th of November, and the majority of its members had returned to their dioceses. The foreign visitors of all nations, who that year had been more numerous than usual, had also taken their departure, and the Eternal City was in that state of absolute tranquillity which recurred regularly every year during the intense heat of the summer months. Attempts had, indeed, been made to create disorder; the *Democrazia* of Florence stated in its number of August 31 that all the Roman emigrants, even those in the army, had been asked if they were willing to go to Rome to make demonstrations, and that those who consented had received money for the journey.³ During the course of the month some sentinels stationed in lonely parts of Rome had been fired upon, and the Italian flag had been hoisted during the night in some villages near the frontier, only to be speedily pulled down by the *gendarmes*, but these manifestations

¹ De Beaufort, *id.*, p. 434. ² *id.*, p. 452. ³ De Beaufort, *Histoire de l'Invasion des États Pontificaux*, p. 57.

had met with no sympathy from the subjects of the Pope, and excited no revolutionary movement. Even when, at the end of the month, Menotti Garibaldi and some of his partisans came secretly to Rome they were soon discovered by the police and expelled without causing any disturbance. It was, indeed, said that the Italian Government had denounced them to the Papal authorities, for Menotti was more likely to conspire in favor of Mazzini's plans than of their own, and some time previously he had spoken of Lanza and his fellow-ministers as "that pack of rascals and thieves which calls itself the Italian Government."¹

It was on the 7th of September that these statesmen, finding that there was no prospect of an insurrection against the rule of Pius IX. and probably fearing that if France made peace with Prussia she might again be willing to defend the Holy Father, decided, as Visconti-Venosta stated in his circular of that date to the other European powers, not to wait till "the agitation reported to exist in the Papal territory, the natural consequence of the events taking place abroad, ended by causing bloodshed between the Romans and the foreign troops," and the invasion of the Papal States was decreed.

The anxiety which the Italian Ministry felt on the eve of this unprovoked aggression lest their victim should be snatched from their grasp, whether by an outburst of Catholic indignation or by a republican movement against the throne of Victor Emmanuel, is shown by the circular of September 5 addressed by Lanza to the provincial prefects, warning them to maintain order energetically and to repress any illegal manifestation or any attempt to imitate the republic just established in France.² The prefects of Caserta and Sassari were also specially requested to guard Mazzini and Garibaldi with the utmost vigilance, as their escape at that moment would be most embarrassing for the government. Another circular was sent by Raelli, the Minister of Justice, to the Bishops of Italy, assuring them that the government would guarantee to the Pope the greatest liberty for the exercise of his spiritual authority, and would not allow the slightest insult to be offered to the Church, but would not permit the clergy to censure the laws and the institutions of the State or to excite discontent. Any disobedience to these orders would be severely punished.³

Before, however, crossing the frontier the Italian Government made an attempt to persuade the Holy Father to abdicate voluntarily, and Count Ponza di San Martino, a man who when he had been Minister of the Interior had persecuted the religious orders,

¹ Vita di Giovanni Lanza, vol. I., p. 478. ² De Beauffort, L'Invasion des États Pontificaux, p. 491. ³ Id., p. 492.

was sent to Rome bearer of an autograph letter from Victor Emmanuel to Pius IX. In this document the King protested that he addressed the Holy Father with the affection of a son, with the faith of a Catholic, with the loyalty of a King and with the feelings of an Italian. He then brought forward again the false and absurd accusations so often repeated by his Ministers; namely, that the state of mind of the Papal subjects and the presence of the foreign soldiers were a cause of agitation and a danger to Italy which rendered it necessary for him to send his troops to occupy positions which would ensure the safety of His Holiness and the maintenance of order. He requested the Holy Father not to consider this measure of precaution as an act of hostility, for his government would protect the rights of the people and conciliate them with the inviolability of the Sovereign Pontiff, and he expressed the hope that the Holy Father's benevolent spirit, by satisfying the aspirations of the nation, would enable the Head of the Catholic Church to preserve on the banks of the Tiber a glorious dwelling independent of all human sovereignty. His Majesty concluded by asking for the Pope's blessing and declaring himself the most humble and obedient son of His Holiness. On reading this letter Pius IX. exclaimed: "Why this needless hypocrisy? Would it not be better to say frankly that he wants to deprive me of my kingdom?" He replied to the King's letter in a few eloquent and dignified lines, refusing to yield to his demands or even to discuss them and saying that he placed his cause in the hands of God, beseeching Him to bestow on the King the grace and the mercy of which he stood in need.

This embassy to Pius IX. was, it is said, not the only mission which Count Ponza di San Martino had to perform in Rome: he had been charged, it would seem, with the preparation of a revolutionary movement intended to facilitate the entrance of the royal troops; for *La Capitale*, one of the most violent organs of the advanced party, stated on September 28 that the Italian Government had given him a check for 600,000 francs to enable the Romans to purchase arms wherewith to repel the Papal mercenaries, and asked him what he had done with the money, since no revolt had taken place for want of arms; to which the Count replied that he had not cashed the check.¹ He had probably come to the conclusion that it would be useless to attempt to incite an insurrection in Rome on witnessing the enthusiasm with which an immense crowd of Romans greeted the Holy Father, when on the afternoon of September 10, the day on which he had received Victor Emmanuel's letter, he inaugurated on the Piazza de' Termini, close to the ruins of the Baths

¹ *L'Invasion des États Pontificaux*, p. 93.

of Diocletian, the fountain known as the *Acqua Pia*. This vast basin, from the centre of which a group of jets of water shot high into the air, was the end of the conduit nearly sixty miles long which brought from its source in the mountains the water formerly carried by the ancient Roman aqueduct called the *Acqua Marcia*, ruined since many centuries; and it marked the completion of the last great undertaking accomplished for the good of the people by the government of Pius IX.

Count Ponza di San Martino left Rome on the 11th of September with the reply of the Holy Father to Victor Emmanuel, and on the same day the Italian troops received orders to cross the frontier. Pius IX. could expect no help from any of the other sovereigns; their answers to the circular of Visconti-Venosta were received by the Italian Government during the month of September, and it was not only the Protestant States which expressed their approval of the overthrow of the temporal power, as indeed might have been expected; but even the governments of the Catholic nations declined to interfere, accompanying their assurances of non-intervention with expressions of respect and sympathy for the Holy Father, of their confidence in the good feelings, the generosity and the honor of the Italian Government, and of their conviction that it was under the necessity of going to Rome, and that it would surround the Holy Father with all the guarantees requisite for the maintenance of his dignity and the untrammelled exercise of his spiritual authority. None of them uttered a protest against the misrepresentations and the calumnious accusations which the Italian Government had disseminated against the rule of the Sovereign Pontiff, or denounced the reported attempts to incite his subjects to rise in rebellion against him, or the unprovoked aggression on his States, without declaration of war, when these attempts had proved unavailing.

