

Arethusio epô græce conscripta, a Liberio subscripta hæc est. Credimus in unum Deum patrem omnipotentem creatorem et factorem omnium, in quo omnis paternitas in cælo est, et in terra nominatur. Et in unigenitum ejus filium Dm. Nm. Jm. Xm. ante omnia sæcula ex patre genitum ex Deo, lumen de lumine per quem omnia in cælis et in terra facta sunt, tam invisibilia quam visibilia; eundemque verbum esse et sapientiam, lucem veram et vitam, et ultimis diebus hominem factum, natumque ex Sancta Virgine, crucifixum, et mortuum et sepultum esse, sedereque ad dexteram patris, venturumque in consummationem sæculi ut judicet vivos et mortuos, reddatque unicuique secundum opera sua. Cujus regnum indesinens permanebit in infinitas ætates. Sedet enim ad dextram patris non solum in hoc sæculo sed et in futuro. Et in spiritum sanctum hoc est paracletum quem promissum Apostolis post ascensum in coelos, misit ut doceret eos et commonefaceret omnium. Per quem omnes animæ quæ in eum sinceriter credunt sanctificantur." (Here follow twenty-six explicative paragraphs or articles.)

THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY.

IN what sense is the new sovereignty a departure from the old sovereignty; or can it be said that there is any new sovereignty at all? The old sovereignty made authority to be the sure guide of duty; it did this because authority was divine in its origin, and divine within the compass of its control. In the old Christian idea,—in the Catholic apprehension,—there was the authority which was known as the supernatural, and the authority which was known as the natural. The supernatural authority was the authority of the Church; that is, the authority of the teaching Church to teach truth, and the authority of the Christian ministry to perform functions. From this major authority, best known as the spiritual, the minor authority, say the social and domestic, derived a character which was something more than merely natural. If the Church could teach truths in the divine sense of truths, and was also mistress of the whole compass of moral theology, she could obviously define the limits as well as generally prescribe the character of her own relations to both the State and the family. But the new sovereignty—which was first begotten of the Reformation, then travestied or developed by the Revolution, then worked out into a speculative system by modern

thought—has done away with the religious character of natural duties by doing away with the divine character of church authority. Thus the old sovereignty is *not* the sovereignty which governs Christendom, but only a sovereignty which governs members of the Catholic Church. And even in this measure—in the relation of practice to theory—the new sovereignty has robbed the old sovereignty of its harmony.

Shall we say, then, that the new sovereignty is a departure from the old sovereignty, in the sense that it makes authority to be an accident of convenience, instead of being God's rule *through* the Church? Obviously there are two schools which approve the new sovereignty; the school which still believes in Revelation, and the school which either rejects it or doubts it. The first school would be shocked if it were told that it repudiated the supernatural element in authority; and would reply that it accepted the Bible, and believed in the religious character of social duties. Of the second school, it suffices to say simply that it repudiates the supernatural element; and that neither an atheist nor a freethinker believes in any authority beyond such as the order of nature makes convenient. Yet, since the atheist and the freethinker, the cold skeptic and the modern thoughtist, are, to a certain extent, the offspring of Heresy, it may be desirable to trace first the deadly germs of the new sovereignty in a sectarianism which at least affected to be religious.

It has been said that "no man believes by logic," but it is certain that no man *thinks* he believes without it. Or, that a man should reject logic as being irrelevant to Christian faith, or as not auxiliary to the reasonableness of that faith, would be a symptom of an uneducated mind. Every Christian at least imagines that he reasons logically, whether he accept a part or accept the whole of the Christian faith. If, then, there be a syllogistic character about the reasonings of professing Christians,—that is, of course, of educated Christians,—how comes it that even their premises are at war like bitter enemies, and that a Q. E. D. means "my inference, not yours." The answer is, that Bible Christians create one strange premiss for themselves, and that premiss is, "I am my own judge of Revelation." They are right in their first premiss, that "Revelation is divine," but their next premiss is the negative of the first. And not only Bible Christians, but all schools of non-Catholics,—the most transcendental of the ritualists, like the loosest of broad churchmen, or the most scholarly of rationalistic latitudinarians, adopt for their second postulate the most irrational of assumptions, that "the human can interpret the divine." It matters not one straw whether a man chooses his fathers, or his councils, or his saints, or his doctors as his auxiliaries in interpreting divine doctrines; every man who makes "ego" his ultimate arbiter in selection,—in the selection of his own inter-

preters of Revelation,—is as essentially Protestant in his attitude towards authority as a preacher in the humblest conventicle.

