

us not forget the hundreds of missionaries, no less disinterested, no less noble, no less devoted to science, than the heroes whose names fame trumpets forth, missionaries who, whilst bringing Christ's gospel to the heathen, and transforming savages into civilized beings, at the same time have ever had at heart the interests of geographical science.

OF THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

St. Thomas Aquinas. Sum. Theol. I. Pars.

The Metaphysics of the School. By Rev. Thomas Harper, S. J.

(CONCLUSION.)

BY substantial simplicity the human soul is essentially different from the body; its cognitive power assumes a marvellous comprehensiveness; its perfection by far transcends the realm of bodily substances; its nature presents itself to our mind as a new sphere above this universe, resplendent with unseen beauty, variety and excellence. Yet, by proving the soul not to be composite, we have not fully set forth its essence, nor sufficiently evinced its elevation above the material. Though distinct from matter, may it not be dependent on matter in its very existence, requiring this as its natural subject? So, indeed, many have thought. Just as the materialist does not distinguish the principle of rational life from the material forces, so the sensationist confounds it with the sensitive faculties; whence it comes that the one identifies man with matter, and the other with the brute. Nor are views of that kind heard of only in our days; they were entertained in antiquity, as well as in our times, and brought into systems by the Grecian no less than by our modern philosophers.

These opinions, however, have in no age been universal among the learned. Thinkers of a sounder tendency have always combated them with solid reasons. Prominent among the opponents of sensationism were, before the dawning of the Gospel, Plato and Aristotle, with their respective schools; in the Christian ages, after the Fathers of the Church, St. Thomas, with the Scholastics. The ideas chiefly of the latter it will be most proper somewhat to develop, in order to throw full light on this important question. They distinguish three kinds of substantial forms. There are forms which are such acts of a compound substance that without the composite they

cannot exist at all, since they have their being only with dependence on matter, their fellow-constituent.

There are others which are essential acts of a compound, yet can exist also without it, by themselves, having their existence independently of the material element together with which they constitute a substantial whole. Others, finally, are acts to themselves, because they are complete substances, and hence do not enter into composition, but exist exclusively in themselves. The first mentioned forms are called by the Scholastics material, not because they consist of matter, but because they depend in their existence on it as on their subject. The other forms are termed immaterial, because they are in their existence independent of matter, one kind of them not even being united with it, the other, though joined to it, still not being sustained by it. Again, the material forms are considered as non-subsistent, because they are such constituent parts of a substance that they can exist only in a composite in union with their copartner. The immaterial forms, on the contrary, are called subsistent, since they can exist by themselves and apart from any other substantial entity. There is, however, among them a remarkable difference with regard to their way of subsisting. Those forms which, being acts of themselves and integral natures, exist exclusively by themselves, evidently have a complete subsistence; the others, which are by their nature acts of a compound, yet can exist also apart from it, have an incomplete subsistence. For subsistence is the mode by which the substance exists in its own right and becomes incommunicable to another; but substantial forms which are naturally constituents of a composite are communicable to a whole and by right belong to it; they are, consequently, subsistent only in a limited sense as far as they have their existence independently of a subject which receives or sustains them, and, therefore, can exist also by themselves, though as incomplete substances.

These definitions supposed, the Scholastics generally maintain that the vital principle of brutes is a material or non-subsistent form, but that the soul of man is immaterial and, though incompletely, subsistent in itself.¹ It is in this sense that the scholastic philosophy treats of the immateriality of the soul, or of its spirituality, for the two terms coincide as to their real meaning, since, as we have no immediate insight into the spiritual, we define it negatively by conceiving it as something independent of the material.

Let us now at once put forth arguments for this essential attribute of our soul, by which it is distinguished from that of the

¹ See St. Thos. Sum. Theol., p. i.; qu. 75; art. 2 ad 1.

brute. Of course, immateriality is not directly and in itself perceivable to us; just as little is substantial simplicity, and as, in general, the intrinsic constitution of things is hidden from our immediate view. But we have a medium of demonstration in our own actions; for by action the nature or essence of a thing manifests itself. Hence from the property of the nature the property of the action is legitimately concluded, as from the source we may know the quality of that which flows from it; and *vice versa*, from the property of the action we conclude the property of the nature, as from the mirror we derive the figure of the object shining on it. However, to obtain a thorough knowledge of the essence of a being, we must search into all its actions; for only, when taken all together, do they represent its entire perfection; singly they reflect but particular powers of it. Relying on this undeniable truth, we lay down the following axiom: If in a living being there are no actions but such as spring from an organic faculty, that is, from an animated organ, its soul is a substantial form not subsistent in itself, but dependent on matter in its very being; for, as are the actions taken collectively, so is the nature of the substance. If, on the contrary, there are in a living being operations which cannot be elicited by a bodily organ or exclude the concurrence of the body, its soul must be independent of matter and subsistent in itself; for, as the principiate, so also is the principiant. All our argumentation, then, hinges upon that one question, whether man's rational activity is organic or not, whether exercised by the soul alone, or by the soul conjointly with the body; for all our other vital functions, as sensation and vegetation, are organic, according to general consent. So the Scholastics have looked on this subject. St. Thomas, treating of the immateriality or subsistence of the soul, first proves the intellect to be inorganic and then reasons in the following manner: "The intellectual principle, the mind or intellect, performs its operations by itself without the body. But whatever is active of itself is also subsistent in itself; for every being is a principle of operation, inasmuch as it is reduced to act (perfection), and hence operates in the same manner as it is. Whence it follows that the human soul, which we call mind or intellect, is incorporeal and subsistent in itself."¹

To speak first of cognition, whence may we prove intellection to be inorganic? From the nature of cognition and from the things known to us. Cognition consists in the expression of the similitude

¹ S. Theol. p. i.; qu. 75, art. 2: "Ipsum igitur intellectuale principium quod dicitur mens vel intellectus, habet operationem per se, cui non communicat corpus. Nihil autem potest per se operari, nisi quod per se existit. Non enim est operari nisi entis in actu. Unde eo modo aliquid operatur, quo est; propter quod non dicimus, quod calor calefacit, sed calidum. Relinquitur igitur, animam humanam, quæ dicitur intellectus vel mens, esse aliquid incorporeum et subsistens."

of the object within and by the faculty of the cognitive subject. It is, therefore, necessary that the same form exists in the subject knowing and in the object known; yet it is not requisite that the same form should exist in both of them in the same manner. Nor does this imply any contradiction. The features of a man exist both in himself and in his image; but certainly they exist differently in him and in the marble, or the wax, or the photograph, or the painting which bears his likeness; for in him they are living, and in the things just mentioned they are lifeless. Likewise is the form of the tree which we see not in the same way in nature as in our eye. Since, therefore, it is not impossible that one and the selfsame form should exist differently in two subjects, we must not wonder that this in reality takes place in cognition. We may even infer that it generally must be so. The cognizant subject and the object known are evidently in most cases of a different nature. But it is an axiom that whatever is received in a thing exists there in accordance with the nature of that thing, since there must be a strict proportion between the recipient and the reality received. Consequently, a form also exists differently in the cognitive principle and in the objective. However, though the difference of the manner in which the common form exists does not impede cognition, still it determines the perfection and specific peculiarity thereof. In proportion as the form has in the cognitive faculty a superior or inferior mode of existence, the object is represented more or less perfectly, under a wider or a narrower aspect, from a higher or a lower point of view. Conversely from the different manner in which one and the selfsame object is known by different subjects we conclude the different manner in which the objective form exists in them; for as the form is in all the same, it cannot found in them a diversity of cognition but by the diverse manner of its existence. It is, no doubt, for this reason that the same body is differently perceived by the eye and by imagination.