The army intended to operate against Rome was placed under the command of Lieutenant General Raffaele Cadorna. It consisted of the Fourth Army Corps, formed by the Eleventh, Twelfth and Thirteenth Divisions, commanded by Lieutenant General Cosenz, a former Garibaldian officer; Major General Mazé de la Roche, and Major General Ferrero. There were besides two auxiliary divisions, the Second under Lieutenant General Bixio, also a former Garibaldian, and Lieutenant General Angioletti. These five divisions and the reserve comprised eighty battalions of infantry of the line, seventeen battalions of *bersaglieri*, 114 guns, twenty-seven squadrons of cavalry, four companies of engineers, five companies of the military train and one company of the pontoon train. The nominal strength of this army amounted to 81,478 men, giving as the effective strength, which is usually one-fifth less, at least 65,000

men.¹ Besides these troops, another body of over 10,000 men entered the Papal States in order to garrison the various towns and leave the whole of Cadorna's army free to march against Rome.

The small force which the Papal Government was able to oppose to the invasion had been much diminished by the departure of many of the Zouaves and of the *Légion d'Antibes* after the beginning of the Franco-German war, and was reduced to a nominal strength of 13,624 men, while the effective strength did not amount to much over 10,900. The Italians in this army were 8,309 (a proportion of 12 per 1,000 of the population),² the foreigners only 5,324, of whom 3,040 were Pontifical Zouaves. To these should be added the battalion of volunteers of the reserve, composed of 600 Romans armed and clothed at their own expense, and commanded by the Marchese Patrizi and Prince Lancillotti; and the Palatine Guard, also formed of Romans, who were on duty in the Vatican and in Saint Peter's on state occasions. As the detachments stationed at Cività Vecchia, Bagnorea and Cività Castellana were not able to retreat on Rome when the invasion took place, the number of soldiers available for the defense of the city did not amount at the time of the siege to more than 7,857; or, adding the volunteers and the officers, to about 10,000 men.³

Although Rome is surrounded by a wall, it cannot be considered as a fortified city capable of offering a serious resistance to a well-equipped army. It is only the portion situated on the right bank of the Tiber and known as the *Trastevere*, which is defended by modern fortifications provided with bastions, constructed under the reign of Urban VIII. (1623-1644); that on the left bank, by far the larger part of the city, is enclosed by a brick wall dating, for the most part, from the reigns of the Emperors Aurelian, Honorius and Justinian (270 A. D.—565 A. D.); surmounted with battlements and flanked at every 50 or 60 yards by square towers. In some places, as at the garden on the Pincian mount, to the north, these walls are strengthened by the hill behind them, of which they form the outer face, or by high ground a little in their rear, which might serve as a second line of defense, as in the neighborhood of the Porta San Paolo or the Porta San Sebastiano. But on all the eastern side of Rome the walls, without backing of earth and not commanded by buildings or heights, presented no such obstacles to an assailant, and the weakest part of all was that between the Porta Salaria and the Porta Pia, about 300 yards in length. To defend this circuit of about thirteen miles there were only 160 guns, not more than fifty-four of which were rifled: the rest were for the most part antiquated

¹ L'Invasion des États Pontificaux, p. 112. ² L'Invasion, p. 121. ³ Id., p. 192.

and hardly fit for use, and there were but 526 artillerymen to serve them.¹

It had been the original intention of General Cadorna to enter the Papal territory with his *corps d'armée* at Passo di Correse, on the left bank of the Tiber, at a distance of only two days' march from Rome, while General Bixio marched from Orvieto towards Cività Vecchia and General Angioletti advanced from the Neapolitan frontier towards Velletri, and his three divisions were already in the positions assigned to them when the Italian Government, guided, as it stated, by political motives, suddenly changed its plans and ordered the general to transfer his troops to the right bank of the Tiber at two points, Ponté Felice and Orte, eighteen and twenty-five miles higher up, and thence to march to Rome. The reason for this movement, so unadvisable from a military point of view, since it would necessitate the recrossing of the Tiber close to Rome, may perhaps have been the desire of affording the Holy Father more time to reflect on the impossibility of opposing any resistance to such greatly superior forces, and thereby persuade him to yield without fighting; or else the hope that, according as the different towns and villages along the line of march were annexed, anti-Papal demonstrations could be organized, the result of which would be to excite the populace of Rome and bring about that insurrection which the Italian politicians so ardently desired that they might have a pretext for their iniquitous invasion of the territory of the Church.²

General Bixio, who was the first to cross the frontier at 5 o'clock on the afternoon of September 11, had fought under Garibaldi at the siege of Rome in 1849, in the war against Austria in 1859 and in the expedition of Marsala against Francis II., when he was raised to the rank of lieutenant general, which he retained on being admitted into the regular army in 1862. He was a decided enemy of the Church, and had declared openly in Parliament that the Cardinals ought to be flung into the Tiber; and General Cadorna, knowing his violent character, had protested, but in vain, against his appointment to a command.³ The troops forming his division consisted of sixteen battalions of the line, three battalions of *bersaglieri*, six squadrons of cavalry, twenty-four guns and a company of engineers, amounting in all to about 13,000 combatants.

The small detachments of zouaves of twenty men each, stationed at Acquapendente and San Lorenzo, two villages close to the frontier, had already retreated to Montefiascone, held by Major de Suisy with two companies (173 men); but that at Bagnorea was surprised

¹ *L'Invasion*, p. 192. ² *Cadorua*, p. 105; *De Beauffort*, p. 116. ³ *Cadorua, La Liberazione di Roma*, p. 61 and p. 536.

by the sudden advance of Bixio's troops and obliged to lay down its arms. On the following day Bixio turned aside from the road leading to Viterbo and, leaving one battalion to threaten that town, he passed along the southern shore of the lake of Bolsena, marching towards Corneto on the road to Cività Vecchia, where he hoped to intercept Lieutenant Colonel de Charette as he retreated towards Rome. De Charette, who held Viterbo with four companies of zouaves (396 men), forty gendarmes and forty artillerymen with two guns and a *mitrailleuse*, had been ordered to withdraw according as the Italian army advanced, and on being informed of the invasion he recalled the garrison of Montefiascone and prepared to retire. The Piedmontese columns were already in sight about noon on the 12th. The detachment left behind by Bixio was advancing from Montefiascone, and the troops of General Ferrero belonging to Cadorna's army were approaching from Orte, where they had that morning crossed the Tiber. It was only when they were close to the northern and eastern gates of the town that de Charette, who had taken up a position on a height outside the walls, marched away by the road to Vetralla, where he arrived that evening. There he was joined by about 200 gendarmes collected from their stations in the surrounding country, and the next morning he continued his march towards Cività Vecchia, meeting everywhere with the utmost cordiality and assistance in the way of provisions and transport from the inhabitants of the villages through which he passed.¹ But his further progress was stopped at Monte Romano, for there he learned that the advanced posts of Bixio's troops, which from Marta on the lake of Bolsena had marched through Toscanella to Corneto, had seized the roads leading to Cività Vecchia, and left him no means of escape except through a wild and mountainous district through which it seemed impossible for heavily laden troops to make their way. It was, however, through this labyrinth of wooded hills and precipitous ravines, across which the guns and the baggage wagons were dragged by the soldiers, that de Charette led his 900 men by a daring and fatiguing march of twelve hours, the greater part of which took place during the night. At one point, from the summit of a height, the camp fires of the enemy were seen in the plain below; but no alarm was given, and at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 14th the detachment entered Cività Vecchia, whence that afternoon it proceeded to Rome.²

