

of the second half of the nineteenth century. A marvelous gift of eloquence and a charming amenity of manner were added in his person to every priestly virtue. The charm of his manner was but equaled by the dignity of his life and the ardor of his zeal and charity. Very popular in the highest society, he was especially the friend of the humble and the obscure, and was one of the first to dare to preach before the rich and the powerful in support of the claims of the working classes. His enemies accused him of ambition and social intrigue. His ambition was—to bring back his country to its ancient faith, to reconcile his beloved Geneva with Rome. He proved that he had no other ambition by refusing the flattering advances made to him by the French Government, which offered him successively the Bishopric of Nice and the Archbishopric of Chambery. As to his politics, his former fellow-workers, those who were the best fitted to know him intimately, declared that he had none. With his delicate minded and generous nature, all sentiment and confiding goodness, he could never divine in others a maliciousness of which he felt himself to be incapable. His great mistake was never to have doubted the loyalty of his enemies, and his great illusion, to believe that the republican and democratic institutions of his country, for which he had a perfect enthusiasm, were a sort of inviolable palladium for the Catholic apostolate.”

T. L. L. TEELING.

London.

THE TEMPORAL POWER.

FOR Catholics the momentous question of the day, religious and quasi-political, is that of the Pope's Temporal Power. Nor does it concern Catholics alone, but the whole world. For, indirectly, the whole world—Catholic and non-Catholic, Christian and non-Christian—is interested in its settlement; first on grounds of abstract justice, to see that a great wrong is righted; secondly, because on its due solution the tranquillity and contentment of the world, to some extent, depend. As long as the Roman Pontiff remains a prisoner in his own city, practically under the lock and key of a usurper, so long will this politico-religious difficulty remain an open sore and so long will two hundred million Catholics, scattered throughout the world, be restless and unwilling to accept the *status quo*. Directly, however, the question affects the Christian nations alone, for they alone by baptism are subjects of the Church.

Moreover, in practice, it concerns Catholics only. Its bearing on Protestants is chiefly of a speculative character, since far from admitting the Pope's jurisdiction over them, they emphatically deny it. At the lowest they are indifferent, and in the main they are hostile. Indeed, had it not been for the moral and material support of Protestants in general, and of British Protestants in particular, the revolutionary Italians in 1870 could not have accomplished this crying act of injustice—the usurpation and spoliation of Rome.

Nine times before has Rome been captured by the enemies of the Papacy, and nine times was the peace of Europe disturbed. Moreover, that peace was never once restored except by the restoration of the Temporal Power.

Taking stock of the confronting forces on this great battlefield of religion and politics, we find ranged, on one side the compact army of sound and well-informed Catholics, and on the other side a motley array of infidels, revolutionists, communists, most non-Catholic Christians, many liberal—that is, unsound—Catholics and lastly not a few Catholics who err, not from malice, but from inculpable ignorance. These last are ignorant for want of due instruction on this vital question. That such ignorance exists probably no one would care to deny. Differences of opinion in matters of minor detail are legitimate enough, but it is surely a curious sign of the times to find Catholics—and sometimes Catholics who ought to know better—professing the laxest views on this all-important question.

I propose in this article to set forth, as far as I understand them, our obligations in regard to the Temporal Power, and the grounds of those obligations. However, before entering on the specific topic of the Pope's Civil Princedom, there are some preliminary questions which I intend to touch on by way of clearing the ground. This seems all the more necessary, since the most exaggerated views have at times been current as to what the Holy Father's temporal powers really are—as to their nature, their limits and their necessity. On the one hand the extravagant opinion has been propounded by some theologians—Henry of Segusia, Augustinus Triumphus, Alvarus Pelagius—that the Pope's direct temporal power is coextensive with the earth.¹ More unbalanced still in their opinions, some few—Hostiensis, for example²—have taught that by Christ's coming all heathen lands were confiscated to the Pope, and that he, consequently, could assign them to whomsoever he chose. On the other hand, Calvin, Peter Martyr and others defended the heretical opinion that the Roman Pontiff, as such, was *de jure divino* debarred from all

¹ This opinion is emphatically denied by Bellarmine. "Tertia Controversia Generalis;" "De Rom. Pontif," v., 1; cf. Hergenröther, "The Catholic Church and the Christian State"—Essay 13, part 2, sec. 3. ² Bellarmine 1. c.

temporal powers and possessions and that for him to bear a temporal sword was a hall-mark of Anti-Christ.

I begin then by laying down four introductory propositions which I will number for the sake of clearness.

The first proposition is this, that in no sense whatever has the Roman Pontiff direct temporal jurisdiction over the whole world. He has, indeed, jurisdiction, temporal but indirect, over all Christians scattered over the whole world; but nothing more. What, however, is meant by direct and indirect jurisdiction? The two terms play an important part in this discussion, and therefore call for clear definition. By *direct* temporal jurisdiction I mean that which is exercised primarily for the advancement of temporal interests; by *indirect*, that which is exercised for the furtherance primarily of spiritual and only secondarily of temporal interests. That the Pope has no spiritual or temporal, direct or indirect, jurisdiction over the whole world is obvious from the fact that Christ gave him none. Our Lord's command to "go and teach all nations" gave only the right to preach and conferred no jurisdiction over all.

The second proposition is this, that the Pope has no direct temporal authority even over the Christian world. Direct spiritual authority he has, conferred by the words, "Feed My sheep, feed My lambs." But neither Scripture nor Apostolic Tradition shows any trace of any such direct temporal jurisdiction. When to Peter and his successors Christ gave "the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven," that gift carried with it direct spiritual, but not direct temporal, authority over Christendom. Were it otherwise, an infidel king, by conversion to Christianity, would forfeit his throne to the Pope—which is absurd. Therefore it is that the Church says in the Vespers of the Epiphany:

Crudelis Herodes, Deum
Regem venire quid times?
Non eripit mortalia,
Qui regna dat coelestia.

The third proposition is this, that the Roman Pontiff has temporal power, supreme but indirect, not over the whole world, but over all Christendom. Not over the whole world; for the direct spiritual and the indirect temporal powers are coextensive, and as the former does not embrace the whole world, so neither does the latter. But over all Christendom; for as that is the extension of the spiritual power, so also must it be the extension of the temporal. For the indirect temporal is but an aspect of the spiritual power, and was given concomitantly with the spiritual.

It is essential to notice that this indirect temporal power is temporal but in name and is spiritual in reality. It concerns the temporal aspect of spiritual things and the spiritual aspect of temporal

things. Hergenröther,³ in an admirable essay on this subject, writes: "This indirect power of the Church in matters temporal . . . is not a temporal, but a spiritual power. It is exerted in matters temporal only in so far as they trench upon religion and thus cease to be purely temporal."