From these premises we may now with certainty infer, not only what objects an organic faculty is able to represent, but also in what manner it can represent them. Considering, on the other hand, the objects which are known to our mind, and the respect in which they are attained, we shall discover the nature of the intellectual principle. And then comparing organic and inorganic cognition, sense, and reason, we shall be convinced that there is a diametrical opposition between them.

First, the organic faculty cannot at all know spiritual objects, because it cannot receive their forms. For an organ is composed of both body and soul, and is, consequently, a material or bodily subject. But the immaterial cannot possibly exist in the material, the latter not being proportioned to the former. Likewise, if we con-

sider cognition as active, it is evident that the material faculty cannot produce an immaterial form to represent by it a spiritual object; for there would be no proportion between cause and effect. But by the intellect we are cognizant of spiritual objects. Certainly, we have an idea of the spirit, and know to some extent what it is and is not; we have some knowledge of God and divine things, however inadequate it be. The intellect, therefore, we must conclude, is of necessity a spiritual principle, for only, if such, can it be fit to produce and receive spiritual forms. This proof, short and simple as it is, has compelling evidence for all who bear in mind the true nature of cognition. Hence we do not consider it necessary to dwell on it any longer, and address ourselves immediately to the consideration of the manner in which the organic faculty and the intellect represent their objects.

The senses are exclusively cognizant of bodies and do not attain but certain material qualities of them. This is a necessary consequence of the essential properties of any organic power whatever. In the latter, soul and body, the formal and the material elements, concur to action. Now, the body being made of matter, and consequently inert, cannot pass into action, unless acted upon by an exterior cause; and hence does not coöperate towards the cognition of an object by which it is not determined. Nor can we say that the body need not be acted on by the object, but may be moved to operation by the soul; because in such a supposition we should not have one organic, but two distinct faculties, of which the one is immaterial, the other material. Furthermore, on the organic faculty the outward body, which is its proper object, can impress only material qualities as such. For, on the one hand, it can produce no other than material forms, as its effects cannot transcend its own perfection; and, on the other hand, as St. Thomas remarks,¹ the sentient body cannot admit a substantial form of another body without being destroyed. Wherefore the organic faculties can receive but accidental material forms, and much more are they unable, on account of the impenetrability of their subject, to take in complete bodily substances. Thus it is absolutely impossible for the senses to penetrate into the nature of bodies; they cleave to their surface, their material qualities and modifications. Not so is it with the mind. The intellect can perceive all things and attain to their intrinsic constitution. Nay, the very aspect under which it takes cognizance of its objects is their essence. Indeed, we can intellectually know all that is, though we perceive the bodily first, and the spiritual secondarily and analogically; and that which we try to grasp in them by scientific

¹ Sum. c. gent., lib. ii., c. 49: "Nullum corpus potest alterius corporis formam substantialem recipere, nisi per corruptionem suam formam amittet."

inquiries, or apprehend by immediate intuition, is their nature and entity. The formal object itself of the intellect, for so is the aspect called under which it views things, is not material at all, because it is so wide and universal that it comprises the spiritual no less than the corporeal, and extends to a depth and height which no organic power can reach. The mind, therefore, must be an immaterial principle, which, even when it perceives material objects, moulds them so that they have an immaterial mode of existing. Nor do we, in saying so, incur any contradiction. For the superior includes the inferior, and the universal the particular. Consequently the spiritual, which is higher and more comprehensive, implies the material, and the form that exists in a spiritual manner eminently contains that which exists in a bodily manner. On this account, though the material or organic faculty cannot perceive the immaterial, still the immaterial faculty can represent the material object.

From the aspect under which the sense and the intellect take cognizance, we deduce several properties which the objects, as known by both the one and the other, must necessarily have. The sense or organic faculty perceives things as extended. The reason is, because the act or form by which it represents them is extended. For the extended form in the cognizant subject corresponds to an extended form in the object, and the extended act, that is effected by many parts distinct from, and outside one another, represents also the object only as extended.¹ This we have proved above sufficiently, when speaking of simplicity. Nor can, for the same reason, unity be perceived by an organic faculty; for the several parts of an object are severally apprehended by the parts of the organ without being collected in any one of them. True, the soul that animates all our nerves and fibres is simple, but the soul alone is not the sensitive principle, this is the composite of both the formal and the material element; and hence, in the sentient subject the parts of the object known exist extended and not concentrated in one simple point. The human mind, on the other hand, not only perceives things which have no extension, as, simple substances, pure and abstract forms, but also reduces the bodies to unity, and, in general, is able to gather and compare all its notions and judgments.

Again, the senses perceive the bodies, their proper object, as existing and actual. The reason thereof is obvious. The exterior senses are cognizant of the exterior body only when determined by it, and therefore perceive it as acting or making an impression on them. Yet, no doubt, what is apprehended as acting, is known

¹ See St. Thom. Sum. c. gent. lib. ii., c. 49, n. 1.

also as existent and actual. The interior sense has a fourfold function. It either perceives the bodies as acting on it through the exterior senses, wherefore it sees, as it were, colors, and hears sounds; in which case it evidently perceives its object as existent. Or it reproduces the former sensitive impressions as they were first received or formed, and in this case again it perceives its objects, not indeed as acting on it at present, but as they were active in the past, and so also beholds them in their existence and actuality. Or it decomposes the images produced by former sensations and again combines the component parts to new likenesses; and if this happens it is evident that the union thus effected is not real without ourselves, but that all the elements of the whole feigned are real, and have resulted from acting and existing bodies. Or, lastly, it discovers a new quality, that of convenience or inconvenience, in the object which it supposes already perceived by the exterior senses, and hence as existent. The intellect, on the contrary, has knowledge not only of the present and the past, but also of the future, of that which exists and that which will never exist, of the actual and the possible; it conceives the essence of things so that it prescind from their existence, and, in general, does not perceive its objects as acting on it.

Another peculiarity of the senses is that they perceive only the individual. So it must be, considering the fact that their object is the existent that acts on us. For, indeed, all that exists, and all that acts, is individual. A second reason of this property of sensuous cognition is the extension of its objects. What is extended, its parts excluding one another by resistance, repels from itself also other beings, and is thus portioned off and divided from them even as to space. Now, is a thing so determined and distinguished not individual? The senses, moreover, perceive but the contingent, for the bodies and their qualities can and cannot exist. But the intellect knows the necessary; for it attains the essences of things, which, belonging to the metaphysical order, have absolute necessity. Besides, the senses are forced to perceive the object according as it makes an impression on them, since their cognition is determined by it; hence they can neither make abstraction, but must at once represent all that the outward body imprints on them, nor can they correct the appearance of things, however contrary to truth, but must report them as they seem. Quite differently acts the intellect. It corrects the impression made on the organ; for it conceives the bodily objects to be under certain circumstances otherwise than they exhibit themselves; it judges the sun and the stars to be infinitely larger than they appear, and the earth to move, though it seems to stand; and it accounts for such judgments by compelling reasons. The intellect

is capable also of abstraction. In fact, it separates nature or substance from the accidents, quantity from quality, and one quality from another; it considers all objects, even the simple, under manifold respects, gives them several predicates common to many, or peculiar to individuals, and thus ranges them in certain classes, genera, and species. From all that we see that in the cognition of the material itself there is an essential opposition between the intellect and the organic faculties. The senses are so confined to the bodies which exist in nature that they can neither go beyond them nor represent them in another than a material manner; the intellect views the bodies under a universal, necessary, and immaterial aspect, and gives them attributes attainable to no sentient power.¹