The garrison of Cività Vecchia was composed of the four companies of zouaves which formed the *dépôt*, three companies of *cacciatori*, half a squadron of dragoons, four sections of artillery with eight field pieces, some gendarmes and *squadrilieri*, in all between

¹ L. Invasion, p. 135. ² J. Powell, Two Years in the Pontifical Zouaves, p. 251.

800 and 900 men.¹ The fortifications which had been recently enlarged were defended by 120 guns, but there were not artillerymen enough to work them. On the morning of the 15th the Italian fleet which, under the command of Vice Admiral del Carretto, had been cruising for some days off the coast of the Papal territory, drew nearer to Civit  Vecchia. It consisted of twelve vessels, ten of which were iron-clads, carrying 105 guns and 4,295 men, and it took up its position opposite the town in order to co perate with General Bixio. The commander of the place, Colonel Serra, a Spanish officer who had distinguished himself in the campaign of 1860, had declared to the foreign Consuls that he would defend the town according to the orders which he had received from Rome, and on the approach of the Italian advanced guard the gates were closed, the guns were manned and every preparation was made to repel an attack. But when General Bixio sent an officer of his staff to demand the surrender of the town and threatened to bombard it if it did not capitulate within twelve hours, the entreaties of the terrified citizens and the noisy demonstrations of the populace so prevailed over the colonel's sense of duty and honor that in spite of the indignant protests of Major d'Albiousse, the commander of the zouaves, he consented to give up the town without firing a shot.

The invasion of the southern portion of the Papal territory took place at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 12th, when General Angioletti entered the province of Frosinone at the head of the Ninth Division, consisting of sixteen battalions of infantry, two battalions of *bersaglieri*, eighteen guns, six squadrons of cavalry and a company of engineers, in all about 12,000 men. According as he advanced he established provisional governments in the different towns, and on the 19th his troops encamped about three miles from Rome.

The province of Frosinone as well as that of Velletri were under the command of Colonel Azzanesi, whose troops, which did not amount to 2,000 men, were all Italian, and as he had been ordered to withdraw before the superior forces of the enemy without offering any resistance, he recalled his outlying detachments stationed along the frontier, falling back with them gradually on Velletri, whence they were conveyed to Rome by rail. One of these detachments, commanded by Major Lauri, of the gendarmes, was intercepted on its way by Angioletti's advanced guard, and in order to escape had to make a dangerous night march like that of Colonel de Charette through the rugged and intricate range of mountains which lies to the south of Velletri; and it is a remarkable fact that, with every facility for deserting and with the certainty that in presence of such

¹ L'Invasion des  tats Pontificaux, p. 141.

an overwhelming hostile force the Papal cause was hopelessly lost, not one of his soldiers, all Italians and Papal subjects, abandoned his flag to pass over to the enemy.¹

In the meanwhile the army of General Cadorna, consisting of forty-eight battalions of infantry, twelve of *bersaglieri*, seventy-two guns, fourteen squadrons of cavalry, two companies of engineers, three of the military train, a company of the pontoon train and a squadron of guides, in all about 35,000 men, had crossed the Tiber at dawn on the morning of the 12th. The Thirteenth Division, under Major General Ferrero, which had seized the bridge at Orte during the night, marched on Viterbo, whence, as we have seen, Colonel de Charette retreated on its approach, while the Eleventh Division, under General Cosenz, and the Twelfth, under General Mazé de la Roche, crossed at Ponte Felice and advanced towards Cività Castellana. The town, which occupies the site of an ancient Etruscan city, stands upon a high table-land of rock surrounded on three sides by deep ravines, and the road from Ponte Felice crosses that lying to the north by a bridge 120 feet high. The fort which gives its name to the town was built in the fifteenth century by Antonio San Gallo for Alexander VI. and enlarged by Julius II. and Leo X. It had served for a long time as a civil and military prison, and contained at the time of the invasion a company of discipline of seventy men belonging to different regiments and 180 convicts. The garrison consisted of Captain de Résimont's company of zouaves (110 men) and twenty-five gendarmes and *squadriglieri*. Warned on the night of the 11th that the enemy was about to cross the frontier, Captain de Résimont stationed a detachment of zouaves in a Capuchin convent situated beyond the bridge and commanding the road leading to it, and when General Cadorna's advanced guard appeared it was received with a heavy fire. The post could not, however, be long defended, for a battalion had been sent by a narrow path leading from the high road down into the ravine to turn the position, and two other battalions which had crossed the Tiber by a railway bridge lower down had already occupied the road leading to Rome and were about to enter the town. The zouaves then retreated into the castle, on which a battery of six guns, strengthened shortly after by two more batteries, and screened by the surrounding gardens and plantations, opened fire from a distance of 1,000 yards. The garrison, which had no artillery, could only reply with musketry, and thus inflicted very little damage on the enemy; but when, after a bombardment of two hours, during which more than 400 cannon balls had been fired against the fortress and 240 shells had burst within its circuit, the

¹ L'Invasion des États Pontificaux, p. 167.

massive towers were on the point of falling and the lives of the prisoners were in danger, Captain de Résimont and Lieutenant Sevilla, who had already refused to capitulate when requested by the Governor of the prison, consented at last to treat with General Cadorna. The general complimented the Papal troops on the gallant resistance which they had opposed to such greatly superior forces, and the next day the garrison marched out with the honors of war, and having laid down their arms were brought as prisoners to Spoleto, whence the foreign soldiers were sent to their homes. On the side of the Italians the loss had been ten killed and wounded; of the zouaves only five had been wounded.¹

