

THE LAST TEN YEARS OF THE TEMPORAL POWER.—
FROM CASTELFIDARDO TO MENTANA.

1. Charles Garnier, *Le Royaume des Deux Siciles*. Paris, 1866.
2. L. A. de Becdelievre, *Souvenirs d'Armé Pontificale*. Paris, 1867.
3. Prof. Antonio Vitali, *Ledici giornate di Monte Rotondo*. Roma, 1868.
4. Paolo Mencaeci, *La Mano di Dio nell' ultima invasion contro Roma*. Roma, 1868.
5. Felice Carallotti, *Storia dell-insurrezione di Roma nel 1867*. Milano, 1869.
6. LeBaron de Mevius, *Histoire de l' Invasion des Etats Pontificaux en 1867*. Paris, 1875.
7. Paolo Mencaeci, *Memorie documentate per la Storia della Rivoluzione Italiana*. Roma, 1879.
8. A. M. Bonetti, *I Martiri Italiani, Storia dei Mezzi Morali della Rivoluzione Italiana*. Modena, 1891.
9. The O'Clery, *the Making of Italy*. London, 1892.
10. René Bittard des Portes, *Histoire des Zouaves Pontificaux*. Paris, 1894.
11. *Battles of the Nineteenth Century*, published by Cassell & Co. London, 1895.

AFTER the defeat of the Papal army at Castelfidardo and the fall of Ancona, the conquest of the States of the Church went no further than the occupation of the provinces of the Marches and Umbria by the troops of Victor Emmanuel. It suited the vacillating policy of Napoleon III, who probably feared to irritate too violently the Catholic and conservative elements of the French nation, to uphold for some time longer the throne of the Holy Father, and the presence of a French garrison in Rome sufficed to stop the advance of the invaders and assure the independence of the territory known as the Patrimony of St. Peter, the poorest and most thinly inhabited portion of the Papal dominions. The Italian army was thus at liberty to hasten to assist Garibaldi in his Neapolitan campaign which, up to that moment, he was officially supposed to have undertaken against the will of Victor Emmanuel, and in spite of the efforts of Cavour to restrain him. And here, perhaps, it may be allowed to digress from the chief subject of this paper, and cast a glance at the condition of the Kingdom of Naples under that House of Bourbon which the Protestant Press of England and the atheistical press of the Continent have always conspired to revile and calumniate. The Bourbons, it is true, did not rule according to the forms of constitutional government so revered and cherished by Anglo-Saxon communities, but the same methods of administration are not necessarily adapted to all races. Among the easy-going and enterprising populations of Southern Europe, the government is expected to lead the way in all social movements, as well as in all industrial undertakings, and Ferdinand II, the father of Francis II, the sovereign whose rule Mr. Gladstone

so blindly and passionately denounced as the "negation of God," labored strenuously throughout his whole reign to promote in every way the interests and the welfare of his subjects.

To him is due the construction of the first railway opened in Italy; of the first suspension bridges made in Italy; of the first electric telegraph laid in Italy; of the first light-houses on the dioptric system raised on the coasts of Italy, and under his reign the first steamer built in Italy was launched from a Neapolitan dockyard. When Ferdinand II came to the throne in 1830, there were only 1,505 miles of road in his kingdom, only 64 miles of which had been made by the French revolutionists during their nine years occupation of the country, and by the end of 1855 he had opened 3,082 more; besides building many bridges, embanking torrents, and draining lagoons and marshes near Taranto, Brindisi, Nola, and Policastro. To Ferdinand II are due the military schools of Maddaloni and Gaeta; the veterinary and agricultural school of Naples, an academy for the navy, and naval schools at Procida and Gaeta, besides numerous colleges, orphanages, and hospitals in the principal cities of his States.¹ The reorganization of the Neapolitan Mint; the establishment of manufactories of arms and ammunition, and of the cannon foundry of Naples, are additional proofs of the activity and energy of a sovereign under whose rule trade and commerce flourished, the taxes were light, and the funds, a sure indication of the prosperity of a country, were always above par.

But the overthrow of the Bourbons had been resolved by the conspirators who were bent on uniting all Italy, whether under a monarchical or republican form of government, and to carry out their designs they recoiled from neither calumny nor treason. A single example of their shameless mendacity will suffice; the case, namely, of Baron Poerio, the political prisoner whose defence Mr. Gladstone took up with so much enthusiasm about 1852, making all Europe resound with the tale of his sufferings. Since then, a Radical deputy, Petruccelli della Gattina, has frankly confessed that when he and his fellow-conspirators were seeking to excite public opinion against the Bourbons, they selected Poerio as the embodiment of their hostility to that dynasty; the infidel press of France and England took up the question quite seriously; so did Gladstone, who exaggerated both the reputation of the prisoner and the nature of his punishment, and Poerio, the victim of Ferdinand II, was literally fabricated by means of newspaper articles at three half-pence a line.²

¹ Garnier. *Le Royaume des Deux Siciles.*

² Mencacci. *Memorie documentate*, vol. II., p. 162.

While the kingdom of Naples was in this thriving condition it was invaded by Victor Emmanuel, without a declaration of war, when the way had been opened for him by the filibustering expedition of Garibaldi, whose army before Capua, mostly composed of northern Italians, had already been strongly re-enforced by detachments of *bersaglieri* and artillery landed at Naples from Admiral Persano's fleet. It was on October 11, 1860, that Cialdini coming from Ancona led his troops across the frontier, and after defeating and capturing at Isernia, a small body of Neapolitan troops and armed peasants commanded by General Scotti, he shot in cold blood the peasants who had fallen into his hands, sparing only the soldiers. This act of cruelty was the beginning of the sanguinary atrocities which during the next four years desolated the provinces of the Abruzzi, the Capitanata, and Molise, where a very large proportion of the population still remained faithful to their king, and though treated as outlaws, offered a stubborn opposition to their annexation to Piedmont. From Isernia Cialdini marched to Gaeta, and began the siege rendered famous by the prolonged and gallant resistance of France II and his heroic Queen, leaving the suppression of the royalist guerrilla warfare to his lieutenants, among whom General Pinelli, Major Fumel, and de Ferrari, the prefect of Foggia, distinguished themselves by the ferocity of their proclamations and their acts. The first decreed in the month of November, 1860, that all unlicensed persons found with firearms, poignards or even knives in their possession, should be instantly shot, as well as those who excited the peasants to revolt, or who, by their deeds or their words, insulted the arms of Savoy, the portrait of the king, or the national flag. In Calabria, Major Fumel prohibited under pain of death not only to give food or shelter to a brigand, that is to say, to a royalist in arms, but even to carry bread out of a village. As in the province of Capitanata the royalist bands were generally mounted, the prefect de Ferrari decreed that the blacksmiths should only shoe horses at certain forges and in virtue of a special license; they were not to quit their village without a pass, nor even to have horses or tools for shoeing in their possession without leave from the authorities: any infraction of this law was to be considered as proof of complicity with the brigands.³

It was by this system of merciless repression that the Kingdom of Naples which, according to the Liberal press of Europe, was longing to be emancipated from the despotism of the Bourbons was annexed by the House of Savoy, and although the full details of