The last difference between the organic and inorganic faculties is that the one can reflect on itself, and the other not. By reflection the cognitive principle returns from an outward thing to itself and makes itself its own object. No faculty, of which matter is a component, can do so. For in a power of that kind the material element is neither determined by the soul, because this alone does not act in sensation, nor by itself, because it is inert, and, consequently, is acted upon by an exterior cause; and this cause, which is a body, is the object of cognition, since what determines a cognitive faculty is the thing known by it. This being so, the senses, and, in general, all organic faculties, cannot turn back upon themselves, but always have an object which is outside them. This impossibility of reflection by an organic power can be inferred likewise from the aspect under which we know ourselves. By consciousness we attain, though indistinctly, our own nature and substance as the source and subject of our acts. So far the senses cannot reach, they can neither know the substance of things nor distinguish the properties from their substratum, nor penetrate from the effect to the cause, nor, dividing united elements from one another, perceive their mutual relations; for all that is far above the material qualities, which are the proper object of sensuous cognition. Since, then, our mind perfectly returns to itself and is cognizant of its own acts and substance, it cannot be organic; it must needs be a cognitive principle free from all materiality, entirely independent of matter in its operation.²

¹ St. Thom. S. theol., pet. qu. 84, art. 1.

² "The exterior sense," says S. Thomas (S. Theol., p. i., qu. 87, art. 3, ad 3), "is perceptive inasmuch as its organ is altered by a sensible object. But a material being is altered, not by itself, which is impossible, but by some other thing. Therefore, the exterior sense, does not perceive itself, but is perceived by the interior sense, which, on its part, it alters and determines. Of course the same reason holds true also of the brain, the interior sense, which consequently cannot turn back upon itself either. Indeed, in other places S. Thomas maintains the impossibility of any

To sum up what we have said of the intellect and the organic faculty, it is evident they are in every regard opposed to one another. The one perceives of its object but material qualities, the other essence and being; the one remains at the surface, the other penetrates to the nature of things; the one is confined to the cognition of the material world, the other is unrestricted in its knowledge and comprehends all without exception; the one is cognizant of the bodies as existent, concrete and individual, the other gathers from them the abstract, the possible, the necessary, and the universal; the one is unfit to reflect upon itself, the other is self-conscious. If we further examine why the organic cognitive principle is so limited in cognition and bound down to the material, we find as the last reason that matter enters into its composition; wherefore, it can produce and support only material forms. If this be so, must not the intellect, so contrary to the sense, be independent of matter? Must it not be immaterial, and must not this immateriality be the cause of its wonderful knowledge, broad conceptions, judgments, and reasonings? Must it not be a spiritual power, in which spiritual forms are received and all things are represented by spiritual likenesses, and, for this very reason, more universally, more comprehensively, more thoroughly?

It is, however, not from the intellect alone that we infer the spirituality of the soul; we arrive at the same conclusion when we reason from the attributes of the will. What is, first, the will's formal object? The good in general, all good, not a certain kind or degree alone of good. For the will is a tendency to happiness, and this consists in the embracing of good without restriction. In this boundless extension of all good also the merely spiritual

kind of sensitive reflection taken in its proper sense. In his commentary on the Third Book of the Sentences (Dist. 23, qu. 1, art. 2, ad 3), he says that no organic faculty can know its own acts, because for this it would be necessary that the material organ, by the concurrence of which reflection is exercised, should intercede between the cognitive faculty and the material organ by which the direct act was elicited; which is undoubtedly the case, inasmuch as the organ and through it the faculty of reflection should be acted on and determined by the organ of the direct perception as by its object. But this is evidently impossible, because the material organ of both acts is the same. In the Theological Summa (p. i., qu. 14, art. 2, ad 1), he asserts that the cognitive powers which are not subsistent in themselves, cannot reflect or be self-conscious, which he says to be evident from the senses. As a reason of his assertion he assigns that non-subsistent forms are not concentrated, but poured out on matter, which certainly means that they cannot act without matter, and, consequently, not become cognizant without being determined by an outward object.

If in other places St. Thomas says that the senses know their act, yet not their essence, he asserts, not reflection in its proper sense, which is a cognitive act distinct from the perception of the outward object, but reflection improperly so-called, or as others say, reflection *in actu exercitato*, inasmuch as every cognitive faculty in the object apprehended, perceives its own act as in its effect. For if we see a mountain, a river, a city, these very objects as *seen* by the direct act imply *our seeing*.

is contained, the divinity, the ideals abstracted from all matter, morality, virtue, justice. Nay, according to the nature of the will, we take the infinite, which is supereminently, and above all else, spiritual, as the last end of all our love and desire, because in it alone we find unlimited goodness; to it we direct all our actions, and to it we subordinate all other objects agreeing with our inclinations; and from it as from the supreme standard we judge what is morally lawful or forbidden. To the attainment of the infinite good we make subservient the use or enjoyment of material things; we even despise sensual gratifications in proportion as we long for full happiness in God, and the more we thus spurn the earthly, the more is the energy of our soul intensified. Our will, therefore, we must conclude, is a power impregnated with the spiritual and perfected by the supersensible.

Of what nature must such a principle of human volition be? The will presupposes a spiritual faculty, because it tends only to the good apprehended by cognition, and no cognitive power but a spiritual can reach the infinite. The will is spiritual itself. For it consists, particularly when put into action, in an inclination or adaptation to a suitable object, which it tends to and finally embraces, in a capacity to be filled out with the things affected. But must there not be proportion between the object and the inclination to it, the capacity and its complement? The one, therefore, being immaterial, the other must of necessity be so too. Besides, appetite tends to such good as conduces to the perfection of the subject in which it is. Yet the spiritual is by no means the perfection of an organic being, as it cannot be received in that being, just as little as the sound enters the eye, or the color the ear. No organic faculty, then, can tend to the spiritual, and much less can it renounce for the same the sensual, being made for the sensual and impelled to it by an inborn tendency.