On the same day General Cadorna received orders from the Minister of War to advance by forced marches to Rome, and his troops, taking two days' rations with them and leaving all their baggage behind, started at noon and encamped that night at Monterosi, about twenty-two miles from Rome. They continued their march next morning at 3, and halted that afternoon about ten miles from Rome, where General Cadorna established his headquarters at a wayside inn named *La Storta*. An advanced guard of nine squadrons of cavalry and six guns, commanded by General Chevilly, had preceded them, and on arriving near Rome had sent detachments to patrol the roads in the environs of the city. It was then 8 o'clock, and the mists which float over the Campagna in the early morning had not yet passed away, so that they were not perceived till they were close to the outpost of a company of zouaves stationed at the Convent of Sant' Onofrio, a few miles to the northwest of Rome. Sergeant Shea, who commanded the post, went forward with four men to demand the watchword, but was surrounded, severely wounded and made prisoner with his men after a desperate resistance. The rest of the company retreated upon Rome after having inflicted some loss on the enemy and taken their lieutenant, Count Crotti di Costigliole. The father of this officer sat in the Italian Parliament, where he had distinguished himself by his eloquence in defense of the rights of the Church, and he died suddenly a few days after the taking of Rome, most probably from the grief and indignation caused by the spoliation of the Holy See.²

The anxiety of the Italian Ministers to induce Pius IX. to yield on the question of the temporal power and to condone the sacrilegious aggression of the House of Savoy by the voluntary cession of the territory of the Church, was again rendered evident by the action of General Cadorna, who before undertaking the difficult operation of transferring his army from the right to the left bank of the Tiber, tried to accomplish the object of the campaign by diplo-

¹ *L'Invasion des États Pontificaux*, p. 179. ² *Id.*, p. 156.

macy rather than by violence. On the 15th he sent one of his staff officers, Lieutenant Colonel Count Caccialupi, with a letter to General Kanzler, asking him in the name of the King of Italy to allow his troops to occupy Rome, assuring him that their object was purely to maintain order, and that the Italian officers of the Papal army would be allowed to preserve their rank, while the foreign soldiers would be sent to their respective countries; to which General Kanzler simply replied that the Holy Father preferred to see Rome occupied by his own troops, and not by those of another sovereign. In spite of this rebuff General Cadorna sought once more to overcome the resistance of the Papal Government, and on the following day he sent Major General Carchidio to inform General Kanzler of the taking of Cività Vecchia, and to request him again to admit the Italian troops into Rome, appealing at the same time to his feelings of humanity and pointing out to him that resistance was useless in presence of the superior force assembled round the city. General Kánzler in his reply remarked that the loss of Cività Vecchia could have no influence on the defense of Rome, and he reminded the Italian general that the Holy See had not provoked this war, and that it was rather for the invaders to show their humane feelings by desisting from an unjust aggression.

In the meanwhile preparations were actively carried on by Cadorna's orders for throwing a pontoon bridge across the Tiber near a farm called Grotta Rossa, about four miles above Rome; the steep banks of the river had been cut down to allow of easy access to it, and roads to connect it with the high road constructed across the fields. At nightfall three battalions of *bersaglieri* were ferried across to protect the working party. Nine other battalions followed about midnight, when the bridge was completed, and they seized the bridges over the Aniene to guard against an attack from the garrison of Rome.¹ The rest of the army followed in the course of the 17th, and on the evening of the 18th the Eleventh Division was encamped on the *Via Salara* nearest to the Tiber, the Twelfth on the *Via Nomentana* and the Thirteenth on the *Via Tiburtina*, where its left was in touch with the troops of the Ninth Division under General Angioletti, which on arriving from the southern provinces took up their positions on the *Via Latina*. Bixio, too, received orders to hasten forward with the Second Division, and on the evening of the 19th his troops were seen advancing on the road from Cività Vecchia.

As all the applications made directly by the Italian Government had failed to persuade Pius IX. to lay down his sovereign power and to allow the army of Victor Emmanuel to occupy Rome, an-

¹ Cadorna, p. 169.

other attempt to treat was made through the intervention of Count von Arnim, the Prussian Minister at the Vatican, and at that moment, owing to the absence of the Austrian Ambassador, the head of the diplomatic body in Rome. Taking upon himself, apparently unsolicited, to negotiate in the interests of Italy, he came to General Cadorna while he was watching his troops crossing the Tiber, and asked him to put off the attack on Rome for twenty-four hours, as he hoped by applying directly to Pius IX. to persuade him to cease a resistance which was altogether owing to the predominant influence of the military party among his advisers.¹ General Cadorna was only too happy to grant his request, not only because he was aware that the Italian Ministers would much prefer to obtain possession of Rome without fighting, but also, as he confesses in his report of the campaign, because he would require more than twenty-four hours to place his troops in the positions they were to occupy and give their officers time to study the ground over which they were to operate. Count von Arnim's mendacious assertion with regard to the pressure brought to bear on the Holy Father by the "foreign mercenaries" was a favorite theme with the revolutionary politicians and journalists, who tried to explain the constancy with which Pius IX. guarded the possessions of the Church by spreading the report that Colonel de Charette and the zouaves refused to obey the orders of the Pope to lay down their arms, and that they were masters of Rome and terrorized the citizens.² This calumnious statement was soon after publicly refuted in the principal journals of Europe by Count Blume, a former Austrian Minister, then present in Rome. Count von Arnim's efforts to persuade Pius IX. to abandon his temporal power met with no more success than the previous endeavors of Ponza di San Martino and Cadorna, and the Italian Ministry, perceiving that there was no hope of entering Rome peaceably, ordered their general to take the city by force, with the exception of *la Città Leonina*, or that part of the *Trastevere* which encloses the Castle of St. Angelo, St. Peter's and the Vatican, reminding him at the same time that the political situation demanded prudence, moderation and dispatch. Another telegram on the following day informed him that from the political point of view delay might be fatal.³

Within Rome all was quiet; the people showed no disposition to facilitate the entrance of the Italian army by an insurrection against the Papal troops; but when a *triduo* was held in St. Peter's at the altar of *la Madonna della Colonna* the Romans flocked thither in crowds, through which the Swiss Guards could hardly make a way

¹ Cadorna, p. 171. ² Italian Correspondence of September 18 and 19 in the London *Times* of September 24 and 27, 1870; *La Nazione* of Florence, September 19, 1870. ³ Cadorna, p. 185.

for the Holy Father, and when, a few days later, on the feast of the Stigmata of St. Francis, he visited the Church of *Ara Caeli*, he was received with enthusiastic applause by the throngs which lined the streets. The preparations for the defense of Rome were still actively carried on; by a proclamation of General Kanzler the city was declared to be in a state of siege; the gates were closed with the exception of six, in front of which earthworks were thrown up and armed with artillery; the troops left their barracks and bivouacked at the various points where an attack was to be apprehended; and posts of observation were established on the cupola of St. Peter's and the belfries of the Lateran and Sta. Maria Maggiore, which were put in telegraphic communication with the Ministry of War and the Vatican.