You cannot make a syllogism unless you have two postulates, and those two postulates must be patent as the noonday sun. You may make sport of a postulate, for the mere enjoyment of mental play, but we all know what is meant by a postulate. Thus: "Every man thinks; John is a man; therefore John thinks," may be made sport of on the ground that really but few men can be said to think; and that as to John, he is the most thoughtless of persons. Yet even in this case all the world knows our meaning, and all the world attributes the faculty which we postulate. But in the grand syllogism which may be built up for the Catholic faith, there is no room for any possible play, for any escape from a sufficient Q. E. D. That "Revelation is divine" is that one common belief which all Christians accept for their first postulate; and this, not only as regards its divine Author, but equally as regards all its doctrine. Yet when we come to the human intelligence of what we have admitted to be divine, Catholics alone can affirm (and they can logically demonstrate) that "Divine doctrines require an infallible interpreter."

The old sovereignty was grounded on this last principle. The new sovereignty is grounded on its rejection. Herein lies the divorce which modern thought has created, not only between dogma and sentiment, between authority and popularly accepted creeds, but also between *duties* and *conveniences* in the whole range both of politics and of social ethics. The old sovereignty so impregnated every department of life, that from the emperor to the peasant, from the judge to the attorney's clerk, from the father to the son, from the parish priest to the sexton, one and the same authority made one and the same spirit of duty to possess the intellects and the consciences of all Christians. The new sovereignty has allowed the religious sentiment to survive—that is, in the case of professing Christians—but it has taken out the backbone of almost all Christian duty, by making every man his own interpreter of the idea, duty.

It would be too large a field over which to travel leisurely, if we were to write down all the social and the political changes which have come about from the acceptance of the new sovereignty. It may be said, perhaps, that a free press has both embodied and established the reign of changeful convenience over duty. A free press means the advocacy of private judgment, in regard to all points of religious faith, as well as all points of social ethics, irrespective of any authority beyond such as the civil power and the adopted canons of society may approve. A free press ignores God, save only in such sense as private judg-

ment may apprehend His existence. It may graciously lay down the postulate, "God is;" but it claims the right to apprehend both His being and His providence in the measure which its own bias may most commend. Here, then, is *not* the sovereignty of God, but the sovereignty of "my own private opinion of Him." Take the normal (religious) attitude of modern thought in regard to the religious side of political questions. Fifty years ago, in England, the old cry of "Church and State" meant an alliance, if not a union of the two; it meant at least, "there is a true religion, and it is the duty of the political powers to recognize it." Meagre as was such a confession of political duties, at least it was better than French Paul Bertism. True, the English government, from the time of the Reformation, had divorced political duties from Catholic obedience; it had centred all religious authority in itself; it had even created a brand new Established Church, and had created brand new thirty-nine articles; still, there was the admission that "religion and politics could and did go together theoretically." It is perfectly true that what we are speaking of as the new sovereignty was proclaimed and embodied by the Anglican Parliament, in its usurpation of teaching powers in regard to religion; and it is perfectly true that Paul Bertism is *only* a logical outcome of the principle, "The State rules the Church, and may therefore quash it." Sooner or later, it was certain that private judgment, whether mantled by the lofty patronage of crown and Parliament, or left to meander in its own currents in private heads, must lead on to private rejection of all authority, on the ground that "no man can bow the head to his own authority." The very idea of authority, even in the natural order, is the idea of a power outside oneself; while, in the supernatural order, it is the idea of a power, not only outside but infinitely above oneself. The Catholic philosophy has been always grounded on this truism; but so-called Anglicanism has never formulated a philosophy. Hence, when Rationalism came to lay hold of the Anglican mind, and to urge that reason was independent of clerical teaching, Rationalism came off conqueror, because the only accepted clerical teaching was, in fact, the salaried teaching of State functionaries. Rationalism, in its appeal to Catholics, had to combat the dual position, that divine dogma is always assured to them by a divine interpreter; that is, by an interpreter divinely aided to interpret, in such measure as to be what we understand by "infallible." [The word is imperfect English, but it suffices to convey this meaning,—an authority which is divinely prevented from making mistakes.] Rationalism, therefore, made few conquests among Catholics. But among Protestants its victories were rendered easy, because the sole authority for Protestant doctrine is *a* Protestant's reason. We need not insist upon

the distinction between Catholic "dogma,"—rendered certain by the infallibility of the interpreter,—and Protestant "doctrine," rendered uncertain by private judgment; the distinction is so obvious that it suffices to state it as a fact which is closely linked with our whole argument. Rationalism could not attack the Catholic philosophy without attacking its primary safeguard, an aided interpreter; whereas in attacking the Protestant illusion, its work was made easy, by frankly adopting the Protestant postulate, "private judgment."