³ Garnier. *Le Royaume des Deux Siciles*, pp. 180, 184, 190.

these atrocities will probably never be known, it has been estimated that the number of so-called brigands summarily executed amounted to 17,000,⁴ and that up to November, 1862, no less than sixteen towns, situated in seven different provinces, with a total population of 49,366 souls, had been sacked and burned.⁵

Even Napoleon III, without whose connivance the invasion of the Papal States and consequently of the Kingdom of Naples could never have taken place, could not restrain his indignation on hearing by what methods was being established the unity of Italy, that cause for which he had squandered the gold and shed so lavishly the blood of France, and in a letter to General Fleury in July, 1862, he stated that he had written to Turin to express his horror at the cruelties of the Piedmontese generals, and he declared that the Bourbons had never been guilty of similar acts.⁶

While the rule of Victor Emmanuel was being thus brutally imposed on a people whom he was supposed to have come to enfranchise, the Papal Government, protected in its diminished territory from its exterior enemies by the presence of the French, was gradually reassembling and reorganizing the remains of its army. The Franco-Belgian battalion which had suffered such heavy losses at Castelfidardo was soon raised by the arrival of fresh recruits to the number of 600 men; on January 1st, 1861, its name was changed to that of Pontifical Zouaves and Major de Becdelièvre was raised to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Towards the end of the same month the battalion was sent under his command to carry out a project devised by Mgr. de Mérode, the Minister of War, namely, the invasion of the province of Rieti and the re-establishment of the authority of the Papal Government. The surprise of the post which held the bridge at Passo di Correse, a village on the northern frontier of the province of Rome, was the only result of this expedition, for when, a few days later, the pontifical soldiers were advancing towards Rieti, they were stopped by a message from General de Goyou, the commander of the French troops in Rome, who undertook to hold the outposts along the limits of the Patrimony of St. Peter and prevent any aggression on the part of the Piedmontese. It was to be regretted that the General's solicitude for the safety of the territory confided to his care had not been aroused sooner, for in the same month of January, the Piedmontese general, de Sonnaz, who commanded a division at Sora in the Kingdom of Naples, crossed the Papal frontier in pursuit of a band of royalists composed of Neapolitan soldiers and armed peasants

⁴ Bonetti. part II., p. 5.

⁵ O'Clery. p. 305.

⁶ Garnier. p. 181.

under the command of a Swiss officer, Count de Christen, seized the monastery of Casamari, plundered both it and the church and set it on fire.⁷ It was this general who in the previous month of September had taken Perugia, and who, on the following day, had tried by court-martial and condemned to death the Rev. Baldassare Santi, falsely accused of having fired on the Piedmontese and killed a soldier. It was in vain that the Bishop of Perugia, Cardinal Pecci, now His Holiness Pope Leo XIII, and the principal citizens of the town interceded for the unfortunate priest, and bore witness to his piety, his charity, and his virtuous life. The sentence was executed within twenty-four hours, but a few days later the falsity of the denunciation and the innocence of the victim were fully recognized.⁸

General de Sonnaz crossed the frontier again with several thousand men soon after his sacrilegious aggression on Casamari, and attacked Bauco, a village surrounded by a mediæval wall and standing on the summit of a steep hill, where Count de Christen had taken refuge with his band. The general bombarded the village for some hours, and then sent his troops twice to the assault; they were repulsed on each occasion with a total loss of 500 killed and wounded, and the position seemed impregnable; yet the general's pride forbade him to withdraw from before a mere village defended by irregulars while he feared that the arrival of French or Papal troops might compel him to make an ignominious retreat. He therefore offered to allow the band which had nearly exhausted its ammunition to retire without being pursued, promising to return to his side of the frontier, on condition that Count de Christen should give his word to refrain from further hostilities.⁹

Nevertheless the Piedmontese government continued to show its contempt for the principles of international law by allowing the troops to make frequent incursions into the Papal territory, though sometimes the invaders were made to pay dearly for their aggression. Thus on July 28, 1862, a patrol of seventeen Pontifical zouâves, led by Lieutenant Mousty, surprised a body of 200 *bersaglieri* who had entered the territory of the Church near Ceprano in pursuit of a body of Neapolitan royalists, and by their sudden onslaught drove them back across the frontier in disorder and with heavy losses. The village was immediately occupied by a detachment of French troops in order to guard against any future attacks, but the *Civiltà Cattolica* asserts that between December 31, 1864, and July 1, 1865, Piedmontese patrols crossed the limits of the Papal states no less than eight times and usually for the purpose of arresting

⁷ O'Clery p. 246. Bonetti. *Martiri Italiani*, part 1.

⁸ Bonetti, part II, p. 36. O'Clery, p. 248.

Papal subjects accused of brigandage, though the General in command of the French army of occupation never failed to protest against these violations of international law.¹⁰

In the meanwhile the adherents of Mazzini and Garibaldi were not idle, but continued to agitate and conspire to bring about the annexation of Rome and Venice. An expedition which was organized in the month of May, 1862, to invade the Venetian provinces, seems to have been at first connived at, if not, indeed, encouraged by the Italian Government, and it was not till the last moment that Rattazzi, then prime minister, thought fit to arrest the leaders. In the month of August of the same year Garibaldi put himself at the head of a similar movement with the openly avowed intention of marching upon Rome. The facility with which he was allowed to organize an army of about 3,000 men in Sicily, made him apparently believe that Rattazzi would allow him to prepare the way to Rome for him as he had prepared the way to Naples for Cavour; and, indeed, the feeble opposition he met with from the Piedmontese generals in Sicily, and from Admiral Albini at Catania, must have encouraged him in that belief, as he sailed from Catania on August 24, with 2,000 volunteers, and landed in Calabria the next morning. But to attack Rome was a far more serious matter than to invade the kingdom of Naples, and the determination manifested by France to defend what remained of the Papal territory must have made the Italian government understand that the treacherous policy of Cavour which had caused the downfall of Francis II would, in this case, have no chance of success. Energetic measures were therefore immediately taken to stop the march of the general, who had thrown himself with his band among the dense woods and the intricate ravines of the mountainous region known as Aspromonte which forms the southernmost extremity of Italy, and Colonel Pallavicini was sent from Reggio with several battalions of *bersaglieri* to arrest him, or even, according to General Ciadini's words, to destroy him, if he attempted to resist.¹¹ The royal troops met the Garibaldians on the 29th of August, and, though Garibaldi had ordered his volunteers not to fire, a skirmish took place in which some fifty men were killed and wounded, and, among the latter, Garibaldi himself. The General was brought as a prisoner to the fort of Varignano, near La Spezia, but after an imprisonment of a little over a month, he and his followers were set at liberty.

The resolution, however, of the ministers of Victor Emmanuel

¹⁰ *Civiltà Cattolica*. series 6, vol. iv, p. 487.