A still more striking proof of the immateriality of the will is taken from its freedom. That our will is free is a fact testified by our own consciousness and by the consent of all nations and all ages; of it neither the demonstrations of the learned can give us more certainty, nor the objections of the skeptics raise a serious doubt. True, the materialists deny it, saying that it is unaccountable to science and entangled in inextricable difficulties. But, if not materialistic, at least sound philosophy explains it sufficiently, deriving it from the nature of the will and the intellect. And even were it not so, what then? Would, therefore, freedom not be real? If we were to disown the existence of all that we cannot fully account for, how many things as evident as the sunlight should vanish away? Can we unfold the mystery of the growth of plants and animals, the process of cognition in all its details, the

nature of bodies and their forces? Who will answer in the affirmative? Shall we, therefore, say that all those things do not exist? The reality of freedom being set beyond all doubt, we must solve the question, whether it be compatible with materiality or not. Is the free will an organic faculty? By no means. Matter is implied as a necessary element in every organic power, and is in it, neither deprived of a share in operation, nor put into action by the form by which it is quickened, since both these constituents are so dependent on each other as to make up one complete active principle. But matter is inert and follows necessary laws. Hence the organic faculty, in accordance with the nature of such a component, cannot act, unless determined from without, and when acted upon, cannot but react, vitally indeed, but in proportion to the impression received. Just the reverse takes place in the rational will. We can react or not react, when acted upon by an outward agent; we can act in contravention to the impression or can follow the weaker of two and resist the stronger; we can reject what is agreeable to the senses and choose what is repugnant to them. So broad is our freedom of choice. Carefully examined into, it is found to arise from the unlimited expansion of the will. This latter is so constituted that nothing is adequate to it but the infinite, for the reason that it is a tendency to all good without restriction. Being of such a nature, the will is moved or attracted of necessity by the infinite alone, for only the adequate object necessarily sways a power; and is, on the contrary, allured, but not necessitated, by finite things. Allured by them it is, because, being good, they contribute in some way to our happiness; but it is not necessitated, because they are deficient and not necessary to our felicity. Wherefore, that the will is an immaterial faculty, follows quite evidently from its freedom.

Thus both intellect and will, in all their operations, are proved to be spiritual. As such, they manifest themselves by the manner in which they act, and by the object which they regard or pursue. The one, viewing the things under the aspect of being, and hence having the fitness to know all truth; the other, tending to the good in general, to the enjoyment of unlimited goodness, they both bear in their very nature a relation to the infinite, a capacity to embrace God, the boundless ocean of all that is true and good. A tendency of this kind is, undeniably, above and independent of matter; for, whatever implies matter as its constituent is weighed down to the material, and cannot rise above it, neither by cognition nor by appetition. The soul, thus enabled to lift itself up to the Divinity, not only bears no resemblance to earthly things, but is a likeness of the Divine Spirit. For a likeness, as St. Thomas remarks, is that which is formed to the imitation of another being, so as to ex-

press the specific nature of that being, though in an imperfect manner. To God the highest kind of life, the intellectual, is peculiar, and this He has communicated to the soul in its creation, implanting in its nature the fitness and the irresistible tendency to know Him as the Infinite Truth, and to love him as the Infinite Good.¹

What beauty of the human mind is thus disclosed to us, and in what exalted dignity does it appear? Yet, what contrast also between man, as revealed to us by the reasoning of Christian philosophy, and again as shown in the light of materialistic tenets? Here he is lowered to the brute or to matter, endowed with but material forces, and with cognition that is rather fiction than representation of truth; there, he is the likeness of the Deity, his mind being raised above all that is visible, impelled to the infinite and made akin to the increate spirit. Whence is this difference of views and conclusions arrived at? Sound metaphysics and materialism do not take their departure from different points; no, they both start from the human activity, as known by experience. But the Christian philosopher endeavors without prejudice to analyze the facts given to him, and, having obtained a sufficient knowledge of their nature, to trace them back to their true source, and from this to ascend to the first cause and supreme principiant. In this way he not only finds the soul as a substance independent of matter, but also God as its Creator, as its highest object and centre, as its archetype, as the pure and infinite ocean of being, from which life has been poured out on it. But the materialist enters upon the question with the preconceived notion that there cannot be anything but matter, which he can reach with his instruments of observation and measure according to mathematical formulas. The non-existence of the soul is for him a foregone conclusion, and the method adopted by him beforehand involves the impossibility of arriving at the spiritual. Accordingly, he will never meet the soul, any more than the miner will ever reach the heavenly stars; he will look on psychological phenomena as on insolvable riddles, and the highest intellectual endowments of human nature he will either flatly deny, or with hypocritical language and ambiguous terms apparently acknowledge, but in reality bring down to the level of organical forces. A sad degradation of man, indeed, treacherously attempted under the guise of profound learning, and perfidiously covered with false, yet much vaunted, freedom and enlightenment! But, let us turn away from the results of godless science, and return to our spirit as manifested in a brighter and more gladdening light.

¹ Sum. theol. p. I, qu. 92, art., 1, 2, 4, 6, 8.

IV. THE UNION OF THE HUMAN SOUL WITH THE BODY.

We have thus far considered the human soul in itself. We proved it to be a substance not composite, but essentially simple, united with the body, but not dependent on the body in its being; incomplete, because a partial constituent of our nature, but still subsistent in itself, because fit for separate existence. And this simple immaterial substance is the source of wonderful activity; for, able as it is to express in itself all being, it penetrates by intellection all things, yet reposes in nothing but the infinite, and, being qualified to aspire to all good, it can love and desire whatever has any degree of perfection, but rests only in the embracing of the unlimited and essential goodness. The human soul thus essentially differs from any other. Plants and brutes have no vital action that does not flow from an organic faculty, and, therefore, their vital principle is, though distinct from matter, still dependent on it or material. Substantial simplicity, then, immateriality and aptitude for intellection and free volition, unbounded in their sphere, are peculiar to man's principle of life. But, these conclusions being reached, it is now time to consider our soul in its relation to the body. Without having treated of it also in this regard, we would not yet have distinguished it from all other entities, as is required for the scientific explanation of its nature. It is its union with the body that gives it distinction from the substances above us, from the pure spirits, as immateriality and simplicity make it distinct from natures below us.

Here, however, the doctrine expounded seems to entangle us in great difficulties. From the tenets set forth in the beginning of this essay, it follows that the human soul must be regarded as the substantial form of our body. Yet can it be such, if once conceived as spiritual, subsistent, and independent of matter? Many philosophers have answered in the negative. Plato and his school have denied the rational soul to be the essential form of the human composite; in their opinion, it is, after a long pre-existence, thrown into the body as in a prison, in which it dwells as its motor. Some philosophical systems of our times know of no other connection between soul and body than that of mutual influence or mutual presence. Leibnitz construed their union into a harmony, established by Divine intervention between their actions. Others granted the information of the body, but, to account for it, postulated two or even three souls,—a rational, an animal, and a vegetable one.

This opinion has been revised in our days by Günther, who supposes in man two vital principles, the spirit (*πνεῦμα*) as the source of the intellectual, and the soul (*ψυχή*) as that of sensitive life.