The new sovereignty is, therefore, both in its theory and in its practice, the conservation of the authority of private judgment, and this judgment is only restrained from violent action by the sentiment of "public propriety," which is traditional. The best way to test the logic of any theory is to drive it to its ultimate possibilities, and it is certain that the Catholic theory will bear that test, as it is certain that non-Catholic theories will not. Sovereignty is a fearless word to use, yet Catholics can use it without fear. The Catholic philosophy, which, having accepted Revelation, proceeds to logically correlate an infallible teacher, can as logically lay it down that the precise limits of infallible teaching are known infallibly by the infallible teacher. The Church—to use the word in its didactic sense—knows what it can teach, and what it cannot teach; knows how far it can prescribe any social or domestic duty; knows the limits of its authority in dictating to secular governments, or in even (spiritually) commanding their obedience. It is quite possible that what may be called the executive power, in the mundane intercourse of the Holy See with secular governments, may be at fault through misapprehension of actual facts (as in the case of the quarrel of King John with his barons, when Pope Innocent not only annulled the grand charter, but "excommunicated all disturbers of the public peace," because His Holiness had been misinformed as to actual facts, and had been led to believe that the barons were to blame); but, in regard to all questions of faith and morals, and their bearings on the relative duties of kings and subjects, there is no possibility of the Holy See making a mistake. The judgment in particular cases may be erroneous, but the judgment as to divine principles cannot be. Thus we drive the Catholic theory to its ultimate possibilities, and we see that, beyond mistakes in the executive (now rendered very improbable from the swiftness of intercourse, though in earlier times scarcely avoidable through slow journeyings), the divine principle, which we have called the old sovereignty, was a guarantee of not only spiritual security, but of the security of public justice *through* spiritual teaching. The worst that could possibly happen under the old sovereignty was a delay in the rectification of public quarrels; but,

in point of right or wrong, both as to dogma and as to morals, the teaching Church was the divine security of kings and subjects.

The exact opposite of these truths, both in reason and experience, will be found to issue from the process of "driving" the principle of the new sovereignty to what we have called its ultimate possibilities. Yet, we have no need to speculate as to any possible future; let us take the new sovereignty as it is. The "possibilities" have been already fully reached. The "argument from the absurd" has been worked out. In church government we see the laity practically teaching their clergy, obliging them to adopt their doctrines—from "Canterbury" down to the rural curate—to the prevalent apprehension of "enlightened views." And, just as Bible Christianity had developed hundreds of sects, each of which combated the doctrines of all the others, so Ritualism, which affects to honor *past* authority, is proverbially contemptuous of *present* authority. Indeed, Ritualism has done this service to the Protestant intellect, that it has put before it the principle of the new sovereignty worked into absolute completeness from both extremes. Private judgment has gone mad in the wildness of its inventions (in the case of the modern Ritualist sect), to the extent even of creating "mass" out of a Protestant service—which service was invented expressly to displace the mass—and to the extent of creating a fictitious system of obedience out of a system which was built up solely on disobedience. It is impossible to pass hastily over this last unique instance of the most "respectable" of the developments of the new sovereignty. Private judgment—which was the new sovereignty—had dethroned authority. At the very best, it had transferred obedience to the State, or to state-made courts, or to the private influences of honored pastors or honored friends. Ritualism came to the rescue in proposing a past authority as a substitute for the living authority of the Catholic Church, and, ridiculing private judgment, proceeded to make every man a pontiff, as judging councils, fathers, saints, even all the popes. It would not hear of any obedience being shown to my Lord of London, —still less, to that supreme state-trimmer, his Grace of Canterbury—but required every man to monopolize all the powers of the teaching Church, by requiring every man to judge infallibly all that it taught. Ritualism is the coronation of the wildest extremes of private judgment, making that judgment to judge infallibly its devoted teacher. The old Protestantism said: "We have no teacher; we teach ourselves out of our private judgment of Bible teaching." Ritualism says: "We have a teacher; that teacher is what we call the Primitive Church; but we claim the right, and the intellectual fitness, to judge infallibly of all the teachings of all the teachers of the first five centuries of the Christian Church; and, as