¹¹ O'Clery. p. 331.

to annex Rome was not in any way diminished because they had been obliged to repress the indiscreet ardor of a too zealous instrument: they sought, therefore, to obtain by diplomatic methods the victory which it was impossible to achieve by force as long as the French troops guarded any portion of the States of the Church, and they began to negotiate with the Court of the Tuileries with the object of inducing the Emperor to put an end to the occupation on condition that the independence of the Holy See should be recognized. Their first overtures were firmly rejected by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, but in June, 1864, he informed them that his government was willing to discuss the question, and after secret negotiations conducted between the Emperor, the Italian Ambassador Cavaliere Nigra, and the Marchese Pepoli, a special envoy, but without the intervention of Pius IX, who was not even consulted on the occasion, a convention was signed on the 15th of September, 1864, which, under the fallacious appearance of a guarantee for the independence of the Holy Father, prepared the way for the final abolition of his temporal power.

According to this agreement, the Italian Government pledged itself not to attack the territory still remaining to the Church and to hinder by force any attempt at an invasion: it promised not to protest against the organization of a Papal army even though composed of foreigners, sufficient to maintain order in the Papal States and on their frontiers, provided it did not become a means of aggression against Italy; and it consented to take upon itself a proportional part of the debt of the former States of the Church. The French Government on the other hand, agreed to withdraw its troops gradually, according as the Papal army was increased, and to complete the evacuation within two years. By a secret protocol annexed to the Convention it was stipulated that it was to become executive after the publication of a decree transferring the capital of Italy from Turin to Florence, and that this transfer was to take place within six months of the date of the Convention.

No one, however, was deceived by the guarantees contained in this document: the unprovoked invasions without declaration of war of the States of the Church and of the kingdom of Naples had shown the methods by which the Italian Government intended to carry out its resolution to unite all the Peninsula under the Crown of Savoy: and if any doubt remained on the subject, the outspoken declarations of the Italian press, of the Italian ministry, and even of the diplomatists who had drawn up the Convention, would have manifested its utter worthlessness as a safeguard for the Temporal Power. They all agreed in asserting that no intention of abandon-

ing the aspirations of the nation had been expressed in this document, that it severed the last link of the chain which bound France to their enemies; and even M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed that the possibility of a revolution bursting out spontaneously in Rome had not been foreseen by the Convention. He added, it is true, that in case such an event took place, France reserved her liberty of action, but the successors of Cavour knew very well how easily spontaneous revolutions could be brought about. They nearly succeeded in causing one against themselves, for the first result of the publication of the Convention was to excite an intense irritation among the people of Turin, when suddenly informed of the approaching transfer of the capital to Florence. The turbulent demonstrations of anger to which this irritation gave rise were suppressed with a ferocity and an amount of bloodshed unknown under the much caluminated governments of Pius IX and Francis II, and the immediate dismissal of the ministry alone saved Turin from civil war.

In view, therefore, of the approaching departure of the French army of occupation, it became necessary to take steps for the reorganization and increase of the small army on which the Holy Father would thenceforth have to rely for the defence of the diminished territory of the Church. General de La Moricière who, though still retaining the title of commander-in-chief, had lived since the capitulation of Ancona at his country house in France, died suddenly on the 10th of September, 1865, and in the month of October following, General Kanzler, who had distinguished himself at the combat of San Angelo during the campaign of 1860, was promoted to the supreme command of the Papal army, and became Minister of War in the place of Mgr. de Mérode. About the same time was formed a regiment named from the town, where it was enrolled, *La Légion d'Antibes*. It was composed of French officers and soldiers authorized by the Emperor to enter the service of the Holy See but who still retained their French nationality and their respective ranks in the French army. Major de Becdelièvre, who had formed the battalion of Pontifical Zouaves and had led it at Castelfidardo, had resigned his command in 1861 in consequence of a misunderstanding with Mgr. de Mérode, and had been succeeded by Colonel Allet, a Swiss officer and one of those who had been longest in the service of the Holy Father. During the following years, the Zouaves, like the rest of the Papal troops, had been scattered in small detachments among the villages situated along the Neapolitan frontier, and were unceasingly engaged in pursuing the bands of brigands which infested that mountainous region. These

marauders had then lost all political significance; they were no longer recruited from the partisans of the Bourbons, fighting for their king and the independence of their country, but were merely gatherings of outlaws and desperadoes such as has for centuries formed the usual elements of Italian brigandage.¹² After the departure of the French troops who embarked at Civitá Vecchia on December 11, 1866, the Zouaves began to receive numerous accessions from all parts of Europe; a large number of these recruits bore the names of the most illustrious houses of France where the aristocracy principally distinguished itself by its devotion to the Holy Father; those still more numerous, from Belgium and Holland, who formed about two-thirds of the entire regiment, came generally from the peasantry. Ireland, which in 1860 had sent a contingent of 1,200 men to the army of La Moricière, was now represented in the regiment of Zouaves by Captain d'Arcy and Captain Delahoyd, who had served in the battalion of St. Patrick, by Surgeon-Major O'Flynn who had taken part in the defence of Spoleto under Major O'Reilly, and by several recruits who hastened to join the Papal standard when the Garibaldian invasion began.

By October 1, 1867, the Papal army amounted to nearly 13,000 men; 8,415 of whom were Papal subjects, and many of them from the provinces which had been annexed by the Kingdom of Italy. The foreign element was represented by 2,237 Zouaves, 1,233 Swiss carabineers and 1,096 French serving in the *Légion d'Antibes*. The effective force, however, capable of taking the field, did not amount to more than 8,000 men, but these were far better organized and disciplined than those whom La Moricière had commanded in 1860, and they were animated with a spirit of loyalty and devotion to the cause of the Holy Father which amply compensated for their deficiency in numbers.

In the spring and summer of 1867 Garibaldi visited the chief cities of North Italy with the openly avowed intention of enrolling volunteers for an invasion of the Papal States, proclaiming everywhere the necessity of abolishing the Temporal Power, and boasting that he would seize Rome in spite of the protection of France and the vigilance of the Italian troops which guarded the frontiers. In answer to his appeal a small band commanded by Galliano of Genoa, a former Garibaldian officer, left Terni in the month of June and advanced as far as Monte Rotondo, but fled on the arrival of a detachment of Papal troops.¹³ This expedition was blamed and

¹² G. Galtiano, *Spedizione di Terni*, p. 8. 17.

¹³ Bittard des Portes p. 69. O'Clery, p. 3

disavowed both by the Italian ministry and by Garibaldi, probably because it was unsuccessful, but it served to reveal the approaching danger to the Papal Government and to put it on its guard. Rattazzi, who was then prime minister, had a different game to play. He wished to make use of Garibaldi for the purpose of exciting in the Papal States a revolutionary movement which would serve as a pretext for the entrance of the Italian army, while on the other hand he could not afford to quarrel with the Emperor who seemed determined to maintain the independence of the Holy See, and who insisted that the Papal frontier should be carefully watched and the Convention of September faithfully observed. Rattazzi, indeed, gave repeated assurances of his respect for the Convention and of the care with which he sought to carry out its stipulations; he even affected to believe that Garibaldi had changed his mind, that he had abandoned his projected expeditions and was about to return to Caprera,¹⁴ though, meanwhile, crowds of volunteers were allowed to assemble in the towns and villages of Tuscany and prepare for the invasion of the Papal territory. On September 16th Garibaldi issued an inflammatory proclamation calling on the Romans to rise, and Rattazzi foreseeing the imminent danger of another French intervention and probably a war with France, ordered Garibaldi and his staff to be arrested at Sinalunga near Arezzo on September 23d. The General was brought to the fortress of Alexandria in Lombardy, but, after a few days, Rattazzi, intimidated by the noisy demonstrations and the menaces of the advanced Radicals, allowed him to return to his home on the Island of Caprera, without exacting any conditions or promise, but to prevent his escape, the island was watched by two cruisers and after a short time their number was increased to seven.