It follows then that within certain due and well defined limits the civil is subordinate to the spiritual power. And reasonably so, since the end of the former is temporal and mediate, that of the latter spiritual and final. The one promotes temporal interests, the other eternal salvation. Nevertheless both Church and State have their own clearly defined spheres into which the other has no right to intrude. Hence St. Bernard wrote: "When temporal rulers make no opposition to the divine law, they then hold their kingdoms and their rights entire and with full power."⁴ Both these spheres are, however, concentric and the radius of the ecclesiastical sphere is greater than the radius of the civil sphere, so that while the State has no power outside her own circumference, the Church has direct spiritual power throughout her whole circumference and indirect temporal power within the circumference of the State. However, this leaves the State absolute mistress within her own proper domain. If, for example, the State cannot define doctrines, so neither may the Church command conscription. Therefore St. Thomas writes:⁵ "The secular power is under the spiritual power in so far as it is placed under it by God; that is to say, in those things that concern the salvation of souls. Consequently therein we must obey the spiritual rather than the temporal authority. But, in what belongs to the civil sphere, we must obey the temporal rather than the spiritual authority, according to those words, 'Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, but unto God the things that are God's.'" This indirect temporal power—direct as to the moral law, indirect as to the temporal matters involved—Christ exercised when He drove the buyers and sellers from the Temple, and again when He cast the Gadarene swine into the sea; and the Pope exercised it when he condemned the Plan of Campaign in Ireland, the Falk Laws in Germany, the Divorce Courts in Christendom, when he upheld the claims of the French Republic, when he denounced the claims of the Italian monarchy.

Our fourth proposition runs thus, that the Roman Pontiff is, by divine right, exempt from and superior to all secular authority and civil jurisdiction of whatsoever kind or degree. This doctrine is an accepted conclusion of theology and is thus enunciated by Suarez:⁶ "The Roman Pontiff is free and exempt from all secular judgment

³ L. c., sec 4. ⁴ Ep. 255. Migne. P. L. Tom. 182, col. 462. ⁵ L. II., Sent. d. etq. ult. ⁶ Contra Sectam Anglic, L. 4, c. 4, n. 3.

and jurisdiction, even of Emperors and of Kings. This doctrine is held by all Catholic doctors who declare this exemption to be a divine right."

But in what sense "a divine right?" To answer that question clearly we must define our terms. What then is "a divine right?" St. Thomas says pithily: "Divine is that right which is made known to us by revelation."⁷ Revelation, or promulgation, is, however, two-fold—natural (or non-positive) and positive; natural when it is implicitly given, as a logical concomitant or reasonable consequence of some supernatural dignity conferred by God on man; positive when it is given explicitly by God. As, therefore, a supernatural dignity expressly bestowed would be *de jure divino positivo*, its logical concomitant or necessary consequence, though not expressly mentioned, would be *de jure divino naturali*. In this acceptance of the term "natural" as distinguished, not against "supernatural," but against "positive," the positive precedes the natural as the cause precedes the effect.⁸

Papal exemption is then a divine right, but is it a positive or a natural right? Was it conferred on St. Peter and the Roman Pontiffs explicitly and directly by Christ's special and peculiar will, or is it merely connatural to and logically deducible from the spiritual dignity of the Head of Christendom? Suarez explains it to be a divine right in both senses, natural and positive; but positive only in a secondary way.

It is *de jure divino naturali* because as Christ constituted Peter and the Roman Pontiffs the Supreme Head in spirituals, it follows logically that He must also have conferred on His Vicar exemption from the secular jurisdiction of all and any of his spiritual subjects. A subject may not be the sovereign of his own Sovereign Lord. Suarez, however,⁹ admits that this deduction is not without its difficulties. For might not an opponent argue that the Pope's supreme and direct spiritual jurisdiction and his supreme but indirect temporal jurisdiction on the one hand were not incompatible with his direct temporal subjection on the other? Does an official's superiority over another in one respect prevent his subjection to that other in another respect? Is not a King's mother superior to her son, but inferior to the King, just as the King as a son is inferior to his mother, but superior as her King? Without denying a certain cogency to this objection Suarez¹⁰ replies: "Nevertheless the connection between the privilege of Exemption and the dignity of Spiritual Head, if not fully evident, is at least most consonant to reason; and in many ways. First, because the superior who gives jurisdiction is

⁷ "Jus divinum dicitur quod divinitus promulgatur," 2-2, 57, 2, ad. 3m. ⁸ Cf. Schiffini. "Disp. Phil. Mor.," Vol. I., u. n. 195, 198. Suarez, Contra Sect. Aug., 4, 4-6. ⁹ l. c., n. 8. ¹⁰ l. c., n. 9.

also held to give all the adjuncts necessary for its due execution. Now, that the Pope may exercise his spiritual office over all Christians, princes and people, it is morally necessary that he should be himself subject to none of them. . . . For it is certainly unmeet that the Supreme Head of the Church, to whom all Christian princes are subject, should be judged, constrained or punished by any of them. Again, the Pope's secular subjection would be a standing cause of parties and divisions. Moreover, the Pope could not, with due liberty and authority, exercise his spiritual jurisdiction and use his indirect temporal power over princes if at the same time he was himself civilly subject to them and they were able legitimately to imprison and punish him. Therefore Papal Immunity is *de jure divino naturali*."

But the Pope's Immunity is also *de jure divino positivo*¹¹ in this sense, not that Christ's explicit word first created the privilege, but only afterwards declared it. For Immunity is a logical deduction from the Spiritual Primacy, and the positive right superadded only declared explicitly the deduction to be true. Exemption already implicitly existing in the divine law, Christ, by a positive act, explicitly affirmed so to exist.

The classical proof of this positive and confirmatory act of our Lord is drawn from the Payment of the Tribute Scene in St. Matthew (xvii., 24-27), which reads thus:

"And when they were come to Capernaum, they that received tribute money came to Peter and said, Doth not your Master pay tribute? He saith, Yes. And when he was come into the house, Jesus forestalled him, saying, What thinkest thou, Simon? Of whom do the Kings of the earth take custom or tribute? Of their own children, or of strangers? Peter saith unto Him, Of strangers. Jesus saith unto him, Then are the children free. Notwithstanding, lest we should scandalize them, go thou to the sea and cast an hook and take up the fish that first cometh up, and when thou hast opened his mouth, thou shalt find a stater; take that, and give it to them for Me and for thee."

Thus Christ pays the tax for two, since the poll tax was two drachmas, and one stater equaled four drachmas. He paid, not because He and His Vicar were subject to the law, but to avoid scandal of the ignorant. Yet though He and Peter paid, nevertheless they were not taxed. The tax gatherers received the money, yet neither Christ nor Peter was mulcted of it. It was taken neither from their earnings nor from the common purse. Christ, therefore, a "Child of the King"—God—worked a striking miracle in order—without scandalizing the weak—to vindicate exemption and immu-

¹¹ Suarez, l. c., cap. 5.

ity from the law, both for Himself and for His Vicar, St. Peter, and in St. Peter for the whole line of the Roman Pontiffs.