to our modern Anglican bishops, if they cannot agree with us, it is obvious that we must try to teach them to do so." Ritualism obeys an authority, which has been dead and buried for a thousand years, but only obeys it on the condition that each individual Ritualist must be the sole infallible interpreter of what it taught. Modern sovereignty has culminated in Ritualism. No further extravagance is even conceivable. Private judgment, with this last sect, has gone beyond even its apparent ultimatum, in setting up an infallible authority, dead and buried for a thousand years, to be privately judged by every person who claims the privilege, to be privately condemned where it seems to assert Catholic authority, but privately honored where it seems to confirm Ritualist "views."

It was impossible not to notice this eccentric phase of the new sovereignty; not to speak of it as the grandest fallacy the world has known. The world is indebted to the Ritualists for having invented a fallacy which "Euclid" would have intensely appreciated as infinitely comic. Minor fallacies shrink into contemptible insignificance by the side of that fallacy which proposes obedience to a dead authority, on condition that *we* may teach the honored remains. The opposite extreme—which was profoundly venerating one's own "reading" of the whole of both the Old and the New Testament—was a childlike vanity, a simple weak-headed complacency, which had become consecrated by three centuries of tradition. Nor was it a fallacy wholly without an apology. Our friends, the Dissenters, are not unworthy of our respect, on the ground of saying that "the Holy Spirit guides their minds." It is a pious belief, and it is not without some truth, in the sense in which pious persons intend it. Dissenters do not care about dogma, do not think that there need be any dogmas, and, in their simple idea that "belief in Christ makes a Christian," they must be left outside the intellectual reasoning as to "sovereignty." They do not go to first principles, but they rest on religious sentiment; and there we must leave them, and—we say it respectfully—as we leave good children to be good in their simple way. But, unhappily, out of this childlike, ignorant innocence, has sprung the apology—adopted by persons who are not childlike—for rejecting all religion *with* all dogma. Reasoning people apprehend that the doctrines which come from God—as distinct from the commandments which come from God—cannot be infallibly apprehended by natural intelligence; or rather, to speak more accurately, that the mysteries of the divine wisdom can only be infallibly "defined" by the divine wisdom. If, therefore, the interpreter be not infallibly aided, there is an end of all infallible definition. The realization of this truism—for the simplest of truisms it is—has obliged

all persons who do not accept the Catholic authority to fall back on one of two only alternatives: they must either give up all dogma, as not an essential of Christianity, or they must reject Christianity altogether. Both these "schools" come within the empire of the new sovereignty. And thus, religiously, the new sovereignty means heresy and schism gone mad, where it does not mean the rejection of Revelation and the deification of self-worship in its place.

II.

Politically, the consequences of this deification of self-worship—for it is not precisely the deification of self, but the deification of the *principle* of self-worship—has led to two results in chief: first, the secularizing of all government; next, the persecution of Catholics. Under the old sovereignty all governments accepted certain principles, which principles were laid down by Catholic authority. Justice and morality were not defined by the government, but were adopted in their Catholic signification. Now, here let it be stated that it is most irrational to confuse facts, each of which must stand on its own justification. The Church is not responsible for the disobedience of governments to its doctrinal or to its moral authority; nor are Christian subjects responsible for the disobedience of their governments, nor of revolutionists, in any sense of the word. It is perfectly certain that just as the principles of good and evil must always contend in the individual subject, so the principles of good and evil must always contend in whole nations, in governments, in political systems, or evolutions. Yet no amount of historical scandals can ever affect the Catholic principle, that all government ought to be based on the Catholic faith, so that, both on the part of the governing powers and on the part of those who are governed, the Catholic faith should sanctify mutual relations. This was always the *principle* of the old sovereignty. It was not, we know, always the practice,—the practice of Catholic governments,—but, as a *principle*, it was universally recognized. The Church had a system of laws—it has now—which is known as Canonical Right. In this system we find it taught that "so long as princes and their laws are in conformity to the law of God, the Church has no power or jurisdiction against them or over them." But it is also stated that "the Church has a right to carry out her divine mission in every land, and to do so, if need be, in spite of the civil power." The true idea, therefore, of "Church and State" must be the alliance of the two, each respecting the other in its own sphere, yet the State being necessarily inferior to the Church, in creation, in endowment, in object. "Separation of Church and