The arrest of its leader did not stop the Garibaldian expedition. According to the General's orders the bands which formed the right wing of his forces, commanded by General Acerbi, were to advance from Orvieto towards Viterbo; those of the centre, under Menotti Garibaldi, from Terni towards Monte Rotondo and Tivoli, and those of the left wing under Nicotera, were to enter from the Kingdom of Naples and march towards Velletri. By this skilfully devised plan of campaign Garibaldi hoped that if the Papal troops were dispersed in various directions to guard the frontier against simultaneous invasions at widely distant points, the people of Rome would be free to rise, while if they remained on the defensive in Rome, the three divisions of his army would unite and attack the city.¹⁵ Their numbers alone would have rendered them formidable, for no less than 30,000 men are said to have been enrolled.

¹⁴ Mevius, p. 101.

¹⁵ Cavallotti, p. 317.

The first band of volunteers comprising somewhat over 20 men crossed the frontier coming from Orvieto on the evening of September 28th. Galliano of Genoa was again their leader and the next day he surprised a small post of gendarmes at Grotte San Stefano; the villages of Bomarzo, Soriano, and Caprarola, also held by a few gendarmes, were taken in the course of the following days; but the band, which had been increased by fresh arrivals to the number of 60 men, was defeated near Ronciglione by a company of the line and a detachment of gendarmes, and forced to retreat to Bagnorea. Other bands apparently acting independently of each other entered the northern portion of the Papal territory about the same time coming from different directions; one was beaten at Canino, not far from Viterbo; others at Ischia and Valentano close to the Tuscan frontier; another of over 300 men led by Count Pagliacci, an officer of Acerbi's staff, took Acquapendente after a vigorous resistance from the garrison of 27 gendarmes, but it was surprised a few days later at the neighboring village of San Lorenzo by Colonel Azzanesi, the military governor of the province, and defeated with the loss of many prisoners.

The first serious resistance by the Papal troops was at Bagnorea, a walled village to the north of Viterbo, strongly situated on the summit of a steep hill and accessible only by a single road passing over a bridge. As the town was not held by a garrison a Garibaldian band seized it on October 1st, sacked the Churches, broke the images of the saints, insulted and ill-treated the clergy, took possession of the municipal treasury and proclaimed the dictatorship of Garibaldi.¹⁸ The arrival of other bands soon raised their numbers to 500; and they proceeded to strengthen the defences of the town; they loopholed the walls of the houses which commanded the bridge, fortified the convent of San Francesco outside the gates and raised barricades on the roads. They were thus able to repulse a reconnaissance made by a detachment of 20 Zouaves, 4 gendarmes and 45 soldiers of the line which succeeded in storming one of the barracks and killing many of its defenders, but was obliged to retire before the heavy fire from the houses, and with the loss of some prisoners. The triumph of the Garibaldians did not last long. On October 5th Colonel Azzanesi marched from Montefiascone with two companies of Zouaves commanded by Captain Le Gomidec, and four companies of the line under Captain Zanetti, together with a few dragoons and two guns, in all about 460 men; and after a sharp combat drove the Garibaldians from their barri-

¹⁸ *Mencacci*, vol. 1, p. 35.

cedes into the town, and took the convent at the point of the bayonet. The artillery then came into action; after a few discharges the Garibaldians fled through the ravines surrounding the town and the citizens flinging open their gates welcomed their liberators. This victory cost the Papal troops only six wounded, while the Garibaldians lost 96 killed and wounded and 110 prisoners.

In spite of these reverses the invasion continued and band after band entered the Papal States at many points, hastening back when defeated to take refuge on the Italian side of the frontier. Victor Emmanuel's troops, which were supposed to guard the frontier, rarely made any attempt to arrest the volunteers who arrived in crowds at Perugia, Orvieto and Terni, mostly provided with free passes over the railways, and were allowed to receive arms and ammunition from the National Guards of the adjacent villages. It would be tedious to enter into the details of the many skirmishes which took place every day; from that where Menotti Garibaldi was defeated near Monte Libretti in the north, to Subiaco in the east, where the Garibaldian leader, Major Blenio, was killed, and to Vallecorsa in the south where Nicotera's Neapolitan volunteers were beaten and dispersed after having plundered the village of Falvaterra, but the attack on Monte Libretti on October 13th is more worthy of notice.

The band of Menotti Garibaldi which had been defeated and driven across the frontier on October 6th, shortly after it had invaded the Papal territory, had returned in much greater strength, and occupied Monte Libretti, a walled village built around a castle of the middle ages, on the summit of a steep and isolated hill. At the foot of the hill a bridge crosses a deep ravine, and from the gate of the town a street leads to it commanded on one side by the walls of the castle. Menotti Garibaldi was known to be advancing towards the village and Lieut.-Col. de Charette had ordered three detachments to march from different points to intercept him. One of these columns had already been sent in a different direction and did not receive the counter-order; another came too soon to the point where the three were to meet and after waiting some time withdrew; the third column composed of 90 Zouaves under Lieutenant Guillemin, on arriving near Monte Libretti about six in the evening, surprised the Garibaldian advanced posts, and attacking them at once drove them back into the town. Guillemin then sent a section of his men under Sub-Lieutenant de Quélen to turn the enemy's position, and at the head of the others dashed forward through the vineyards which covered the approaches, and on through the narrow street, under a heavy fire from the windows of the castle,

to the open space before the gate which was filled with Garibaldians. Here he fell with a bullet through the brain, and a furious hand to hand fight ensued between the small body of Zouaves and their far more numerous opponents. Major Fazzari, a Garibaldian officer, was wounded and made prisoner; Corporal Alfred Collingridge, of London, fought desperately, hemmed in by six Garibaldians, till he was mortally wounded, and Peter Yong, a tall and athletic Dutchman, killed sixteen Garibaldians with his clubbed rifle, then sank down exhausted with fatigue, and was immediately bayoneted. When the fight had lasted for about a quarter of an hour the section of de Quélen came up, and drove the Garibaldians into the town, but de Quélen fell mortally wounded, and though the Zouaves made three attempts to pass the gate, their efforts failed before the shower of bullets directed upon it from all sides, and the Garibaldians closed and barricaded the door. Seventeen Zouaves had been killed and eighteen wounded, and night having fallen a part of the survivors retreated to the village of Monte Maggiore, but Sergeant-Major Bach, a Bavarian, who, along with some Zouaves had been separated from the others in the darkness, took possession of a house near the gate, and continued to exchange shots with the enemy till dawn next morning, when he too withdrew to Monte Maggiore, while Menotti, who had no less than 1,200 men, believing that this handful of Zouaves were the advanced guard of a larger force, retreated in the opposite direction to Nerola.