To elucidate the scholastic system with regard to this point, we shall first show the oneness of the human soul. Above we have proved from the oneness of the living being the oneness of the vital principle, and we have for this purpose also appealed to the contradiction which is involved in the admission of several substantial forms in the same thing. This, undoubtedly, holds good also of man. Hence, indeed, St. Thomas infers the oneness of the human soul.¹ In following this course, however, do we not rely on an opinion rejected by good authorities, as, for instance, the Scotistic school? And do we not, moreover, beg the question? We are to demonstrate the information of the body by the soul, and now do we not deduce the oneness of the soul from the Scholastic tenet that in the same being only one substantial form is possible? A few remarks will suffice to answer these objections. The several souls admitted in man by the modern systems mentioned above, are as to their nature either complete or incomplete; if complete, they must be considered as pure forms; if incomplete, they belong to an entire essence, not as material, but as formal constituents. So, in fact, Plato, Günther, and others have viewed this point under discussion; they termed the sensitive soul the form of the body; the rational they thought to have the nature of a pure spirit. But, if this be so, the several souls admitted in man are substantial forms. Whether they are considered as informing the body or not, does not matter at all; nay, if information is denied, it is much easier for us to argue. For, in this supposition, what shall unite the several vital principles to one living being? No doubt, the body, their common dwelling-place. But, who will say that several living substances are reduced to oneness by existing in the same house? Yet, the body, it is answered, is more than the simple abode of the soul. Well, suppose it to be whatever you like, it can never produce vital union. For it has of itself no unity, as may be understood from the dissolution to which it falls a prey as soon as the vital principle has departed from it. No, it is not the body that gives unity to the soul; on the contrary, the soul gives unity to the body by quickening it and shaping it into a perfect organism fitted for immanent activity. So, if we admit several souls in man, we have several substantial forms constitutive of several natures, without any union at all. From this it may also be understood that the opinion of the Scotists is not opposed to us in this question. They gainsay the Thomistic proposition in its generality concerning the impossibility of many substantial forms co-existing in the same subject, but they never asserted the possibility of many souls existing in the same living body, being full well aware that, at least in this case, all essential unity would be neces-

¹ S. theol., p. I., qu. 76, art. 3 ab initio; Sum. c. gent., lib. II. c. 58, n. 2.

sarily destroyed, because diverse principles of immanent action cannot but diverge from one another and constitute diverse living and acting beings.

We now proceed to confirm and illustrate the oneness of the human soul, thus far deduced, *à priori*, by two arguments taken from experience and consciousness. If we reflect on ourselves, we do not attribute our vital operations to several subjects, but all to one and the self-same. It is the same *Ego* that we perceive to be intelligent and sentient, to grow and physically develop itself. Now this oneness, forced on our consciousness, cannot be accounted for by saying that several vital principles harmonize in us, or are subordinate to one another, for harmony and insubordination do not make unity in existence, just as little as they effect that the master and the servant, the rider and the horse, are one and the self-same being; they unite actions, but not natures, which stand by themselves, and are intrinsically independent. Nor is any one conscious of such loose union of his constituent parts, or conceives himself to be a spiritual being that keeps a brute subject to itself; everybody rather knows himself to be perfectly and strictly one in life and in existence. Consequently, in one human being there is but one vital principle; for, where life is but one, there the vital source too must needs be one.¹

Another proof is afforded by the dependence which exists between the evolution and the exercise of vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual life in man.² Our cognitive faculties, whether rational or sentient, are not developed and adapted to action before the body is evolved by vegetation, and whenever the bodily organism is hurt or weakened, cognition is impaired or entirely impeded. As far as operation is concerned, vegetation must precede sensation to form its organs, and sensation is prior to intellection, in order to offer the mind its proper object with which to begin thinking. And, conversely, sensation serves vegetation, since the appetite is stirred up and directed by it in the pursuit of the necessities of subsistence, so much so, that with our feeling life itself would soon be extinct. Again, the prevailing operation of the one kind opposes that of the other. If vegetation or sensation are predominant, intellection is lamed; intense mental activity, on the other hand, is detrimental to vegetation and slackens sensation and sensual appetites. Likewise, who does not know that the exertions of the intellect and will modify the body in many respects, and that, *vice versa*, climate, food, health, age, sex have a remarkable influence on the mind? How shall we account for all these phenomena of daily occurrence? By the oneness of the soul. If there

¹ Sum. c. gent., lib. ii., c. 58.

² S. Theol., p. i., qu. 76, art. 3.

were many souls in man, each the principle of a different life, there would be no such mutual dependence among our faculties. The rational soul, being not only independent of the body, but not even really united to it, would be of itself a complete spiritual substance, and, consequently, also an entire principle of spiritual activity. But if such, it cannot be made dependent on a sensitive or vegetative principle in its evolution without a startling contradiction. Neither can that which is material act on the spiritual substance, because no agent can produce an effect above its own sphere; nor can the spirit be prevented from intellection and volition, or be determined to it by the sentient faculties, because as it is raised above them and is complete in itself, so it must act of itself and independently of them. With similar difficulties we meet if we consider the vegetative and sensitive souls. It is an essential property of every principle of immanent action, that, in developing and perfecting itself, it is like a centre from which operations proceed and to which they return. The vegetative soul, therefore, which is only such, evolves but vegetative organs, and cannot at all perform vegetative functions for another body. And the sensitive soul which is only sensitive, cannot terminate in another one's vegetation or feel hunger and thirst for another being. This is an absolute impossibility founded in nature itself. For these reasons the mutual dependence of intellectual, sensitive, and vegetative life peremptorily requires one sole vital principle. From two irrefragable proofs we thus infer the oneness of the soul, from the oneness of our self or substance, and from the mutual dependence of our operations. Our oneness in being could not subsist if there were several souls in us, each one complete in itself; our actions could not be reduced to such unity as is shown by their mutual dependence, if our faculties proceeded from several vital principles, of which each is in its existence independent of the other and by itself a source of action.

After this preliminary statement, it will no more be difficult to prove that in man the rational soul is united to the body as its substantial form. In all living beings of the material universe the body is the material, the soul the formal element; the body is potential, the soul is the act. In man, the highest living substance of this world, there is but a rational soul and none besides; this is, consequently, in him the substantial form of the body. We must, however, demonstrate this important truth not only by inference from general actions, but also by a closer examination of our own being, because, from the latter, as we already suggested, some particular difficulties are raised against the theory of information. To this end, let us first show that soul and body form in man but one complete nature or substance, and one person. One

and the selfsame nature is constituted by soul and body, if from their union results one intrinsic principle of action, for thus we have above defined nature. Now this in reality is the case. There are in man actions which spring only from both of them united. Sensation (and the same is to be said of vegetation and locomotion), is not the action of the soul alone, nor of the body alone, but of the composite of them. In sensuous cognition and apposition the body has its share, for those acts are aroused in us by the determinations which are impressed on it by the outward object; they are strictly commensurate to a bodily organ; they imply in it some physical and chemical changes; they are extended over it, and hence become fit to represent extended things. Still the body alone cannot feel; it is of itself absolutely incapable of vital action; the soul must also concur with it, or rather join it, complete and elevate it to a higher grade of perfection competent with such immanent activity. Sensation in man, therefore, proceeds from the soul as from its main source. Yet from what soul? From the rational, for there is no other one in us. The body, then, and the rational soul make up in us one principle of action, and consequently one nature. As, furthermore, nature is in us identical with substance, it follows that they also constitute one complete substance, but are themselves severally incomplete. For, what is not a full principle of action, what is still in need of another element, is unfinished in itself and but a part of a whole; and what, on the contrary, is an entire nature, having all its powers fully constituted, is a whole of itself and naturally destined to no further union, particularly if a source of immanent activity.

This being proved, it is evident that soul and body form also one person. What do we understand by a person? A rational nature which subsists completely in itself, and is hence incommunicable as a part to a whole. Such is the composite formed of the rational soul and the body. Being singly incomplete in themselves, they constitute one entire rational nature, and consequently one substance completely subsistent in itself and naturally incommunicable to another self. This we perceive also by our consciousness. It is the very same ego, the same subject which we know to be intelligent, sentient, and vegetative, and to which we attribute all our perfections, both of the body and of the soul, however different from one another.