General Cadorna had given orders to begin the attack at dawn on the 20th, and his troops took up their positions in the course of the two preceding days. On the right of the besieging army General Cosenz placed the batteries of the Eleventh Division at 500 yards from the Porta Salara; twelve pieces of heavy artillery under General Corte, destined to make a breach in the wall between the Porta Salara and the Porta Pia, were stationed on some rising ground about 1,000 yards away, and six others at 400 yards. General Mazé de la Roche was to attack the Porta Pia with the three batteries of the Twelfth Division, and the infantry of the line and the *bersaglieri* of these divisions, together with the six battalions of *bersaglieri* of the reserve, the cavalry and the *ambulances*, were drawn up in the rear near the Church of St. Agnes, while Cadorna fixed his headquarters at the Villa Albani. To the left General Ferrero, with the Thirteenth Division, was to attack the Porta Maggiore and the opening in the city wall called *I tre Archi*, through which passed the railway to Naples; General Angioletti, with the Ninth Division, was to cannonade the Porta San Giovanni and the salient angle where is situated Santa Croce in Gerusalemme, while Bixio's guns were to be directed against the line of bastions on the right bank of the Tiber. The real attack was that against Porta Pia and the adjacent wall; the others were intended to divert the attention of the besieged and oblige them to scatter their forces.¹ While the Italian army was thus drawing nearer to the walls of the Eternal City, Count von Arnim made a last effort to persuade Pius IX. to lay down his sovereignty and surrender his temporal power, seeking to alarm him by pointing out that if Victor Emmanuel were unable to make Rome the capital of Italy, the proclamation of an Italian Republic was inevitable, which would be far more dangerous for the Holy See. But Pius IX. was neither to be deceived by diplomacy nor intimi-

¹ *L'Invasion des États Pontificaux*, p. 263.

dated by threats, and the arguments of Count von Arnim were unsuccessful, as was also his attempt to induce the rest of the diplomatic body in Rome to support his demand by signing an address to the Pope with the same object.¹

When the Holy Father was informed that Rome was to be bombarded on the following day he addressed to General Kanzler a letter, in which in dignified and solemn words he bade farewell to his army. His object had been attained; he had obliged the enemies who had approached his throne with feigned respect and perfidious offers of protection to cast aside the mask and show themselves in their real character of oppressors and spoliators of the Church. He knew, indeed, that with his small army a prolonged resistance could have no other result than a useless shedding of blood; but he was resolved that if the House of Savoy was to usurp the temporal power entrusted to his keeping, it should be in virtue of superior might, not in consequence of any abdication on his part or any failure to perform their duty on the part of his soldiers; and he, therefore, commanded that as soon as a breach was opened in the walls the garrison should capitulate.

During the 19th the movements of the enemy were carefully watched from the ramparts, and when possible a shell or a volley of musketry was directed against the detachments of Italian troops which advanced to occupy the surrounding villas; and that night the sentinels on the walls could see close at hand the watch fires of the outposts and hear the distant rolling of the artillery as it took up the positions where the batteries were to be established.

It was not yet daylight when, at 5 o'clock on the morning of the 20th, General Ferrero's three batteries opened fire on the earthwork armed with two guns and a howitzer which protected the three arches by which the railway enters Rome, and at the same time General Angioletti began to bombard the Porta San Giovanni, defended by two guns in the earthwork covering the gate and by two more guns and a howitzer mounted on the adjacent rampart; but his attack on the Porta San Sebastiano did not begin till about an hour later. The guns at the *Tre Archi* were soon put out of action by the masses of brick and stone which fell round them as the walls crumbled away under the heavy and well directed fire of the Italians, and the two companies of Swiss Carabineers, two of infantry of the line and two of zouaves, which under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Castella defended the position, could only reply with musketry. The walls were already tottering and two companies of Italian infantry were held in readiness to give the

¹ L'Invasion des États Pontificaux, p. 254; Ideville, p. 180.

assault, when, at 10 o'clock, a dragoon brought a verbal order to cease all resistance, which the lieutenant colonel refused to obey, and it was only on receiving a written order half an hour later that he displayed the white flag, when the firing ceased, and at noon further orders made the troops abandon the post and retreat to Sta. Maria Maggiore.¹

The Porta San Giovanni was guarded by some companies of Swiss Carabineers, one of zouaves and one of *squadriglieri*, under Lieutenant Colonel de Charette. They were soon obliged by General Angioletti's more powerful artillery to withdraw their guns from the earthwork before the gate and place them on the bastion beside it, where they were reinforced by four mountain pieces under Captain Daudier. But, though the Papal guns were few, their fire was so skilfully directed by their officers, Prince Rospigliosi and Count Macchi, that three of the enemy's guns were dismounted, two ammunition wagons were blown up and the Italian batteries were three times forced to change their position. The neighboring Basilicas narrowly escaped destruction. More than fifty shots struck that of St. John of Lateran.

Some of the side chapels in Sta. Croce in Gerusalemme were laid in ruins and a shell burst in the Passionist Convent near the Santa Scala, wounding one of the monks and killing Lieutenant Piccadori, of the Pontifical dragoons. Though the gates of the Porta San Giovanni took fire and fell, the Papal soldiers still maintained an obstinate resistance until de Charette received the written order to cease the combat and some time after another commanding him to retire with his men to the *Città Leonina*.²

The troops stationed at the Porta San Sebastiano and the Porta San Paolo withdrew at the same time; they had so well defended the approaches to those gates by two guns placed on the bastion of San Gallo that four of General Angioletti's guns stationed near the tomb of Cecilia Metella on the Appian way were obliged to change their positions several times, but at 10 o'clock the order came to cease fire and had to be obeyed.

General Bixio had been instructed to set his troops in movement as soon as he heard the first cannon shot fired by General Ferrero, and it was therefore about half-past 6 when his four batteries opened fire against the Porta San Pancrazio and the fortifications which crown the heights of the Janiculum. This part of the city, under the command of Colonel Azzanesi, was defended by native troops, the *cacciatori* under Lieutenant Colonel Sparagana and the regiment of the line under Lieutenant Colonel Tanetti, and in spite of the efforts which had been made to turn them away from their allegiance

¹ De Beaufort, *L'Invasion*, p. 272. ² *id.*, pp. 277 and 279.