Like Monte Libretti, Nerola is a walled village situated on the summit of a steep hill and defended by a strongly built castle, impregnable except with the help of artillery, and the approaches had been fortified by barricades. Lieut.-Col. de Charette received orders to dislodge Menotti Garibaldi from this formidable position, and he marched from Monte Rotondo with one gun and about 900 infantry drawn from the Zouaves, the *Légion d'Antibes* and the Swiss carabineers. He arrived before Nerola on the morning of the 18th and found that Menotti Garibaldi had withdrawn to a position nearer to the frontier leaving 200 men to defend the village. The Garibaldians were soon driven back into the castle from which they maintained a heavy fire for some time, till finding that the gate was on the point of being blown open and that there was no hope of assistance from Menotti, they laid down their arms.

On the same day another victory was achieved by the Papal soldiers near the village of Farnese, on the Tuscan frontier, where after a sharp combat, in which Lieutenant de Fournel was killed, a small body of Zouaves, gendarmes, and chasseurs, in all 110 men, drove a numerous band of Garibaldians from their advanced post

in a farmhouse and afterwards from the village of Farnese; but the Garibaldians who had lost heavily, and were rendered furious by their defeat, murdered two Capuchin fathers in a neighboring monastery.

After taking Nerola, Colonel de Charette had intended to pursue Menotti Garibaldi, break up his band and drive him across the frontier, but a dispatch from General Kanzler recalled him to Rome where it was found necessary to concentrate the scattered detachments of the Papal army. It was not merely against the incursions of armed bands that the Papal Government had to guard; it was well aware of the presence in Rome of Garibaldian emissaries actively engaged in preparing an insurrection which would afford a pretext for the intervention of the Italian troops and the occupation of Rome, and it saw the importance of taking every precaution to assure the tranquility of the Eternal City and the safety of the Holy Father. The city was therefore declared to be in a state of siege; the bridges over the Aniene were mined; most of the gates were closed and barricaded; earthworks armed with guns were thrown up outside those left open; artillery was placed in position on Mount Aventine and the ditches of the castle of St. Angelo were filled with water. Even the two companies of recruits in the *dépôt* at San Callisto were called on to share the duties of the garrison, and remained under arms for the greater part of each night in readiness for any emergency.

In spite of the vigilance of the police there were at that time in Rome, three secret committees actively engaged in conspiring against the authority of Pius IX, but their efforts to overthrow his government were happily counteracted to a great extent by their mutual jealousies and their incessant disputes. The origin of these committees may be assigned to the revolution of 1848, for the last act of Mazzini and his fellow triumvirs before leaving Rome on the entrance of the French troops in July, 1849, was to found a secret society under the title of *il Comitato Centrale* for the purpose of spreading republican principles among the people, and fostering a spirit of hostility towards the rulers of Italy, and more especially towards the Sovereign Pontiff.¹⁷ As dissensions soon broke out in this committee, Mazzini dissolved it and instituted another, *la Direzione Centrale interna*, the special object of which was to make ready for a general insurrection throughout Italy, and which did, in fact, cause a rising in Milan in February, 1853. This outbreak was quickly suppressed by the Austrian troops, and its failure, by

¹⁷ Cavallotti, p. 29.

manifesting the incapacity of Mazzini, weakened his authority among his followers and produced an irritation against him which split up *la Direzione* into two factions; the *puri* or thorough-going republicans, who remained faithful to their leader's ideal of an Italian republic, and the *fusionisti* who aimed at uniting all shades of opinion under the constitutional government of the House of Savoy. This latter section founded in Rome in 1853 the *Comitato Nazionale* which soon brought under its influence many citizens whose opinions were liberal but who were averse to violence, and in return for the services it rendered to the liberal party it received from the Piedmontese ministry a monthly subsidy of 5,000 francs.¹⁸

The temporising policy of the *Comitato Nazionale* which deprecated and hindered any attempt at an insurrection in Rome, and hoped to achieve the unity of Italy solely by diplomacy and through the intervention of Piedmont, seemed contemptible to the more enthusiastic members of the revolutionary party. They derided the childish manifestations by which the *Comitato* sought to remind the public of its existence and annoy the police without incurring any danger; such as exploding noisy but harmless fireworks, burning tri-colored lights in public places, or letting loose dogs with tri-colored cockades tied to their tails, and in 1861 they founded the *Comitato d'azione*, which printed secretly a newspaper entitled *Roma o Morte*, entered into correspondence with Garibaldi and made preparations for a revolt. Garibaldi's defeat at Aspromonte put an end to this project, and several of the conspirators were arrested to the great relief of the more cautious committee which was even accused of having aided the Roman police in its investigations, and of having taken advantage of the misfortune which had befallen its fellow-conspirators, to steal their clandestine printing-press.¹⁹ Three years later, when the departure of the French troops seemed to present a favorable opportunity for a rising, the *Comitato d'azione* was again established, and to hasten on still more the revolutionary movement, it was soon followed by a third Committee named *il Centro d'insurrezione*. The *Comitato Nazionale*, always hostile to the idea of a revolt, issued in vain protestations and warnings against the dangerous tendencies of its new rival; it was rapidly losing its influence and the subsidy it received from Piedmont, which Baron Ricasoli, when prime minister, had raised to 10,000 francs a month, was withdrawn in 1867 by his successor Urbano Rattazzi. Some of the members of the discredited *Comitato* then resigned, and forming a coalition with the *Centro d'insurrezione*, founded in July, 1867, a

¹⁸ Cavallotti, pp. 40, 164.

¹⁹ Cavallotti, p. 41.

new Committee, which under the name of the *Giunta Nazionale Romana* took upon itself from thenceforward the direction of the conspiracy. The insurgents were mostly composed of Garibaldians from different parts of Italy who had entered Rome secretly, and remained there in hiding; their principal leaders were Colonel Francesco Cucchi, of Bergamo, who held the supreme command, and Guerzoni, a member of the Italian parliament, who acted as his lieutenant; but only a small proportion of the Roman people belonging, almost without exception, to the dregs of the populace, took part in the rising.²⁰

The long expected insurrection, which was intended to serve as a pretext for the intervention of the Italian troops, began on the evening of October 22d, in several parts of Rome simultaneously, but it was speedily suppressed before any serious injury had been caused, with the exception of the destruction of the Serristori barracks not far from St. Peter's. The conspirators had planned to undermine and blow up all the barracks in Rome; among others, those of the Swiss Guard in the Vatican, and even the powder magazine of the Castle of St. Angelo;²¹ but Rattazzi ordered Colonel Cucchi to change the date of the rising from the 27th, which had been originally fixed, to the 22d before all was ready, and his impatience saved the city from ruin. At the Serristori barracks two barrels of powder had been deposited in a workshop on the ground floor and when, at 7 o'clock, the mine was fired, a large portion of the building sank in ruins, crushing in its fall thirty-four Zouaves, nineteen of whom were Italians, mostly bandsmen. The loss of life would have been far greater had not the company quartered in the barracks been sent some hours previously to seize a store of arms and ammunition concealed in a villa three miles beyond the Porta San Paolo. At the same time a band of Garibaldians commanded by Guerzoni, surprised and disarmed after a short resistance, the corporal's guard at the Porta San Paolo, intending to bring in the arms and ammunition which they did not know had been already discovered and carried off, and Cucchi led other detachments to the attack of the Capitol. There the guard held its ground, and being quickly re-enforced, the Garibaldians were repulsed with loss, while Guerzoni and his band were soon after driven from the post which they had taken and where they had raised a barricade. Attempts were also made by other bodies of insurgents to seize the gas works and the military hospital, and some soldiers returning alone to their barracks were set upon and murdered, but by midnight the Gari-

²⁰ Mencacci, vol. II, p. 28.