On the ground of these positions, it will be easy directly to show how the rational soul is united to the body as its substantial form. First, by what we said thus far all contrary opinions are already refuted. For they all overturn either the oneness of our vital principle, or the substantial and personal union of soul and body. They all divide man into two subsistent principles, which move or act on

one another, or agree in their actions, but do not unite themselves to one nature and substance, of which, as of the whole or the supposit, all that each of them does or possesses is predicated. Such views are fundamental to Plato's system, that supposes the soul imprisoned in the body as its motor; to Günther's theory, admitting two principles of life, the *πνεῦμα* and the *ψυχή*; and to Leibnitz's pre-established harmony. In a similar dualism any other opinion opposed to information must result. For whenever we suppose two principles, each already determined to a species and qualified for activity, we have two natures and two complete substances. To combine two elements into one nature, it is necessary that the one is yet undetermined, the other determinant; the one passive, that is, in need of its ultimate perfection; the other active, that is, conferring on the former the last complement, by which it becomes a subject fitted for action. This, however, is nothing but the theory of matter and substantial form. In addition to this, all our preceding conclusions are as many positive proofs for substantial information. Man, we said, is one nature, consisting of soul and body. What part has each component in this whole? The body is that component which we have in common with all corporeal beings, and is, as to its elements, even transmitted from them into us. The rational soul is that component which is peculiar to us, distinguishing us from the inanimate, the plant, and the brute, and constituting us in our own species. The body is of itself unfit for any vital actions; the soul is the source of vitality, the principle which by its union shapes the body into the human, the most perfect of all organisms, and endows man with activity proper to him, with vegetation, sensation, and intellection, raising him thus to the highest grade of life. This being so, is not the body the material, the soul the formal element of the human substance? Does not the one coincide with the very definition of matter, and the other with that of form?¹

We reach the same conclusion if we begin with analyzing the notion of form. The substantial form, says St. Thomas,² has two characteristic marks. The first is, that it gives substantial entity to the thing in which it is, not by acting on it, but by communicating itself to it. The second, which follows from the first, is

¹ S. Theol., p. i., qu. 76, Art. 1.

² Sum. c. gent., lib. ii., c. 68, n. 2: "Ad hoc, quod aliquid sit forma substantialis alterius, duo requiruntur. Quorum unum est, ut forma sit principium essendi substantialiter ei, cujus est forma, principium autem dico non effectivum, sed formale quo aliquid est et denominatur ens. Unde sequitur aliud, scilicet quod forma et materia convenient in uno esse, quod non contingit principio effectivo cum eo, cui dat esse; et hoc esse est in quo subsistit substantia composita, quæ est una secundum esse ex materia et forma constans."

that, together with the material element to which it is united, it partakes of the same being, inasmuch as it constitutes with matter one entire nature and complete substance, which is identical with and predicable of both combined, but of neither of them separately. The form, inasmuch as it thus concurs to the production of things,

- is a cause, but one quite different from the efficient. The efficient cause is always extrinsic, the formal cause always intrinsic to the thing constituted; the former is completely distinct from the effect it produces, and outside the same; the latter is within the thing it makes up, as part of it, and partakes of its being. So the architect is distinct from the house which he builds, but the materials and their arrangement are intrinsic to it, nay, both taken together are identical with the building that is made of them. Now the rational soul gives to the body substantial entity, since it determines the same to a specific substance. For the body is, as such, indeterminate and common to all material beings, the soul ranges it in a certain species and makes it human; the body is, of itself, devoid of life, the soul completes it to one living whole, that stands completely by itself, and is an entire principle of intellectual as well as sensitive and vegetative activity. And so the soul does, not in that it acts or imprints new modifications on the body, but in that it joins its own entity to it and enters into composition with it, so as to constitute together with it, as a component part, a new being of superior perfection. Such being the union between soul and body, it is likewise evident that they have the same being in common, for they are constituent parts of the one complete substance or nature of man, who is neither the body alone, nor the soul, but both together united, and is the subject of both bodily and spiritual operation. In every regard, then, does the rational soul possess all the essential attributes of the substantial form, and in all respects does it show itself, not as an agent that moves, modifies, or governs the body, but as a principle which as a formal element concurs to the constitution of the human whole.

Philosophically speaking, therefore, we must maintain information as the only means to explain the composition of our being, the union of soul and body. It stands on a firm ground, and is supported by convincing reasons, taken from experience as well as metaphysical speculation; it excludes the dualism upheld by all other systems, and defends man's essential unity. Nor is it a philosophical tenet alone; it is also a theological doctrine, and an article of our holy faith. The union of the body with the soul, as its substantial form, is implied in several mysteries and dogmas of revealed religion, and has, therefore, repeatedly been taught and defined by the authority of the Church: by Clement V., in the

Council of Vienne, in 1311, against certain Averroists;¹ by Leo X., in the fifth Lateran Council, in 1513, against Pomponatius; by Pius IX., in his condemnation of Günther's and Balzer's systems, in 1857 and 1860. In these ecclesiastical acts it is defined to be of Christian faith that the rational soul is the form of the body, of itself, truly, immediately, and essentially. The soul is the form of the body, truly, if not in a metaphorical or improper sense, that is, not only acting on it; of itself and immediately, if by communicating its own entity, and not by the interposition of some reality, whether substantial or accidental; essentially, if by the exigence and in consequence of its own essence, and hence, for the perfection of this, and for the end of forming a new and complete nature. Moreover, according to the definition quoted, the soul gives to the human body life, which, as all agree, belongs to our being quite essentially and substantially. Is, then, the union between soul and body not substantial, and is, in that union, the soul not the formal constituent of the substance newly composed, and, consequently, the substantial form? Though, therefore, in the documents cited, the term *substantial* does not occur, still, all that is peculiar and essential to a substantial form is predicated of the rational soul.

Although the theory of information is thus philosophically and theologically demonstrated, several explanations may still be desired for a fuller understanding. It might still seem to be hardly conceivable how the rational soul is the ultimate source not only of intellectual but also of sensitive and vegetative activity, and how, from a spiritual substance, another than a spiritual operation can proceed. The difficulty has been foreseen by St. Thomas, and solved in more than one place.² The several substantial forms, he says, differ from one another by their greater or lesser perfection, as there is also a gradation in the things made up of them in nature; for the animate bodies are more perfect than the inanimate, and the animals are above the plants. Wherefore, he continues, Aristotle likens the several species of natural beings to numbers, which differ from one another by the subtraction or addition of the unit, and compares the souls to the several species of geometrical figures. But the superior degree of perfection includes the inferior, the greater the smaller number, the pentagon the tetragon, and so we must conclude that also the higher substantial form implies the virtue and the excellence of the lower. For this reason the ra-

¹ The definition of the Council of Vienne is couched in the following terms: "Quisquis deinceps asserere, defendere, seu tenere pertinaciter præsumperit, quod anima rationalis seu intellectiva non sit forma corporis humani per se et essentialiter, tanquam hæreticus sit censendus." Clement. De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica. Tit. 4, cap. unico.