We have now cleared the horizon by the brief statement of these four propositions; that the Pope has direct temporal power neither over the whole world, nor over the whole Christian world; that he has power—supreme, direct, spiritual, and supreme, indirect, temporal—over all Christendom, but not over heathendom; and that he is exempt from and superior to all secular authority whatsoever. We may now more conveniently pass on to our main investigation into the nature of the Roman Pontiff's *de jure* civil sovereignty over Rome and the Roman States. Of what right is it, divine or only human?

I reply that over no territory whatsoever has the Pope by divine right, natural or positive, direct temporal sovereignty. Therefore, not over Rome.

He has not a divine positive right, for no express command of God to that effect is found in either Scripture or Apostolic Tradition.

He has not a divine natural (*i. e.*, non-positive, but implicit) right deducible by reason as a corollary of his spiritual dignity of Supreme Pontiff. Of such a right there is no proof, as I shall now show.

Bellarmino and Suarez both deny the existence of such divine right, whether natural or positive.

Bellarmino's¹² argument is this, that since Christ, as Man, while He lived on earth, willed not Himself to possess temporal and territorial sovereignty over any particular province or city, so neither did He give any such sovereignty to St. Peter and his successors. It becomes, therefore, of importance to investigate what Christ's temporal authority before His Passion was. Christ, as God, was, of course, Sovereign of the Universe, but His authority as God He did not, and indeed could not, transfer to His Vicar. Again, Christ, as Man, was the spiritual Sovereign of all men, so that He could, and did, bind all men, under sanction of heaven or of hell, to accept His religion. By this direct spiritual, and therefore by its concomitant indirect temporal, jurisdiction Christ could dispose of all temporal possessions, as He did—to cite again the instances already quoted—when He overturned the tables of the money changers and indirectly caused the destruction of the Gadarene swine.¹³ Moreover, Christ, even as Man, could—had He willed—have assumed territorial Lordship of the whole earth. He had the power to do so, but that power He did not will to exercise. Hence not only He did not exercise territorial dominion, He did not even possess it. For Temporal Princeship is built on one or more of these four titles—inheritance, popular election, conquest, divine donation—and Christ had none of them.

¹² De Rom. Pont., cap. 4. ¹³ Mk. v., 13; Mt. xxi., 12.

Not inheritance. For though descended from the royal family of David, there is no evidence that He was a nearer heir than a multitude of others of the same stock. Moreover, there was no throne in Judah to inherit, for the sceptre had passed out of David's family, and that, too, as it seems, with God's approval. For, speaking in God's name, Jeremiah the prophet¹⁴ had clearly foretold that abolition of Jewish sovereignty. He predicted that no offspring of Jehoiakin, King of Judah, should sit upon David's temporal throne: "Thus saith the Lord, Write ye this man childless, a man that shall not prosper in his days; for no man of his seed shall prosper sitting upon the throne of David and ruling any more in Judah." And again:¹⁵ "Thus saith the Lord of Jehoiakin, King of Judah: He shall have none to sit upon the throne of David." Now Christ was a descendant of Jehoiakin—or Jechonias—as St. Matthew expressly tells us.¹⁶ Therefore as the prophecy was necessarily true, it must necessarily be false that Christ ever sat as temporal King on the throne of Judah.¹⁷ Nor may we argue that Jeremiah's was inconsistent with Gabriel's prediction that "the Lord God shall give unto Him the throne of David His father."¹⁸ For both fathers and theologians explain that the prophet refers to a temporal, but the archangel to a spiritual throne.¹⁹

Not election by the people. Our Lord's own words prove this; for when He was invited to intervene, as a King might, in a dispute He replied: "Man, who made Me a judge or divider over you?"²⁰ And should it be argued that the sceptre was at least offered to Christ, the reply is obvious that neither was it the people's to give nor did He accept it: "When Jesus perceived that they would come and take Him by force, to make Him King, He departed again into a mountain Himself alone."²¹

Not conquest in war. For Christ's warfare was not with flesh and blood, but with principalities and with powers, with the rulers of this world of darkness, with the spirit of wickedness in high

¹⁴ Jer. xxii., 30. ¹⁵ xxxvi., 30. ¹⁶ Matt. i., 11. ¹⁷ To invalidate this argument it has been objected, for example, in Smith's "Dict. of the Bible," s. r. "Jehoiachin," that Jeremiah's prophecy referred only to the childless Jehoiachin, the last of Solomon's (though not of David's) line; but that the right of succession duly passed to the line of Nathan, son of David, whose descendant, Salathiel, the son of Neri, was consequently called by St. Matthew i., 12, the son of Jehoiachin (or Jechonias): "Jechonias begat Salathiel." But this explanation seems very strained, not to say unnecessary. Professor N. J. White, in Hastings' "Dict. of the Bible," II., p. 557, writes: "Needless difficulty has been raised over the question of Jehoiachin's children. Whatever be the truth as to the parentage of Salathiel, the very prophecy which is alleged to prove his childlessness (Jer. xxii., 28) mentions his seed twice. Like Ezk. xxi., 26, it is a declaration of the abrogation of the temporal power of David's line. It explains in what sense he was to be 'childless' (*ἀκαθάρτων*—'proscribed'), 'for no man of his seed shall prosper,' words surely unnecessary if he had no seed at all." ¹⁸ Lk. i., 32. ¹⁹ Cf. Amhrose, In Lk., L. 3, c. 1. Migne, P. L. Tom. 15, col. 1607. Jerome, In Jer. xxii., 30. Migne, P. L. Tom. 24, col. 819. Augustine, "De Civ. Dei," L. 17, c. 7. Migne, P. L. Tom. 41, col. 538. Bellarmine, "De Rom. Pont." v., 4. Suarez, "De Incar." xviii., 1-3. ²⁰ Lk. xxii., 14. ²¹ Jo. vi., 15.

places. This title Christ had, not to a temporal, but to His spiritual kingdom.

Not a divine donation. For there is no proof of any such gift. Nay, there is clear proof against it. To relieve Pilate of all suspicion that He aimed at a temporal sceptre, our Lord declared that His Kingdom was not of this world.²²

Under no title, then, was our Lord, as Man, a temporal Prince over Judæa. Moreover, to Him royal power would have been not an aid, but a hindrance. For the end to attain which He came on earth, the redemption of mankind, supreme power was indeed needed, but spiritual and not temporal power. We must bear in mind, too, that by virtue of that spiritual power He possessed indirect jurisdiction over all things temporal to dispose of them as He knew best for spiritual purposes. Therefore temporal power would have been superfluous. Nay, it would have been positively harmful. It would have stood as a stumbling-block in the path of Christ's ascetic teaching. For our Lord both by example and word—since "He came to do and to teach,"²³ "not to be ministered unto, but to minister"²⁴—sought to lead men to despise wealth and position and honor and power and glory. Therefore with what playful sarcasm He questioned those who had gone out into the desert in quest of John the Baptist:²⁵ "What went ye out to see? A man clothed in soft raiment? Behold they that wear soft clothing are in the houses of Kings."