State" has been authoritatively condemned from the time of St. Ambrose to that of Cardinal Manning. So has the theory that the State may control the Church, in faith, morals, jurisdiction, or education. The "philosophy" of the true relations of Church and State is so simple that even a child should understand it. Profound thinkers and deep essayists may work out the severe principle which Aristotle laid down before the Christian era, that "all authorities and societies are related to one another in proportion to the relation existing between their ends," and many thus show, by elaborate reasoning, that a divine society with eternal objects must take the precedence of human societies with temporal objects; yet it seems simpler to argue that all States which are called Christian must be taught their Christian duties by the teaching Church. If they refuse to be so taught, they are not Christian. They are, therefore, unfaithful to the Christian subjects whom they govern, not only in their bad example of disobedience, but in their not setting the highest example of perfect loyalty. Cavour and Garibaldi in Italy, Gambetta and Paul Bert in France, Dr. Falk and Prince Bismarck in Germany, Lord Palmerston and Mr. Gladstone in England, are all types of men who place the State above the Church, to the utter contempt even of the traditional sentiment of Catholic obedience. Having got rid of the divine authority of the teaching Church, they are compelled to exalt themselves into amateur pontiffs. This last attitude was certain to follow upon the first. *Some* authority must exist in every nation, to deal with the religious side of a nation's politics; and, since the true authority is rejected, there is only one possible alternative,—to make the authority of the State usurp its place.

This is what our modern liberals try to effect. They *have* effected it in some Christian countries. While professing to abhor Socialism, they adopt one of its ugliest fallacies, that the State is the earthly deity of a pure society. In Germany, where the government is a Cæsarism modified by a more or less obedient parliament, the State has striven for ten years to become the supreme arbiter in all controversies which belong to the empire of religion. The State would select and appoint parish priests with reference to their political partisanship. The State would monopolize education. The State would require a bishop to kneel to it, to ask permission to excommunicate an unworthy priest. The State would appoint its own (infidel) official to preside over the religious studies of all seminarists. The "regium placitum," as it is grotesquely misnamed, means, really, that all letters of the Supreme Pontiff must be scrutinized by a board of lay examiners, one of whom is a Jew, another a Protestant, a third a bad Catholic, and the fourth an avowed infidel. These gentlemen have supreme power to ad-

wise as to the "regium placitum," which, of course, is not royal at all, but simply infidel. This is a comic development of the new sovereignty. It was totally impossible that it should be otherwise developed. When the State becomes Pontiff it becomes possessed. When the people forsake the Church they become slaves. They are either slaves to the selfish Cæsar of the hour, or slaves to the selfish demagogue of the hour. [We need not speak of the third kind of wretched slavery, that of being victimized by every caprice of private judgment.] A people which has lost the guidance of Catholic authority, tumbles about from one tyranny to another, or from one frantic excess to another, and being usually reined and bitted by some popular leader, who persuades it that it is perfectly free and enlightened, rejoices in its own enslavement to the political hero of its illusions, because he *calls* himself a Liberal or a Radical. M. de Hauleville said, "Chez les nations Catholiques la liberté civile est ancienne, l'absolutisme est moderne;" and a truer remark could not be made, nor one which could be interpreted in a larger sense. It is true of the absolutism of demagoguism, as it is true of the absolutism of Cæsarism. Germany just now illustrates the second kind; France just now illustrates the first kind. In Germany neither Catholic nor Protestant has for a long while known the dignity of freedom. [They have *never* known it since the apostasy of the Reformation.] While the base servility of the French Radical herd to its immediate hero is only equalled by the mocking faithlessness of that hero to the real interests, spiritual and temporal, of his dupes. The hero promises peace; the herd believes him. But the herd does not want peace, it wants war. Peace to an infidel Radical would be a kind of death. Was it Deputy Malinckrodt who said in the Prussian Diet: "If true patriots make peace with false patriots, doubtless they will enjoy a kind of peace; the same peace which reigns in the churchyard?" But would either class of patriots enjoy peace? Only for about twenty-four hours. Radicalism,—not in its merely political sense, in the sense of wishing to alter a form of government, but in the sense of that headlong infidelity which scorns religion as the antagonist of liberty,—knows no peace, and will give none so long as a still wilder outburst is conceivable by its excited fancy. To insult religion for the simple pleasure of insulting it, is the fondest pastime of its political fitfulness. For example: The Radical electors of Northampton might have found many a workingman of high character who would have respectably represented them in Parliament, but the braggadocios of that constituency derived an exceptional gratification in picking out an unsavory atheist. This is the superlative degree of Radical spite. It is not political Radicalism—which is a legitimate theory, and may be consistent with the Christian faith—