²¹ Mevius, p. 212.

baldians had been everywhere beaten and dispersed, and the 3,500,000 francs which the Italian Government had given to organise this revolt, as was proved in the following year at the trial of Monti and Tognetti, the assassins who had blown up the Serristori barracks, had been spent in vain.²²

The absence of an important reinforcement which, happily for Rome, failed to arrive in time, contributed not a little to this speedy suppression of the insurrection. Two Garibaldian officers, Enrico and Giovanni Cairoli, the latter a captain in the Italian army, had promised to introduce a convoy of arms into Rome, and, accompanied by 74 volunteers, all picked men, they descended the Tiber, and before dawn on the 23d they were about two miles from Rome, at the spot where the Aniene falls into the Tiber, where they seized a boat with some custom house officers on guard. Not meeting, however, with the guide they expected, they hid themselves in a villa surrounded by a vineyard situated on the Monte Parioli, which rises abruptly from the banks of the Tiber. They were not discovered till the afternoon, and at dusk they were attacked by a company of Swiss Carabineers. A desperate fight ensued, in which Enrico Cairoli was killed, and his brother and seven others wounded, the remainder of the band escaped, helped by the darkness and recrossed the frontier.

Rome was not yet, however, quite out of danger. It was only on the morning of the 25th that the police discovered the existence of another *dépôt* of arms, ammunition and Orsini bombs concealed in the Trastevere, in a cloth manufactory, an isolated building of great extent and strongly barricaded. A large number of Garibaldians amounting to 80 or 100 and mostly from outside Rome, were assembled there and intended to make another attempt to excite a revolt. That afternoon the house was attacked by the Zouaves of the 1st company of the *dépôt* and some gendarmes; the doors were broken open and the Garibaldians who made a determined resistance were driven from one part of the building to another, losing 16 killed and 30 wounded; till the survivors laid down their arms.

Though the Papal troops had already begun to return to Rome they still held Viterbo where Colonel Azzanesi had a small garrison of about 400 men, mostly Italian soldiers of the line, with 52 Zouaves, 50 gendarmes, a few dragoons and two guns. He was attacked on the night of the 25th by a band of 1,500 volunteers led by General Acerbi, the commander of the right wing of the Gari-

²² Mevius, p. 201.

baldian forces, who, until then, had remained in the strong position of Torre-Alfina, organizing and drilling his men, and who had been given to understand that the citizens of Viterbo were ready to rise against the Papal garrison. The combat lasted the greater part of the night, the Garibaldians succeeded in setting fire to one of the gates, and advanced to the assault, driving before them as a screen, the monks whom they had dragged from two neighboring monasteries, but their repeated efforts to force an entrance were repulsed each time, and as, in spite of the promises of the revolutionary committee of Viterbo, the citizens showed no intention of rising, Acerbi withdrew his men, many of whom were made prisoners next day during their retreat.

Meanwhile Garibaldi who on the 2d of October had already made an attempt to escape from Caprera but had been stopped and brought back by one of the cruisers, succeeded in leaving the island in a canoe on the night of the 13th. On the coast of Sardinia a fishing boat provided by his friends was in readiness for him, and on the 19th he landed near Leghorn. On the 21st he was in Florence, where Rattazzi, who had just given in his resignation, refused to take on himself the responsibility of ordering his arrest, and so did General Cialdini, the new minister, who had not yet formed his cabinet.²² At last, at the request of the French ambassador, the King himself directed Rattazzi to seize Garibaldi, who, after addressing the people from the window of the house of his friend Crispi, had left for the frontier by special train. Rattazzi's telegram to the prefect of Perugia ordered him to pursue the General, but so as not to overtake him, and Garibaldi, crossing the frontier at Correse on the evening of the 23d, took the command of the bands which had been assembled there from all directions, and which formed an army of at least 10,000 men, divided into 22 battalions. The majority of these were drawn from the populace of the cities of Northern Italy, their own leaders spoke of them with the utmost contempt,²³ and their conduct in every town or village which they took showed that they were attracted mainly by the hope of plunder, but there were also among them many soldiers and officers of the regular army who had been given leave of absence, and many veterans who had fought under Garibaldi in his previous campaigns.

The road from Correse to Rome passes through Monte Rotondo, a small town situated on a height. Only one-third of its circuit is protected by a wall, in which are three gates, the remainder has no other defence than the houses and gardens which line the brow of

²² Mevius, p. 192.

²³ Mevius, p. 298.

the hill. Near the centre is the palace of the Prince of Piombino, a massive building of three stories from which rises a tall tower. Colonel de Charette when retreating on Rome had left in the town as garrison under the command of Captain Costes of the *Légion d'Antibes*, two companies of that regiment, one of Swiss rifles, some gendarmes, dragoons and artillerymen, in all 323 men with two guns. At daybreak on the 25th the Garibaldians were seen advancing in three strong columns and taking up their positions round the town; they were under the command of Menotti Garibaldi, while his father remained in the rear with the reserves. Captain Costes, who had received orders to defend the town as long as possible, posted his small garrison at the gates and in the houses on the outskirts of the town so as to command every approach, and when, at 6 o'clock, the attack began, the Garibaldians were everywhere received with such a heavy fire, that though frequently rallied by their officers, they were finally repulsed after three hours of continuous fighting. Garibaldi then brought up fresh troops, took the command in person, and recommenced the attack on all sides, but in vain: his volunteers were repeatedly driven back both from the gates and from the open part of the town by the well directed fire of the Papal troops, especially the Swiss rifles, and after a combat of eight hours they gradually withdrew wearied and discouraged.