Christ neither exercised temporal and territorial sovereignty over Judæa nor possessed it. Theologians teach that He had neither the use nor the dominion. Bellarmine²⁶ writes: "Christ was in the fullest sense a poor man as regards both use and dominion." Nor is Suarez less emphatic:²⁷ "Christ assumed dominion neither over the whole world nor over any temporal kingdom . . . as His poverty evinces. For perfect evangelical poverty consists in the renunciation of all things temporal, as regards not only use, but also power and dominion over them."

David's temporal throne was, therefore, but a figure of Christ's spiritual throne. It follows, then, that as He had not territorial sovereignty Himself, so neither did He give it to Peter and his successors. For the Pope exercises that same visible office which Christ, as Man, exercised during His temporal life and before His Passion. The prerogatives of the Risen Christ, immortal and glorified, were not transmitted to Peter and the Roman Pontiffs. Peter and the Popes rule the Church as Christ ruled it before His crucifixion.

²² Jo. xviii., 36. ²³ Acts i., 1. ²⁴ Mt. x., 45. ²⁵ Mt. xi., 18. ²⁶ op. cit. v., 4. ²⁷ "De Incar." xviii., 2, 5.

I do not mean, of course, and the distinction is of supreme importance—that to Peter Christ, even as Man, communicated all His power. Theologians distinguish a three-fold dominion and jurisdiction—divine, human, *dei-virile*.²⁸ The first belongs to God as God; it is essentially independent and incommunicable, and Christ, as Man, was subject to it. The second belongs to man, as man; it is mainly founded on human suffrages; its end is to preserve the State in peace and concord. The third belongs to Christ as Man, but as Man substantially united to God; it is a function of the Man-God, and is styled the “dominion of excellence.” It stands midway between the divine and the human. It is inferior to the divine because it is subordinate to God. It is superior to the human, and that in at least three ways: in origin, coming directly from God and not from man; in stability, being eternal; in object, extending to all creation, natural and supernatural, men and angels. Hence every jot and tittle of that temporal sovereignty which Emperors and Kings possess, and incomparably more, Christ the Man-God wielded *eminenter*, not indirectly but directly, for the attainment not merely of spiritual but also of temporal ends. By this “dominion of excellence” Christ, as Man, by His own power and by virtue of His own authority, worked miracles, uttered prophecies, instituted sacraments, forgave sins without a sacrament.

Now of these three, Christ gave to Peter and the Popes neither divine dominion nor the “dominion of excellence,”²⁹ for they were not communicable, nor yet human dominion, for it was not His to give. Nay, even their spiritual jurisdiction He restricted to the faithful: “Feed My sheep, feed My lambs.” Of that jurisdiction which can be conferred on a mere man and which was necessary for the government of Christians unto eternal life, He transferred to them only a part.

Hence St. Thomas writes:³⁰ “Theologians attribute to Christ a certain power possessed neither by Peter nor his successors. They call it the ‘power of excellence.’ Therefore the power of Peter and his successors does not equal Christ’s power. Nay, His power utterly exceeds theirs. For Christ could save without baptism. And consequently Jerome says that Christ cured no man’s body without at the same time curing his soul, and that without baptism. Yet Peter could not do as much, for even after the coming of the Holy Ghost he baptized with water Cornelius the Centurion and all his family. Christ, too, could change both form and matter of the sacraments, which Peter and his successors could not.”

The Popes have no divine right to the Roman States. This propo-

²⁸ Suarez, “De Incar.” xlviii., 2, 4. ²⁹ Suarez, “De Incar.” xlvii., 1, 4. ³⁰ “De Regimine Principum,” iii., 10.

sition I may now be allowed to support by authority. Bellarmine says emphatically: "The Pope has, directly and by divine right, no merely temporal jurisdiction."⁸¹

Nor is Suarez less explicit:⁸² "Christ gave no temporal dominion directly and immediately to the Roman Church; but what she actually possesses comes from the donation of Emperors and Kings." And again:⁸³ "By the title of *donation* only has the Pope direct temporal jurisdiction over the patrimony of St. Peter given by Constantine." And again:⁸⁴ "Christ neither instituted the Pope a sovereign prince nor commanded him to be so instituted."

In the following passage the mind of Suarez is made clear beyond all possibility of mistake:⁸⁵ "Christ did not *forbid* the Pope to be a temporal prince. For no such prohibition can be adduced. Nor is it essentially wrong for one and the same individual to be both Prince and Pastor. On the contrary—although too ample a temporal sway would not be in keeping with spiritual duties—nevertheless a moderately sized temporal principedom is not only permissible, it is even expedient for the maintenance of the Church's authority and splendor, to provide the necessary income, and for other similar purposes. Christ, therefore, did not prohibit a temporal sovereignty, but left it to human arrangement, regulated by right reason, and to the opportunities which time would offer."

The Temporal Power of the Popes over the Roman States is therefore *de jure humano* only.

I have labored rather to prove this conclusion, because it is of great importance, and it has been seriously controverted. At least two modern writers have made earnest, interesting and able attempts to prove a divine right for the Temporal Power. They have striven to adduce Scriptural warrant to show that it is *de jure divino positivo*, and therefore (I presume) that the denial of it would be formally heretical. I refer to the Hon. Colin Lindsay's learned work, "De Ecclesia et Cathedra; or, The Empire-Church of Jesus Christ," and to the Rev. C. F. P. Collingridge's careful thesis on "The Civil Principality of Christ."

Mr. Lindsay⁸⁶ writes: "It is *evident* then that the principle of the Temporal Power, long ago foretold by the prophets, would be continued in the Christian Dispensation, and that the place wherein it would be established was ancient and Imperial Rome, at that time the future metropolis and centre of Christendom."

And again:⁸⁷ "The principle of the Temporal Power is one originally ordained by God. . . . The Temporal Power has been established upon earth as a *divine* principle."

⁸¹ Op. cit. v., 4. ⁸² De Leg. iii., 2, 5. ⁸³ Cont. Sect. Angl. iii., 5, 13. ⁸⁴ Ibid, n. 19. ⁸⁵ Ibid, n. 19. ⁸⁶ P. 902. ⁸⁷ P. 918.

Father Collingridge,³⁸ after implying that the Temporal Power "is an *essential* part of the Divine Plan," writes: "I maintain that the Civil Principality or Temporal Princedom is a gift of Jesus Christ and a divine institution foreshadowed in the Old Testament and vindicated in the New." In other words, it is *de jure divino positivo!*

I am bound, however, to confess that Mr. Lindsay's argumentation seems to me, in large measure, fanciful, and that Father Collingridge deduces from his premises far more than they logically contain. I fail to see that either writer has proved more than the two conclusions which are common-places in theology, viz., that Christ possessed the "dominion of excellence" and that the Roman Pontiff is exempt from secular jurisdiction. Both authors assume that our Lord was, by divine right, a territorial King in Judæa, that He gave that right to Peter and the Popes, and that He transferred the seat of empire from Jerusalem to Rome. Father Collingridge³⁹ writes: "Jesus the Son of David was therefore the last bearer of the sceptre of Juda." It seems to me abundantly plain that He was not. Belarmine⁴⁰ says: "From *this false principle* that Christ, as Man, was a temporal King, two opposing errors have arisen," etc. Before Father Collingridge, Mr. Lindsay had written:⁴¹ "This principle of the Temporal Power was clearly and unequivocally established by God and that principle is indelible." Suarez, however, thought otherwise:⁴² "The Pope's temporal kingdom was founded, not immediately by God, but by the devotion of men, or by some other similar cause."