but irreligious Radicalism, anti-religious Radicalism, the digging up of all the foundations of Christian States.

Spain has just refused, by an overwhelming majority, to do away with the (theistic) oath in the Parliament. France has not as yet abolished appeal to God. Italy and Austria still preserve it. But England is now in the throes of an inquiry as to whether she shall set a fiendish example. Now, let it be stated that the great majority of the English people are most ardently on the side of "Religious Conservatism;" more than this, the great majority of the English people are still attached to (at least) the traditions of the old sovereignty. Accepting what we have called the old sovereignty as the divine supremacy of religion over the whole world; as that ever-present and intensely realizable superiority before which all secular governments must bow down; the majority of the English people are good to the core, full of backbone, of sound sense, of religious will, and only wanting a thorough knowledge of Catholic truth to make them the most Christian people in the world. More than this, the humbler classes,—not the lower or the vulgar classes,—are imbued with refined instincts of respect for truth, nor must they be confused with that political residuum which howls radicalism from its stolid ignorance, moral depravity, or force of contact. There is in England, as in most countries, a scholarly radical class which simply aims at a vast extension of political liberties. These men have a profound contempt for infidel radicalism. But there is also a large class which would define radicalism as the popular right to pull down every church and chapel in the kingdom, to make Timothy Stubbs president of an infidel republic, provided that he hated noblemen and capitalists, and to do away with such restrictions upon morals and upon manners as hamper the perfect liberty of the citizen. True, this is an extreme class of the new radicalism. But how came it to have any existence? The answer, that liberal leaders, who are themselves respectable men, and who would resent the imputation of a low radicalism, are constantly, for the sake of "party," for the sake of gaining political followers, affecting to favor what they know to be wrong. Mr. Gladstone, who reads the lessons in his parish church, brings in a relief bill for Mr. Bradlaugh, not because he likes filthy atheism, but because he likes to take the lead in all liberalism. Mr. Gladstone is a prime minister of the new sovereignty. That sovereignty has dethroned divine authority. Because the State *is*,—not *should* be—above religion, therefore statesmen must put their politics above their God.

Dr. Benson, the new Archbishop of Canterbury, has just shown how the new sovereignty in religion is in close sympathy with the new sovereignty in politics. How should they not be in close sympathy, seeing that they were both born together? Dr. Ben-

son waits on the ministry which appointed him, before he commits himself to a repudiation of the affirmation bill. He lacks the courage of St. Ambrose, who in the fourth century told the Emperor (and would not have hesitated to tell a prime minister) to attend to his purely temporal affairs, and not to presume to have a voice in any sacred affair. But this was in the days when the old sovereignty would have made it impossible that a Christian government should have brought in an affirmation bill. Such a question must have been submitted to the spiritual power, though indeed it could not possibly have arisen. The spiritual power was the foundation of the temporal power; the Church being the mother of Christian nations. There was a complete distinctness, but a complete harmony of the two powers. As St. Thomas wrote: "The ministry of this (the spiritual) kingdom, in order that things spiritual be kept distinct from things temporal, is not intrusted to earthly kings, but to priests, and especially to the high priest, Peter's successor, Christ's vicar, the Roman Pontiff, to whom all the kings of Christian peoples are bound to be subject, as to Jesus Christ Himself." Dr. Benson, who may be styled, without any exaggeration, the archbishop of both provinces of the new sovereignty, tells his clergy that the Relief of Atheists Bill is a matter for the State, not for the Church. Is he not encouraged by the pervading secularism of the age? Christendom is a thing of the past. Christendom was the alliance of Christian nations with the spiritual sovereignty of the Catholic Church; so that all governments were based on the principle that the spiritual alliance *alone* made them legitimate. The new sovereignty has annihilated Christendom by not only divorcing the State from the Church, but by giving the State the right to ignore the Church, to control the Church, to teach the Church as it thinks best.