² S. Theol., p. i., qu. 76, art. 3; Quæst. Disp. De Anima, Art. 9.

tional soul, which is among all the substantial forms of this universe the most perfect, virtually contains the perfection of the sensitive and vegetative principle of the brutes and plants, and, consequently, united to matter, it imparts to the bodily composite all powers that are found in any grade of life. Thus it is by the rational soul that man is intelligent, sensitive, and vegetative. From the axiom appealed to St. Thomas draws a further conclusion.¹ The rational soul being supreme, it virtually also contains the body-form, and hence completes in us primordial matter to a body endowed with physical and chemical forces, with quantity and qualities. To one and the selfsame soul, therefore, man owes it that he is an actual, a bodily, a living, a sentient, and a human being. By the rational soul man is an actual being, because he is constituted by it in a complete essence; a bodily being, because he is endued by it with all the properties and powers of a perfect body; a living being, because he is quickened by it and enabled to vegetate; a sentient being, because he is furnished by it with sensitiveness; a human being, because he is gifted by it with reason, his characteristic. This view of the Angelic Doctor's is in full accordance with the above-mentioned tenet of his, that in the same being there can be only one substantial form.

From this it may be understood to what extent the soul informs matter in us. The body owes to the soul, besides the physical forces, its vegetative and sensitive faculties. So far there is between them a natural union, a mutual completion to one active principle. But the rational faculties are not and cannot be communicated to the body; these, with their corresponding acts, the soul reserves for itself. The body, therefore, does not, as it were, imbibe the entire virtue and excellence of the soul, and, conversely, the latter, though it communicates to the body its undivided simple substance, is not in the body completely and in every regard, but rather remains elevated above it, exercising its supreme activity without it by its own power.² And so, it stands to reason; for the soul is of a superior degree of perfection, and the higher cannot be entirely absorbed by the lower.³

Yet, if that be so, another serious difficulty seems to arise. In every substantial union, according to Scholastic principles, each component is of itself incomplete—the one in need of further determination, the other in need of a subject in which it is to be received. Whenever elements, not being of that description, are con-

¹ S. Theol., p. i., qu. 76, art. 4; art. 6, ad. 1.

² Quæst. Disp., De Anima, Art. 1, ad. 18: "Quamvis esse animæ sit quod ammodo corporis, non tamen corpus attingit ad esse animæ participandum secundum totam suam nobilitatem et virtutem, et ideo est aliqua operatio animæ, in qua non communicat corpus."

³ Sum. c. gent., lib. ii., c. 68, sub finem.

sidered as complete in themselves, they enter, not into an essential, but into an accidental composition. So we ourselves have reasoned above, in order to prove information. How, then, is it that the soul, which is a subsistent or spiritual substance, having operations of its own, requires a body? How is it perfected and completed by a material element, and not rather impeded in its spiritual activity, as Plato thought? Again, how is the unity of human operation better accounted for in our theory than in the systems of mutual influence or pre-established harmony? St. Thomas has not failed to answer these objections. In his opinion, the human soul, though spiritual, is of itself, without the senses, no perfect principle of intellection, and has, on this account, a natural aptness to a substantial union with the body. Having, in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, evinced its preëminence over the body, he proceeds to say: "Yet, since our intellection itself requires faculties which operate through certain bodily organs, to wit, the fancy and the senses, the human soul is understood to be naturally united to the body; in order to complete the human species." In like manner he says, in the *Summa Theologica*,² that the soul is adapted to the union with the body on account of its imperfection and potentiality in the intellectual order itself. This might seem to be in contradiction with its spirituality, and with the nature of intellection, which was proved to be an inorganic operation. Yet that this is so, we learn from what he says of the degree of human intelligence.³

The intelligent creatures, as he says, are partakers of God's intellectual nature, the more so the nearer they approach Him on their grade of perfection. Now God, being infinitely perfect, clearly and distinctly knows all truth by His own essence as by one single idea, which, as it comprises all things, may justly be termed most universal. Intellectual natures must, consequently, be capable of universal ideas; yet, as their cognitive power or light diminishes, the more they recede from God, their ideas must, in proportion to the lower degree of their intellect, be less universal or comprehensive; not because they cannot represent many or even all things at once, for this is essential to the intellect, but because they exhibit the particular and individual ever more faintly and indistinctly.⁴ Hence every created intelligence attains a clear and distinct knowledge of particular objects by several

¹ Sum. c. gent., lib. 2, c. 68: "Quia tamen ipsum intelligere animæ humanæ indiget potentiis, quæ per quædam organa corporalia operantur, scilicet imaginatione et sensu, ex hoc ipso declaratur, quod naturaliter unitur corpori ad complendam speciem humanam."

² Sum. Theol., p. i., q. 51, art. 1.

³ Sum. Theol., p. i., qu. 89, art. 1; Quæst. Disp. De Anima, art. 15.

⁴ Sum. Theol., p. i., qu. 55, art. 3.

ideas, by few or many according as its nature is more or less perfect. The human soul is the lowest among all intellectual principles, and hence, in behalf of the clearness of its cognition, its ideas are most multiplied; nay, it is no more fitted to know things in their individuality by universal species, there remaining in it only that universality which comprises many things indistinctly; a deficiency which is, indeed, patent to experience and most striking in those of inferior mental endowments. If, therefore, only universal species were communicated to us, our cognition would be very imperfect, for it would be extremely confused and indistinct. To render it clear and perfect, it is necessary that we have as many ideas as there are knowable objects, or for each particular thing a particular idea. But whence should the soul gather particular species? Of course, not from the spiritual substances; for these are universal, inasmuch as the spiritual, though individual in its existence, includes many perfections on account of its pre-eminent nature. The human intellect must, therefore, get its species from the material world below the spiritual. From there not only the higher grades of being are excluded, but, in consequence of their imperfection and impenetrability, one bodily substance excludes and repels also the other; yet the bodily agents cannot act on the spiritual. Therefore the soul, that it may enter into communication with them, must be united with a body furnished with senses, which, on the one hand, partly inhering in the rational vital principle, and, on the other hand, determined and acted upon by the exterior world, hold up to the mind by their cognition the material objects and bring them near to it. From the sensuous perception, then, the intellect abstracts species after a spiritual manner, which are universal, inasmuch as they represent things from a general point of view, and particular, inasmuch as they afford us knowledge of the bodies in their individual and particular nature. Hence we understand the senses to be necessary to the soul, not as a part of its intellectual faculty, but as a means by which the proportioned object is presented to the mind; and thus it is plain how the soul is of itself an incomplete principle even of intellectual activity and is made an entire and perfect nature by its union with the body.

This solution of the difficulty spoken of throws light on several other important points. Now we see why the intellect, though inorganic, depends nevertheless on the evolution and the regular activity of the organic faculties, extrinsically, however, and not intrinsically. Now the objections of the materialists, taken from the physical and chemical processes that take place in our brain during mental operations, may easily be refuted. Now the influence which the senses, and through them the material things, exercise