It might, perhaps, be objected that both Popes and theologians were for centuries mistaken in their contention that the Temporal Power was based, wholly or mainly, on the so-called Donation of Constantine. I think they were mistaken. But how does that vitiate their conclusion? They deny unanimously that the Temporal Power is *de jure divino*, whatever the precise title may be on which it is held; "hominum devotione, vel alio simili humano titulo."⁴³

But may it not be argued that having proved Papal Exemption from secular jurisdiction to be *de jure divino*, it follows that the Popes, not being subjects, must, with equal right, be sovereigns? Is not every non-subject a sovereign? In a prefatory letter to Father Collingridge's booklet, Cardinal Vaughan seems to lend his weighty support to this opinion. His Eminence writes:⁴⁴ "The great theologian, Suarez, who speaks for the whole school, says that Christ declared Peter to be exempt from tribute, just as He Himself was, and that we are to understand that Christ granted this privilege

³⁸ P. 8. ³⁹ P. 27. ⁴⁰ Op. cit. v., 4. ⁴¹ P. 877. ⁴² "Contra Sect. Angl." iv., 4, 1. ⁴³ Suarez, l. c. ⁴⁴ P. 5.

of exemption to Peter because Peter was to be Prince and Head of the Church and the Vicar of Jesus Christ Himself. This privilege was, therefore, not personal to Peter, but real, and attached to the dignity and office which passes on to his successors in virtue of Divine power and of the peculiar institution and will of Christ. If tribute be the sign of temporal dependence and subjection, he who is not really subject to the payment of tribute is not really under temporal subjection."

Thus far His Eminence's argument is uncontrovertible. It is the same argument which has been sketched out in the preceding pages. It is the common opinion of theologians. Moreover, I have shown that Peter's non-subjection is undoubtedly *de jure divino*. But the letter then continues:

"The Pope is independent. If independent, he is sovereign. The principle of the temporal independence of the Pope appears to be contained in the text of the Gospel just referred to."

His Eminence's argument runs thus:

With what right a person is exempt from secular subjection, with that same right he is a secular sovereign.

But with divine positive right the Pope is so exempt.

Therefore with divine positive right the Pope is a secular sovereign.

I may remark that even thus the Cardinal's contention does not by any means reach the level at any rate of Mr. Lindsay's. The former draws the conclusion that the Pope is *de jure divino* a sovereign, but the latter that he is *the* sovereign of Rome.

I should like, if possible, to endorse the Cardinal's argument, but I must confess my inability to follow His Eminence's reasoning. With much mistrust of my own judgment, I venture to express a doubt as to the validity of the above syllogism. The minor is undeniably true; but can the major be proved? Is it evident that every non-subject is of necessity a sovereign? I think not. Not to go beyond the Scripture passage in question,⁴⁵ are not "the children of Kings" exempt from taxation and yet are they sovereign? Our Lord Himself was preëminently exempt, and yet He was not a sovereign. Is it therefore certain that the essentially non-subject Pope is also essentially a sovereign? Suppose the nations of Europe united (as they might) to guarantee the exemption and immunity of the present Prisoner of the Vatican, the Pope would be non-subject, but he would not be a sovereign.

Let us, however, examine the question on a lower ground. The Pope is *de jure divino positivo* non-subject; does it not logically follow that he is at least *de jure divino naturali* sovereign? Is not some

⁴⁵ Matt. xvii., 25.

sovereignty—if not sovereignty over Rome—a logical and necessary *deduction* from the Pope's non-subjection? Again I am constrained to answer in the negative.

But again it may be objected against me that not only is the deduction necessary, but that both the Papacy and the Episcopacy have repeatedly declared it to be necessary. Take two instances. In his Allocution of March 12, 1877, Pius IX. said: "In no way does the Roman Pontiff possess, nor can he ever possess, full liberty, or exercise his full authority, so long as he is subject to others ruling in his city. In Rome he must be either a sovereign or a captive."⁴⁶

And in his Letters of September 20, 1895, Leo XIII. wrote: "Nothing can ever confer true independence on the Papacy so long as it has no temporal jurisdiction."⁴⁷

Both Popes therefore maintain the *necessity* of temporal sovereignty.

I reply that they do not maintain it as a necessary *deduction* from exemption. They never claim that it is *de jure divino*. On the contrary they expressly refrain from that claim. The Temporal Power is, in these days, a *practical* necessity. For with all the facts clearly before them, the authorities have never affirmed more than this, that the Temporal Power came to the Holy See, "not as the effect of chance," but "by a peculiar design of Divine Providence," and "by a special disposition of God"—as Father Collingridge himself bears witness.⁴⁸ With all the data before them on which to base a sound judgment—for the present imbroglio is not new, since Rome has nine times already been captured by enemies—the authorities have ever advocated divine right of any kind for the Temporal Power. Neither in the Collections of the Councils, nor in the Bullarium, nor in the Acta Sanctæ Sedis, nor in the tomes of any father, doctor or theologian—so far as I am aware—is there on the one hand a single passage which maintains the divine right of the Temporal Princedom, while on the other hand there are scores of passages which explicitly affirm that right to be merely human.

However, let us look more closely into this most important question of the *necessity* of the Temporal Power. Is the Civil Princedom of the Popes really *necessary*? I reply that both from extrinsic authority and from intrinsic evidence we know for certain that it is.

Before, however, setting forth the rulings of ecclesiastical authority, I may first point out that this doctrine of *necessity* is not new. It was taught by the Holy See at least as far back as the thirteenth century. On August 4, 1278,⁴⁹ in the Encyclical Letter, *Fundamenta Militantis Ecclesiae*, addressed to the French Bishops, Pope

⁴⁶ "Acta Sanctæ Sedis," 1877, p. 57. ⁴⁷ "Acta S. Sedis," 1895, p. 200. ⁴⁸ P. 5. ⁴⁹ Bullarium Romanum, Mainard, Tom. III., pt. 2, p. 23.

Nicholas III. wrote: "That Holy Mother Church, in her pastoral care of the faithful, should not stand in need of temporal aids; nay, rather, in order that, helped by them, she might ever progress in spiritual growth; *not without a miracle* was the design conceived by Constantine of leaving the City of Rome to Pope Sylvester. . . . For Constantine deemed it unmeet that where the Heavenly King had established the High Priest and Head of the Christian Religion, there an earthly Emperor should hold sway. Nay, rather he held that Peter's See, now established on the throne of Rome, should possess full liberty in its action, nor be subject to any man, seeing that by divine choice (*aere divino*) it is known to have been set over all."