Garibaldi had not expected this obstinate resistance; he had hoped to have stormed the town in a few minutes and then, by making a forced march, to have taken Rome by surprise. He gave orders, therefore, to renew the attack that night, and about 9 o'clock a cart laden with faggots and bags of sulphur was rolled up against one of the gates by a party of volunteers who lost heavily on the occasion, and set on fire. The gate was soon enveloped in flames, but whilst it was burning, Captain Costes raised barricades in the streets leading from it, and when the gate fell and the Garibaldians rushed into the town it was only after two hours of desperate fighting that the Papal troops, yielding to superior numbers, were driven back into the Palace. The combat began again with the return of daylight; the Garibaldians had occupied the surrounding houses, and from the roofs and windows fired upon the Palace, till at 9 o'clock, when Captain Costes, finding that the building was being undermined, and seeing no hope of help from Rome, was obliged to capitulate after a resistance of 27 hours, during which the loss of the garrison had been only 4 killed and 20 wounded, while the Garibaldians, as their leader stated, had lost 500 killed and wounded, though the number is known to have been much greater. It is but just to add that the prisoners were treated with courtesy by Gari-

baldi and his two sons who protected them against the brutality of their undisciplined followers: they were brought to Correse and handed over to the Italian troops guarding the frontier, whence they were brought to La Spezia and kept there till the end of the campaign. The Garibaldians were, however, allowed to plunder and desecrate the Churches of the town and the monasteries outside it, to ill-treat the clergy, to smash the crucifixes and the images of the saints, and to carry away the sacred vessels.³⁵

Up to this time the indecision of the Emperor of the French and the uncertainty as to what line of policy he would ultimately adopt had caused the government of the Holy Father much uneasiness; it seemed as though he were anxious to allow the Italian troops following in the track of Garibaldi to occupy Rome, and then accept the downfall of the Temporal Power, as an accomplished fact never more to be discussed. On the 16th of October Napoleon III had, indeed, declared his intention of upholding the throne of Pius IX, and orders had been given to embark troops at Toulon but the negotiations with Italy still continued, and when Rattazzi who, it is assured, had made overtures to Prussia for the formation of a defensive and offensive alliance against France,³⁶ gave in his resignation on the evening of October 9th, the Emperor seemed to take it for granted that the complicity of the Italian Government with Garibaldi was at an end, he countermanded the departure of the expedition and the troops were again landed. As, however, General Cialdini who was called upon to succeed Rattazzi was unable to find colleagues who were willing to execute the stipulations of the Convention of the 15th of September, the Emperor once more ordered the expedition to start. Even then he showed irresolution, for the fleet was again stopped when on the point of leaving, and it was only on the evening of the 26th that it sailed from Toulon.

Garibaldi was detained at Monte Rotondo till the 27th by the necessity of reorganising his troops after their heavy losses, and on the evening of that day he marched with his whole army to Foronovo, about 8 miles from Rome, but did not advance again till the 29th when he found that the Ponte Salaro, one of the three bridges over the Aniene had been blown up, and that the other two were strongly guarded, and he withdrew. On the 30th he again advanced, intending to seize the Ponte Nomentano, but his battalions were stopped by the troops which guarded the bridge, and after skirmishing all day without making a serious attack he drew off his men at night-fall and retreated to Monte Rotondo. He had

³⁵ Vitali, pp. 30, 43, 97.

³⁶ Mevius, p. 187.

been already apprised of the landing of the French expedition at Civita Vecchia and that afternoon their first brigade entered Rome, while by order of Victor Emmanuel the Italian troops crossed the frontier and occupied the towns which had been taken by the Garibaldians.

Although many volunteers, disheartened and irritated by the retreat from the very gates of Rome, had thrown away their arms and deserted, fresh bands of volunteers continued to arrive and Garibaldi still hoped to prolong the struggle. He at first intended to fortify Monte Rotondo and await there the attack of the Papal army; considering, however, that Tivoli situated on the slopes of the Sabine hills with a river in front and the mountainous district of the Abruzzi in the rear was a much stronger position, after much hesitation and many changes of plans, he gave orders to his son Menotti to march for that town at dawn on the 3d of November, but his departure was delayed till 11 by the necessity of distributing shoes and clothing to his followers. According to the most trustworthy calculations he had still at that moment at the very least 10,000 men.²⁷

The army which General Kanzler led out from Rome that morning was divided into two columns: the first composed exclusively of Papal troops and commanded by General de Courten, reckoned 2,913 men, 1,500 of whom were Zouaves; in the second column were a little more than 2,000 of the French soldiers under the order of General de Polhés, in all about 5,000 men with ten guns. The troops were called to arms at one o'clock, but it was already four when the Papal forces marched out of the Porta Pia, followed at a short distance by the French contingent. The morning was rainy and dark, the soldiers in heavy marching order and carrying two days rations, advanced slowly over the muddy road. After crossing the Ponte Nomentano, about three miles from Rome, General Kanzler sent Major de Troussures with three companies of the 2d battalion of Zouaves by a road to the left towards the valley of the Tiber, there to march on a parallel to that followed by the main body, so as to turn the right flank of the Garibaldians. The remainder of the column then went on though mud and rain till it reached the farm of Capobianco halfway on the road to Mentana, where it halted to let the men get some food, and dry their clothes; and when, after an hour's rest, they had again formed their ranks and resumed their march, the rain had ceased and the sun shone out brightly in a cloudless sky.

On leaving Capobianco the road gradually ascends towards a

²⁷ Mevius, p. 365.

more elevated region of the Campagna and then winds along the lower slopes of several hills covered with brushwood, till near Mentana, where it is commanded on the right by Monte Santucci, a high table-land where there is a large vineyard, and on the left by Monte Guarnieri a wooded height with some farm houses. The vineyard, the woods and the farmhouses had been strongly occupied by the advanced guard of the Garibaldian army composed of battalions of riflemen from Genoa, Lombardy and Leghorn, commanded by Major Burlando, Col. Missori and Captain Meyer, as soon as the approach of the Papal army had been discovered and Garibaldi had found himself obliged to stop his march towards Tivoli and accept battle at Mentana. The rest of his troops were assembled in and around the village.

The dragoons who preceded the Papal column as scouts came upon the Garibaldian outposts about half past twelve, exchanged shots with them and galloped back to give the alarm. General de Courten immediately extended the first company of Zouaves under Captain d'Albiousse, and the second under Captain Thomalé to the left and right of the road in skirmishing order; the third under Captain Alain de Charette and the fourth under Captain Le Gonidec following as supports. The Garibaldians were soon driven from the woods, but the Leghorn rifles of Captain Meyer and a Genoese battalion under Captain Stallo, held the tableland to the right of the road, where their heavy fire checked the advance of the Zouaves till their line was strengthened by the companies of Captain de Moncuit and Captain de Veaux; and when Lieut.-Col. de Charette hastened up with the company of Captain Lefebvre he led a furious bayonet charge which swept the Garibaldians before it. They tried in vain to rally and reform their ranks behind farm-buildings or clumps of trees, their positions were stormed one after another and the shattered battalions were driven back upon the Santucci vineyard, leaving behind them a long line of killed and wounded.

The Santucci vineyard, an extensive walled enclosure, in which stands a large farm-house which had been loop-holed, was held by the battalion of Major Ciotti. It defended the approach to Mentana from the East across the high ground which dominates that village, while the road running in a hollow at its feet, was swept by the fire from the Castle of Mentana, and Monte Guarnieri on the opposite side of the road, served as an outpost to the vineyard and protected its flank. This position had, therefore, to be seized first and the company of Captain Alain de Charette climbed its steep sides and dislodged the Garibaldian sharpshooters from their hiding places among the trees. A piece of artillery directed by Count Bernardini

then opened fire on the Santucci vineyard, from a farm which had been just taken by the company of Captain d'Albiousse and a company of Swiss, while Lieut.-Col. de Charette at the head of his Zouaves supported on their right by five companies of Swiss attacked the vineyard in front. The walls of the enclosure were soon scaled and the Garibaldians driven back into the farmhouse, where they held out for some time till the doors were broken in, when they laid down their arms, but this success cost the Zouaves one of their officers, Captain de Veaux, who had distinguished himself at Castelfidardo, and who fell during the assault struck by a bullet through the heart.