III.

Lastly, that we may very briefly trace the effect of the new sovereignty upon what is commonly understood by "society," let us begin by quoting the words of Cardinal Newman, uttered in Rome in the spring of 1879: "The goodly framework of society was the *creation* of Christianity." His Eminence did not say that society was the "accident," but that it was the offspring, the legitimate family of that religion which was taught to us in Bethlehem and on Calvary. Before Christianity there was no society. The reason is that society should mean a family of families; the sovereign principle of Christian authority governing all. Now, just as the old *dictum* of Christian States was, "Christianity is law;" but the new

dictum is, "The law makes Christianity, or, what is the same thing, can modify it;" so the old *dictum* of society was, "Society is Catholicity;" but the new *dictum* is, "Society is classes." It would be unreal to say that society, in any period of the Christian era, was wholly knit by one fellowship of Catholicity, just as it would be unreal to say that society, in its modern conventional sense, is wholly disunited by "religious liberty."

It is of principles that we are speaking, and the principle of society *was* Catholicity; the principle of society *is* classes. The new sovereignty of private judgment, beginning with schism, proceeding with political pontificalism (that is, the State taking the place of the teaching Church) has naturally and necessarily broken up the social fabric into as many discordant items as there are discordant "views." Society is, therefore, as dead as is Christendom. Classes aggregate for political convenience, for social or for commercial convenience, but society, in the sense of the family-bond, has no existence in any (whole) Christian country. The principle of Christendom used to be harmony; this corollary of schism is classes. We must, doubtless, blame some Catholics, even in the most Catholic times—and we must, also, blame most Catholics of our own time—for making worldliness to ride roughly over Christian harmony; in short, for class pride, class vulgarity. Conventionalism has dried the sap of Catholic charity. Religion is made one thing, but social fellowship is made another, so that between religion and society there is divorce. The old idea was a sort of marriage of the two. It might be mainly an idea, but this was better than the modern approved fallacy that each class should move integrally within itself. It is curious that political Liberalism, which was the offspring of religious Liberalism, has resulted in social rupture, social hatred. Hatred is not too strong a word to use in regard to this seeming attitude of class to class. Conventional pride has so rotted the social fabric that not only classes but minute sections of classes lift up the hem of their garments from each other. Catholicity is displaced by conventionalism. One sufficient explanation can be given. We can imagine a typical society, in which, all classes being refined by the highest tone of Catholic faith and Catholic sentiment, modesty and mutual respect would be as "natural" between all classes as is vanity and mutual distrust at the present time. But schism and heresy, religious Liberalism,—which means self-worship,—political Liberalism,—which means pulling *down* your superiors instead of pulling yourself *up* to their level,—together with a gross materialism of object or aspiration, such as now really "motives" half the world, have brought about such a low standard of social striving or emulation, that we must, most of us, feel our cowardice and our little-

ness. Disraeli said: "Life is too short to be little," but we, most of us, make it shorter by our own littleness. The new sovereignty in the social life, as in the religious and in the political life, has made littleness to be the stamp of human life. Personal heroism seldom dares to go beyond the social canons; it contents itself by being superlative within those canons. Yet the very idea of Catholic heroism was the being so untrammelled by the world as to live above it in both action and end.

Family life suffers with social life from this littleness of the new sovereignty of private judgment. A youth creating his own religion and his own politics; completing, at eighteen years, his own system of philosophy, his own canons of "the grammar of ascent;" respects his father as "the governor," but, disagreeing with him on many points, lives enjoyably without reference to parental views. Religion being a private conception, politics being chiefly a game at parties, morality being social propriety, charity being "giving a copper," and magnanimity in general being muscular or robust, as distinguished from the grandeur of self-sacrifice, the age does not present to us a type of Christian youth which, except in mere profession, is not pagan. Such manliness takes a low material form. Manliness would be the acting on severe principles, without the slightest reference to conventional smallness or human respect. It would be the honoring of principles, not of self. But manliness in these days is the honoring of self, whether the principle be perfect or be faulty. We find in the humbler classes of English people almost perfectness both of manliness and of aspirations, but it is exceptional to find either in the higher classes, or even in the upper middle or wealthy classes.