Of all arguments for the Temporal Power, the chief—at least for Catholics—is that from authority. For a Catholic the high road to certain truth in religion is not the beaten path of argument. His Church, with her supreme authority, must be to him the ultimate court of appeal. Such a one will look to the authoritative decisions of Popes or Councils, to the sense of the Church expounded by theologians, to the traditional view prevalent among pastors and people. And on this subject of the Temporal Power all these authorities are at one. Three quotations will set this assertion in a clear light.

Pius IX. in his Encyclical of 18 June, 1859, and addressed to all the Bishops of the Church, said: "We publicly proclaim that a Civil Princedom is necessary to this Holy See, that it may be able to exercise its sacred power without any impediment."

And again in Apostolic Letters of 16 March, 1860: "Since the Catholic Church, founded and instituted by Christ the Lord to procure the eternal salvation of men, has, by virtue of its divine institution, obtained the form of a perfect society, it ought consequently to possess such liberty that in the exercise of its sacred ministry it should be subject to no civil power. And because to act freely, it needed defenses corresponding to the condition and necessity of the times, therefore, by a *decidedly singular counsel* of Divine Providence, it happened that when the Roman Empire fell and was divided into several kingdoms, the Roman Pontiff, whom Christ has constituted the Head and Centre of His whole Church, acquired a Civil Princedom, whereby in truth it was most wisely provided by God Himself that, amidst such a multitude and variety of temporal Princes, the Sovereign Pontiff should enjoy that political liberty which is so *necessary* that he may exercise his spiritual power, authority and jurisdiction throughout the whole world, without any impediment."

Thirdly, the Bishops assembled in Rome in 1862 in an Address dated July 9 repeated this doctrine. That Address may be looked upon as coming from the whole episcopate, seeing that it was signed

by 265 Bishops in Rome, that many at a distance afterwards sent in their adhesion and that the Pope accepted and approved it. The document ran thus :

“We recognize the Civil Princedom of the Holy See as something *necessary* and manifestly instituted by God’s Providence, nor do we hesitate to declare that in the present state of human things this Civil Princedom is altogether *required for the good and free government* of the Church. It was assuredly necessary that the Roman Pontiff should not be the subject, nay, not even the mere guest, of any Prince, but that, residing in a kingdom and dominion of his own, he should be his own master. . . . By all of us, therefore, it is to be held *as most certain* that this temporal rule did not fortuitously accrue to the Holy See, but by *a special disposition of God* was assigned to it, and during a long series of years confirmed and preserved to it, with the unanimous consent of all kingdoms and empires and *almost by a miracle.*”⁵⁰

The summary of the doctrine laid down in these passages is this : First, that the Temporal Power was established and maintained by God through a special Providence ;⁵¹ secondly, that it has been beneficial ; thirdly, that it was, and still is, necessary for the Church ; fourthly, that its beneficial character and necessity continue to the present day ; and fifthly, that all this is most certain.

The Temporal Power, therefore, is undoubtedly, in some sense at least, necessary. But with what degree of necessity ? This necessity is one “corresponding to the condition and necessity of the times”—as Pius IX. expressed it, in the language of the Bishops—“in the present state of human things.” It is a necessity, not absolute but relative, not essential but accidental. It is essential neither to the existence of the Church nor to the indispensable action of the Holy Father. That much seems plain from these two facts alone : First, that the Church existed in the Catacombs without any Temporal Power, either *de jure* or *de facto*, for some three centuries ; secondly, that she exists now without that power *de facto*. Moreover, it is clear that, by a change in His Providence, God could make the Church flourish more without than she ever flourished with her civil sovereignty.

The Temporal Power, therefore, is necessary to the Church ; not to her *esse*, but her *bene esse* ; not to her being, but her well-being.

But to what degree of well-being ? Well-being is an elastic term and admits of a very considerable latitude of interpretation. For example, is a mechanic in a state of well-being with thirty shillings a

⁵⁰ Quoted in extenso by Father Collingridge, p. 70. ⁵¹ By “Providence” is understood that care which God takes of His creatures both in the natural and supernatural orders. It is the natural or supernatural *provision* which He makes for them.

week? Or a County Court Judge with thirty pounds? Or the Archbishop of Canterbury with three hundred pounds? Or a merchant prince with three thousand pounds? If these are all cases of well-being—as they seem to be—they are certainly not the same well-being. Then for what *degree* of well-being is the Temporal Power *necessary* to the Church? I think I am safe in saying that the authorities quoted understand a well-being that is not superlative, not superfluous; not a well-being of extreme prosperity, but a well-being such as is reasonably due to the Church, such as is in keeping with her state, such that without it she would be hampered and embarrassed, such that if it were lost permanently she would be in a state, not indeed of ruin but of want, not of collapse but of distress.

That answer, however, does not quite solve the problem. For what is a due well-being? Protestants think the Church has a due well-being now; Catholics are sure she has not. Who is to define what is fit and becoming as regards her well-being? A somewhat similar difficulty confronted Aristotle in his definition of "Virtue." According to him, virtue stands in the mean.⁵² But what is the mean? Neither excess nor defect. But what is excess and what is defect? If a rich Duke gives a half-penny for the Westminster Cathedral, and the poor widow in the Gospel gives to the Temple two mites, which make a farthing,⁵³ would the Duke be twice as generous as the widow? No, for the mean is not absolute, but relative—relative to the individual. Well, then, what donation would be generous in a Duke? For if the mean is relative, who is to define it? Aristotle replies: "Defined by reason." Yes, but whose reason? The miser's or the spendthrift's, Shylock's or Antonio's? Aristotle again answers and finally: "As the *prudent* man would define it." Who, then, are the "prudent men" fit to define what is necessary to the due well-being of the Church? The Pope and Bishops.

I have said that the Temporal Power is so necessary to the Church that without it she would be straitened, but not starved. It is necessary for the modest competence of the Church. And in thus saying I mean, not the Church of the Catacombs before she reached her adult stature, but as she is now, in her normal condition, widespread, full-grown, mature. Moreover, I mean the Church in her permanent condition and not in a state of passing trials and occasional disturbances.

But another obscurity presents itself. This well-being, defined as necessary by the "prudent," is it that moderate well-being which duly befits the Church, or is a minimum rigidly due to the Church? Is it only that which ought to be there, or is it that which must be

⁵² Ethics, B. 2, c. 6, n. 10. ⁵³ Mk. xii., 42.

there and which God has promised shall be there? Unless He found a substitute for the Temporal Power, God of course could not positively will its final extinction; but could He permit it? Would such permission invalidate His promises? Has God guaranteed that it shall not become finally extinct? If He has, then He will restore it. If He has, then the Papal and episcopal declarations of necessity imply that the final abolition of the Temporal Power is a moral impossibility and that God is bound to and therefore will reestablish it.