to Pius IX.,¹ they performed their duty as courageously and as loyally as any of the foreign soldiers. Only fifteen of the guns, mostly smooth-bores mounted on bastions, could reply to the twenty-four pieces of General Bixio, but the fire of the Papal infantry was so heavy and so well aimed that his *bersaglieri* were driven back, and his batteries, which he had placed at 400 yards from the walls, had to be withdrawn to 1,200. General Cadorna in his report on the campaign blames severely the recklessness with which Bixio exposed his soldiers to a cross-fire from the ramparts and from the *Città Leonina*, losing thereby more killed and wounded than General Cosenz; and more killed than General Mazé de la Roche, whose troops had taken part in the assault.² The fire of Bixio's artillery, whether wilfully or through carelessness, was also badly directed, so that while the bombardment carried on by the other generals injured only the fortifications and caused but little damage to the buildings of Rome, Bixio's shells set fire to a cloth manufactory near the Porta San Pancrazio, to a house in the Piazza Navona, to a house and a forage store in the Via Lungara and to several houses in the Via Giulia, where a woman was killed in the street. Four more shells fell on the Convent of San Callisto, several on the hospital of San Gallicano, where the sick had to be carried down into the cellars, and in another hospital a patient was killed in his bed.³

As has been already mentioned, the real attack was directed against the Porta Pia and the adjacent walls. An earthwork holding two rifled guns had been raised before the gate, and a third gun was stationed to its right. Three guns on the terrace of the Pincian mount, one in the garden of the Villa Medici and six in the great square enclosure which advances beyond the line of the walls and is known as the Prætorian Camp, commanded the approaches to the gate, while a detachment of zouaves and another of Swiss Carabineers held the gardens of the Villa Patrizi some distance beyond the walls. General Cadorna's batteries, mounting fifty-four guns, opened fire soon after 5 o'clock, but his artillerymen were much incommoded by the musketry from the Villa Patrizi, which the Thirty-fifth Battalion of *bersaglieri* was sent to take, and succeeded in occupying after a stubborn resistance. Shortly before 7 one of the guns at the Porta Pia was dismounted; it was soon replaced, but an hour later another met the same fate, and the earthwork was in such a ruinous condition that it was abandoned; but the musketry fire was maintained from the walls, where no guns could be mounted, and the Italian pieces, which had advanced to 600 yards from the city.

¹ Roman Correspondence in *London Times*, September 29, 1876. ² Cadorna, p. 191. ³ De Deauffort, p. 283.

were obliged to recede to 800 yards and then to 1,200, though even at that distance the Remington bullets caused the Italians some loss. To the left of the Porta Pia, on the terrace of the Pincio, which was raked by artillery stationed in the Villa Borghese, some of the guns, on account of the want of artillerymen, were served by zouaves, several of whom, as well as two of their officers, Lieutenants Niel and Brondois, were severely wounded; and to the right, at the Prætorian Camp, where embrasures had been opened in the walls, the few guns available replied steadily to General Ferrero's batteries as they cannonaded the three railway arches.

It was not long, however, before the ancient wall between the Porta Pia and the Porta Salara began to crumble away beneath the fire of the heavy siege pieces; the Villa Bonaparte in its rear was in flames; the breach was already opened about 9 o'clock, and the Italian infantry, approaching through the grounds of the neighboring villas, formed in columns for the assault. Just before 10 General Botacco reported that the breach, then widened to the extent of thirty yards, was practicable, and Cadorna, hoisting a flag on the tower of the Villa Patrizi, signaled to his artillery to cease fire and to the attacking columns to advance.¹ The Thirty-ninth Infantry Regiment, covered by the fire of the *bersaglieri* stationed in the Villa, ran forward immediately to storm the Porta Pia, while a detachment from the division of Mazé de la Roche, with the Twelfth *bersaglieri* at its head, and another from the division of Cosenz, led by the Thirty-fourth *bersaglieri*, passing through openings made in the walls of the surrounding gardens, rushed towards the breach. A few minutes previously a dragoon galloping up to the Porta Pia had brought a verbal order from General Zappi to raise the white flag, since the breach had been opened; but Major de Troussures, who commanded at the gate, declined to obey except on a written order, and sent Lieutenant van der Kerchove to the general. The two companies of Captains de Gastebois and de Couëssin, stationed to right and left of the gate, maintained in the meantime a rapid fire and kept the hostile column at bay till the officer's return with the order to surrender. The white flag was then displayed and the combat ceased. The companies of Captains Thomalé, Berger and Desclée, reckoning in all about 250 men, which held the breach, though losing heavily under fire of the *bersaglieri* as they advanced, and of the sharpshooters in the neighboring vineyards, made an obstinate resistance, before which the assaulting column recoiled with the loss of its leader, Major Pagliari, two other officers and several men. At that moment a staff officer brought the order to cease fire, the white flag was raised and the troops grounded arms. The

¹ Cadorna, p. 197.

Italians then crossed the breach, still firing on the zouaves, who could not reply (Cadorna confesses that his soldiers did not perceive the white flag); they insulted the Papal officers and deprived them of their swords and their revolvers; they flung one of them from his horse, which was seized by an Italian officer, and then led their prisoners towards the Porta Pia. There, too, the suspension of hostilities was not observed, and in spite of the white flag two zouaves were killed in the ranks by the *bersaglieri*, who fired as they entered. One of their officers discharged his revolver on Lieutenant van der Kerchove and another tore Captain de Couëssin's cross and medals from his breast. One officer alone drove back his men with the flat of his sword and obliged them to respect the prisoners; the other *bersaglieri*, both officers and men, loaded them with insults, but the infantry of the line showed them more consideration.¹ The Italian troops then, in defiance of the usages of civilized warfare, according to which, when a besieged town hangs out a white flag, there is a truce and the contending forces remain in their respective positions until the capitulation is signed, pressed on into the city and occupied the Quirinal, the garden of the Pincio, the Piazza del Popola and the Piazza Colonna. As they approached, most of the Papal troops, informed of the surrender, fell back on the *Città Leonina*, as they had been directed to do, not only unmolested by the people, but greeted with courtesy and sympathy as they passed through the thoroughly Roman quarter of the *Trastevere*.² Several companies, however, surrounded in the positions which they occupied, were obliged to lay down their arms, and were brought to the Prætorian Camp.

Thus, after a bombardment by 114 guns during five hours, was Rome taken; though, as General Cadorna stated in an order of the day to his soldiers, it had been stubbornly defended (*ostinatamente difesa*). The losses of the Italian army, according to some of their own officers, amounted to 2,000 men; according to the official report there were only 32 killed and 143 wounded.³ Those of the Papal troops were 16 killed and 58 wounded, and even the journals most hostile to the cause of the Holy See rendered justice to their gallantry. According to the Neapolitan journal *La Soluzione*, "they did their duty with modesty and bravery like heroes; the defense of Rome was courageous and brilliant; they were resolved to die on the walls if the Holy Father had not ordered them to surrender;" and *L'Italie*, a Florentine paper, stated that "they fought with a courage and coolness which commands our respect. . . . The zouaves fought like brave men; they proved it at the Porta Pia and the Villa Bonaparte, as I saw with my own eyes."⁴

¹ De Beaufort, p. 303. ² *Id.*, p. 338. ³ Cadorna, p. 484. ⁴ De Beaufort, p. 312.