on the soul, and which conversely the soul has on the body, is no longer a riddle. If the intellect must receive its proper object from the senses, proximately from those which have their seat in the brain, it is evident that the soul cannot act if the body is not properly disposed, and that, notwithstanding their diversity in nature, there is a proportion between sensuous and mental operations. Again, as the organic and inorganic faculties, the intellect and the senses, the rational and lower appetite all spring ultimately from the same simple substance of the soul, the intense operation of the one necessarily mars that of the other, since it exhausts the strength of the common source, which is but too finite and imperfect; and the energetic tendency of the one carries away the others, since they are intimately connected in the same root. We may also explain how it comes that the intellect, as we daily experience, cannot at all think, during this life, without being assisted by the fancy, however great an abundance of intelligible species be stored up in the memory by former operations. It is the substantial union of the soul with the body that effects such complete harmony between our lower and higher faculties. Every being acts as it is. The soul, and with it the intellect, is linked to the body so as jointly to form one essence; hence it does not act at all but together with the bodily senses.¹ Though elevated above the body, the soul is nevertheless weighed down and closely attached to it by oneness in nature; therefore, it cannot take its flight alone even with its rational faculties, but rises only together with its partner in the same human essence, having become like a bird destined to soar in the air, but which, when fastened to the earth, is able but to walk on the ground. So far it is true that the body fetters and confines the mind; but this loss is amply compensated by other advantages. However, though the soul cannot during this earthly life exercise its activity independently of the body, it does not follow from this that disembodied it becomes unfit to act. For, being on the lowest grade of intelligent substances, it is of itself not incapable of cognition, but only of clear and distinct intellection by universal ideas. Separated from matter, it regains its power of merely spiritual operation, not imperfect as it was at the moment of creation, but enriched with species, which it acquired dependently on the senses, and prepared to receive a higher intellectual light, which it deserved by virtuous actions. Not improperly it is said that the soul is united to the body for the sake of the first evolution, but is disunited from it again, when once developed, in order to exist and act more perfectly, as a tender plant is first brought up in a hot-house, but, when grown up, is placed in the earth.

¹ Sum. Theol., p. i., qu. 84, art. 7.

To recapitulate our prolonged discussion, how has the human soul been presented to our view by all our proofs and positions? With what attributes have we seen it endowed? What nature did we discover in its depth? We may in accordance with our conclusions define it an intellective principiant which is the substantial form of the body. The soul is the principle of life, a substance free from all composition of both integral and essential parts, independent of matter in its existence, and consequently subsistent in itself, a source of the broadest activity, a subject endowed with an intellect capable of knowing all truth, and a will tending to all goodness, the one satisfied only with the knowledge, and the other with the perfect love, of the infinite. To the human soul, therefore, a wonderful excellence is imparted, which raises it not only immensely above the inanimate, but also above all the principles of animal life. For the bodies as such are inert, restricted in their being, and repellant; but man's soul is self-moving, comprehensive, expansive, fit to receive all forms and inclined to all perfection. The bodily world is ever changing even as to its substantial composition, and hence exists limited in time and space; yet our soul, simple in its substance, is absolutely incapable of any essential change, adapted to endless existence, and comprising with its thoughts eternity. All other vital principles of this universe are united to bodies, on which they are essentially dependent, wherefore they cannot exist by themselves, but become extinct together with the destruction of their material substratum; the human soul, on the contrary, is independent of matter and able to exist apart from the body by itself. Again, all cognition and appetition of the sensitive life is restricted to the material, but our vital power lifts itself up by the intellect and will to the objects most pure and spiritual, nay, to the Divinity itself, of which it is a likeness.

But though the human soul is of so noble an origin and nature, it is in its order on the lowest degree of essential perfection, the most imperfect intelligence; on this account it is as a substantial form planted in the body and is made with it one complete substance; to gather by means of the senses less universal, yet clearer, cognition from the world beneath. United to matter, it gives the same completeness in every regard, making it an actual, a living, a sentient being; and, not yet exhausted, it keeps man's characteristic gift, reason and free will, for itself, thus rising above the body, but acting always conjointly with it in consequence of substantial conjunction. This relation to the body distinguishes our soul from the pure spirits, and shows it, particularly during this life, much inferior to them, since they have a direct insight into the immaterial by few, but most comprehensive, ideas, without any

change or interruption. But by this imperfection and destination to union with the body, the soul realizes a grand plan of Divine Providence and plays a wonderful part in the universe. The immense gap between the material and the spiritual is thus shut; two worlds so different, the one so high, the other so low, are amicably joined in one essence, and all creation is harmoniously united. Man himself, in whom this union is effected, becomes a microcosm, a little world resembling the great in all its parts, an epitome, as it were, of all finite being. In him is the material and the immaterial, the latter imperfectly, but the former in its highest perfection, since the bodily forces, vegetation and sensation, are in him more perfect than in anything else.¹

Much and valuable knowledge have we thus gained by the inquiry into the nature of the human soul. We have seen a substance which is a mirror of the whole universe, the summary of all its excellence, the medium of the most astonishing harmony and unity, the source of action more wondrous than all the beauty and the energy of visible nature. We have beheld in it the sublimest kind of cognition, a spark of divine life, a reflection of God's simplicity and infinity, a likeness of the Deity itself. Nowhere are the highest truths, the greatness of God, His wisdom and bounty, revealed to us so clearly as in our own soul.

Into our own selves we have acquired a deeper insight. We have become acquainted with our own weakness and imperfection, but we have also been taught our preëminence over the material, and our exalted dignity; and from thence we may conclude further excellences of the rational part of our being, its incorruptibility and immortality, its destination to contemplate in eternal bliss the beauty, and to embrace with everlasting love the goodness, of the Infinite Being. Our desires, too, are directed to a sublime goal; we feel ourselves carried above these earthly things, low and perishable, to the eternal. Our esteem and love of the moral order is heightened, for the latter now begins to attract us with unwonted power, since it appears to be a light from a superior world, a way to true and everlasting happiness, a harmony between our elevated rank and our conduct, between our actions and our last end in eternity.

Lastly, our courage and confidence is strengthened and mightily supported, because we know ourselves to be the object of God's tenderest affection, since we are His likeness, and rulers of this world set up by Him to dispose of it for His glory. We are assured that, notwithstanding our febleness, He will not despise us, but with careful providence lead us back to Himself, whence we proceeded. Nor shall we find it inconsistent, but rather highly

¹ Sum. Theol., p. i., qu. 91, art. 1.

credible, that out of His supereminent bounty He has gratuitously lifted us up to the supernatural order revealed in Christian religion. By this new creation He has but extended the profusion of the goodness which He manifested in our first making, and accomplished that conformity and that tendency to Him which He implanted in the nature of our soul.

THE DUTY OF CATHOLICS IN THE FACE OF MODERN UNBELIEF.

IT has been remarked by ecclesiastical historians, that no heresy has ever flourished for more than three hundred years. If one and another among the various forms of error has continued to exist beyond this period, its life has been but a living death. The principle of corruption inherent in it from the first became so manifest to all except those whose eyes were blinded by their personal interest in it, that men passed it by as having outlived its time. It was out of harmony with the spirit of its age. It was not only certainly doomed to die, but the process of decay was visibly proceeding. It was like the man who still lingers on, although mortification has long ago eaten away the diseased limb, and is advancing surely and slowly towards some vital part. After its tercentenary of vigor (if falsehood can ever deserve the name of vigorous), every heresy is doomed to linger on rather than to live, to drag on an inglorious existence without influence, without strength, without any hold on men of cultivated intelligence and ability, save in so far as it panders to pride and passion, and affords a convenient excuse for a life of self-indulgent pleasure-seeking, or sordid money-getting, or selfish ambition. If its term of life has been extended, it is because of the respectable shelter it affords to those who shrink from obedience to a church which enforces upon her children, in practice as well as in theory, the necessity of self-denial and submission to authority. If it still numbers among its members some pious souls, who, in all good faith, accept its teaching, it is because prejudice and education have blinded their eyes, or because they have no opportunity of knowing a better creed. But they are a class existing rather in the past than in the present, or at least they are to be found only in dark nooks and crannies, where the light of God's truth shines but dimly.