I must, however, confess that a degree of necessity so high as that seems to me theologically incapable of demonstration. I hope the Temporal Power will be restored. I hold, personally, arguing from past historical analogies and from present political embarrassments, that it will be restored. But that such restoration is certain, that divine guarantees make it certain, that Pope and Bishops implicitly declare it to be certain—where is the proof? Christ said:⁵⁴ “When the Son of Man cometh, shall He find faith on the earth?” And in like manner we may ask: “Shall He find His Church in possession of her Temporal Power?” Who knows?⁵⁵

Next, if we pass from the declarations of authority to the dictates of reason, it is not hard to assign grounds for the necessity of the Pope’s civil sovereignty. Those grounds I propose to explain at length in another article, but they are summed up in the sentence of Pius IX.: “That the Holy See may be able to exercise its sacred power without any impediment.” In a word, these are the main reasons: To secure freedom from secular dictation; to possess ability to carry on, without let or hindrance, the world-wide government of the Church; to enjoy the possession of competent revenues for that purpose; to wield the power necessary to uphold the dignity and even the splendor of the Pope’s unique position.

Let us next ask what precise obligation lies on Catholics to accept this teaching? How far is a Catholic bound to recognize the necessity of the Temporal Sovereignty? Is that necessity a mere opinion? Is it a dogma of the faith? Or is it a doctrine intermediate between mere opinion and absolute dogma? In view of the loose views prevalent on this subject, this question calls for a clear reply.

Would a denial of the necessity of the Temporal Power be heresy? For those writers who think the Temporal Power to be of positive divine right—“clearly, evidently and unequivocally,” as Mr. Lindsay holds—and writ plain in Scripture, perhaps it would.

⁵⁴ Lk. xviii., 8. ⁵⁵ On this subject there is a curious speculation in Suarez, “*Contra Sect. Angl.*,” v. 7, 9 and 11, that Rome will perhaps some day be destroyed, its buildings uprooted and the whole city burned to the ground and blotted out. Nor does he think that such an event would run counter to the divine promises in behalf of the Church, since Peter’s See shall never fail whether it be set up in this place or that, whether the Church remain visible or be driven by persecution to fly to the mountains or to hide in secret holes. As the Church began in the Catacombs, he thinks it not improbable that she may end in them.

Again, for those who hold it to be a natural divine right, the denial might be heretical.

But, as I have said before, I doubt if there be reasonable grounds—I am sure there is no obligation—to hold either of these superlative opinions. No one is *bound* to believe that the Temporal Power is based on anything higher than human right, though he must hold that a special Providence guided men to confer that right.

This then is the practical question: What is the obligation to submit, founded on the plain, repeated and authoritative teaching of the Papacy and the Episcopacy? That question I shall now strive to answer.

In a letter of His Eminence Cardinal Prosper Caterini, Prefect of the S. Congregation of the Council of Trent, and written by command and under the direction of Pius IX., after granting that “the matter in question does not *directly* concern the faith,” the writer says:⁶⁶ “To assert that the doctrine as to the necessity and fitness of the Civil Princedom of the Holy See is a novelty of but recent introduction is historically false and *doctrinally erroneous*. It is equivalent to attributing error and usurpation to the Popes who have received and maintained their temporal sovereignty over the States of the Church and to gainsaying the two celebrated Councils of Lyons and Constance, which both, by word and deed, have sanctioned this Temporal Princedom. To assert the contrary would be to renew the error of Arnold of Brescia, Calvin and other heretics, who in their hostility to the Church and the See of Rome taught that it was foreign to the spirit of the Gospel to conjoin spiritual jurisdiction with civil power—a proposition deservedly branded as *heretical*.”

According to Caterini, therefore, to call the necessity of the Temporal Power a novelty is doctrinally erroneous and “equivalent” to heresy.

A practical test of the Church’s mind on this subject is supplied by the fact that when in 1877 Father Curci, S. J.—one of the most distinguished men of his order—held and taught the non-necessity of the Temporal Power, he was called upon to recant and, refusing, was expelled from the Society of Jesus, of which for forty years he had been so bright an ornament.

Moreover, the Syllabus of Pius IX. contains two condemned propositions touching the Civil Princedom which throw a very clear light on the obligations of Catholics. One denies the necessity of the Temporal Power; the other affirms its extinction to be beneficial. But before citing them verbatim I may be allowed to preface their quotation with a few words of explanation.

The Syllabus was published as an appendix to the Encyclical

⁶⁶ The letter is printed in the *Month*, February, 1860, p. 195.

"Quanta Cura," of December 8, 1864, and is a catalogue of propositions enunciating the principal errors of the day, all of which had been already condemned before the Syllabus appeared.⁵⁷ The censure under which each proposition is branded is not affixed in the Syllabus, and to discover what the particular note of condemnation is recourse must be had to the original Papal document in which each error was originally stigmatized. It is certain, however, that not all were condemned as heretical. Some of them evidently deserve a minor censure, such as "false" or "erroneous" or "rash" or "impious" or "dangerous" or "scandalous." Again, it is certain that many, at least, of the condemnations are not "doctrinal Pontifical definitions, not ex-cathedral judgments." Fessler⁵⁸ expressly teaches this: "It is certain that several of the documents containing these condemnations and from which the proscribed propositions are drawn, do not contain Papal definitions or ex-cathedral judgments."

There is, however, a further question. When Pius IX., in the Syllabus, renewed the condemnation of these proscribed propositions *in globo*, did he raise the original censures to the dignity of definitions of faith? It cannot be proved that he did. To quote Fessler again:⁵⁹ "Did the Pope, from the fact of his sending the Syllabus to the whole episcopate, mean to raise the censures passed by him to the dignity of definitions of faith, such as, according to the dogmatic decision of the Vatican Council, would constitute a formal judgment *ex-cathedra*? That is a question about which many theologians think it permissible to raise a doubt, until at any rate there comes a new declaration from the Holy See."