Pius IX. had requested the representatives of the foreign powers to assemble at the Vatican as soon as the bombardment began; they assisted at his Mass which he said at the usual hour of half-past 7, while the thunder of Bixio's guns was resounding through the palace, and after Mass he conversed with them in his library, from the windows of which might be seen the columns of smoke rising from the houses set on fire by the shells. The Holy Father spoke of various incidents of his past life; of his visit to Chili in his youth; of the meeting of the diplomatic body at the Quirinal under similar circumstances in 1848, and of the display of the flags of various nations for the protection of foreign residents, which he had seen in the streets of Rome, contrasting it with the decorations made in honor of his return from Gaeta. He mentioned, also, that the students of the American Seminary had asked to be allowed to take arms, but that he had thanked them and told them to take part in assisting the wounded. Just before 10 Count Carpegna, a staff officer, brought word that the breach had been opened and was practicable. The Pope conferred with Cardinal Antonelli for a few minutes, and then, turning to the Ambassadors with tears in his eyes, informed them that he had given orders to capitulate, as any further resistance would cause great bloodshed, which he wished to avoid. "It is not for myself I weep," continued Pius IX., "but for these poor children who have come to defend me as their Father. Will each of you take charge of those of your own country? They are of all nations. And think also, I beg of you, of the English and the Canadians, whose interests are not represented here." Cardinal Antonelli then reminded the Pope that in the absence of Mr. Odo Russell they would be cared for by an English *chargé d'affaires*, and the Holy Father said: "I recommend them to you that you may preserve them from the ill-treatment which others of them suffered some years ago." He then declared that he released his soldiers from their oath of allegiance, in order to leave them at liberty; and he dismissed the envoys, requesting them to agree with General Kanzler with regard to the terms of the capitulation.¹

When, according to the orders of the Holy Father, the white flag had been raised on the cupola of St. Peter's and on the Castle of St. Angelo, General Kanzler sent two officers of his staff, Lieutenant Colonel Carpegna and Major Rivalta, with a letter to General Cadorna to discuss the terms of the surrender of Rome, which the general consented to do, but which he seemed to consider a great concession on his part, since his troops already held the city. General Kanzler soon followed his delegates, as well as the diplomatic body, whose interference in the negotiations Cadorna refused to

¹ De Beaufort, p. 323.

allow; but with the Papal general he concluded a capitulation, according to which Rome, with the exception of the Leonine City, was to the frontiers of their country, and the native soldiers were to be given up to the Italians, the garrison was to march out with the honors of war, the foreign troops were to be sent at once by rail remain in a *dépôt* till the government had come to a decision as to their future position. General Cadorna states in his history of the campaign that the brigades furnished by each division for the occupation of Rome were directed to place guards over the churches, monasteries and public buildings for their protection and for the maintenance of order; but it is not the less true that in the rear of his troops came some four or five thousand Garibaldians, the scum of the great cities of Italy, and many political exiles, who, though he had requested them not to compromise his cause by rendering themselves guilty of excesses,¹ joined with the rabble of Rome in heaping every sort of insult and outrage on the defenders of the Pope as they were led disarmed and prisoners through the streets, while in some cases the *bersaglieri* forming their escort either did not protect the Papal soldiers or even, it is asserted, took part in these manifestations of vindictiveness.²

With the exception of the companies which had been surrounded and disarmed in the neighborhood of the Porta Pia, and who rejoined their comrades later, the Papal troops had assembled in the Leonine City, which had been reserved to the Pope by the terms of the capitulation, and they passed the night in front of St. Peter's, where, on the great feasts of the Church, they had often knelt while, from the Loggia far overhead, the voice of Pius IX. resounded through the vast Piazza as he pronounced the benediction "*Urbi et Orbi.*" Just before mid-day on the 21st the bugles called the troops to arms and they formed their ranks for the last time. The *Légion d'Antibes* was drawn up at the foot of the steps of the basilica; in their rear the Swiss, then the zouaves, the infantry of the line, the *cacciatori*, the dragoons and the artillery. At the word of command, the bayonets were fixed and the troops were on the point of marching when one of the windows of the Vatican was thrown open and Pius IX. appeared. A cry of "*Vive Pie IX.*" burst from the soldiers, accompanied by the crash of a volley of musketry as the men of the *Légion d'Antibes* and the Swiss fired off their rifles in the air, while the Holy Father, stretching out his hand, gave his army a last blessing, and then fell back fainting into the arms of his attendants.

To avoid all danger of a collision with the populace it had been decided that the Papal troops should not pass through Rome; they

¹ Cadorna, p. 183. ² De Beaufort, p. 332.

went out, therefore, by the Porta Angelica, and followed the road which runs at the foot of the ramparts of the Leonine City till they reached the Porta San Pancrazio, a distance of about three miles. There, between the two bastions nearest to the gate, were General Cadorna and the other generals of the Italian army on horseback, and near them, on foot, Generals Zappi and de Courten. On both sides of the road were drawn up lines of Italian infantry, the bands playing, the men presenting arms as the Pontifical troops marched past. Then, turning away from the walls of Rome, each regiment laid down its arms in the Villa Belvedere, and the disbanded troops, to the number of perhaps 8,000, streamed away silently across the parched up fields of the Campagna, towards the station of Ponte Galera, nine or ten miles distant. Conveyed thence in several trains to Civit  Vecchia, the native soldiers were sent to the fortress of Alexandria, in North Italy; the foreigners, classified according to their nationality, were lodged, some in the forts and others in the convict prison. A few days later the French zouaves left for France; one of their captains had succeeded in concealing and carrying away the flag of the regiment; it was unfolded and saluted for the last time on board the steamer, and then divided among the officers. Colonel de Charette soon reorganized his men; their numbers were augmented by fresh recruits, and under the name of *Les Volontaires de l'Ouest* they upheld worthily the reputation of the regiment in the Franco-German war, especially on the stubbornly contested fields of Loigny and Patay. The other prisoners were brought by sea to Genoa, where the Belgians and Dutch were quartered in the fort of *Monte Ratti*, the English and Irish in the barracks of *San Benigno*, whence, after a few days, they departed for their homes. The Italian soldiers of the Pontifical army were for the most part detained for a considerable time in the fortresses of North Italy before being set free, and the *squadriglieri*, or armed mountaineers, who were more especially the objects of the hatred and the calumnies of the revolutionary party, on account of the efficacious assistance they had rendered to the Pontifical gendarmes in the suppression of brigandage, thereby depriving the Italian Government of every pretext of crossing the frontier, were treated with a harshness totally contrary to the terms of the capitulation: they were accused of being brigands; they were made to associate with galley slaves; and when they were at last released, some of them after two years' detention, they were placed under the supervision of the police, as though they were criminals.¹

The Leonine City had been reserved by the capitulation as the territory of the Pope, where he could be independent of the Italian

¹ De Beaufort, p. 374.