A cowardly homage to conventional smallness rules the world. The fact that the lower orders (not the humbler orders) have bad manners, is made the pretext for having nothing to do with them, instead of being the soundest reason for "pulling them up." There could be no such thing as "lower orders," if all classes did their duty in good example, in keen sympathy, in modest manners. But the principles of the new sovereignty of self-worship have so permeated all the strata of social life—save only the purer types of the humbler orders—that isolation not sympathy, caste-vanity not generousness, complacent manners not kindness or tenderness, make the barriers of class-life harder and harder. In family life, almost as much as in social life, there is a flying-off from dutiful sympathies and chivalrous sacrifice, with a disposition to make "ego" the one object of all endeavor, in success, in enrichment, in comfort.

Thus, religiously, politically, socially, and also within the sacred homes of private life, we may see that the new sovereignty has

corrupted civilization; has made civilization to mean the using of modern appliances for the greatest possible enjoyment of selfish repose. We speak, of course, of societies, not of persons. Principles are not to be judged by rare apologists, nor are developments to be tested by rare types. Every one knows that there are thousands of persons "in society," thousands of Anglicans, of Dissenters, perhaps of freethinkers, who for seriousness, and even intenseness of life, might be honored by doctors or even saints. A man is made by his circumstances, until the time shall arrive—and it arrives, perhaps, to most men—when he can make himself out of his own opportunities. Indeed, the superiority of individuals in modern times shows equally what immense merit there is in themselves, and what immense power there is in their traditions. We are constantly struck with admiration at some profoundly thoughtful remark made by some one from whom we least expected it, showing that his instincts are intensely Catholic, hugely wide, though perhaps he does not know even a single Catholic. The traditions of the old sovereignty which governed Christendom for fifteen centuries, have so penetrated men's natures that, only catch them in happy moments, and you find that perhaps most men, at the bottom of their hearts, are as Catholic as if they had been born Catholics. The surface is smeared over by conventionalism; but the new sovereignty would lose the majority of its subjects if they would all do justice to themselves by opportunity. And, at this point, let it be hazarded that the chief reason why true principles, both in the supernatural and in the natural order, do not captivate, do not convert, modern thoughtists, is that what is good is so very often put before the world in an aspect which is more conventional than Catholic. May it be permitted to say, diffidently, that the *mise en scène* of the Catholic Church does not strike an outsider as supernatural.

There is an apparent homage to a good deal the world thinks its own. True, all this is but *mise en scène*; it is the result mainly of habit or timidity; it is the mere outsideness of perhaps necessary etiquette, which in a vulgar world must be kept up. Yet,—if a private layman may be forgiven for frankly stating an impression derived from his observations in many countries,—it seems to him that a more primitive simplicity, *plus* a more courageous contempt for the world's gods [what are they but rank, influence, possessions; with pomp, ceremony, giving and taking of the world's titles?], in short, a bold return to the "style" of the primitive Catholics, who must have a most manly contempt for unrealities, would quickly convince society that Catholicity *is* divine, because it is not conventional or like the world. Catholics alone know the inside of the Catholic Church, non-Catholics know only its outside. If

the outside were the true face of the inside, if all Catholics would root out of the Catholic Church those appearances,—those mere appearances,—of world-copying, which are as false to individual Catholics as to the Catholic spirit, “the world” would sooner be captivated by the presentment of a religion which was the *only* state of being which was not conventional. It is sufficient here to speak only “in the general.” It would be bad form to enter into particulars. The greatest society in the world is the Catholic Church, and it is the greatest because it is God’s society. It is often made to *look* earthly by the genuflections of its magnates to the puerile smallness and vanity which rot the world. The new sovereignty, which is a false liberalism, a false radicalism, would be quickly shamed if it always saw in the old sovereignty the purest worship of simplicity and magnanimity. It is the big people of the world who have created radicalism. The humbler orders have an instinctive love of “superiority,” not so much of mere talent or witching gifts, of position, or of the accidents of prosperity, as of that grandeur of nature which cares only for what is truest, and puts all the shams of the world under its feet. Religiously, politically and socially, the humbler orders are convertible to the highest standards, if only they can find the types which they can appreciate. How many such types do they see? In the parish priest, or among the exceptional Catholic laity, they very often, as we know well, see such types. But a whole country looks less at individuals than it looks at the presentment of the idea; and it is for this reason that the presentment should be so palpably *above* society, that society should say, “This is *not* the world.”