There were still large bodies of Garibaldians in the woods to the left of the road, but the company of Captain d'Albiousse, that of Captain de Charette, a company of Swiss and the Légion, which then came into line, soon drove them from their shelter out on the slopes which descend towards Mentana, and poured a heavy fire on the fugitives who were hastening from all sides towards the village.

It was then two o'clock, there was a cessation of hostilities for a few minutes, during which the wounded were picked up and carried to the ambulance, and General Kanzler, who had established his headquarters at the Santucci Vineyard, prepared to attack Mentana.

The castle of Mentana, a mediaeval fortress belonging to the Borghese family, stands on a rock with precipitous sides which advances from the high road into a deep valley; it was held along with the village in its rear and the barricades at its entrance, by four battalions of Garibaldians under Lieut.-Col. Friggyesi, a Hungarian; the high ground above the village to the East, where there was a large farm house, with stacks of hay and corn, was occupied by Colonel Elia, Lieut. Col. Paggi and Major Valzania with nine battalions; Major Cantoni, with three battalions was stationed to their left on the road leading to Monte Rotondo, and the two guns which had been taken at that town were drawn up on Monte San Lorenzo, some distance in the rear.

General Kanzler placed on Monte Guarnieri three guns, two of which were French, and escorted by two companies of chasseurs, another gun on the high road and two more in the Santucci vineyard, in order to silence the fire of the Garibaldian artillery and throw their forces into disorder. The Zouaves then advanced from the vineyard, the companies of d'Albiousse, de Charette and de Veaux (the latter commanded by Lieutenant Fabri) leading in skirmishing order, followed by three companies under Major de Lambilly. Five companies of Swiss carabineers and the *Legion*

d'Antibes covered their left flank. The Zouaves drove the Garibaldians out of a building called the Conventino, from which the ground rises towards Mentana, but when they came in sight of Colonel Elia's battalions, it was no longer possible to restrain them; and too impatient to wait till the fire of the artillery had disorganized the ranks of the enemy, they broke away from their officers and charged, heedless of the commands of their Colonel or of the sound of the bugles, they dashed forward, driving the Garibaldians from every hedge or clump of trees which they tried to defend, and flung them back into the houses of the village. There the hail of bullets which was poured from the loop-holed walls stopped the impetuous charge, but they held their ground, and sheltered by the haystacks, returned the fire of the Garibaldians. A sudden attack of the enemy dislodged them for a while from their position, but Major de Lambilly's three companies hastened to their relief, they quickly reoccupied their post, and at this spot, which was several times lost and retaken, the combat lasted till nightfall.

The attack on the village of Mentana having thus been stopped. Garibaldi sent two strong columns to turn the flanks of the Papal army. The first, composed of three battalions, marched from the northern end of the village and nearly succeeded in surrounding two companies of Swiss carabineers which had been sent from the left to the extreme right of the line. They retired slowly and in good order, firing as they went, until they were re-inforced by two more companies of their regiment, two of the *Legion d'Antibes* and a company of Zouaves, when they dashed forward again, broke up the Garibaldian ranks and pursued them as far as the road leading to Monte Rotondo. The second column, which advanced from the southern end of the village, did not meet with greater success. It was repulsed by three companies of the *Legion*, which followed it as far as the entrance of the village, broke into a house and made some prisoners, but was forced to retire in presence of superior numbers. It was then that the detachment led by Major de Troussures was seen advancing in the rear of the village towards the road leading from Mentana to Monte Rotondo. Garibaldi at once perceived that the battle was irretrievably lost, and that his line of retreat was in danger of being intercepted; he hastened therefore to provide for his safety and left Mentana, while his son, Menotti, still continued to defend the village.

It was then half past three; the Garibaldian chiefs resolved to make another effort to surround the wings of the Papal army; they assembled all the men still able to fight and again sent forward a column from each end of Mentana. All General Kanzler's troops

were by that time engaged and dispersed here and there over a great extent of broken ground; he had no reserves to meet these battalions which advanced in good order like well disciplined soldiers; and he therefore requested General de Polhès to bring his infantry into line. A French battalion of the line and three companies of Chasseurs, led by Colonel Fremont, marched at once to take up their position on the right of the Papal troops, and for the first time the "*Chassepot*" was brought into action. The combat ceased for a few minutes over the rest of the field, as the soldiers on both sides paused to listen to its rapid fire, as incessant as the rolling of a drum, before which the Garibaldians broke their ranks and fled back to Mentana or towards Monte Rotondo in spite of the efforts of Menotti Garibaldi and his officers to rally them. The column on the enemy's right wing met with the same fate, being attacked in front by a battalion of French infantry of the line, and on its right flank by Major de Troussure's Zouaves.

Mentana was now completely surrounded, and General Kanzler resolved to give the assault, though the Castle had as yet suffered but little from the fire of the artillery, and was defended as well as the village by some of the best soldiers of the Garibaldian army. The principal column of attack was led by General de Polhès; it was composed of two battalions of the line and three companies of chasseurs, but it was unable to force the strong barricade erected at the entrance to the village, and crushed by the fire from the Castle and from the surrounding houses, it retreated after losing several killed and wounded.

The fight then ceased, for night had fallen, the Garibaldian army was utterly defeated and scattered, and those who still held out in the Castle could hope for no assistance. The Papal and French troops then lit their watch fires round the village, threw out strong advanced posts and sentinels, and took every precaution against a surprise. The next morning at dawn, Major Fauchon entered Mentana with a French battalion, when some hundreds of Garibaldians laid down their arms, and about 800 others who formed the garrison of the Castle capitulated and were allowed to recross the frontier. The Garibaldians had left on the field over 1,100 killed and wounded, besides 1,398 prisoners in the hands of the Papal troops, while the loss of the latter was but 30 killed and 114 wounded, and that of the French 2 killed and 36 wounded.

Garibaldi continued his retreat to Correse on the evening of the battle, and crossed the frontier the next day with 5,000 men who were disarmed by the Italian troops; 900 others under Colonel Salomone escaped into the Abruzzi, while the General was arrested

on his way to Caprera and brought to the fort of Varignano, in the Gulf of La Spezia. The band of Acerbi, which, on the recall of the Papal troops to Rome, had entered Viterbo, where it had plundered the Municipal Treasury and exacted large sums of money from the Bishop and the religious communities, as well as the bands commanded by Nicotera, which had seized Frosinone, Velletri, Palestrina and Tivoli, had been followed as they advanced by the Italian troops which entered the Patrimony of St. Peter at different points, to the number of 5,948 men.⁷ As soon, however, as the arrival of the French expedition and the victory of Mentana allowed the Papal Government to reoccupy these towns, the Italian soldiers were withdrawn, the Garibaldians fled across the frontier without fighting, and peace reigned once more in the territory of the Holy Father, while the whole Catholic world felt reassured by the solemn declaration made on December 4th, by M. Rouher, in the Corps Législatif, in the name of the Imperial Government, that France would never allow Italy to seize Rome or the territory still remaining to the Holy See.

DONAT SAMPSON.

London.

⁷⁷ Cavallotti, p. 664.