The two condemned propositions concerning the Temporal Power are, therefore, not heretical. They are, however, "false and perverse opinions." For in the concluding sentence of the *Quanta Cura*⁶⁰ all the propositions of the Syllabus are collectively proscribed and condemned as, at least, "false and perverse opinions and to be so proscribed and condemned by all true children of the Catholic Church." Moreover, in the Syllabus itself, in a note appended to the two condemned propositions in question, it is laid down that the contradictions of these are to be most firmly held by all Catholics.⁶¹

But, it may be asked, are Catholics bound to accept anything more than the dogmas of the Church? To that question Pius IX. returned an emphatic answer in the Brief *Tuas Libenter*, addressed to the Archbishop of Munich December 21, 1863: "It is not enough to venerate and receive the dogmas of the Church. It is further necessary to submit to the doctrinal decisions of the Pontifical Congrega-

⁵⁷ Cf. Hergenröther, "Church and State," Essay V. ⁵⁸ "True and False Infallibility," French Trans., p. 133. ⁵⁹ P. 134. ⁶⁰ Denzinger, "Enchiridion," n. 1,547. ⁶¹ Denzinger, n. 1,625.

tions, as also to those heads of doctrine which by the common and constant consent of Catholics are held as theological truths and as conclusions so certain that though the opposite opinion cannot be called heretical, nevertheless it deserves some other theological censure."⁶²

But might not an opponent argue that though the two propositions in question have undoubtedly been condemned as false and perverse opinions, and though the Pope has declared that Catholics are bound so to hold them, yet that neither condemnation nor declaration need be taken to bind under a grave obligation? For is it an infallible declaration that these two propositions are false and perverse opinions? If the proscribed propositions themselves are not heretical, but only false, would it be heretical to deny that they are false? Is the Syllabus infallible? I reply that the Syllabus cannot be proved to be infallible, nevertheless that it binds under a grave obligation. Hence Christian Pesch, S. J., writes:⁶³ "Although some have doubted whether the Syllabus be a formal ex-cathedral definition, still the propositions whereof the Syllabus is an authoritative catalogue have been condemned by the Pope in such a way as to show that he intended to bind the Universal Church to reject them. This, too, is proved by the unanimous consent of the Catholic Episcopate, since no Catholic is now allowed to defend these proscribed propositions. But what note must be affixed on individual propositions, and with what degree of assent the opposite doctrines must be held is to be gathered partly from the documents out of which the propositions have been culled, partly from the subject matter."

Therefore the Syllabus, if not formally, is at any rate practically infallible. For it is the common teaching of theologians that the Church is substantially infallible in branding false doctrines, whatever be the note with which she may proscribe them. De Lugo writes:⁶⁴ "Theologians commonly admit that the Church's judgment in affixing these minor censures is certain. To say that the Church can err in this judgment is an error, or is allied to error. To persist in saying it Malder holds to be heretical. To say that the Supreme Pontiff can err in decreeing these censures Turrian stigmatizes as an error, while I think it to be erroneous or proximate to error, since the infallible assistance of the Holy Ghost promised to the Church should not, I think, be limited to dogmas proposed as *de fide*, but it ought to extend to all those subjects which the faithful at the bidding of the Church are bound to believe."

The obligation, then, is grave. But to what sort of an assent is it an obligation—internal or only external? Is it only an obligation to

⁶² Denzinger, n. 1,537. ⁶³ "Institutiones Propaedeuticae," Vol. I., n. 520.
⁶⁴ "De Virtute Fidei Divinae," D. 20, sec. 3, nn. 108,109.

observe a decorous silence? That question hardly merits a reply. However, the Encyclical *Quanta Cura* puts the matter beyond dispute. Pius IX. wrote:⁶⁵ "We cannot pass over in silence the foolhardiness of those who, not enduring sound doctrine, maintain that it is possible, without sin and without any detriment to the Catholic profession, to withhold assent and obedience to those judgments and decrees of the Apostolic See the object of which is declared to refer to the Church's general good, her rights and her discipline. How profoundly opposed this opinion is to the Catholic dogma of the plenitude of power in the Roman Pontiff, divinely conferred on him by Christ Himself, of feeding, ruling and governing the Universal Church, any one in his senses can understand."

The Pope says "assent and obedience." Had he said "obedience" alone a strained construction might have limited it to merely external acts. But he adds also "assent," which can only refer to internal conformity both of intellect and of will. The Holy Father's teaching is then clear that we cannot without sin, and without grave sin—that is, without detriment to our Catholic profession—withhold internal assent to the converse of these condemned propositions.

With that preamble I now proceed to quote the proscribed propositions in question. The former affirms the *necessity* of the Temporal Power to be doubtful: "The children of the Christian and Catholic Church are not at one (*disputant*) as to the compatibility of the Temporal and Spiritual Powers."

The latter goes further and affirms not only that the Temporal Power is not necessary, but that its abolition would be *beneficial*: "The abolition of the Temporal Power, whereof the Apostolic See is possessed, would greatly contribute to the Church's liberty and prosperity."⁶⁶

I quoted above Caterini's judgment, endorsed by Pius IX., that to hold these branded propositions was "doctrinally erroneous and equivalent to heresy." I end by quoting a similar criticism on the same propositions, passed by one whose theological erudition and well-balanced judgment have hardly been surpassed in our generation. I refer to Father Edmund J. O'Reilly, S. J., some time professor of theology, first at Maynooth, then at St. Beuno's, North Wales, and finally in the Catholic University of Ireland. In his book, "The Relations of the Church to Society,"⁶⁷ he writes about these propositions: "The question, therefore, is *not* debated among sound Catholics. Indeed, I look upon the condemnation of the Pope's Temporal Power as *constructive heresy*. For if the Temporal Power is wrong, the Church, too, is wrong in a way in which our faith forbids us to admit she can be wrong." And in a masterly

⁶⁵ Denzinger, n. 1,547. ⁶⁶ Denzinger, nn. 1624, 1625 ⁶⁷ P. 345.

article in the *Month*⁶⁶ the same theologian writes even more sternly: "What is to be thought of those professing Catholics who pretend that the extinction of the Temporal Power would be beneficial to the Church? Taking into account the Papal and Episcopal declarations, and at the same time the action of the Popes, and the sense of the Church manifested in many ways for ages, I cannot bring myself to believe that such a view falls short of *heresy, at least of constructive heresy*. I do not want to imply that it is contradictorily opposed to a dogmatic definition on the utility of the Temporal Power, but that it obviously charges the Church with a very serious error, doctrinal and practical; for if that condemned view be right, the Church is grievously and mischievously mistaken concerning her own condition, and has been so for ages. And such an imputation cannot be cleared of heresy."

Our obligations in regard to the Temporal Power are, therefore, very grave; much graver indeed than many Catholics seem to realize.

CHARLES COUPE, S. J.

Stoneyhurst, Engl. ad.

FROM SILVIO PELLICO TO FRANCESCO CRISPI.

LITERATURE stands at one end of the chain of Italian Revolution, License at the other. Both were well personified, the one in the gentle prisoner of the *piombi*, and the other in the wrecker of the Roman Bank. In the same sense that the poet makes Hamlet bitterly cry, "Frailty, thy name is Woman," it may be truly said of the demagogic ideal, "Liberty, thy name is Avernus." Once embarked on that fatal slope, there is no halting until the depths where ruin lurks are touched. There can hardly be a doubt that the writings of Silvio Pellico were the means which won that intense outside sympathy with Italian conspiracy without which it could hardly have achieved the ambiguous success it did. A very large number of persons, well-meaning and influential, in England as well as on the continent of Europe, and not a few in the United States, were greatly moved at the recital of prison sufferings in Italy. And, while this fact is creditable to the humanity of such sentimentalists, it must not be suffered to obscure the moral of the episode that in the several countries wherein those philanthropists shed the gentle ray of their influence on human progress, there existed, in Silvio

⁶⁶ September, 1871, p. 186.