Government, and he was allowed to retain the Noble Guard, the Swiss Guard, a company of gendarmes and the Palatine Guard for the defense of the Vatican, in all, some 300 or 400 men.¹ His independence did not last long. The Pontifical troops had hardly marched out of Rome, when a crowd, composed of the dregs of the populace, crossing the bridge of St. Angelo, plundered the deserted Serristori barracks, attempted to seize those which had recently been built under the colonnade of St. Peter's and tried to force their way into the Basilica. A detachment of gendarmes from the Vatican drove them off, killing two and wounding several; but the Holy Father, foreseeing that the trifling amount of liberty which had been left to him would henceforth be continually menaced, and not wishing to live in a state of permanent warfare, asked General Cadorna, through the medium of Count von Arnim, to send troops to occupy the Leonine City. The request was presented to the general while he was assisting at the march past of the Papal army; and on receiving soon after the same demand in writing from General Kanzler, he ordered two battalions of *bersaglieri* to enter the Leonine City and mount guard over St. Peter's and the Vatican. For a few days longer the Castle of St. Angelo was occupied by the *sedentarii*, or pensioned-off soldiers of the Pontifical army; but on September 27 it, too, was handed over to the Italian Government, and since then the territorial possessions of the Holy See have been limited to the Vatican, and its gardens and the villa of Castel Gandolfo.²

For the next two days and nights the wildest disorder prevailed in Rome; the Garibaldians who had entered along with the troops were joined by crowds of others brought by rail, and one of their first acts was to pillage the law courts at Monte Citorio, where the lists of criminals, the records of their sentences and other legal documents were destroyed and damage inflicted to the amount of 50,000 francs before the arrival of the Italian soldiers. The portraits and busts of the Holy Father exhibited in the shops were taken out and torn to pieces in the streets, the barracks of the Papal troops were plundered of everything they contained, the offices of the *Giornale di Roma* and of the *Osservatore Romano* were saved from being wrecked only by the timely intervention of the troops; the Papal arms placed over the gates of the palaces of the Roman nobles were pulled down and smashed, and attempts were even made to destroy those over the doors of the foreign embassies. The mob succeeded in doing so at the palace of the Portuguese envoy, and General Cadorna was obliged to make an ample apology for the outrage which his troops had failed to prevent, and to allow the arms to be re-

¹ Der Italienische Raubzug, p. 130. ² Cadorna, p. 219, p. 304.

placed.¹ Even the Roman correspondent of the Florentine journal *La Nazione* wrote: "Since two days we are without government, and rascals take advantage of it to commit crimes against property and persons under pretense of showing their zeal and their love for Italy and the King. . . . Rome has been abandoned to every organizer of agitation and disorder, to every political firebrand, to every speculator in anarchy who until now had been tramping the pavement of the hundred cities of Italy. . . . One would say that the government intended to make Rome the sink of all that is miserable in the rest of Italy."²

On the 22d a tumultuous meeting was held in the Coliseum under the guidance of persons of well-known republican opinions for the purpose of choosing a *Giunta*, or municipal council, of forty-two members; but as some of those elected held anti-monarchical principles, General Cadorna set aside the popular vote; he selected eighteen of the persons named, and, taking no notice of the protests of the Republican party, installed the new *Giunta* in the Capitol, which he had previously occupied with a strong force of *bersaglieri*. One of the first acts of the municipality was to take steps for the performance of the usual grotesque farce known as *il plebiscito*, or the vote of the people, by which the Italian Government had sought on previous occasions to justify its annexations. The Holy Father forbade all Catholics to take part in it, as they would thereby have acknowledged that the invaders were entitled to question his sovereign rights. The electoral lists were drawn up after the parochial registers, which were taken forcibly from the clergy; many of the names of the more respectable citizens were omitted and others inserted.³ To increase the number of electors, as it was well known that the Catholics would not vote, Lanza obliged the railway companies to carry gratuitously to Rome all those who gave themselves out as Roman emigrants and who were provided with certificates furnished by the authorities of the towns where they were domiciled.⁴ There descended thus upon Rome from all parts of Italy over 10,000 persons, whose aspect inspired General Cadorna with such mistrust that he thought it prudent to send strong patrols through the city on the nights preceding the vote. The formula presented to the electors, to be accepted or rejected, was: "We desire to be united to the kingdom of Italy, under the rule of King Victor Emmanuel II. and his successors;"⁵ and during all the 1st of October tickets bearing the word *Sì* (yes) were distributed in the streets. To dispel all fear of foreign intervention in favor of the Sovereign Pontiff, thousands of copies of a forged letter from the

¹ De Beaufort, p. 364. ² Roman Correspondence of September 21 in *La Nazione*, September 24. ³ De Beaufort, p. 393. ⁴ Der Italienische Raubzug, p. 297; Ideville, p. 219. ⁵ Cadorna, p. 272.

King of Prussia to the Holy Father were sold in the streets, in which His Majesty was made to express his regret that he could not interfere in the Roman question, and to state that he did not doubt that if the King of Italy were under the necessity of entering the Papal territory in order to guard it against the revolutionary party, he would guarantee to His Holiness the free exercise of his spiritual authority.

The election took place on October 2. Urns to receive the tickets had been placed on high platforms at the Capitol and in each *Rione*, or quarter of the city; the commission which distributed electoral cards gave them to all who applied, without asking any questions with regard to birthplace, age or antecedents, so that many voted who could claim no right to do so, and, as the card was not given up on voting, the same person could vote as often and in as many *Rioni* as he pleased.¹ Towards evening the urns were sealed and carried to the Capitol, where the tickets were reckoned, and the total result, which was solemnly proclaimed to the people assembled before the palace, was 40,785 Yes and 46 No.

The absurdity and falsity of this result are rendered still more palpable by the well-known facts that a large number of the Roman nobility remained faithful to Pius IX., that only sixteen of the Pontifical officers entered the Italian army and that the great majority of the persons employed in the government offices gave in their resignation rather than serve the usurper.²

Thus ended the struggle which, since so many years, the heterogeneous band of conspirators, monarchical and republican, known as the revolutionary party had carried on against the Sovereign Pontiff by means of fraud, hypocrisy, calumny and violence; it had at last conquered, and the Temporal Power had ceased to exist; but the glorious era of honor and prosperity which it was hoped that the accomplishment of the unity of Italy would inaugurate has not as yet dawned for the Peninsula.

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¹ Der Italiensche Raubzug, p. 208. ² De Beaffort, p. 46.